Williamson v. State
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Derek M. Williamson v. State of Maryland, No. 86, September Term, 2006. CRIMINAL LAW SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE: Petitioner, Derek Maurice Williamson, sought review of the denial of a motion to suppress statements he made during the execution of a search warrant. During surveillance, police had observed Williamson enter and leave the residence to be searched on numerous occasions. Based upon their belief that Williamson was an occupan t of the reside nce, after arriv ing to exercise the search warrant and seeing him leave the house, police stopped him as he was about to enter his car; the police returned him to the house and detained him during the execution of a search warrant. The Court of Appea ls affirmed, holding that the co urt properly denied Williamson s motion because the police had the authority to return Williamson to the house and detain him while the search was conducted. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 86 September Term, 2006 DEREK MAURICE WILLIAMSON v. STATE OF MARYLAND Bell, C.J. Raker Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, Wilner, Alan M . (Retired , specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by Battaglia, J. Filed: April 13, 2007 Petitioner, Derek M aurice W illiamson, see ks review of the den ial of a mo tion to suppress statements he made after he was detained during the execution of a search warrant at a house that Williamson occupied and just had left. We hold that the court properly denied Williamson s motion because the police had the authority to return Williamson to the house and detain him while the search was conducted. I. Introduction On November 20, 2001,1 Baltimore County police detectives obtained a search and seizure warrant for 8016 Wynbrook Road, Baltimore County, Maryland, and the persons of Susan Michelle Hub bard 2 and D erek M aurice W illiamso n. The application for the warrant and attached affidavit stated that police had received two ano nymous na rcotics com plaints stating that Susan Hubbard and her boyfriend Derek were selling crack cocaine at 8016 Wynbrook Rd. Baltim ore, Marylan d, 21224 ; the affida vit also stated that police had initiated an investigation in which tw o informa nts had pa rticipated in th ree separate controlled purchases of cocaine from Ms. Hubbard between August and November 2001. The search war rant was e xecuted o n Nove mber 21 , 2001, wh en Detec tive Timothy Bryant Ward, several other police detectives, and a uniformed officer arrived at 8016 Wynbrook Road and set up surveillance for twenty to thirty minutes. Detective Ward recounted the events which then transpired: 1 All of the facts, as herein set forth, were developed at the suppression hearing. 2 Hubba rd is not a pa rty to this appeal. [STAT E]: And when was it that you actually executed the warrant? What caused you to say now is the time to execute? [DETECTIVE WARD]: The target of our investigation, Derek Williamson, was leaving the address to what we believe was the time he we nt to wo rk. We wanted to get him detained before we -- before he left the location. [STATE]: And what time of day was this? [DETECTIVE W ARD]: Like afternoon, early afternoon. [STAT E]: The location 8016 Wynbrook Road, can you describe what kind of residence -- is it a residence? [DETECTIVE W ARD]: Yes. It s a row home. [STATE]: A row home? [DETE CTIVE WAR D]: Yes, sir. [STAT E]: And did he exit the front or the back do or? [DETE CTIVE WAR D]: The front do or. [STAT E]: And when you indicated -- you said you wa nted to detain him , how did you effectu ate that? [DETECTIVE W ARD]: How did we [STA TE]: Ho w d you do that? [DETECTIVE WAR D]: Actually, it was, two of m y partners identified themselves with Police, told them why we were there and that we were going to handcuff him. *** The Defendant, Williamson, was just handcuffed for our safety until we made entrance into the location of the home. [STAT E]: How fa r from the front doo r? [DETECTIVE WAR D]: Twenty, 20, 30 feet. No more than 30 feet. [STA TE]: Yo u -- had he reached h is car yet? [DETECTIVE WARD]: If I m not mistaken, he was just maybe putting the key in to open the doo r, or the, h is hand on the, on the door handle. [STAT E]: And how long did this all take from stopping him at the car and leading him to the front door of the house? [DETECTIVE WARD]: He was stopped at the car, and then we made entrance into the location, at which time Susan H ubbard was also deta ined for s afet y. We made our rounds through the house to make sure that it was clear. So it was probably no 2 more than 15 m inutes after he was first stoppe d at the car. [STAT E]: And the entry into the house, how was that effected? [DETECTIVE WAR D]: Front door was open, the screen door was open. We knock ed, identified ourselves as Po lice Officer and entered the location. Detective Ward also testified as to why Williamson was searched inside the house and not at the car and what occurred after entering the house: [STAT E]: Oka y. And wh y wasn t he searched at his car instead of being brought into the house to be searched? [DETE CTIVE WAR D]: Why wasn t he searched at his car? [STA TE]: Rig ht. Pursuan t to the search warrant. [DETECTIVE WARD]: Cause we hadn t read the search warrant, [or] Miranda statement . . . to the parties that were named in the warran t. [STATE ]: And is that your practice, to do that before you actually begin the search? [DETEC TIVE WA RD]: Yes, sir, it is. *** [STATE]: [W]hen was the first time the Defendant was Mirandized? [DETECTIVE WAR D]: Inside the house before we read the search war rant. Or, I m s orry, after we read the search w arrant. *** [STAT E]: And were you present when the search and seizure warrant was read? [DETEC TIVE WA RD]: Yes, I was. [STA TE]: An d did they hav e any question s about that? [DETECTIVE W ARD]: Not at that time. [STAT E]: Did they appear to you that they understood English? [DETECTIVE W ARD]: Yes, it did. [STAT E]: Prior to the, or during the course of the execution on the warrant, did you have an opportunity to have any kind of verbal conversation with Mr. Williamson? 3 [DETECTIVE W ARD]: Yes, sir, I did. [STA TE]: An d what w as that? [DETECTIVE WAR D]: I basically pulled him to the side, and I, and I said to him, you know, why we re here. We re not patrol detectives. The, w hich time h e stated he d id. I said, is there any drugs in the home? At whic h time, if memory serves me correct, he told me that there was a coffee can upstairs in the dresser, in the bedroom. [STATE]: And did you retrieve that coffee can? [DETECTIVE W ARD]: Yes. Yes, sir I did. [STATE]: And did you find narcotics in there? [DETE CTIVE WAR D]: Yes, sir. [STAT E]: Did you subsequently have more contact with him prior to any trans portation to th e Precinct? [DETECTIVE WAR D]: Aga in, I m not a hundred percent sure. Maybe. I kno w th at I had pulled him aside init ially, and we had spoken and we ma y have had a few more previous conversations but, basically, the search went on, and we recovered the rest of what was recovered at the home. On cross-examination, Detective Ward iterated that he believed Williamson resided at the house because the police had seen him there several times during their surveillance and because a confidential police informant had told them that Williamson lived there with Hubbard: [COUNSEL FOR WILLIAM SON]: To your knowledge, there was no evidence that M r. Williamson resided in that house; isn t that correct? [DET ECTIV E WA RD]: I w ouldn t say that. [COUNSEL FOR WILLIAM SON]: What evidence did you have that Mr. Williamson resided in that house? [DETECTIVE WARD]: I had seen him leave on several occasions before during surveillance, pre-surveillance of that search warrant, and I had information fro m my Reliab le Informant that he was, indeed, living there with Susan Hubbard. During the search, which took approximately forty minutes, the police discovered 4 three plastic baggies containing cocaine, including the baggie in the coffee can identified by Williamson, three hundred dollars, three straws containing residue, a pen cap containing residue, a clear bag containing a razor with residue, a black digital Tanita scale, and a plastic baggie contain ing num erous s mall un used b lue plas tic bagg ies. After completin g the search , the police esc orted William son to the N orth Point Police Station, where further interrogation occurred: [STA TE]: W as he transp orted to the P recinct? [DETEC TIVE WA RD]: Yes, sir, he was. [STAT E]: At the Precinct did you have an opportunity to speak to him again? [DETECTIVE W ARD]: Yes, I did. [STAT E]: And did you specifically advise him of his rights per Miranda? [DETE CTIVE WAR D]: I specifically did, yes, sir. *** [STATE]: And what questions did you ask him? [DETECTIVE WA RD ]: I as ked him, basically, if he lived at that location, and he stated to me that he did live there. [STATE]: Mm-hmm. [DETECTIVE WARD]: I asked him how long that he lived there and, if memory serves me right -- minute please -- I asked him how long ha d he lived there and, and in his handwriting he wrote 18 months. *** [STATE]: And what else did you ask? [DETECTIVE WAR D]: I then as ked him the bedroom upstairs, the master bedroom, wh o sleeps there? To w hich Mr. Williamson stated in writing, Me and Susan. [STATE]: And what else did you ask? 5 [DETECTIVE WAR D]: I then asked M r. Williamson, the safe in the bedroom closet, who does it belong to? Mr. Williamson stated in writing , It s min e. [STATE]: What else did you ask? [DETECTIVE WAR D]: I asked Mr. Williamso n, the drugs in the safe, who do they belong to? He again stated in writing, Me. I then asked Mr. Williamson who weighs and packages the drugs? Mr. W illiamso n replied , in his ha ndwr iting, I d o. I then finally asked Mr. Williamson, does Susan Hubbard sell cocaine for you? To which Mr. Williamson replied in writing, Yes. She sells drugs to help provide for the family, as well as the bills. Williamson was indicted on one count of possession of a controlled dangerous substance, cocaine, in violation of Article 27, Section 287 of the Maryland Code,3 one count of possession with the intent to distribute a controlled dangero us substan ce, cocaine , in violation of Article 27, Section 286 of the Maryland Code,4 and one count of possession of 3 Section 28 7 states in pertin ent part: Except as authorized by this subheading, it is unlawful for any person: (a) To possess . . . any controlled dangerous substance, unless such substance was obta ined directly, or pu rsuant to a v alid prescription or order from a practitioner, while acting in the course of his professional practice. Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 287. Section 287 was recodified without substantive change as Section 5-601 of the Criminal La w Article, Maryland C ode (2002). 2002 Md. Laws, Chap. 26. 4 Section 28 6 states in pertin ent part: (a) Prohibited conduct. Ex cept as auth orized by this subheading, it is unlawful for any person: 6 drug paraphernalia in violation of Article 27, Section 287A of the Maryland Code.5 Prior to trial, Williamson moved to suppress the drugs and paraphernalia recovered during the execution of the search warrant and the statements he made to police at the scene after he was detained and at the police station. Williamson argued that the application for the search warrant did not estab lish probab le cause fo r its issuance and that his detention during the search was an illegal arrest because the police actions exceeded the scope of the warrant, so that any of his statements would be inadmissible as the fruits of the illegal detention. Con vers ely, the State argued that the warrant did not lack probable cause, and even if probable cause was lacking, the police were acting under a good faith belief that the (1) To . . . possess a controlled dangerous substance in sufficient quantity to reasonably indicate under all circumstances an intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substan ce . . . . Md. Code (1957 , 1996 R epl. Vo l., 2001 S upp.), A rt. 27, § 286. Section 286(a)(1) was recodified without substantive cha nge as Section 5-60 2 of the Criminal Law Article, Maryland Code (2002). 2002 Md. Laws, Chap. 26. 5 Section 28 7A states in pertinent pa rt: (c) Use or p ossession w ith intent to use. It is unlawful for any person to u se, or to posse ss with inten t to use, drug paraphern alia to plant, p ropaga te, cultiva te, grow , harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, con ceal, inject, inge st, inhale, or otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled dangerous substance in violation of this subheading. Md. Code (1957 , 1996 R epl. Vo l.), Art. 27 , § 287A . Section 287A was recodified without substantive change as Section 5-601 of the Criminal Law A rticle, Maryland Code (200 2). 2002 Md. Laws, Chap. 21. 7 warrant was sufficient. The State also contended that the police officer s actions did not constitute a full-fledged arrest, but merely a temporary stop to search Williamson at the location specified in the warrant and that Williamson s statements should not be suppressed because they were not the fruits of an illegal detention. Judge Alexander R. Wright, Jr. of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County denied Williamson s motion to suppress his statements as fruits of an illegal detention and determined that the police were entitled to return Williamson to the house and detain him during the search. Williamson subsequently was convicted of possession of a controlled dangerous substance, cocaine, and possession with an inten t to distribute a controlled dangerous substance, cocaine, and sentenced to ten years imprisonment without the possibility of parole.6 Williamson noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, contending that Judge Wright erred in den ying his motion to suppre ss. Williamson argued that the search warrant was issued without probable cause and even if it were valid, the police were re quired to search him at the car and release him after the search revealed no drugs or paraphernalia. Williamson also argued that the police could not detain him during the search of the house.7 6 Williamson s first trial occurre d in December 2002, but resulted in a hung jury. In May 2004, he was retried and convicted. The State nol prossed the charge for possession of drug p arapherna lia at Williams on s secon d trial. 7 Before the Court of Special Appeals, Williamson presented three additional arguments: first, that the State was prohibited from impeaching Williamson by questioning him at trial about his prior conviction for possession of cocaine with an intent to distribute; second, that various docket entries must be corrected; and third, that the trial judge faile d to 8 In an unrep orted opinio n, the interme diate appella te court affirm ed, finding no merit in Williamson s arguments: Appellant s argumen t overlooks the fact that the application, which was based in part on three controlled purchases at the residence, contained overwhelming probable cause for the search of 8016 Wynbrook Road. There is simply no merit in the argument that [Williamson] was not in possession of any property described in the search w arrant because the State s case against [Williamson] involved constructive possession. As to the issue of whether appellant could be returned to the premises, in Cotton v. State, 386 Md. 249, 258-59 (2005), the Court of Appeals stated: [I]n executing a search warrant . . . for a premises . . . where the police are likely to encounter people who may well be dangerou s, they are entitled, for their own safety and that of others persons, to take command of the situation and, except for persons wh o clearly are unconnected with any criminal activity and who clearly present no potential dan ger, essentially immobilize everyone until, acting with reasonable expedition, they know what they are con frontin g. . . . It would be deci dedly unreasonable to expect the police simply to give a friendly greeting to the folks there and proceed to search the house without another thought as to who those people are or what they may do. We therefore reject [Williamson s] argument that his Fou rth Amendment rights were violated because he was ushered back into the residence. Williamson v. State, No. 826, Septem ber Term 2004, slip op. at 5-6 (filed August 17, 2006) exercise discretion in denying his motion to receive d rug treatme nt in lieu of incarceration. These arguments were rejected by the panel, and they were not presented in Williamson s petition for writ of certiorari; therefore, we do not consider them. 9 (emphasis in original). We granted Williamson s petition for writ of certiorari, which presented one question which we have rephrased:8 When the police are present at a residence to execute a search warrant, is it reasonable during the s earch to de tain an occupant who just had left the house? Williamson v. State, 396 Md. 9, 912 A.2d 646 (2006). We hold that an occupant who just left the house and was twenty to thirty feet away, can be returned and detained by police during the e xecution o f a search w arrant. II. Discussion In reviewing a Circuit Court s grant or denial of a motion to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment, we ordinarily consider only the information contained in the record of the suppression hearing , and no t the trial re cord. Whiting v. S tate, 389 Md. 334, 345, 885 A.2d 785, 791 (2005 ); State v. Nieves, 383 Md. 573, 581 , 861 A.2d 62, 67 (20 04); Laney v. State, 379 Md. 522, 533, 842 A.2d 77 3, 779 (2004); State v. Green, 375 Md. 595, 607, 826 A.2d 486, 493 (2003); State v. Rucker, 374 M d. 199, 207, 821 A .2d 439, 443-44 (2 003); 8 Williamson s question presented in his petition for writ of certiorari has been rephrased for purposes of clarity; it queried: Whether under Cotton v. S tate, 386 Md. 249, 872 A.2d 87 (2005), an individual can be ushered back into a house and detained during the execution of a search warrant where police are in possession of a warrant but have not yet approached the location to be searched simply because the individual was seen leaving the house tha t is the subject o f the warra nt. 10 Carter v. State, 367 M d. 447, 4 57, 788 A.2d 6 46, 651 (2002 ). Whe re, as here, the motion is denied, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favora ble to the prevaili ng part y on the m otion. Whiting, 389 Md. at 345, 885 A.2d at 791; Nieves, 383 M d. at 581, 86 1 A.2d a t 67; Laney, 379 Md . at 533, 842 A.2d at 779; Green, 375 Md. at 607, 826 A.2 d at 493; Rucker, 374 M d. at 207, 82 1 A.2d a t 444; Carter, 367 Md. at 457, 788 A.2d at 651-52. Although we extend great deference to the hearing judge s findings o f fact, we review independently the application of the law to those fac ts to determine if the evidence at issue was obtained in violation of law and, a ccordingly, sho uld be suppressed. Whiting, 389 M d. at 345, 88 5 A.2d a t 791; Nieves, 383 Md. at 581-82, 861 A.2d at 67; Laney, 379 Md. at 533-34, 842 A.2d at 779-80; Rucker, 374 Md. at 207, 821 A.2d at 44 4; Carter, 367 Md. at 457, 788 A.2d at 651. Williamson contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements made at the scene and at the police station after he was detained during the execution of the search warrant for the house. Williamson concedes that the officers had the right to stop and search him pursuant to the search warrant issued for his person but contends that the search warrant for his person is a red herring because the police did n ot search him when he was at the car. Williamson argues that the police were not entitled to take him back into the house and detain him during the search under Cotton v. State, 386 Md. at 249, 872 A.2d at 87, because there was no evidence that he resided at the location, and because he was in the process of leaving the house. 11 The State, co nversely, argues that the trial court did not err in denying Williamso n s motion to suppress. The State argues that the police had the right to stop Williamson, bring him back inside the house, and detain him while the search of the house was conducted, pursuant to Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.E d.2d 340 (1981 ). The State conte nds that the f act that Williamson was leaving the house an d was tw enty to thirty feet away when the police stopped him at his car does not affect the validity of the detention. The lawfulness of a detention of a perso n by police is go verned b y the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,9 made applicable to the States by the Fourteen th Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches and sei zures. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 -10, 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 1772, 135 L.Ed .2d 89, 95 (1996); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S . 1, 8-9, 88 S.C t. 1868, 1873, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 898 (1968). Th e Fourth Amen dment, however, is not a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but only against unreason able search es and s eizures . United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 , 105 S.Ct. 9 The Fourth Amendm ent to the United States Constitution provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const., Amend. IV. 12 1568, 1573, 84 L.Ed.2d 605, 613 (1985) (emphasis in original). Therefore, [t]he touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmen tal invasio n of a c itizen's pe rsonal s ecurity . Byndloss v. State, 391 Md. 462, 480, 893 A.2d 1119, 1130 (2006), quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S.Ct. at 1878, 20 L.Ed.2d at 904. Ge nera lly, any seizure of a person, whether by arrest or detention, must be supported by probable cause. Stanford v . State, 353 Md. 527, 532, 727 A.2d 938, 941 (1999), citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. at 700, 101 S.Ct. at 2593, 69 L.Ed.2d at 348. In Michigan v. Summers, the Court articulated one basis for the detention of an occupant of a dwelling which is being sea rched: a w arrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises w hile a proper search is conducted. 452 U.S. at 705, 101 S.Ct. at 2 595, 69 L.Ed.2 d at 351 . In that case, police, arme d with a valid search warrant, stopped Summers as he descended the front porch steps of a house that was going to be searched and took him back into the house, detained him during the search and after discovering n arcotics in the house, arrested and searched him, seizing drugs in his coat pocket. In addressing Summers s contention that probable cause was lacking for his detention, the Cou rt emphasized the fact that the detention was only an incremental intrusion of personal liberty, and that the search warrant provided an objective justification for the detention : Of prime importance in assessing the intrusion is the fact that the police had obtained a warrant to search respondent s house 13 for contraband. A neutral and detached magistrate had found probable cause to believe that the law was being violated in that house and had authorized a substantial invasion of the privacy of the persons who resided there. The detention of one of the individuals while the premises were searched, although admittedly a significant restraint on his liberty, was surely less intrusive than the search itself. Indeed, we may safely assume that most citizen s unless the y intend flight to avoid arrest wo uld elect to remain in order to observe the search of their possessions. Furthermore, the type of detention imposed here is not likely to be exploited by the officer or unduly prolonged in order to gain more information, because the information the officers seek norm ally will be obtained through the sear ch and not thro ugh the detentio n. *** We have already no ted that the de tention repre sents only an incremental intrusion on personal liberty when the search of a home has b een a utho rized by a valid warrant. The existence of a search warrant, however, also provides an objective justification for the detention. A judicial officer has determined that police have probable cause to believe that someone in the home is committing a crime. Thus a neutral magistrate rather than an office r in the field h as made th e critical determination that the police should be given a special authorization to thrust themselves into the privacy of a home. Summers, 452 U.S. at 701-03, 101 S.C t. at 2593-94, 69 L.Ed .2d at 349-50 (citations and footnotes omitted). Further, Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the Court, enunciated three law enfo rcement in terests, any of w hich could justify detention d uring the ex ecution of the search warrant: preventing flight in the event that incrimina ting eviden ce is found ; minimizing the risk of harm to the officers inherent in the execution of a warrant to search for narcotics [which] is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or 14 frantic efforts to co nceal or de stroy evidence ; and the orderly completion of the search [that] may be facilitated if the occupants of the premises are present, such that the detained occupant s self-interest may induce them to open locked doors or locked c ontainers to a void the use of force that is not only damaging to property but may also delay the completion of the task at hand. Id. at 702-03, 101 S.Ct. at 2594, 69 L.Ed.2d at 349-50. As the Court recognized, to justify such a detention, the occupant detained must have a sufficient nexus with the pla ce to be searche d such tha t the police ha ve a reason able basis to believe that the occupant has a connection with the criminal activity being investigated: [t]he connection of an occupant to that home gives the po lice officer a n easily identifiab le and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies a detention of that occupant. Id. at 703-04, 101 S.Ct. at 2594-9 5, 69 L.Ed.2d at 35 0. As a result, the Court held that it was lawful to require [Summers] to re-enter and to remain in the house u ntil evidence establishing p robable ca use to arrest h im was found. Id. at 705, 101 S.Ct. at 2596, 69 L.E d.2d at 3 51. This Court has had occa sion to interpr et Summers, most recently in Brown v. State, 397 Md. 89, 916 A.2d 245 (2007), when Ju dge Irma S. Raker , writing for the m ajority, stated: The clear rule that emerges from Summers, in the words of Professor LaFave, is th at po lice m ay always detain persons found at the premises name d in a search warr ant, provided (i) the warrant authorizes a searc h for contraband a nd (ii) the persons detained are occupa nts. 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.9 (e), at 726 (4th ed. 2004) ( emphas is in 15 original). See also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S . 93, 98, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 1470, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005) ( An of ficer s autho rity to detain incide nt to a search is categorical; it does not depend on the quantum of proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure. ) (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 705, n . 19, 101 S.Ct. At 2595, n.19)). The significance of this standardized procedure, as explained by Professor LaFave, is that even though the Supreme C ourt could have adopted an ad hoc, case by case approach, requiring an analysis of whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the perso n has com mitted or w as about to c ommit a crime, the Court has opted for a stand ardized pro cedure to avoid the necessit y of case-by-case decisionmaking by police and courts. 2 LaFave, supra at 726. Th e rule works well when the person detained is an owner of the residence or one who actually lives at the house. Problem s arise when the person detained is a visitor or bystander. 10 Brown, 397 M d. at __, 916 A.2d at __ . In this regard, th e record in the present cas e reflects that the police believed Williamson to be an occupant of the residence at 8016 Wynbrook Road. Detective Ward testified at the suppression hearing that he had witnessed Williamson entering and leaving the house several times during pre-warrant surveillance, an d that a confidential informant had told him that Williamson lived at the house with Hubbard. Williamson, however, attempts to distinguish the current factual situation from Summers by em phasizin g tha t he w as tw enty to thirty feet away from the house when the police executed the warrant so that he presented n o danger to the office rs to require re-entry and detention. Therefore, Williamson contends that the offic ers must ha ve released him after 10 Brown, 397 Md. at __, 916 A.2d at __, dealt w ith a visitor who approached the property being searched, and Cotton, 386 Md. at 253, 872 A.2d at 89, involved a bystander present when a search was conducted. 16 the search of his person failed to reveal any contraband, and that the detention during the search of the house was unreasonable. The Court of Special Appeals rejected these distinctions as inapposite, as do we. With respect to the argument that Williamson was outside of the zone of detention when he was twenty to thirty feet outside of the house, the Supreme Court in Summers did not identify in wh at proximity on e must be in order to have been found at the premises in order to justify detention. Our intermediate appellate court, however, has had the opportunity to address such a question. In Fromm v. State, 96 Md. App. 249, 624 A.2d 1296 (1993), when police arrived to execute a search warrant for an apartment, they saw Fromm, a known resident of the apa rtment to be searched, w alking out of a neighboring apartment building toward the parking lot. Judge Alan M. Wilner, now retired from this Court, writing for the intermediate appellate court in Fromm, opined that the detention of an occupant of a residence during the search was appropriate, even though the occupant was not in the premises to be searched when police arrived: When faced with factually similar situations, courts in other jurisdictions have consistently upheld detentions of persons found outside of dwellings to be searched. *** There is no dis pute, in the instant case, that appellant was the subject of a police investigation into illegal drug transactions, that he resided in the apartment that was specified in the search warrant, and that the police officers knew that he resided there and had been shown his picture. Although appella nt was not inside his apartment when the officers arrived to execute the 17 search warrant, he, like the defendants in the cited cases, was only a short distance away. The evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress established that he was heading out of a neighboring apartment building and toward the parking lot. In detaining appellant and transporting him the short distance to his apartment, the police officers promoted at least two legitimate law enfo rcement in terests set forth in Michigan v. Summers preven ting appellan t's flight and facilitating the orderly completion of the search. As the trial court expla ined, it is permissible to detain pe rsons in and about the premises that are specifically identified as having connection with the premises. And this defendant was specifically identified as being the owner or the lessee of th e premises. So that I think it was proper to bring him from outside inside during the condu ct of the search . Id. at 253, 255 -56, 624 A .2d at 1298 , 1299 (citation s omitted). T hus, proxim ity of an occupant to the place searched must be evaluated in the context of whether any of the three law enforcem ent interests articulated in Michigan v. Summers are present when the detention occurs. This balancing formula has been applied by our sister states as well as fed eral courts in validating or invalidating off-premises detentions of known occupants. In State v. Madsen, 5 P.3d 573 (N .M. C t. App.) , cert. denied, 4 P.3d 1240 (N.M. 2000), when police drove into the parking lot of a motel where they were going to execute a search warrant, they observed Madsen, who had been seen during surveillance entering the room to be searched, talking on a pay phone in front of the motel; the police stopped Madsen approximately 50 to 100 yards away from the room to be searched. After he was detained, Madsen admitted 18 to possessing a firearm; a s ubseque nt search rev ealed the firearm and several packages of drugs. The New Mexico intermediate appellate court affirmed the denial of Madsen s motion to suppress, emphasizing that his detention served to assure officer safety, to prevent Madsen s flight, and to facilitate an orderly completion of the search: Moreover, detaining Defendant advanced all three of the governmental interests outlined in Summers. First of all, the detention served the interest of protecting the officers. The officers testified that because they saw Defendant when they arrived at the motel and suspected him of being armed and dangerous, they decided to detain him at the pay phone for safety reasons. Moreover, because Defendant was standing o nly 50 to 100 yards from the motel room, he might have been in a position to observe the officers executing the search warrant or could have become aware of the execution of the search warrant upon returning to the room. Therefore, he posed a flight risk to the officers. Lastly, by detaining Defend ant, the offic ers could have obtained his cooperation and assistance during the search. Defend ant, however, argues that the detention was unlawful because he was not in the motel room w hen the officers arrived to execute the search warrant. Rather, he was using a pay phone on motel grounds, approximately 50 to 100 yards from the room to be searched. We conclude that, based on Defendant's close proximity and demonstrated connection to the room, the detention at the pay phone was reasonable under the circum stances . Id. at 577 ( citations omitted ). Moreover, in United States v. Fullwood, 86 F.3d 27 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 985, 117 S.Ct. 442, 136 L.Ed.2d 338 (1996), as the police approached a house to execute a search warra nt, they saw Poind exter, a known occupant of the residenc e, outside, gettin g into a vehicle. In assessing the reasonablene ss of the police detention, the U nited States Court 19 of Appeals for the Second Circuit accentuated the law enforcement interest in promoting officer s afet y: As the officers arrived to execute the warrant, Poindexter was outside the residenc e and w as entering a vehicle. It was permissible for the officers to require Poindexter to reenter his home and to detain him while they conducted a search of the premises pursuant to a valid searc h warran t. It was also prudent for the officers to h andcuff P oindexter u ntil they could be certain that th e situation w as safe. Id. at 29-30 (empha sis added) (citations omitted). Add ition ally, in State v. Ailport, 413 N.W .2d 140 (M inn. Ct. App. 1987), the police, just prior to executing a search warrant for a hotel room, stopped the room s occupant in the motel parking lot. T he interme diate appellate court affirmed the denial of Ailport s motion to suppress, emphasizing the law enforcement interests in p romoting office r saf ety, preventing flight, and preventing the destruction of evidence: This court finds that when appellant pulled into the motel parking lot at the same time the officers were about to execute the search warrant, the officers had justification to stop, frisk and detain appellant for at least three reasons: (1) to prevent flight in the event incriminating evidence was found when executing the search warrant on the motel room; (2) to prevent appellant from alerting or warning the occup ants of the motel room of the police's presence, which co uld lead to efforts to conceal or destroy evidence; and (3) minimize the risk of harm to officers, since appellant was believed to be armed and dangerous and had a prior felony record. *** Appellant was described to the officers as a very rough-looking 20 individual, who w as believ ed to be dange rous, was known to carry weapons, and believed to be a fence and involv ed in narcotics sales. Agent Edward 's affidavit submitted with the search warrant indicated appellant had a violent criminal history containing convictions for offenses of aggrava ted robbery, burg lary, narcotics, and possession of a firearm b y a felon. In light of appellan t's backgrou nd, his sudd en and ap parently unanticipated arrival immediately prior to execution of the warrant, and his nervous and furtive movem ents after observing the police, th ere w as re ason able justifica tion for the offic er's restrictive and forceful d etention an d seizure of appellant. Id. at 144. See also Commonw ealth v. Catanzaro, 803 N.E.2d 287, 293 (Mass. 2004) (stating that the detention of two occupants of an apartment who had just left and h ad walke d fifty to seventy feet down the driveway was justified based upon the law enforcement interest in preventing flight and co mpleting the search in an orderly fashion). Con vers ely, in Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F .3d 156 (3d Cir. 2001), Internal Revenue Services agents, arm ed with a s earch wa rrant, stopped Dr. Leve to in the park ing lot of his veterinary hospital. The agents drove D r. Leveto to his house and detained him and his wife while a search of the residence was conducted; subsequently, the agents return ed Dr. Le veto to the hospital and detained h im while a search of that location was conducted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found the tenets of Michigan v. Summers to be inapplicab le because the investigation involved alleged tax evasion and neither Dr. L eveto nor his wife p osed any da nger to officer safety or presented any flight risk, and because they were not needed to facilitate the orderly completion of the searches: A primary law enforcement interest served by such deten tion is the prevention of flight in the event that incriminating evidence 21 is found during the search. In this connection, the distinction between searches for contraba nd and searches f or evidence is material. It is not unco mmon for a search for contrab and to produce items that justify an immediate arrest of the owner or resident of the premises, and a person who anticipa tes that a search may imminently result in his or her arrest has a strong incentive to flee. By contrast, a search for evidence-particularly complicated documentary evidence--is much less likely to uncover items that lead to an immediate arrest. Thus, even if the search is successful, the suspect may well remain at liberty for some time until the evidence is examined and an indictment is obtain ed. As a result, the inc entive to flee is greatly diminished. In Dr. Leveto's case, the agents sought evidence of a suspected tax evasion scheme. A search of th is type is unlikely to produce an immediate arrest, and in this case, although the agents allegedly seized thousands of pages of documents and many computer files, . . . Dr. Leveto . . . was [not] arrested. Similarly, there was no compelling need to detain Dr. L eveto to protect the safety of the agents. If the agents had been conducting an in vestigati on in to a typ e of offense often accompanied by violence, detention for some length of time might have been reasonable. By the sam e token, if the agents had possessed inform ation that the Levetos w ere tied to a violent group or had vio lent backgrounds, detention for some period might have been justified. Here, however, there is no evidence that such a threat existed. Dr. Leveto was under investigation for tax crimes, and the alleg ed facts do not suggest that he had any ties to violent organizations or a record of violence. Accordingly, it does not appear that there was any compelling safety reason for detaining him during the lengthy search. Furthermore, Dr. Leveto's detention did little to advance the interest in orderly completion of the searc h. The ag ents apparently did not rely on Dr. Leveto to open locked doors or containers during the course of the search. Similarly, since Mrs. Leveto was at the Levetos' home, there was no apparent need for Dr. Le veto to b e prese nt at the h ome to provid e acces s. Nor was Dr. Leveto's extended detention necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence. 22 Id. at 170-71. Therefore, while Michigan v. Summers did not articu late a standard by which to judge the validity of a dete ntion based upon the d istance betw een the oc cupant detained and the premises to be searched, courts applying its tenets have evaluated off-premises detentions of occupan ts based upon their proximity to the location to be searched taking into consideration the law enforcement interests that were articulated to justify the detention. In the case sub judice, the police clearly articulated at the suppression hearing that Williamson, a known occupant of the residence, was stopped twenty to thirty feet away from the house out of concern for officer safety. This concern was recognized by the Supreme Court in Summers as compelling when a search warrant is executed for narcotics, as in the instant case. 452 U.S. at 703, 101 S.Ct. at 2594, 69 L.Ed.2d at 349 ( Less obvious, but sometimes of greater importance, is the interest in minimizing the risk of harm to the officers. Although no special danger to the police is suggested by the evidence in this record, the execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violen ce . . . . ). Because the police, to promote officer safety, detained Williamson immediately after he left the house , before he entered his car and drove away, police were justified in detaining him and bringing him back into the house during the search. In conclusion, the police were justified in returning Williamson to the house at 8016 Wynbrook Road, and detaining him during the search of the house, when he was leaving the residence and was twenty to thirty f eet a way f rom the house when the police executed the 23 warrant, and so, we hold that the trial court correctly denied Williamson s motion to suppress his statements. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRM ED WITH CO STS. 24
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