MAMSI v. Wu

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HEADNOTE Statutory Interpretation, Md. Code (1995, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 19-507 of the Insu rance A rticle The restrictions pertaining to the coordination of insurance policies contained within Md. Code (1995, 2006 R epl. Vol.), § 19-507(b) of the Insurance Article do not prohibit or restrict the ability of health insurers and HMOs to provide in group or individual contracts that health benefits may be secondary to Personal Injury Protection ( PIP ) benefits under an automobile insurance policy. This conclusion is supported by the title, text, and location of § 19-507, as well as the existence o f separate p ortions of th e Maryland Code tha t specifically govern the coordination of benefits by a health insurer or HMO. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. N o. 8 September Term, 2008 MAMSI LIFE & HEALTH INSURANCE COM PAN Y et al. v. KUE I-I WU e t al. Bell, C.J. Harrell Battaglia Greene Murphy Adkins Barbe ra, JJ. Opinio n by Gre ene, J . Bell, C.J., Dissents. Filed: October 20, 2009 We have before us a question of law certified by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Md. Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), §§ 12-601 to 12-613 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and Maryland Rule 8-305. We are asked to decide whether Md. Code (1995, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 19-507 of the Insurance Article restricts the ability of health insurers and HMOs to provide in group or individual contracts that health benefits may be secondary to Personal Injury Protection ( PIP ) benefits under an automobile insurance policy. We shall conclude that it does not. Our interpretation is informed by the legislative subtitle to sections of the Insurance Code governing the requirement of PIP coverage in auto insurance policies, including § 19-507, enacted by the 1972 Comprehensive Act amending the Insurance Code, Chapter 73 of the Acts of 1972. Further, our interpretation of Maryland law rests on the text and location of § 19-507, within the statutory scheme, as well as the existence of separate portions of the Maryland Code that specifically govern non-duplication or coordination of benefits by health insurers and HMOs. I. We adopt the facts as set forth by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The court stated: The instant case arises out of a class action complaint filed by Plaintiff Kuei-I Wu ( Wu ) on September 24, 2004 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County against her healthcare provider, MAMSI Life and Health Insurance Co. ( MLH ), and MLH s parent companies, Mid-Atlantic Medical Services LLC and Mid-Atlantic Medical Services, Inc. ( MAMSI ) for breach of contract (Count I), breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing (Count II), and civil conspiracy (Count III). On September 26, 2001, Wu was involved in an automobile accident while she was a full-time student at the University of Maryland. At the time of the accident, Wu carried at least two insurance policies (1) a health insurance plan issued by MLH; and (2) an automobile policy issued by GEICO. Wu s health insurance plan was not governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ( ERISA ), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. Wu sought treatment with participating healthcare providers under the Preferred Provider Option ( PPO ) plan to which she belonged. In exchange for providing medical care to MAMSI members, participating healthcare providers were paid at a negotiated rate and agreed not to balance, bill, or collect any other amount from members for whom they provided Covered Services. Wu s contract with MAMSI contained a Coordination of Benefits provision that explicitly excluded any no-fault automobile insurance payments, such as PIP, from being considered in the application of the Coordination of Benefits procedures. Wu alleges that, in a separate document known as the Provider Manual for Physicians and Practitioners, MAMSI illegally directs all providers within its healthcare plans that when a patient has been involved in an automobile accident, the providers must collect PIP benefits from the patient s automobile insurer first, before submitting any claims to MAMSI for payment. Thus, according to Wu s Complaint, MAMSI paid the participating healthcare providers for services rendered to Wu only after her PIP benefits were exhausted. This scheme, Wu contends, is in direct violation of section 19-507 of the Insurance Article of the Maryland Code, which provides that PIP benefits shall be payable without regard to . . . any collateral source of medical, hospital, or wage continuation benefits. On April 5, 2007, approximately thirty months after Wu filed her Complaint, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County certified a class consisting of all owners of MAMSI healthcare plans since September 23, 2001 that also have automobile insurance policies, have had an automobile accident, and whose mandatory PIP coverage was partially or entirely exhausted prior to the use of any MAMSI healthcare benefits. The class certification order on April 5, 2007 brought into the case for the first time class members with employee health plans governed by ERISA. On May 3, 2007, Defendants timely filed a Notice of Removal, having done so within thirty days of the introduction of a federal question based on ERISA preemption. After this Court denied the Plaintiff s Motion to Remand by Order dated October 29, 2007, Plaintiffs 2 proceeded with discovery pursuant to this Court s Scheduling Order. After a discovery dispute was brought to this Court s attention during a telephone conference on May 7, 2008, the parties were permitted to brief issues relating to the size of the class. The parties filed cross motions, Defendants Motion for Clarification of Class Membership and Plaintiffs Cross Motion for Clarification of Class Definition, both of which were fully briefed. The motions were framed as requests to modify the size of the class certified by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, but the Defendants also called into question whether section 19-507 of the Insurance Article of the Maryland Code regulated health insurers. Although the class certification order from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County was amended slightly, this Court did not amend the class certification order to exclude ERISA plan members because Defendants argument appear[ed] intertwined with a more fundamental question that reaches the crux of the entire case, and that [r]esolution in favor of Defendants on this issue could prevent any claim by Plaintiffs under 19-507, whether by a member of an ERISA plan or not. The United States District Court concluded that the issue before it presented an issue of first impression in Maryland law and that it was more appropriate for the issue to be resolved by this Court.1 Accordingly, the District Court certified the following question of law to this Court: Does Maryland Code, Insurance Article § 19-507 prohibit or restrict a Maryland health insurer or a Maryland health maintenance organization from 1 Because we conclude that Md. Code (1995, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 19-507 of the Insurance Article does not limit the ability of a health insurer or HMO to provide in its group or individual contracts that its health benefits may be secondary to personal injury protection ( PIP ) benefits under an automobile policy, it is unnecessary for us to engage in any analysis pertaining to whether § 19-507 of the Insurance Article is preempted by the Employment Retirement Insurance Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 3 providing in its group or individual contracts of insurance or membership contracts that its contractual health benefits may be secondary to Personal Injury Protection ( PIP ) benefits under an automobile liability insurance policy where the automobile liability insurer is legally obligated to provide benefits for healthcare expenses?[2] II. Section 19-507 of the Insurance Article 3 provides: Same When benefits payable; coordination of policies; surcharge; subrogation. (a) When benefits payable. The benefits described in § 19-505 of this subtitle shall be payable without regard to: (1) the fault or nonfault of the named insured or the recipient of benefits in causing or contributing to the motor vehicle accident; and (2) any collateral source of medical, hospital, or wage continuation benefits. (b) Coordination of policies. (1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, if the insured has both coverage for the benefits described in § 19505 of this subtitle and a collateral source of medical, hospital, or wage continuation benefits, the insurer or insurers may coordinate the policies to provide for nonduplication of benefits, subject to appropriate reductions in premiums for one or both of the policies approved by the Commissioner. (2) The named insured may: (i) elect to coordinate the policies by indicating in writing which policy 2 The question of whether MAMSI Life and Health Insurance Co. ( MAMSI ) breached its insurance contract with Wu is not before this Court. The United States District Court may or may not determine that Wu s insurance policy with MAMSI obligated MAMSI to pay the participating healthcare providers, regardless of whether the Personal Injury Protection ( PIP ) coverage also obligated the automobile insurance carrier. Nonetheless, we conclude that such an obligation does not arise out of the statute at issue here. 3 Section 19-507 of the Insurance Article must be read in conjunction with Md. Code (1995, 2006 Repl. Vol.), §§ 19-505 and 19-506 of the Insurance Article. Section 19-505 of the Insurance Article is entitled Personal injury protection coverage In general. This section provides that every automobile insurance policy issued in Maryland must contain Personal Injury Protection ( PIP ) coverage, unless the coverage is waived in accordance with the provisions of § 19-506, which is entitled Same Waivers. 4 is to be the primary policy; or (ii) reject the coordination of policies and nonduplication of benefits. (c) Surcharge prohibited. An insurer that issues a policy that contains the coverage described in § 19-505 of this subtitle may not impose a surcharge for a claim or payment made under that coverage and, at the time the policy is issued, shall notify the policyholder in writing that a surcharge may not be imposed for a claim or payment made under that coverage. (d) Subrogation. An insurer that provides the benefits described in § 19505 of this subtitle does not have a right of subrogation and does not have a claim against any other person or insurer to recover any benefits paid because of the alleged fault of the other person in causing or contributing to a motor vehicle accident. Id. MAMSI argues that § 19-507 of the Insurance Article applies only to automobile insurers4 and thus, does not prohibit benefits coordination by health insurers and HMOs. MAMSI contends that its position is supported by: (1) the location, title, and language of § 19-507, (2) the existence of distinct sections of the Health Insurance Title of the Insurance Article and the Maryland HMO Act that specifically govern non-duplication or coordination of benefits by health insurers and HMOs, and (3) an understanding of the basic characteristics of health insurance, particularly group health insurance. In relation to the latter contention, MAMSI asserts that health insurance and automobile insurance are fundamentally different and that these differences provide evidence that § 19-507(b) applies only to automobile insurance. The gist of MAMSI s assertions are that subsection (b) of § 19-507 only prescribes the limited terms on which an automobile insurer can make PIP 4 The terms automobile insurer and motor vehicle insurer are used interchangeably within this Opinion. 5 benefits secondary and does not impose the same restrictions on approved contracts making health insurance or HMO benefits secondary. Wu asserts that the legislative design and purpose of § 19-507, as well as this Court s interpretation of the statute in Dutta v. State Farm, 363 Md. 540, 769 A.2d 948 (2001), support the opposite conclusion. Wu posits that these authorities clearly establish that PIP benefits cannot be coordinated by an auto insurer or health insurer unless the insured has given clear and unequivocal permission to do so in accordance with the provisions of § 19507. Furthermore, Wu asserts that the failure to apply § 19-507 to health insurers would render segments of that statute meaningless and lead to illogical and unreasonable results. Specifically, Wu asserts: [MAMSI S] contention that § 19-507 only governs motor vehicle insurance . . . would make entirely superfluous those provisions of § 19-507 that PIP benefits shall be payable without regard to any collateral source of medical, hospital, or wage continuation benefits. Similarly, such an interpretation would make entirely irrelevant those provisions in subsection (b)(1) and (b)(2) of § 19-507 that expressly set forth the manner in which a health care provider and PIP insurer may legally coordinate their respective policies to provide for the non-duplication of benefits. Since a reduction in premiums can only be implemented upon the insured s coordination of her respective policies, where an auto insurance policy exists, the other policy must be the healthcare insurance policy. There simply cannot be two auto insurance policies that would require coordination by the insured. Wu directs the Court s attention to the administrative decision, Maryland Ins. Admin. ex rel. G.P., Jr. v. MD-Individual Practice Ass n, OAH No. MIA-INS-34-200100024 (May 29, 2003), which she contends provides guidance as to how this Court should apply § 19-507 6 of the Insurance Article to health insurers.5 III. Subtitle 5 of the Insurance Article sets forth the kinds of primary coverages that motor vehicle insurers are required to offer in Maryland policies. MAIF v. Perry, 356 Md. 668, 671, 741 A.2d 1114, 1115 (1999). One of the primary coverages is PIP benefits, as provided for in Md. Code (1995, 2006 Repl. Vol.), §§ 19-505 to 19-508 of the Insurance Article. Id. The purpose of PIP benefits is described by Andrew Janquitto, in his treatise, ANDREW JANQUITTO, MARYLAND MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE 478-79 (2d ed. 1999). Mr. Janquitto writes: Nowhere does the State s paramount concern with providing compensation to victims of motor vehicle accidents manifest itself more clearly and unmistakably than in Subtitle 5 of Title 19 of the Insurance Article. That subtitle, among other things, requires that every policy of motor vehicle insurance issued, sold, or delivered in Maryland contain personal injury protection, known sometimes as economic loss coverage and more commonly as PIP. A first-party coverage, PIP plays a central role in Maryland s comprehensive insurance scheme by providing medical, hospital, and disability benefits without regard to fault. JANQUITTO, supra, at 478. Indeed, this Court has declared on numerous occasions that it is clear that PIP legislation was enacted in Maryland in order to assure financial 5 This administrative decision addressed, only in dictum, the certified question. There, the administrative law judge suggested that under this Court s holding in Dutta v. State Farm, 363 Md. 540, 769 A.2d 948 (2001), HMOs are considered a collateral source of medical benefits. The administrative judge did not address, however, whether the restrictions applicable to automobile insurers under § 19-507 of the Insurance Article are also applicable to health insurers and HMOs. Maryland Ins. Admin. ex rel. G.P., Jr. v. MDIndividual Practice Ass n, OAH No. MIA-INS-34-200100024 (May 29, 2003). 7 compensation to victims of motor vehicle accidents without regard to the fault of a named insured or other persons entitled to PIP benefits. Clay v. GEICO, 356 Md. 257, 265-66, 739 A.2d 5, 10 (1999) (quoting Pennsylvania Nat l Mut. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 154, 416 A.2d 734, 736 (1980)); see also Dutta, 363 Md. at 547-48, 769 A.2d at 952 (explaining that the purpose behind the passage of PIP legislation in Maryland is to provide prompt financial compensation to victims of motor vehicle accidents without regard to the fault of the named insured or other persons entitled to PIP benefits ). In Dutta, this Court examined § 19-507 of the Insurance Article, focusing primarily on subsection (a) of the statute. In that case, the petitioner, Dutta, filed a PIP claim for reimbursement of medical expenses that stemmed from injuries he incurred in an automobile accident. Dutta, 363 Md. at 544, 769 A.2d at 950-51. Dutta s PIP insurance carrier refused to pay the reimbursement on the grounds that the bill was previously paid by the petitioner s HMO. Dutta, 363 Md. at 545, 769 A.2d at 951. Legal action ensued. Id. When this Court considered the matter, we held that the PIP insurer was statutorily mandated by section 19-507 to provide PIP benefits to petitioner regardless of the fact that [the petitioner had] also received health insurance benefits from his HMO . . . . Dutta, 363 Md. at 554, 769 A.2d at 956. The Dutta Court stated: The Legislature could not have expressed its intent any clearer an insurer must pay PIP benefits regardless of any collateral source of benefits i.e., regardless of whether a health insurance provider, HMO, or other collateral source provides benefits. . . . If the Legislature had meant to exclude 8 members of HMOs that provide collateral benefits from PIP coverage, language to that effect would have been included in either section 19-505, section 19-507, or section 19-513. *** [The PIP Insurer s] argument that [Dutta] cannot recover both PIP benefits and collateral medical and hospital benefits demonstrates complete disregard for the plain language of section 19-507. *** [A]utomobile insurers who provide services in Maryland are mandated to provide coverage for the medical, hospital, and disability benefits for individuals identified as first named insureds on their policies except if waived by the insured. The Legislature included mandatory language to require insurers to at least offer PIP coverage to potential insureds. The intent of the Legislature is clear that unless waived by the insured, PIP benefits are to be provided to cover appropriate expenses arising out of a motor vehicle accident, which are incurred within a certain time period. Dutta, 363 Md. at 551, 555, 768 A.2d at 954, 956-57. The holding in Dutta makes clear that § 19-507 governs automobile insurers and that PIP benefits must be paid when incurred, regardless of whether an insured has a collateral source of benefits. Id. This Court s opinion in Dutta, however, concerned only what § 19-507(a) requires of automobile insurers providing PIP coverage. See Dutta, 363 Md. at 549-51, 768 A.2d at 953-56. This Court in Dutta, did not address, and has not yet addressed, whether § 19-507(b) restricts or prohibits a health insurer or HMO from providing by contract that its health benefits are secondary to PIP benefits. Because the answer to the question before us is not provided by precedent, the issue before this Court is an issue of first impression that requires us to construe § 19-507(b); hence, we are guided by the rules of statutory construction, which are well settled in 9 Maryland. Carroll v. Konits, 400 Md. 167, 191, 929 A.2d 19, 34 (2007). We enumerated the rules in Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 571-73, 911 A.2d 427, 431-32 (2006), where we stated: The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. As the Court has explained, to determine that purpose or policy, we look first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning. We do so on the tacit theory that the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant. When the statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language to determine the Legislature s intent. ... If the language of the statute is ambiguous, however, then courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment under consideration. We have said that there is an ambiguity within a statute when there exist two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute. When a statute can be interpreted in more than one way, the job of this Court is to resolve that ambiguity in light of the legislative intent, using all the resources and tools of statutory construction at our disposal. If the true legislative intent cannot readily be determined from the statutory language alone, however, we may, and often must, resort to other recognized indicia among other things, the structure of the statute, including its title; how the statute relates to other laws; the legislative history, including the derivation of the statute, comments and explanations regarding it by authoritative sources during the legislative process, and amendments proposed or added to it; the general purpose behind the statute; and the relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions. Id. (citations omitted). Applying the rules of statutory construction to this case, we hold that § 19-507 of the Insurance Article does not prohibit a health insurer or HMO from providing in its group or individual contracts of insurance or membership contracts that its contractual health benefits may be secondary to PIP benefits under an automobile insurance policy. We begin 10 our analysis by looking, first, at the plain language of § 19-507 of the Insurance Article. Section 19-507(a) clearly provides when an auto insurer must pay the PIP benefits enumerated in § 19-505 of the Insurance Article. Section 19-507(b)(1) provides for the coordination of the required PIP benefits and collateral sources of benefits among the insured, insurers, and policies to provide for nonduplication of benefits. Section 19507 does not define the terms insured, insurers, or policies, nor does Md. Code (1995, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 19-501 of the Insurance Article, which provides definitions for the relevant subtitle. Section 19-507(b) enumerates the right of the named insured to reject coordination of policies and nonduplication of benefits. Section 19-501(d) of the Insurance Article defines named insured as the person denominated in the declarations in a motor vehicle liability insurance policy. (Emphasis added.) The Legislature s use of the term insured, unmodified, along with the plural terms insurers and policies in § 19-507(b)(1) and use of the defined term named insured in § 19-507(b)(2), invites the question of whether the statute restricts only automobile insurers or restricts collateral insurers also, such as health insurers and HMOs.6 Because 6 The dissent points out that [s]ubsection (b)(1), is, by its terms, [s]ubject to Paragraph (2), and then relies on the Legislature s use of the plural terms insurers and policies in subsection (b)(1) when applying the restrictions set forth in subsection (b)(2), concluding that the restrictions of § 19-507(b)(2) apply to all carriers involved in a coordination of benefits. ___ Md. __, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (2009) (dissenting opinion) [slip op. at 20-21]. This conclusion, however, does not account for the fact that the Legislature switched from using the general term, insured, when permitting coordination in subsection (b)(1), to a defined term, named insured, when discussing the restrictions (continued...) 11 we conclude that this aspect of § 19-507 is ambiguous, we seek to ascertain what the Legislature intended when enacting the statute. See Stachowaski v. Sysco, 402 Md. 506, 517, 937 A.2d 195, 201 (2007) ( A statute is ambiguous where two or more reasonable interpretations exist. ). Chapter 73 of the Acts of 1972, which contained the section that was subsequently recodified as § 19-507 of the Insurance Article, enacted comprehensive amendments to the Insurance Code. The amendments included the addition of §§ 538 to 546, requiring mandatory PIP coverage for automobile insurance policies, in this State, under the subtitle Motor Vehicle Casualty Insurance Required Primary Coverage. Chapter 73 of the Acts of 1972 ( . . . to add new Sections 538 to 546 inclusive to said article and title under the new subtitle 35. Motor Vehicle Casualty Insurance Required Primary Coverage . . .). The subtitle provides evidence that the Legislature, when enacting the new sections, intended to create obligations and restrictions on motor vehicle insurance carriers when providing casualty insurance, specifically the required primary coverages, one of which is PIP. See Moore v. State, 388 Md. 623, 635, 882 A.2d 256, 263 (2005) ( [T]he title of an 6 (...continued) on coordination set forth in subsection (b)(2). In our view, the use of a more limited term, named insured, which applies only to motor vehicle insurance policies, demonstrates the Legislature s intent that the restrictions on coordination apply only to motor vehicle insurance carriers who seek to coordinate PIP benefits with collateral sources of benefits. Had the Legislature intended to apply the restrictions set forth in § 19-507(b)(2) to insurers other than motor vehicle insurers, the Legislature would have used the more general term insured, which the drafters used in § 19-507(b)(1). Thus, to resolve this ambiguity, we look to the legislative history and statutory scheme. 12 enactment is an important indication of the General Assembly s intent. ); Kushell v. DNR, 385 Md. 563, 577, 870 A.2d 186, 193 (2005) (explaining that when determining legislative intent, we analyze [a] statutory scheme as a whole and attempt to harmonize provisions dealing with the same subject so that each may be given effect ). Chapter 73 of the Acts of 1972, § 540 was originally codified at Md. Code (1957, 1979 Repl. Vol.), Article 48A, § 540, and subsequently recodified without substantive change at § 19-507 of the Insurance Article by Chapter 11 of the Acts of 1996. Subtitle 5 of Title 19, in which § 19-507 is contained, was [written as part of] a comprehensive [1972] law that, among other things, . . . required [motor vehicle insurance] policies to contain . . . PIP coverage. Perry, 356 Md. at 674-75, 741 A.2d at 1117-18 (noting that [t]he thrust of the 1972 law was to extend . . . insurance protection, especially a limited amount of primary, no-fault benefits for wage loss and basic medical expenses. ). In addition, the first section of Subtitle 5, § 19-501, provides definitions for the subtitle and defines the named insured referenced in §§ 19-505 and 19-507 as the person denominated in the declarations in a motor vehicle liability insurance policy. § 19-501(d) of the Insurance Article (emphasis added). The text of § 19-507 of the Insurance Article references § 19-505, which provides in pertinent part: Personal injury protection coverage In general. (a) Coverage required. Unless waived in accordance with § 19-506 of this subtitle, each insurer that issues, sells, or delivers a motor vehicle liability insurance policy in the State shall provide coverage for the medical, hospital and disability benefits described in this section for each of the 13 following individuals: (1) except for individuals specifically excluded under § 27-606 of this article: (i) the first named insured, and any family member of the first named insured who resides in the first named insured s household, who is injured in any motor vehicle accident, including an accident that involves an uninsured motor vehicle or a motor vehicle the identify of which cannot be ascertained; and (ii) any other individual who is injured in a motor vehicle accident while using the insured motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of the named insured. § 19-505(a)(1) of the Insurance Article (emphasis added). While motor vehicle insurance is mentioned throughout §§ 19-505 and 19-507, neither section mentions health insurers nor HMOs. Accordingly, we discern that the title of the overall comprehensive Enactment and text of § 19-507, specifically its repeated cross-references to § 19-505, its use of the defined term named insured when enumerating the restrictions on coordination of benefits in § 19-507(b)(2), as well as its location within the Insurance Article, demonstrates that the Legislature intended the restrictions contained within subsection (b) of the statute to apply only to motor vehicle insurers, the named insured, and persons entitled to PIP benefits. In our view, the statute mandates that a motor vehicle insurance policy containing PIP benefits is the primary source of coverage for a person injured in an automobile accident. If, however, the insured agrees in writing to permit the motor vehicle insurer to coordinate with the insured s collateral insurers, the insurers may arrange for the motor vehicle policy to serve as a secondary source of coverage. See § 19-507(b)(i) of the 14 Insurance Article.7 Furthermore, other aspects of the legislative history of § 19-507(b) of the Insurance Article support our interpretation that the Legislature intended to establish a mechanism to allow insureds to make PIP benefits secondary to a collateral insurer. See Walzer, 395 Md. at 573, 911 A.2d at 432 (identifying legislative history as one of the resources and tools of statutory construction ). Chapter 73 of the Acts of 1972 enacted the statutory framework for PIP coverage. Section 540 of Chapter 73 provided that PIP coverage is payable regardless of fault or of any collateral sources of medical, hospital, or wage continuation benefits. Thus, the Legislature established that PIP is the primary source of recovery where an expense is incurred, regardless of fault, arising out of a motor vehicle accident. Chapter 771 of the Acts of 1973 amended § 540, adding the coordination of benefits language.8 7 In Appleman on Insurance Law, Eileen Swarbrick provides an example of coordination of benefits in the context of automobile insurance policies. Swarbrick states: For example, a party injured in an automobile accident may have both no-fault and health care policies, both of which provide the same types of benefits for medical services. The primary coverage pays for all of the losses up to the applicable policy limits. The second policy comes into play only when these limits are exhausted or inadequate. Eileen Swarbrick, Automobile Insurance, in APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 158.1 (2d ed. 2004). Section 19-507(b) of the Insurance Article governs only when an automobile insurance policy providing PIP coverage may coordinate to make its coverage secondary to a primary carrier. 8 The Legislature subsequently amended § 540, in Chapter 161 of the Acts of 1974, (continued...) 15 Where the insured has coverage for both the benefits required under Section 539 and the collateral benefits, the insurer or insurers may coordinate the policies to provide for non-duplication of such benefits; subject, however, to appropriate reductions in premiums for one or both of said coverages approved by the Insurance Commissioner, and the named insured shall have the right to elect or reject the coordination of policies and non-duplication of benefits. If the insured elects to coordinate, he shall indicate in writing which policy is to become primary. Id. This language addresses the fact that some insureds have alternative medical, wage replacement, and hospital benefits available and thus do not require the mandatory PIP benefits. The coordination of benefits language allows the PIP carrier to pay its benefits secondary to another line of insurance if the insured so desires, thus potentially availing the insured a discount on one or both lines of insurance. In the absence of such an agreement between the named insured of an automobile policy and the PIP carrier to make another insurance primary, the PIP coverage remains primary to the collateral insurance as required by the language of § 19-507(a). Section 19-507(b) s language requiring the insured s consent to the coordination of policies and the non-duplication of benefits applies only when the insured seeks to make a collateral benefit primary to PIP coverage. As we explain here and have explained previously, § 19 of the Insurance Article focuses on automobile insurance carriers and their insureds, not HMOs or other insurance carriers. See Perry, 356 Md. at 674-75, 741 A.2d 8 (...continued) and Chapter 11 of the Acts of 1996. The Legislature specifically noted that the changes were grammatical and for the purpose of an overall revision of the Code, respectively, and were not intended to be substantive. 16 at 1117-19. Section 19-507(b)(2) established conditions that an automobile insurer must meet before the insurer can agree to make its statutory obligation to pay PIP benefits secondary to benefits provided by a collateral source. The PIP carrier s obligation under § 19-507(a), as the primary payor of benefits, prevents the carrier from unilaterally refusing to pay benefits unless the named insured consents under § 19-507(b)(2). See Dutta, 363 Md. at 549-551, 554, 768 A.2d at 954-55. Section 19-507(b) does not, however, restrict the efforts of health insurers or HMOs to coordinate benefits or otherwise avoid duplicate payments. The existence and location of separate portions of the Maryland Code that specifically regulate health insurers and HMOs provide additional support for the holding that § 19-507(b) of the Insurance Article does not restrict health insurers or HMOs. See Insurance Co. of N. Amer. v. Aufenkamp, 291 Md. 495, 506, 435 A.2d 774, 780 (1981) (noting that while there is some overlap that inherently exists between the coverage provided by various types of insurance, [t]he very structure of the insurance code leads [to the conclusion] that the various types of insurance defined there . . . constitute various categories of insurance which for the most part are mutually exclusive ). Maryland HMOs are regulated by the Maryland Health Maintenance Organization Act, codified with amendments at Md. Code (1982, 2005 Repl. Vol.), §§ 19-701 to 19-735 of the HealthGeneral Article ( HMO Act ). Section 19-706(c) of the Health-General Article states that [e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subtitle, a health maintenance organization is not 17 subject to the insurance laws of this State. Section 19-706 then enumerates all the specific subsections and subtitles of the Insurance Article that apply to Maryland HMOs. Notably, § 19-507 of the Insurance Article is not listed. The HMO Act also contains its own authorization for coordination provisions in HMO contracts. Section 19-713.1(a) of the Health-General Article provides: Nonduplication or coordination of coverage provisions In general. A group contract between a health maintenance organization and its subscribers or a group of subscribers may contain nonduplication provisions or provisions to coordinate the coverage with subscriber contracts of other health maintenance organizations, health insurance policies, including those of nonprofit health service plans, and other established programs under which the subscriber or member may make a claim. Id. Sections 19-713.1(d) and (e) of the Health-General Article prohibit an HMO from subrogating PIP benefits. These subsections provide: (d) Subrogation provisions Authorized. Notwithstanding § 19701(g)(3) of this subtitle, a contract between a health maintenance organization and its subscribers or a group of subscribers may contain a provision allowing the health maintenance organization to be subrogated to a cause of action that a subscriber has against another person . . . . (e) Same Recovery under personal injury protection policy. Subsection (d) of this section does not allow a contract between a health maintenance organization and its subscribers or a group of subscribers to contain a provision allowing the health maintenance organization to recover any payments made to a subscriber under a personal injury protection policy. § 19-713.1 of the Health-General Article. This prohibition appears only in the HealthGeneral Article applicable to HMOs. It is logical to conclude that had the General Assembly intended to place additional restrictions on HMO contracts, it would have done so within Title 19 of the Health-General Article, which specifically governs HMOs. 18 Because the General Assembly chose not to do so, it is reasonable to conclude that no additional restrictions exist with respect to HMOs and coordination provisions in those policies. See Comptroller v. Science Applications, 405 Md. 185, 198, 950 A.2d 766,773 (2008) ( [T]he Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant. ) (quoting Tribbitt v. State, 403 Md. 638, 646, 943 A.2d 1260, 1264 (2008)). The Health Insurance Article included within the Maryland Insurance Article also contains a specific provision relating to non-duplication and coordination provisions in health insurance policies. Md. Code (1995, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 15-104(b) of the Insurance Article provides: Authorized. In accordance with regulations that the Commissioner adopts, the Commissioner shall allow health insurance policies and policies of nonprofit health service plans to contain nonduplication provisions or provisions to coordinate health benefits with: (1) other health insurance policies, including commercial individual, group, and blanket policies and policies of nonprofit health service plans (2) subscriber contacts that are issued by health maintenance organizations; and (3) other established programs under which the insured may make a claim. Id. Because the Legislature provided in this section, located in the Health Insurance subtitle of the Insurance Article, that a health insurance policy may contain nonduplication provisions and coordination provisions, it would be illogical for this Court to conclude that the Legislature intended for § 19-507(b) of the Motor Vehicle subtitle of the Insurance Article to restrict or prevent the exclusions of such provisions within health insurance policies. See Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 231, 935 A.2d 731, 743 (2007) ( In the case 19 where two statutes apply to the same situation, we first attempt to reconcile them, and then, if the statutes remain contradictory, the more specific statute controls. ); see also A.S. Abell Pub. Co. v. Mezzanote, 297 Md. 26, 40, 464 A.2d 1068, 1075 (1983) ( Ordinarily, a specific enactment prevails over an incompatible general enactment in the same or another statute. ). Contrary to the arguments advanced by Wu, our decision that § 19-507 of the Insurance Article does not restrict or prohibit HMOs or health insurers from providing by contract that their health benefits are secondary to PIP benefits does not render superfluous those provisions of § 19-507(b) that permit an insured to elect to coordinate policies or reject the coordination of policies. For example, an individual may be covered by two or more motor vehicle policies that provide PIP coverage. See Bishop v. State Farm, 360 Md. 225, 236, 757 A.2d 783, 789 (2000) ( A person injured in an automobile accident could be eligible for PIP benefits from two or more sources . . . . ) (quoting Perry, 356 Md. at 676, 741 A.2d at 1118); see also JANQUITTO, supra, at 556 ( A person may be insured by two or more motor vehicle policies . . . . ). In addition, § 19-507(b) sets forth the terms in which motor vehicle insurers may coordinate their policies with one another or with other insurance policies and provides the insured the right to agree to such coordination in writing or to reject such coordination. What § 19-507(b) does not do is restrict when a health insurer or HMO may attempt to coordinate its policy. Cf. Smith v. Physicians Health Plan, 514 N.W.2d 150, 155 (Mich. 1994) (concluding that under a similar no-fault 20 automobile insurance act, that [although] the consumer has the choice whether to coordinate coverage on the no-fault side of his [or her] insurance . . . [t]here is not a corresponding guarantee that the selection of an uncoordinated no-fault insurance policy will dictate the terms of whatever other insurance one might have ). CERTIFIED QUESTION OF LAW ANSWERED AS SET FORTH ABOVE COSTS TO BE EQUALLY DIVIDED BY THE PARTIES. 21 | IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. N o. 8 September Term, 2008 MAMSI LIFE & HEALTH INSURANCE COM PAN Y, et al. v. KUE I-I WU , et al. Bell, C.J. Harrell Battaglia Greene Murphy Barbera Adkins, JJ. Dissenting Opinion by Bell, C.J. Filed: October 20, 2009 I. The majority holds that Maryland Code (1995, 2006 Repl. Vol.) § 19-507 1 of the 1 Maryland C ode (199 5, 2006 R epl. Vol.) § 1 9-507 of the Insuran ce Law Article provides: Personal injury protection coverage. When benefits payable; coordination of policies; surcharge; subrogation. (a) When b enefits payab le. The be nefits describ ed in § 19- 505 of th is subtitle shall be payable without regard to: (1) the fault or nonfault of the named insured or the recipient of benefits in causing or contributing to the motor vehicle accident; and (2) any collateral source of medical, hospital, or wage continu ation be nefits. (b) Coordination of policies. (1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, if the insured has both coverage for the benefits described in § 19-505 of this subtitle and a collateral source of medical, hospital, or wage continuation benefits, the insurer or insurers may coordinate the policies to provide for nonduplication of benefits, subject to appropriate reductions in premiums for one or b oth of th e policie s appro ved by th e Com mission er. (2) The nam ed in sure d ma y: (i) elect to coordinate the policies by indicating in writing which po licy is to be the primary policy; or (ii) reject the coordination of policies and nonduplication of benefits. (c) Surcharge prohibited. An insurer that issues a policy that contains the coverage described in § 19-505 of this subtitle may not impose a surcharge for a claim or payment made under that coverage and, at the time the policy is issued, shall notify the policyholder in writing that a surcharge may not be imposed for a claim or payment made under that coverage. (d) Subrogation. An insurer that provides the benefits described in § 19505 of this subtitle does not have a right of subrogation and does not have a claim again st any other pers on or insure r to recover a ny benefits pa id because o f the alleged fault of the o ther person in causing o r contributing to (continued...) Insurance Law A rticle does not prohibit a health insurer or HMO from providing, and thus requiring, in its group or in dividual co ntracts of ins urance or m embersh ip contracts th at its contractual health benefits are seconda ry to PIP bene fits under an automob ile liability insurance policy. __ Md. __, __, __ A.2d __, __(2009) [slip. op. at 10]. In concluding that when the General Assembly enacted § 19-507 , it was only con cerned w ith automo bile insurance policies and not c ollat eral i nsur ance policies, the m ajority was persuaded by the facts that the G eneral As sembly separately considered and codified legislation that governs automob ile insurance policies and that governs healthcare providers and health maintenance organizations. That § 19-507 is located in Title 19, Motor Vehicle Casualty Insurance Required Primar y Cover age, Subtitle 5, Motor Vehicle Insurance - Primary Co verage, he alth insurance regulation in this state is pursuant to provisions found in Title 15, Health Insuran ce, of the Insurance Article, and Maryland health maintenance organizations are regulated by the Marylan d Health Mainten ance Org anization A ct, which is located in Title 19, Subtitle 7 of the Health-General Article, it says, id. at. __, __, ___ A.2d at __, ___ [slip. op. at 12-13, 17-19], dem onstrate that the Legislature intended the obligations and restrictions 1 (...continued) a moto r vehicle accide nt. By Chapter 378 of the Acts of 2009, effective January 1, 2010, subsection (c) was amended to prohibit, in addition to surcharging, the retiering of the policy, by adding "or retier the polic y" and "a nd the p olicy may n ot be reti ered." 2 it contains to apply only to automobile insurers and to the persons entitled to benefits as a result of having an insuran ce polic y with tho se insur ers. Id. at ___, __ A .2d at ____ [slip op. at 12]. In that regard, as to the former, the majority points out, § 19-501, the definitions section for the Su btitle, defines named insured, referenced in §§ 19-5052 and 19-507, as 2 The relevant parts of § 19-505 provide: Personal injury protection coverage. In general. (a) Coverage required. Unless waived in accordance with § 19-506 of this subtitle, each insurer that issu es, sells, or delive rs a motor v ehicle liability insurance p olicy in the State sh all provide c overage f or the med ical, hospita l, and dis ability ben efits de scribed in this se ction... *** (b) Minimum benefits required. (2) The m inimum m edical, hosp ital, and disability ben efits provided by an insurer u nder this sec tion shall inclu de up to $2,500 for: (i) payment of all reasonable an d necessary expense s that arise from a motor ve hicle accident and that are incurred within 3 years after the acc ident for ne cessary prosthe tic devices an d ambula nce, dental, f uneral, hospital, me dical, profes sional nursin g, surgical, and x-ray services; (ii) payment of benefits for 85% of income lost: 1. within 3 years after, and resulting fro m, a moto r vehicle accident; and 2. by an injured individual who was earning or producing income when the accident occurred; and (iii) payments made in reimbursement of reasonable and necessary expenses incurred (continued...) 3 the person denominated in the declarations in a motor vehicle liability insurance policy. Id. at ___, __ A.2d at ____ [s lip op. at 13]. It fin ds particularly sign ificant, more over, that § 19507 (b) uses that term,3 that o nly motor vehicle insurance is mentioned in §§ 19-505 and 19- 2 (...continued) within 3 years after a motor vehicle accident for essential services ordinarily performed for the care and m aintenance of the fam ily or family househo ld by an individ ual who was injure d in the accident and not earning or producing income when the accident occurred. 3 The use in § 19-507 (b) of the term , named insured, is p articularly importa nt to the majority s an alysis because o f the Leg islature s subs titution of it for th e more ge neral, insurer. It reasons: [T]he use of a more limited term, named insured, which applies only to motor vehicle insurance policies, demonstrates the Legislature s intent that the restrictions on coordination apply only to motor vehicle insurance carriers who seek to coordinate PIP benefits with collateral sources of benefits. Had the Legislature intended to apply the restrictions set forth in § 19-507(b)(2) to insurers other than motor vehicle liability insurers, the Legislature would have used the more general term insured, which the drafters used in § 19-507(b)(1). Thus, to resolve this ambiguity, we look to the legislative history and statutory scheme. ___ Md. at___, ___ A. 2d at ___ (slip op. at 11 note 6). It faults my analysis for disregarding the substitution and, in any event, not appreciating or giving effect to its significance. The majority misses the point of § 19-507 (b) (2). Whichever term is used, the more general or the more specific, because, as the majority points out, we are dealing with a provision regulating motor vehicle insurance, the provision must be re ferring to the person insured. I did not disregard the change in the language in that regard; I do not think that is the proper fo cus or signif icance of th e provision . What can not be gain said is that subsection (b) (1), by providing for coordination if the insured has both coverage for the benefits described in § 19-505 of this subtitle and a collateral source of medical, hospital, or wage continuation benefits , addresses the situation in which the named insured under the automobile policy has, in addition to that policy, a collateral source of (continued...) 4 507 and that neither section me ntions health insurers or health m aintenance organizations. Id. at ____ , ____ A .2d at __ ___ [s lip op. at 1 4]. Turning to the latter, the ma jority notes that Maryland Code (1982, 2005 Repl. V ol.) § 19-706 (a) of the Health General Article states that except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, a health m aintenance organizatio n is not subject to the insurance laws of this S tate. Id. at ____, ____ A.2d at _____ [slip op. at 17-18 ]. Emphasizing this section and pointing out that [s]ection 19-706 th en enum erates all the sp ecific subse ctions and s ubtitles of the Insurance Article that apply to Maryland HMOs, id , while not referencing § 19-507 of the Insurance Article at all, the majority asserts that it is logical to conclude that had the General Assemb ly intended to place additional restrictions on HMO contracts, it would have done so within Title 19 of the Health-General Article, which specifi cally gov erns H MO s. Id. at ____, ____ A.2d at __ ___ [slip o p. at 19]. As indicated, the majority also relies on the facts that the 3 (...continued) benef its policy, i.e. a health insurance policy or is a member of an HMO. As impo rtant, it contemplates that the policy under which those collateral benefits are provided may be issued by the same or a different insurer. We know this to be so because subsection (b) (1) refers to insurer or insurers and one or both of the policies. Although this also answers the majority s automobile insurance argument, what Wu argu es do es so more directly: [S]uch an interpreta tion wou ld make e ntirely irrelevant tho se provision s in subsection (b)(1) and (b)(2) of § 19-507 that expressly set forth the manner in which a health care p rovider and PIP insure r may legally coord inate their respective policies to provide for the non-duplication of benefits. Since a reduction in premium s can only be implemen ted upon the insured s coordination of her respective policies, where an auto insurance policy exists, the other policy must be the healthcare insurance policy. There simply cannot be two au to insurance policies that wo uld require coordi nation b y the insur ed. 5 statutes regulating health insura nce in this state are found in Title 15, Health Insurance, of the Insuran ce Artic le, id. at __, __ A .2d at __ [slip . op. at 19], § 15-104 (b) of which expressly addresses non-duplication or coordination of ben efits by health insurers 4 and that the authority of health m aintenance organizatio ns to coord inate benef its is prescribed in § 19713.1 of the Health-General Article.5 ___ M d. ____ , ____, _ ___ A .2d ___ _, ____ [slip op at 1]. I do not believe that the m ajority s analysis is correct and, so, I dissent. A significant issue in this appeal, and my focus, is whether § 19-507(b) s use of the plural terms, insurers and policies, places the same restrictions on collateral insurers, such as health insurers and 4 Section 15-104 (b) of the Health Insurance Article provides: Authorized. In accordance with regulations that the Commissioner adopts, the Commissioner shall allow health insurance policies and policies of nonprofit health service plans to contain nonduplication provisions or provisions to coordinate coverage with: (1) other health insurance policies, including commercial individual, group, and blanket policies and policies of nonprofit health service plans; (2) subscr iber contrac ts that are issued by health maintenance organizations; and (3) other established programs under which the insured may make a claim. 5 Section 19-713.1 (a) of the Health -General Article provides: Nonduplication or coordination of coverage provisions - In general. A contract between a h ealth maintenance org anization and its subscribers or a group of subscribers may contain nondup lication prov isions or pro visions to coordinate the covera ge with su bscriber co ntracts of oth er health maintenance organizations, health insurance policies, including those of nonprofit health service plans, and with other established programs under which the subscriber or member may make a claim. 6 health maintenance organizations (HMOs) as it does on automobile insurers. The issue in this ca se had its ge nesis in an a utomob ile accident in which the responde nt, Kuei-I Wu (Wu), was involved , and was injured, while she was a full-time student at the Univ ersity of Maryland. In addition to the automobile insurance she was mandated to have , see § 19-505(a), Wu was insured by the petitioner, M AMS I Life and Health Insurance Co. ( MLH ), under a health insurance plan. The Preferred Provider Option ( PPO ) plan, to which sh e belonge d, paid particip ating health c are provide rs, in exchange for medical care provided to its members for Covered Services, a negotiated rate, which the providers agreed to accept as full paymen t. Wu s health insurance policy contained a Coordination of Bene fits provision . It expressly exclu ded cons ideration of any no-fault automob ile insurance payments, such as PIP, in the application of the Coordination of Benefits procedures. Nevertheless, Wu alleges, in a separate document known as the Provider Manual for P hysicians and Practitioners, MA MSI illegally directs all providers within its healthcare plans that when the patient ha s been inv olved in an automob ile accident, the providers m ust collect PIP benefits fro m the patient s automobile insurers first, before submitting any claims to MAMSI for payment. As a result, she m aintains, the pe titioner paid the participating healthcare providers for services rendered to her only after h er PIP ben efits were exhausted. Believing the Provider Manual for Physicians and Practitioners and the policy of the p etitioner reflec ted in it to be in direct violation of the directive in § 19-507 of the Insurance Article that P IP benef its shall be payable without regard to...any collateral 7 source of medical, hospital, or wage continu ation be nefits, Wu filed, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County and against the p etitioner and its p arent com panies, a clas s action comp laint. The case having been transferred to the Federal District Court and the dispositive issue having been determined to center[] on whether the terms of section 19-507 app ly onl y to automob ile insurance carriers and whether the reasoning of Dutta v. State Farm Insurance Co., 363 Md. 54 0, 769 A. 2d 94 8 ([] 2001), can be extended to healthcare companies or HM Os, the District Judge decided to certify that questio n to this Co urt. The actual question certified w as the follow ing: Does Maryland Code , Insurance A rticle § 19-50 7 prohibit or restrict a Maryland health insurer or a Maryland health maintenance organization from providing in its group o r individual c ontracts of insura nce or me mbership contracts that its contractua l hea lth benef its may be secondary to Personal Injury Protection ( PIP ) benefits under an automobile liability insurance policy where the automobile liability insurer is legally obligated to provide benefits for healthcare expenses? II A statute authorizing Personal Injury Protection coverage was first enacted by the Maryland Legisla ture in 1 972, as a part of the Insu rance C ode. See Chapter 7 3 of the A cts of 1972, which was codified as Article 48A and, in particular, § 540 of that Article, the predecessor of § 19-507. Its purpose was to offer those injured in an incident with an autom obile... quick no -fault compen sation for m edical bills and lost wages up to a minimum amou nt.... Dutta, supra, 363 M d. at 547 , 769 A .2d at 95 2. 8 Prior to the passage of House Bill 444, the bill which was to become Chapter 73 of the Acts of 1972, and, thus, before mandatory PIP coverage became law, at a meeting of the Special Committee on No-Fault Insurance , a comm ittee created b y the Legislative Counc il and charged with studying and considering no-fault insurance, representatives of organized labor expressed concern with regard to the effect of the no-fault insurance upon the [then] previously negotiated accident and health plans included in labo r contracts. They were concerne d specifica lly that: If the no-fault benefits were secondary to the accident and health benefits, then the worker wo uld be paying for automobile insurance which he could never collect. If the no-fault benefits were primary, then the worker was suffering a payroll deduction with no benefit. This problem would have to be resolved before full sup port by or ganize d labor could b e given to a no- fault pla n. See Report of the Special Committee on No-Fault Insurance (Jan. 31, 1972). Sub sequ ently, when th e legislation w as passed, th e applicable provision related to, and governing, no-fault insurance benefits and collateral benefits, § 540, provided: The benefits required under § 539 of this article shall be payable without regard to the fault or nonfault of the named insured or the recipie nt in causing or contributing to the accident, and without regard to any collateral source of medical, hospital, or wage continuation benefits. This provision has undergone a number of amendments, however, the most notable of which provided for coordination of benefits. In 1973, a second sentence was added to § 540, as follows: Where the insured has coverage for both benefits required under § 539 and the collateral benefits, the insurer or insu rers may coo rdinate the policies to provide for nonduplication of such benefits; subject, however, to appropriate reductions 9 in premiums for o ne or both of said coverages approved by the Insurance Commissione r, and the named insured shall have the right to elect or reject the coordination of policies and nonduplication of benefits,[6] If the insured elects to coordinate , he shall indicate in writing which policy is to becom e prima ry. In 1989, the General Assembly amended § 540, in relevant part, to read: (a) The benefits described under § 539 of this subtitle shall be payab le without regard to: (1) The fault or nonfault of the named insured or th e recipient in causing an d contributin g to the accid ent; and (2) Any collateral source of medical, hosp ital, or wage continuation benefits. (B)(1) Subject to Paragraph (2) of this subsection, where the insured has coverage for both the benefits described under § 539 of this subtitle and the collateral benefits, the insurer or insurers may coordin ate the policies to provide for nonduplication of the benef its, subject to appropriate reductions in premiums for one or bo th of said coverages approved by the Commissione r. (2)(I) The nam ed insured shall have th e right to elect or reject the coordination of policies and nonduplication of benefits. (II) If the insured elects to coordinate policies, the insured shall indicate in writing w hich policy is to becom e prima ry. In 1996, the Legislature repealed Article 48A and did a Plain English recodification 6 In 1974, the General Assembly amended § 540 to make a grammatical change, replacing a comma with a period after the word benefits and before If the insured elects to coordinate, he shall indicate in w riting which policy is to become primary. In 1984, the General Assembly deleted the words pursuant to and replaced them with the word u nder prior to referenc e to § 539 " so that it read, an insurer p aying benef its under § 539 of this Article shall have no right of subrogation and no claim against any other person or insurer to recover any such benefits by reason of the alleged fault of such other p erson in causin g or con tributing to the ac cident. 10 of the Insurance Article, including to the Motor Vehicle Insurance Subtitle . See 1996 Maryland Laws, Chapter 11. The goal of the recodification was clarity and conciseness, as the Overview of House B ill No. 11 recites: The goal in revising is to rewrite the law more clearly and concisely without making any substantiv e change s. Where th e legislative intent is clear, a revision will reconcile inconsistent provisions, delete obsolete provisions, and fill gaps in the law. Thus, although the language of a revision differs from the source statute, the legislative intent does not change.... See House B ill 11 Overview (dated Jan. 11, 1996). Therefore, consistently and to be sure, the prior referenc es in § 19-5 07 to the c ollateral bene fits were m odified to re ferences to collateral source of medical, hospital, or wage continuation benefits, and § 19-513 (b) was amended to include the word insurance after motor vehicle liability to make clear and consistent within the Motor Vehicle Insurance subtitle the kinds of policies being addressed. The recodificatio n did not ch ange, or attem pt to chang e, the referen ce in § 19-507 (a) and (b) to, or any application § 19-507 was intended to have on, insurance policies and benefits other than motor vehicle insurance policies and the benef its flowing from them. Accordingly and in short, it did not, in express terms, restrict the application of § 19-507 to only motor insurers or motor policies. III Section 19-5 07, to be su re, do es co ncer n automobile insuran ce co vera ge, speci fica lly, personal injury protection (PIP), a required benefit payable in respect of such p olicies. This is clear from the caption of the statute and by its reference to § 19-505, which describes the 11 PIP benefits, including that their inclusion in automobile policies is required and what the minimum benefits are required to be. Subsec tion (a) of § 19-507 p rescribes when the P IP benefits are to be payable, i.e. without regard to fault or the availability of collateral benefits. But § 19-507 addresses and concerns more than automobile insurance and PIP benefits; it recognizes that medical, hospital, or wage continuation benefits also may exist and that those benefits may duplicate the benefits of the motor vehicle insurance. To addre ss this latter po tential, § 19-507 (b) provides for coordination of benefits to prevent duplication of benefits, subject, however, to appropriate reductions in premiums, and to the named insured s right to rejec t the coo rdinatio n of po licies an d nond uplicatio n of be nefits. To that extent, therefore, by its express terms, when the coordination of benefits is between collateral benefits, medical, ho spital and w age contin uation, and those of an automobile insurance policy, it is § 19-507 that governs. Neither § 15-104 nor Health-General § 19-713.1 (a) provides, as § 19-507 does, 7 for coordination among policies that are not the same kind of policy that is be ing reg ulated. See § 15-104 (b) (1), (2) and (3) and § 19-713.1 (a) ( coverage with subscriber contracts, health maintenance organizations, health insurance policies, including nonprofit health service plans and with other established programs under which the 7 The majority is wrong w hen it says that § 19-507 does n ot mention health insurers or HMOs. I concede that neither is mentioned by its statutory reference, but I submit that both are nevertheless ad dressed, and therefore c overed, by the reference in § 1 9-507 (b) to collateral sources. It is clear that, by so doing, § 19-507 was referring to policies or plans of health insurers or HMOs; indeed, it could mean nothing else. 12 subscriber or member may make a claim. ). One thing is certain, neither references automob ile policies. And § 19-507 (b) (2), in clear and unambiguous terms, make clear who will drive the decision to co ordinate the c ollat eral b enef its po licies and the a utom obile policy the nam ed insu red. To answer the district court s certified question requires us to enga ge in statutory interpretation, the starting po int of wh ich is to determine the intention o f the Leg islature in enacting it. Design Kitchen & Baths v. Lagos, 388 Md. 718, 728, 882 A.2d 817, 823 (2005); Mayor of Balt. v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128, 756 A.2d 987, 991 (2000). Indeed, "ascertaining and carrying out the real intention of the Legislature," is the cardin al rule of statutory construction. Mazor v. Department of Correction, 279 Md. 355, 360, 369 A.2d 82, 86 (1977) citing State v. Fab ritz, 276 Md. 4 16, 421, 348 A.2d 27 5, 278 (19 75); Fairchild v. Maritime Air Service, Ltd., 274 Md. 181, 185, 333 A.2d 313, 315-16 (1975); Purifoy v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 273 Md. 58, 65, 327 A.2d 483, 487 (1974). When interpreting a statute, we give the words the Legislature used their ordinary and natural meaning. Chase, supra, 360 Md. at 128, 756 A.2d at 991, citing Oaks v. Con nors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995); Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523, 636 A.2d 448, 451 (1994); Condo n v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491, 632 A.2d 753, 755 (1993); Harris v. Sta te, 331 Md. 137, 145-46, 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993). Where the words of a statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain mea ning," the C ourt will give effect to the statute as the langua ge is w ritten, Moore 13 v. Miley, 372 Md. 663, 677, 814 A.2d 557, 566 (2003), neither adding nor deleting language so as to "reflect an intent not evidenced in that language," Condon, supra, 332 Md. at 491, 632 A.2d at 758, nor construing it with "'forced or su btle interpretatio ns' that limit or ex tend its applica tion." Id. (quoting Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 308 Md. 69, 73, 517 A.2d 730, 73 2 (198 6)). Section 19-507 (b) is clear and unambiguous. There is nothing about, or in the language, or context, that indicates or suggests the contrary. The statute applies by its terms to PIP cov erage and collateral sou rce medic al, hospital or w age contin uation ben efits when the insured ha s both coverage. Coordination by the insurers is permitted - the insurer or insurers may coordinate 8 - but that is made subject to the named insured s election to coordinate policies or reject that option. There are, as we h ave seen, c oordination provisions applica ble to he alth insu rance, § 15-104 (b), and health maintenance organizations, Health-General § 19-713.1. As we also have seen, those provisions do not address automobile insurance policies as am ong those to be coordinated. Indeed, they address multiple policies of the same kind, providing the same or largely the sam e benefits, issued by othe r health orga nizations, suc h as non profit health service plans, health maintenance organizations or other established programs under which the insured m ay make a cla im. Because they do not address coordination of PIP and 8 Use of both the singular and the plural in subsection (b) in connection with who may coordinate the policies is interesting and logical. It recognizes that the same or different insurers may carry the motor insurance and the collateral insurance. 14 collateral benefits, neither provision trumps the named insured s option, prescribed by § 19507 (b) (2). The m ajority s analysis and h olding do es just that. In so doing, it has f ailed to read [the sta tutes] tog ether, State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 93, 5 81 A.2 d 9, 12 ( 1990) , i.e., interpret[ them] with referenc e to one another, [Farmers & Merch ants Bank v. ]Sch lossberg, 306 Md. [48,] 61, 507 A.2 d [172,] 1 78 [(198 6)]; Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. 1, 10, 497 A.2d 142, 146 (1985), and harmonize[ them ], to the exten t possible, bo th with eac h other and with other provisio ns of th e statuto ry schem e. Balt[imore]. Gas & Elec[tric Co. v. Public Serv. Commission], 305 M d. [145] at 1 57, 501 A .2d [1307 ] at 1313 [(1986)]. Government Employees Ins. C o. an d GE ICO v. Insura nce C omm 'r, 332 Md. 124, 132-33, 630 A.2d 713, 717-18 (1993). The majority also has failed to heed the admonitio n not to read either statute so as to render the other, or any portion of it, meaningless, surplusage, superfluous or nug atory. Tracey v. Tracey, 328 M d. 380, 387 , 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992); D & Y, Inc. v. Winston, 320 Md. 534, 538 , 578 A.2d 1177, 11 79 (1990 ); Kindley v. Governor of Md., 289 Md. 620, 625, 426 A.2d 90 8, 912 (19 81); Moberly v. Herboldsheimer, 276 Md. 211, 217, 345 A.2d 855, 858 (1975). This is especially egregious in this case because the Legislature expressly has provided in § 19-507 (b) (2) for an election by the named automob ile insured, even in the face of the statute s recognition that the insured could h old both an automob ile policy and a h ealth insuran ce polic y providin g dupli cate be nefits. Dutta, supra, is instructive on this point. There, this Court was presented with the question, whether the PIP coverage at issue require[d] State Farm to pa y for petitioner s 15 medical treatment, even though petitioner s health care provider and /or a third party, tortfeasor, actually paid the medical bills. Id., 363 Md. at 543, 769 A.2d at 949. The issue arose when Dutta, who bo th had personal autom obile insurance with P IP coverage and was a member of an HMO through his employer, was injured as a result of an automobile accident in which he was involved. He was treated in the emergency room of the hospital at which he had been treated for a recent he art attack and , although h e signed a C onsent to T reat form, in which he agreed to pay, the hospital sought, and received payment from Dutta s HMO, wh ose information it had on record. Dutta filed a claim with his automob ile insurer for expenses incurred relating to his emergency room treatment. T he insurer re fused to pay the amo unt paid by Dutta s HMO, prompting Dutta to file suit. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County answered the question of the insurer s liability for the PIP payments in the negative, holding for the insurer. It reasoned: Ok ay. I have had occasion to review all of the pleadings and to consider the argumen ts of Counsel, and while it does appear to me that this is somewhat unfair I have to say that I end up being more persuaded by the logic of Mr. Redmond s [State Farm s attorney] arguments in that I don t believe that the expense in this case was an expense that Dr. Dutta incurred within the meaning of the statute, and therefore, I do not believe that there is an obligation for the PIP carrier to pay it. My sympathies are with you, but logic tells me that Mr. Redmond is probably correct and that this is what th e legisla ture had intende d. Id., 363 Md. at 546, 769 Md. at 951. This Court answered the issue before it in the affirmative, holding that the Circuit Court erred in finding th at the expen ses arising ou t of the me dical treatme nt petitioner received at [the]...[h]osp ital, which was initially paid for by his HMO, were not an incurred expense by 16 petitioner for which he was entitled to reco ver from his PIP coverage. Id., 363 Md. at 563, 769 Md. at 961-62. This Court reasoned: The mandatory language of section 19-507(a) emphasizes that petitioner can recover from his HM O ..., as well as PIP benefits from his automobile insurer , State Farm. Th e benefits d escribed in § 19-505 of this subtitle shall be payable without regard to . . . any collateral source of medical, hospital, o r wage continuation benefits. The Legislature could not have expressed its intent any clearer -- an insurer must pay PIP benefits regardless of any collateral source of benefits -- i.e., regardless of whether a health insurance provider, HMO, or other collateral sour ce pr ovid es be nefi ts. [T he H MO 's] co vera ge of pet ition er's medical bills for his treatment at [the] [h]ospital is exactly this -- a collateral source of medical and hospital benefits. If the Legislature had meant to include members of HMOs that provide collateral ben efits from PIP coverage, language to that effect would have been inclu ded in either section 19-505, section 19-507, or section 19-513. To interpret this language in any other way would render section 19-507 (a) (2) meaningless. ... [The insurer s] argument that petitioner cannot recover bo th PIP ben efits and co llateral medic al and hos pital benefits demo nstrates comp lete disre gard fo r the plai n langu age of section 19-50 7. Id., 363 M d. at 550-5 1, 769 A . 2d at 95 4. (citatio ns and footno tes omit ted). The Dutta Court did not end its analysis there; rather, it proceeded to provide another reason that the m ajority is w rong. IV This Court consistently has held that exclusions from statutorily mandated insurance coverage not expressly authorized by the Legislature genera lly will not b e recog nized. Dutta, supra, 363 M d. at 552 , 769 A .2d at 95 5. See also, Enter. Lea sing Co. v . Allstate Ins. Co., 341 Md. 541, 547 , 671 A.2d 509, 512 (1996) ( W here the Legislature has mandated insurance coverage, this Court will not create exclusions that are not specifically set out in the statute ); Van Horn v. A tlantic Mu t., 334 Md. 669, 686, 641 A.2d 195, 203 (1994) ( this Court has 17 generally held invalid insurance policy limitations, exclusions and exceptions to the statutorily required coverages which were not expressly authorized by the Legislature ); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hart, 327 Md. 526, 531-532, 611 A.2d 100, 102 (1992); Gable v. Colonial Ins. Co., 313 Md. 701, 704, 548 A.2d 1 35, 137 (1998 ) ( As a matter o f statuto ry constru ction, w here the Legislature has required specified coverages in a particular category of insurance, and has provided for certain exceptions or exclusions to the required coverages, additional exclusions are generally not p ermitted ); Lee v. Wheeler, 310 Md. 233, 239, 528 A.2d 912, 915 (1987) ( we will not imply exclusions nor recognize exclusions beyond those expressly enumerated by the legislature ); Jennings v. Gov t Employees, 302 Md. 352, 358-359, 488 A.2d 166, 169 (1985) ( we will not insert exclusions from the required coverages beyond those expressly set forth by the Legisla ture ); Nationwide Mut. Ins. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721, 730, 436 A.2d 465, 471 (1981) ( conditions or limitations in an uninsured motorist endorsement, which provide less than the covera ge required by the statute, are v oid ); Pennsylvania Nat l Mut. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 10 6-161 , 416 A .2d 734 , 739 (1 980). Larimore v. American Ins. Co., 314 Md. 617, 622, 552 A.2 d 889, 89 1 (1989); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. USF&G, 314 Md. 131, 141, 550 A.2d 69, 74 (1988). This is the other reason that the majority is wrong. Noting that § 19-507 (a) statutorily mandated the payment of PIP benefits whether or not health insurance benefits were received, even if in the form of the payment for medical expenses arising out of an accident,, we declared, it is not our proper function to add to the statute another class of exemptions. That is a legislative function. Dutta, supra, 363 Md. at 18 553-54, 769 A. 2d at 956. We were guided in reaching this conclusion by [t]he rules of statutory construction relating to statutory provisions that create exceptions or exemptions from other statutory provisions. Id. In addition to the rules of construction, the Court s view that no other exceptions were intended, was reinforced by reference to § 19-513 (e)9 of the Insurance Law Article, expressly providing for an exemption for workers compensation benefits, and State Farm v. Insurance Commissioner, 283 Md. 663, 392 A.2d 1114 (1978). The former demons trated that the L egislature kn ows ho w to mak e exemp tions from the statutorily mandated PIP pa yments. Dutta, supra, 363 Md. at 552, 769 A.2d at 955. The latter is an application o f § 19-51 3 (e); we p ointed out th at, in that case, the Court held that, because of the express provisions in section 539(d) relating to workmen's compensation, [the insured] was not entitled to recover PIP benefits to the extent he had recovered workmen's compensation benefits. Id., 363 M d. at 552 , 769 A .2d at 95 5. As in Dutta, the automobile insurer is statutorily mandated to pay to the named insured the PIP benefits for which the insured contracted. Neither § 19-507 nor any other statute, other than § 19-513, prescribes an exemption or exception , to this mandate. In this case, the justification for the distinction that is sought to be made from Dutta is that coordination, in an 9 Section 19-513 (e) provides, Reduc tion due to w orkers com pensation b enefits. B enefits payab le under the c overages described in §§ 19-50 5 and 19 -509 of th is subtitle shall be reduced to the extent that the recipient has recovered benefits under the workers compensation laws of a state or the federal government for which the provider of the workers compensation benefits had not been reimbu rsed. 19 effort to avoid duplication, of policies is w hat is being don e and suc h coordin ation is statutorily blessed by not only § 19 -507 (b) (1) , but by § 15-1 04 and H ealth-General § 19-713.1. To be sure, coordination of duplicative policies is the goal and aim of the insu red s policy directive, as reflected in the Physician Manual and coordination of such policies is statutorily permitted. The ope rative term, ho wever, is p ermitted; in a case in which the policies to be c oordinated are automob ile and health, by the express terms of § 19-507 (b) (2), coord ination ma y occur only at the election of the named insured, who also has the option to reject coordination. The Legislature, thus, by providing for coordination, has not provided an exception or exemption to § 19-507 (a) s requirement that PIP benefits be paid and, because the other coordination statutes do not address the issue, it has not enacted an exception to the insured s right to elect coordi nation o f policie s with d uplicativ e bene fits or to s imply reje ct that op tion. V In reaching its conclusion in the instant case, not only has the majority ignored the rule of statutory construction relating to statutory provisions that create exceptions from other statutory provisions, it has disregarded, and refused to give effect to the clear and unambiguous language of § 19 -507. In so doing, its conclusion flies in the face of the clearly expressed and unmis takable intentio n of the Legisla ture. The majority acknowledges that § 19-507 (b) (1) addresses the situation in which the insured under an automobile insurance policy has alternative medical, wage replacement, and hospital benefits available and thus do not require the mandatory PIP benefits. ___ Md. at ___, 20 ___, A. 2d at __ _ (slip op. at 16 ). Moreover, it recognizes that coordination may occur at the option of the insureds, but if it does not, the PIP coverage remain s prima ry. Id. at ___, ___ A. 2d at __ _ (sli p op . at 16 ). Cu riously, particularly in light of how much easier, not to mention the potential impact on litigation, it would have been had the Legislature simply said that the section applied only to motor vehicle insurance, the majority concludes that [s]ection 19-507 (b) s language requiring the insured s consent to the coordination of policies and the nonduplication of benefits applies only when the insured seeks to mak e a collateral benefit primary to PIP coverage. Id. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ (slip op. at 16). For that proposition, it cites Maryland Auto Insurance F und v. Perry, 356 Md. 668, 670, 741 A. 2d 1114, 1115 (1999) ( [Section] 19 of the Insurance Article focuses on automobile liability insurance carriers and their insureds, not HMOs or other insurance carriers. ) and relies on the fact that, in the Maryland Code, provisions regulating health insurers and HMOs are located in separate Articles or Titles. The concession that, among the benefits included in the provisions of § 19-507 (a) (1) are collateral source[s] of medical, hospital, or wage continuation, is important. Clearly, the benefits to which th e provision refers, because referred to as collateral and distinguished from thos e req uired by § 19-505, are not those ordinarily associated with automobile insurance policies. Thus, the majority and I agree that § 19-507 ((b) (1) addresses non-auto mobile insurance benefits and, thus, insu rance. Sub section (b) (1 ), is, by its terms, [s]ub ject to Paragraph (2). As I read § 19-507 (b), therefore, coordination of the automobile policy and 21 the non-auto mobile, the c ollateral, policy is subject to the election or rejection of the named insured. To be sure, the provision contemplates that coordination by the insurer or the insu rers may occur and the named insured can not instruct an insurer that is n ot his insurer. It is nevertheless also true that coordination connotes cooperation and that can only occur if the automob ile insurer is at the table, an impossibility if its named insured elects to reject coordination or if coordination can be done without that insure r s involvement. There also is the matter of the requirement that there be appropriate reductions in premiums. In this case, moreo ver, W u is the in sured o f both in surers. If the majority is correct, that an HMO or health provider can unilaterally coordinate 10 its policy to be secondary to PIP coverage, what, one must ask, does § 19-507 (b) (2) mean? The majority answers : An individual may be covered by two or more m otor vehicle policies that provide PIP co verage . See, Bishop v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.,360 Md. 225, 10 The concept of coordination envisions more than unilateral action. The Court of Special Appeals in addressing Talbot County s legal obligation to work in coordination with affe cted mun icipalities to estab lish a proces s to accom modate th e [munic ipal] growth needs, defined the term coordination. Talbot County v. Tow n of Oxford , 177 Md. App. 480, 488, 936 A.2d 374, 379 (2007). The intermediate court explained that the word coordination: whether used as a noun, verb or adjective, has no subtle meaning. "To 'coordinate' means to harmonize, work together, or bring into a common action, effort or condition." See, Network Commerce, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 260 F . Supp . 2d 103 4, 1041 (D.C.W .D. W ashing ton), affirmed 422 F.3d 1 353 (2 002), Sharp v. Fields (In re Baby W.), 796 N.E.2d 364, 373 (Ind. 2003). Id. at 501-02, 936 A.2d at 386-87. 22 236, 757A.2d 783, 786 (2000) ( A perso n injured in a n automo bile acciden t could be eligible f or PIP b enefits from tw o or mo re sourc es . . . . ) (quoting [ MAIF v.] Perry, 356 Md. [668] at 676, 741 A .2d [1114 ] at 1118); see also [Andrew] Janquitto, [ MARYLAND MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE (2d ed. 1992)]supra, at 556 ( A person may be insured by two or more m otor vehicle policies . . . . ). In addition, § 19-507(b) sets forth the terms in which motor vehicle insurers may coordinate their policies with one another or with other insurance policies and provides the insured the right to agree to suc h coordin ation in writing or to reject such coordination. Wha t § 19-507 (b) does not do is restrict whe n a health insurer o r HM O ma y attempt to coordi nate its p olicy. ___ Md. at __ _, ___ A. 2d at __ _ (slip op. at 20). 11 I am no t persua ded. 11 The majority relies on Smith v. Physicians Health Plan, Inc., 514 N.W. 2d 150 (Mich. 19 94) for the proposition that althoug h the cons umer has the choice to coordinate coverage on the no-fault side of [his or her] insurance ... [t]here is not a corresponding guarantee that the selection of an uncoordinated no-fault insurance policy will dictate the terms of whatever other insurance one might have. This case is distinguishable. The statute at issue in Smith, governed coordination of benefits by no-fault insurers. The provision p rovided, in re levant part: MCL 500.3109a; MSA 24.13109(1) provides in pertinent part: An insurer providing personal p rotection insu rance ben efits shall off er, at approp riately reduced p remium ra tes, deductib les and exc lusions, reaso nably related to other h ealth an d accid ent cov erage o n the ins ured. (citation s omitte d). The M ichigan sup reme cou rt explained that: there [was] nothing explicit or implicit in § 3109a to prevent enforcement of the coo rdination clau se in the hea lth care policy, reso lution of this c ase is a ma tter o f sim ple c ontract in terpretat ion. T here is no thing in the statuto ry scheme to enable the p laintiff to unila terally uncoord inate his hea lth insurance. Smith, 444 N.W.2d at 758-59. Unlike the provision found in Smith, there is explicit language in § 19-507(b) that prevents enforcem ent of the coordination c lause like the one foun d in Wu s health ca re policy. We are not dealing with the same statutory scheme. Michigan s statute does not provide a provision similar to § 19-507(b) that expressly allows the insurer to elect or reject coordination of her PIP benefits with any collateral benefits she may have. The Michigan provision mandates the insurer to reduce premium rates, deductibles and exclusions, reasonably related to other health and accident coverage on the insured, and (continued...) 23 Section 19-507 (b) can no t be parsed as the majority would have us do. As I have pointed out, supra, subsection ( b) is applicab le whenever there is coverage for both PIP and from a collateral sou rce. It does no t require, as it cou ld not, coordination, it only permits it, the ultimate election belonging to the named insured. If the majority is correct, coord ination is required or at least can be forced. That approach not only reads a provision into the non- 11 (...continued) does not speak to an insured s option to elect or reject to coordinate benefits. Section 19507(b ) provid es for ju st that. The majority also responds: Dutta ... concerned only what § 19-507(a) requires of automobile insurers providing PIP coverage. This Court in Dutta, did not address, and has not yet addressed, whether § 19-507(b) restricts or prohibits a health insurer or HMO from providing by contract that its health benefits are secondary to PIP benefits. ___ Md. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ (slip op. at 9). In this case, it must be remembered that the policy Wu had with MAMSI contained no such provision. Therefore, in effect, the majority is saying that a health insurer or HMO may do indirectly what it cannot do directly, that, while, under the Insurance Law, it may not be able to issue a policy mandating that PIP be paid before its coverage begins, it can effect that result by inserting such a clause in its contract with its medical providers. If it can do that, any health insurer and HMO will be able to evade the coordination requirement of § 19-507 (b) (2), including, especially, the reduction of the premiums, thus, as Wu points out, essentially negating its impact. Such result also is the realization of the fears expressed by labor before PIP legislation was passed and with which the coordination provision of § 19-507(b)(2) was intended to deal. It is after all the insured un der both p olicies that is m ost directly affected, as he or she pays the premiums, in return for which he or she is entitled to some return. 24 automob ile coordination statutes, Dutta, supra, but it utterly disregards the canon of statutory construction that requires the court to read the conflicting statutes together in an attempt, and with an eye, to harmonizing them, rather than rendering any one or more of them superfluous. United States v. Ambrose, 403 Md. 425 , 440, 942 A.2d 7 55 (2008) citing Kushell v. Dep t of Natural Res., 385 M d. 563, 5 77, 870 A.2d 1 86, 193 (2005 ). Furthermore, it is illogical to suppose that, in one statute, the Gene ral Assem bly would give to insureds a right to elect or reject an insurance option and, by not expressly mentioning that right in another statute, addressing the very benefits affected in the prior statute, inten d to negate that right, even when the insured under both policies is the same. That does not make sense. Just how absurd that interpretation is can be further demonstrated by recalling that one insurance company may supply both automobile and health insurance. In that event, under the majority s analysis, that insurance company could issue an automobile policy, under which its insured could reject coordination and then, or at the same time, negate that insured s exercise of the option by issuing the same insured a health policy that does not give the insured that option. It is well settled th at we do n ot, or are not supposed to, interpret statutes to reach nonsensical or unreasonable results. As we said in Nesbit v. Government Employees. Insurance, Co., 382 Md. 65, 75 , 854 A. 2d 879 , 885 (2004): [W]e have held that the Court must take a commonsensical approach when construing a statute . Board of Trustees of the Maryland State Retirement and Pension Systems v. Harry R. Hughes, 340 Md. 1, 7, 664 A.2d 1250, 1253 (1995) (quoting Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137-38, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994). We must seek to avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with co mmo n sense . Id. 25 See Gregg v . State, 409 Md. 698 , 716, 976 A.2d 9 99, 1009 (2009) ( we do not interpret legislative acts to have been do ne for nonsensical reas ons, nor do we c onstrue statutory language in a manner that renders a portion of the law nugatory or su perfluous .); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. DeHann, 393 M d. 163, 1 70-17 1, 900 A .2d 208 , 212 (2 006). I respectfully diss ent. 26

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