Robey v. State

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Wallace Jerome Robey v. State of Maryland, No. 90, Sept. Term 2006. CRIMINAL LAW - RESTITU TION - THE $10,000 LIMIT ON RESTITUTION IMPOSED BY MD. CODE (2001), CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ARTICLE, § 11-604(B) DOES NOT APPLY TO ADULT DEFENDANTS Wallace Jerome Robey was convicted by the Circuit Court for Wicomico County of second-degree assault and reckless en dangerm ent. The Circuit Court se ntenced R obey to three years imprisonment, all of which was suspended, and ordered restitution in an amount to be determined by the Maryland Division of Parole and Probation. The Division arrived at the figure of $42,260.75. On 21 November 2003, during a separate restitution hearing, the Circuit Court imposed on R obey an obligation to pa y $42,342 .74 in restitutio n to M cCo y. Robey appealed his conviction and sentence to the Court of Specia l Appeals, but did not prevail. He subsequently challenged the amount of his restitution order in the Circuit Court with a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence. The theory of his motion was that Md. Code (2001), Crim. Proc. Article, § 11-604(b) ( Crim. Proc. ) prohibits a restitution order in an amount exceeding $10,000. The Circuit Court denied Robey s motion and Robey brought a timely appeal to the Court of S pecial Appeals. Be fore that court could hear the case, the Court of Appeals granted a writ of certiorari, o n its own motion, to co nsider Robey s contention that the $10,000 statutory limit on restitution orders applies to ad ult defend ants as well as child defendants and respondents and their parents. The Court of Appeals held that the plain language of Crim. Proc., § 11-604(b) precluded Robey s interpretation because the thrust of the relevant subsection and the surrounding subsections comprising § 11-604 deal exclusively with child defendants or responde nts and their parents. Th e Court bu ttressed its conclusion as to legislative intent by examining the legislative history of § 11-604(b). This examination revealed that the predecessor statute from which § 11-604(b) was derived also focused exclusively on restitution as applied to child d efend ants or re spond ents an d their p arents. In addition , a subsequent revision of § 11-604(b) further verified that the General Assembly did not intend to include ad ult defend ants within the purview of the limit on restitution orders. The Court noted that its interpretation of the statute was consistent with the rehabilitative purpose of restitution as directed towards children in the juvenile justice system. The limit imposed on restitution ordered against children endeavors to prevent young offenders from being saddled with an insurmountable debt, which frustrates the goals of rehabilitation. Circuit Co urt for W icomico C ounty Case # 22-K-03-000365 JC IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 90 September Term, 2006 WALLACE JEROME ROBEY v. STATE OF MARYLAND Raker Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, specially assigned), Rodo wsky, L awren ce F. (R etired, specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by Harrell, J. Filed: March 14, 2007 We decide in this case whether a restitution order, entered against an adult defendant in excess of $10,000, violates the limitations on restitution orders found in Maryland Code (2001), Criminal Procedure A rticle, § 11-604(b) (hereinafter C rim. Proc. ). 1 Because we conclude that the relevant statutory limit is applicable only to child d efendan ts, child respondents,2 and their parents, we hold that a restitution order entered against an adult defendant is not subject to the $10,000 statutory ceiling. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On 27 Aug ust 2003, W allace Jerom e Robey w as convicte d in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County of second-degree assault and reckless endangerment. The Circuit Court sentenced Robey to three years imprisonment, all of which was suspended, and ordered restitution3 in an amount to be determined in a separate hearing. Based on medical bills and 1 Md. Code (2001), Crim. Proc. Article, § 11-604(b) (hereinafter Crim. Proc. ) provides: A judgment of restitution for $10,000 issued under Part I of this subtitle is the absolute limit for all acts arising out of a single incident and is the absolute limit against one child, the child s p arent, or both. 2 The terms defendant and respondent reflect the distinct process es and go als associated with the adult crim inal j ustic e syste m an d the juve nile j ustic e syste m, re spec tivel y. The term defendant, which refers to a person who either rec eives probation befo re judgmen t, has been found guilty of a crime, or entered a nolo conten dere ple a, Crim . Proc., § 11-601(e), is descriptive here of a child who has been charged as an adult pursuant to Md. Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article, § 3-8A-03(d) (hereinafter Cts. & Jud. Proc. ). On the other ha nd, the term respondent applies to a child who perpetrated a delinquent act, or an act that, if co mmitte d by an ad ult, wou ld be a c rime. C rim. Pro c., § 11-101(b); Cts. & Ju d. Proc., § 3-8A-01(l). 3 Robey makes no contention that the restitution order in this case was imposed improp erly. See Chaney v. State, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___ (2007) (No. 91, Sept. Term, 2006) (slip. op. at 11-14, filed March 14, 2007) (holding that restitution order may not be imposed absent an affirmative request for restitution on the part o f the victim, a fair (contin ued...) correspondence with the victim , Jesse McCoy, the Maryland Division of Parole and Probation recommended the figure of $42,260.7 5. On 21 November 2003, during the restitution hearing, the Circuit Court imposed on Robey an obligation to pay $42,342.744 in restitution to McC oy. Robey app ealed his conviction and senten ce to the Court of Special Appeals. He did not prevail. He subsequently challenged the amount of the restitution order in the Circuit Court with a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence. The limited ground o f his motion was that Crim. Proc., § 11-604(b) prohibits a restitution order in an amount exceeding $10,000. The C ircuit Court denied Robey s motion and Robey filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special App eals. Before that court could hear the appeal, we issued a writ of certiorari, on our ow n motion, to consider R obey s conten tion that the $1 0,000 statuto ry limit on restitution orde rs applies to ad ult defend ants as we ll as child def endants an d respond ents and their pa rents. We h old that it does not. II. DISCUSSION At the time restitution was ordered agains t Robe y, Crim. P roc., § 11-604(b) provided: A judgment of restitution for $10,000 issued under Part I of this subtitle is th e absolute lim it 3 (...continued) opportun ity for the defen dant to dispu te such a req uest, and sufficient admissible evidence to support a request). The record here merely indicates that restitution was imposed and a separate hearing was held to establish the proper amount to be ordered. 4 There exists in the record contradicting references to the amount of restitution ordered by the Circuit Court. The restitution hearing transcript refers to an amount of $42,342.74 as that ordered by the court and the case history entry from the court s computer system reflects a restitution order of $42,260.75. 2 for all acts arising o ut of a single incident an d is the abso lute limit again st one child, th e child s parent, or both. Robe y posits that § 11-604(b) should be parsed and read so that $10,000 is the absolute limit on the amount of a restitution order: (1) for all acts arising out of a single incid ent, and (2) against one respondent child, the child s parent, or both. By this construction, Robey argues that the $10,000 limit is applicable to adults under parsed clause (1) of § 11-604(b). A s support for his construction, Robey points out that the subtitle dealing with restitution deals with both crim inal and juv enile proce edings an d that § 11-6 04 itself contains no language limiting its scope to matters involving only children. He further states that the use of and in § 11-604(b) serves to divide the subsection into two distinct clauses: one addressing all matters, and the other addressing matters involving only children. The State contend s, ho wev er, th at the plain lang uage of § 11-6 04(b ), as c onfirme d by the surrounding context and the statute s legislativ e history, make s clear that the $ 10,000 lim it on restitution orde rs is applicable only to actions wherein the de fendant is a child who is charged as an adu lt in circuit court, or a child respondent in juvenile court, and the restitution payer is th e child, th e child s parent, o r both. A. The Plain Language of § 11-604(b) Confronting us is the f amiliar ta sk of sta tutory inter pretatio n, the central canons of which are well-settled. It is patent that the cardinal rule of statutory interpre tation is to ascertain and effe ctuate the inte nt of the legislature. Mayor & Town Council of Oakland v. Mayor & Town C ouncil of M ountain Lake Park, 392 Md. 301, 316, 896 A.2d 1036, 1045 3 (2006); Deville v. Sta te, 383 Md. 217, 223, 858 A.2d 484, 487 (2004); Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003). This endeavor invariably commences (and freque ntly ends) with an evalua tion of th e plain la nguag e of the statute in questio n. Twine v. State, 395 M d. 539, 550 , 910 A.2d 1132, 11 38 (2006 ); Deville, 383 Md. at 223, 858 A.2d at 487. If the plain language is unambiguous, that is, it is not susceptible to more than one reasonab le interpretation, we typically cease the inquest into the Legislature s intent and apply the statu te acco rdingly. Twine, 395 M d. at 550, 910 A.2d at 11 38; Mayor & Town Counc il of Oakland, 392 Md. at 316, 896 A.2 d at 1045; Stearma n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 381 Md. 436, 448 n.8, 849 A.2d 539, 546 n.8 (2004) (quoting Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995)); Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A., 365 Md. 166, 181, 776 A.2d 645, 654 (2001 ). In construing statutes, we steadfa stly refuse to employ forced or subtle interpretations [of a statute] that limit or extend its application. Kushell v. Dep t of Natural Res., 385 Md. 563, 576-77, 870 A.2d 186, 193 (2005) (quoting Price, 378 Md. at 387, 835 A.2d at 1226); Taylor, 365 Md. at 181, 776 A.2d at 654; Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Md. v. Dir. of Fin., 343 Md. 567, 579, 683 A.2 d 512, 51 7 (1996); Condon v. Univ. of Md., 332 Md. 481, 491, 632 A.2d 753, 758 (1993) (quoting Tucker v. Fireman s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 73, 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986)); Colem an v. State, 281 Md. 538, 546, 380 A.2d 49, 54 (1977). Occasionally we see fit to examine extrinsic sources of legislative intent merely as a check of our reading of a statute s plain la nguag e. Stanley v. State, 390 Md. 175, 185, 887 A.2d 1078, 1084 (2005) (citing Design Kitchen & Baths v. Lagos, 388 Md. 718, 4 730, 882 A.2 d 817, 82 4 (2005); State v. Glass, 386 Md. 401, 411, 872 A .2d 729, 735 (200 5); and Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128, 756 A.2d 987, 991 (2000)); Coleman, 281 Md. at 546, 380 A.2d at 54; Chesap eake Am usemen ts, Inc. v. Riddle , 363 Md. 16 , 29, 766 A .2d 1036 , 1042-43 (2001); Morris v. Prince George s County, 319 Md. 597, 604, 573 A.2d 1346, 1349 (1990). In such instances, we may find useful the context of a statute, the overall statutory scheme, and archival legislative history of relevant enactments. Mayor & Town Council of Oakland, 392 Md. at 316-17, 896 A.2d at 1045; Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance v. Mullan, 381 Md. 157, 168-69, 848 A.2d 642, 649 (2004 ); Md. Green Party v. Bd. of Elections, 377 M d. 127, 178 -79, 832 A .2d 214, 24 4 (2003); MidAtl. Power Supply Ass n v. Pub. Serv. Comm n, 361 Md. 196, 204, 760 A.2d 1087, 1091 (2000); Bd. of Co unty Com m rs v. Be ll Atl.-M d., Inc., 346 Md. 160, 178, 695 A.2d 171, 180 (1997). Upon a plain reading of the statute, we find the language of § 11-604(b) unambiguous. It is evident to us that the language of subsection (b) contemplates application to a child, the child s parent, or both and no other classes of individuals subject to restitution. Robey s attempt to parse the language of § 11-604(b) in order to man ufacture a shelter for ad ult restitution obligors is without merit. The subsectio n is devoid of any men tion of adu lt defendants or, in fact, any adult no t a parent of a child restitution obligor. Further, it is not appar ent at all that the use o f the typically conjun ctive term a nd in § 11-604(b) was meant to divide the subsection into two separate classes of individuals: one 5 relating to all acts (by adults and children alike) arising out of a single incident, and the other relating to only children and/or their parents. First, the term and ord inarily is not read in the disjunctive as Robey wishes, but rather as [a] conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing the idea that th e latter is to be added to or taken along with the first, Little Store, Inc. v. State, 295 Md. 158, 163 n.4, 453 A.2d 1215, 1218 n.4 (1983) (quoting B LACK S L AW D ICTIONARY 79 (5th ed. 1979)), such that the incident language is inextricably linke d to the per child and/or parent language. Second, Robey s interpretation renders impermiss ibly superfluo us the latter half of the sub section, the p er child and /or parent langua ge. Mayor & Town Council of Oakland, 392 Md. at 316, 896 A.2d at 10 45; Harvey v. Marsh all, 389 Md. 243, 292, 884 A.2d 1171, 1200 (2 005); Smack v. Dep t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 378 Md. 298, 305, 835 A.2d 1175, 1179 (2003). As the State argues pers uasively, [i]f, in fact, the $10,000 limit applies to a ll acts arising ou t of a single incident regardless of the defen dant s age, then any separate reference to a limit agains t a child, the child s parent, or b oth is unne cessary. It is a more rea sonable interpretation of § 11-604(b) that the reference to a child, the child s pa rent, or both w as meant to apply to the entire subsection to the exclusion of any other classes of persons. An inspection of the two surrounding subsections that complete § 11-604 confirms that the thrust of the entire statute, including the $1 0,000 limit on a restitution order, is directed towards c hild offenders. Subsection (a) sets forth, as a general proposition, that children, their parents, or both may be ordered to pay restitution. Subsection (c) addresses 6 the need to provide parents a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present evidence before a court may order restitution against parents of child defendants or respondents. This context, which focuses exclusively on the op eration of restitution in the realm of m atters involving c hildren, with out any men tion of adu lt defendants, confirms the propriety of our conclusion that § 11-604(b) does not have any application to adult defendants. Most telling, however, is the legislative history of the version of Crim. Proc., § 11-604 in force when the restitution order against Robey was entered. During code revision,5 § 11604(b) was created and derived from Md. Code (1957, 1996 Rep l. Vol.), Art. 27 , § 807(a)(3), 6 which dealt solely with restitution in cases involving child defendants and 5 The Criminal Procedure Article was created in 2001 as part of the ongoing process to review and recompile scattered statutes from the Annotated Code of Maryland into articles organized by like subject matter. Chapter 10, §§ 1, 2 of the Acts of 2001. 6 Art. 27, § 807(a)(3) read as follows: (i) Notwithstanding any other prov ision of law , if the defendant is a child, the court may order the child, the child s parent, or both to pay restitution to a victim. (ii) As an absolute limit against one child, the child s parent, or both, a judgment of restitution issued under this section may not exceed $ 10,000 fo r all acts arising o ut of a single incident. (iii) A court may not ente r a judgme nt of restitution against a parent under this section unless the parent has been afforded a reasonab le opportunity to be heard and to present appropriate evidence on the parent s behalf. A hearing under this section may be held as part of the sentencing or disposition hearing. For purposes of comp arison, we reproduc e the statute ad dressing the limitation on re stitution, Crim. Proc., § 11-604, in effect when Robey was ordered to pay restitution: (contin ued...) 7 respondents.7 The Revisor s Note accompanying § 11-604, which we view here as a persuasive aid to sta tutory inter pretatio n, Comptroller v. Blanton, 390 Md. 528, 538, 890 A.2d 279, 285 (2006), indicates that the statute was new language derived without substantive chang e from forme r Art. 27 , § 807(a)(3). The fiscal note addressing the revision further supports the notion that the rev ision generally propagated no su bstantive departure from the statutes as they were codified in the Annotated Code. D EP T OF L EGISLATIVE S ERVS., F ISCAL N OTE, S.B. 1, at 1 (20 01) ( Th is bill recodifies specified existing laws without substantive change. ); see Mo ore v. State, 388 Md. 623, 635 n.4, 882 A.2d 256, 263 6 (...continued) (a) Notwith standing an y other law, if a c hild is the defendant or child respondent, the court may order the child, the child s parent, or both to pay restitution to a victim. (b) A judgment of restitution for $10,000 issued under Part I of this subtitle is the ab solute limit for all acts arising out of a single incident and is the absolute limit against one child, the child s parent, or both. (c)(1) A court may not enter a judgment of restitution aga inst a parent under Part I of this subtitle unless the parent has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present evidence. (2) A hearing under this subsection may be held as part of the sentencing or disposition hearing. 7 Art. 27, § 807(a)(3) was the product of a revision instigated by the passage of the Victim s Rights Act of 1997, w hich, inter alia, merged in to the new Art. 27, § 807(a)(3) one statute regarding restitution orders against child defendants charged as adults, Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. V ol.), Art. 27, § 807(m), and another focusing on restitution imposed on children in juvenile courts, Md. C ode (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 808. Chapters 311, 312, § 1 of the Acts o f 1997; see Grey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 363 Md. 445, 462, 769 A.2d 891, 901 (2001 ). The conflation of these two statutes, which concerned only children, makes clear that the scope of the resultant Art. 27, § 807(a)(3) was limited to restitution orders imposed on children. 8 n.4 (2005) (stating that fiscal notes are persuasive sources of evidence in divining legislative intent). Thus, when Crim. Proc., § 11-604 was enacted as the scion o f Art. 2 7, § 807(a)(3), the new statute inherited its progenitor s focus on child restitution. Furthermore, at no point were adult defendants implicated by the 2001 revision creating Crim. Proc., § 11-604. We glean further substantiation for our reading of § 11-604(b) from a revision of § 11-604(b) that occurred subsequent to the imp osition of Robey s restitutio n order . Nesbit v. Gov t Emp loyees I ns. Co ., 382 Md. 65, 78, 854 A.2d 879, 886-87 (2004) (indicating that subsequent enactments may provide persuasive information for the construction of an earlier version of the same statute) (citing Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 385-87, 614 A.2d 590, 593-94 (1992)). In 2005, the General Assembly eliminated the overall ceiling of restitution for a single incident and focused on imposing a limit on the lia bility of individual children when there are multiple actors in a single incident. Chapter 512, § 1 of the Acts of 2005 ( A judgment of restitution for $10,000 issue d under Part I of this subtitle is the a bsolute limit for all [each child s] acts arising out of a single incident and is the absolute limit against one child, the child's pare nt, or both. ) (emphasis in original). The newly revised statute lacks any mention of adult defendants. Moreover, it altered the phrase which Robey argues covered adult defendants by inserting language relating only to children. Tellingly, the portion of the fiscal note addressing this change did not discuss a substantive change effecting the limits of restitution awards impose d on adu lt defenda nts. Rather, th e note described the revision a s effecting only matters inv olving child defenda nts or respo ndents 9 and their parents, elevating the potential for victims to recover m ore from multiple acto rs in a single incident than possible un der the previous statute. D EP T OF L EGISLATIVE S ERVS., F ISCAL N OTE, S.B. 873, a t 2 (2005) ( A victim m ay receive a res titution judgm ent up to $10,000 for each child s act arising out of a single incident, instead of a maximum cap of $10,000 for the incide nt, regardless of the num ber of actors. ). B. Objectives of Restitution We also consider the objectives of restitution as it may affect our interpretation of Crim. Proc., § 11-604(b). Contrary to Robey s assertion, the principal objective of restitution in the adu lt and juv enile jus tice system s is diffe rently nua nced in each. It is clear that restitution is significantly rehabilitative in nature in the adult system, see Grey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 363 Md. 445, 460, 769 A.2d 891, 900 (2001) (citing Coles v. State, 290 Md. 296, 305, 429 A.2d 1029, 1034 (1981) and Lee v. State, 307 Md. 74 , 78, 512 A.2d 37 2, 374 (1986)), but especially so in the juve nile system . In re Don Mc., 344 Md. 194, 203, 686 A.2d 269, 273 (199 6); see Cts. & Jud. Proc., § 3-8A -02(a)(4). As restitution relates to the child alo ne, its sole purp ose is rehab ilitative. LopezSanchez v. State, 388 Md. 214, 247, 879 A.2d 695, 714 (2005). Robey s contention that restitution is penal in nature, as applied to the child defendant or respondent, is misplaced. Robey relies on language from In re John M., 129 Md. App. 165, 174, 741 A.2d 503, 508 (1999) (quoting In re Ze phrin D ., 69 M d. App . 755, 76 1, 519 A .2d 806 , 809 (1987) ( Zephrin D. )) as support for his position, but neglects to discuss fully from wh ence this 10 retributive or penal qu ality was ascrib ed to the restitution statute. The Court of Special Appea ls in Zephrin D. drew the penal in nature language it used to describe restitution in the juvenile system from an earlier ca se, In re Appeal No. 321, 24 Md. App. 82, 85, 329 A.2d 113, 114 (1974), which, importantly, discussed the retributive element of restitution as applied to the parents of child offenders. The In re Appeal No. 321 court justified the imposition of restitution on parents by reasoning that vicarious liability is imposed as a consequence of a presumed neglect of parental responsibilities. 24 Md. App. at 85, 329 A.2d at 114. Thus, in the context of child restitution orders, the only retributive consideration is directed towards the parents of child of fende rs. Lopez-Sanchez, 388 Md. at 247 n.7, 879 A.2d at 714 n.7; see also Cts. & Jud. Proc., § 3-8A -02(a)(2), (3). Because rehabilitation is the main objective of the juvenile justice s ystem and its dispositional consequences, such as restitution, it is consistent with that objective to limit the amount of restitution to which a child may be obligated to pay. Placing an insurmou ntable debt on a child offender necessarily defeats the rehabilitative purpose of imposing restitution in the first instance because the child may endeavor forever to satisfy the obligation without success. Such futility frustrates the goal of rehabilitation, which aims at the successful completion of a disposition. Conversely, there is no policy rationale for imposing a limit on the a mou nt of restitutio n wh ich a n adult defen dant may b e obligat ed to pay. 11 JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR WICOMICO COUNTY AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER. 12

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