Casey v. Rockville

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Betty Brown Casey, Trustee v. Mayor and City Council of Rockville, No. 85, September Term 2006. ZONING LAW - HISTORIC DISTRICT ZONING - THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL ARE NOT REQUIRED, WHEN DESIGNATING AS HISTORICALLY/ARCHITECTURALLY SIGNIFICANT A PARTICULAR PARCEL OF PROPERTY, TO CONSIDER THE ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY OF PRESERVING THAT PROPERTY, EVEN WHEN THE DESIGNATION PROCEEDINGS WERE INSTITUTED IN RESPONSE TO A DEMOLITION PERMIT APPLICATION FILED BY THE PROPERTY OWNER - CONSIDERATION OF ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY IS RESERVED FOR THE CITY'S HISTORIC DISTRICT COMMISSION ONCE THE PROPERTY IS DESIGNATED FORMALLY AS WITHIN THE HISTORIC DISTRICT ZONE. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - THE TAKINGS CLAUSE - THE MAYOR AND COUNSEL'S REFUSAL TO CONSIDER THE ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY OF RENOVATION DURING THE HISTORIC DESIGNATION PROCEEDINGS DID NOT WORK A REGULATORY TAKING OF THE PROPERTY. Circuit Co urt for Mo ntgomery C ounty Civil Case No. 244757 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 85 September Term, 2006 BETTY BROWN CASEY, TRUSTEE v. MAYOR A ND CITY COUNC IL OF ROCKVILLE Bell, C.J. Raker Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by Harrell, J. Filed: July 30, 2007 This case invites examination of a decision of Respondent, the Mayor and Council of Rockville, Maryland, to designate as historically/architecturally significant and, as a result, place within Rock ville's histo rical distr ict, a certain piece of improved real property. The property at issue is an 11,300 square foot parcel of land located at 115 Park Avenue, at the intersection of Fleet Street and Park Avenue, and improved with a 1½ story bungalow (collectively the "Property") constructed approximately 80 years ago by one Henry Howes for J. Roger Spates and his wife, Annie E. Spates. The bungalow, now owned by the Betty Brown Casey Trus t,1 is commonly referred to in Rockville as the "Spates Bungalow." Because the historic designation of the Property may hinder subs tanti ally Petitio ner's ability to raze the bungalow in order to put the lan d to arguab ly a more eco nomically rewarding use,2 the Trust file d a petition in th e Circuit Court for M ontgomery County seeking judicial review of the historic designation action. The Circuit Court, on 15 October 2004, opined that the decision to place the Property in the historic district was not arbitrary on the record before it, but nevertheless remanded the matter to the Mayor and Co uncil in orde r to consider the economic feasibility of pre serving the bungalow . Accordin g to the Circ uit Court, the Mayor a nd Cou ncil erred in neglecting to consider this factor in th e course o f its deliberations on whether to designate the Property as historic. Upon appeal by the Mayor and Coun cil, the C ourt of Specia l Appe als, although agreein g with the Cir cuit C ourt's 1 2 The Petitioner in this case is Betty Brown Casey, acting in her capacity as Trustee. Due to urban ren ewal of d owntow n Rock ville occurrin g in the early 1970's and the Prop erty's close proximity to major roads, government buildings, and other office buildings, 115 Park Avenu e is well-po sitioned for r edevelop ment. conclusion as to the sufficiency of evidence supporting the Mayor and Council's decision concerning historical significance, reversed the Circuit Court's judgment remanding the matter. The intermediate appellate court reasoned that the Mayor and Council was not required to consider economic infeasibility of preservation when deciding whether to include the Property within the h istoric district. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the interm ediate appe llate court. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Since the date it was platted, the land upon which the Spates Bungalow is located has been linked for most of th e tim e to a rgua bly sig nific ant f igures in Roc kville his tory. Prior to construction of the bungalow, the land was part of a larger tract ("The Park")3 owned by Judge William Veirs Bouic, Sr., a prominent political leader during a period of rapid gr owth in Rockville in the mid- to late-19th century. Considered instrumental in securing selfgovernance for Rockville in 1860, Judge Bouic served as a Town Commissioner until 1867. Previously the State's Atto rney for M ontgom ery County and counsel to the B&O Railroad, he was appointed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County in 1867, and served in that capacity until 1882. By the end of Ju dge Bouic's judicial career, his only son, W illiam Veirs Bouic, Jr., also a residen t of "The P ark," 4 had himself beco me a prominen t civic leader. 3 "The Park" was platted originally in 1888, and consisted of a subdivision of 25 lots located immed iately adjac ent to the Agricu ltural So ciety Fair G round s in Ro ckville. 4 Bouic, Jr., constructed a home commonly referred to as "Boucilla" on a sizeable lot located west of Park Avenue. 2 Bouic, Jr., educated at the Rockv ille Academy and Columbian University in Washington, D.C., was admitted to the Bar of Maryland in 1870. During his illustrious career, B ouic, Jr., was Rockv ille's first Mayor un der the To wn Ch arter of 188 8, elected to the State Se nate in 1897, a presidential elector, and helped f orm the Maryland State Bar Association. M ARYLAND S TATE A RCHIVES, 110 M ARYLAND M ANUAL 178-79 (1898 ). Despite the land's historical roots prior to construction of the bungalow, it is the bungalow itself that was the main f ocus of th e current histo ric designation controversy. After the death of B ouic, Jr., his estate s old to Mr. and Mrs. J. Ro ger Spates two subd ivided lots located within "The Park." Constructed for the Spates family approximately in 1923, the bungalow is believed to have been the S pate s fam ily's pr imar y resid ence during R oger's term as Rockville's Mayor from 1926 to 1932.5 The Sp ates Bung alow is on e of the last two original structures remaining in what had been "The Park" subdivision. It is considered by some to be "an excellent and little-altered example of the Craftsman style of architecture" 5 This fact was disputed at the relevant administrative proceedings. Even though Petitioner argued that "no evidence was presented . . . that Mr. Spates actually even lived in" the Spates Bung alow, a s the intermediate appellate court noted, Petitioner's architectural history and preservation expert, Daniel Koski-Karell, Ph.D., posited that Spates resided at 115 Park Av enue dur ing his term as Mayor . Dr. Koski-Karell, in his research regarding the Prop erty, discovered that the electrical panel w ithin the house bears a 1929 ti me-sta mp. This lead him to believe that the house actually was constructed in 1929. Pinpointing the exact year of construction, howev er, is not material to the disposition of the issu es before this Court because it was the architectural style of the house that was responsible principally for the bungalow being designated as historic. Moreover, at this juncture, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the historic significance of the Property is not at issue. 3 popular in the 1890's to 1920's.6 J. Roger and Annie E. Spates sold the Property on 5 December 1949 to Berna rd and Catherine J. Poss wh o, in turn, sold th e Property in 1 954 to Mary E. Clemen ts Offutt. M rs. Offutt was the w idow of Lee Of futt, the M ayor of Roc kville from 1906-1916 and again from 1918-1920. After Mrs. Offutt's death in 1963, the executors of her estate sold the Property to Eugene B. Casey who, in 1990, along w ith his wife, B etty 6 This fact likew ise was in d ispute. Wh ile experts fo r Respon dent posited that the residential structure's unique Craftsman style gave the house its historical significance, Dr. Koski-K arell was of the opinion that "[t]he dwelling at 115 P ark is a derivation from a S ears House Bungalow design, which is itself a derivation from the C raftsman S tyle. The stylistic linkage be tween 11 5 Park an d the Craf tsman arch itectural style is twice-removed and may be fairly characterize d as attenuated and tenuous." According to the Maryland Historical Trust forms completed by the State Highw ay Administration ("SHA ") regarding 115 Pa rk Avenue, the Craftsman style was the dominant style for many modestly-sized homes during the time period between 1905 and the mid-1920's. Originating in southern California in the early 20th century, Craftsman bungalows were "characterized by low pitched, gabled roofs with wide overhangs; exposed roof rafters; decorative beams and braced under the gables; and porches supported by tapered square columns that extend to ground level." According to the record, experts that submitted testimony in favor of designating the Prope rty as historic believed that the Spates Bungalow's "wide eave overhangs, triangular knee braces at the gables, an inset porch with tapered square columns resting on solid square piers that extend to the ground, and a gabled dormer" were indicative of various decorative features common to the Craftsman style. We reiterate, however, that this background information on the Property is included here merely to illustrate th e character o f the record before us . The Co urt of Spe cial Appe als determined, as we will discuss infra, that Respondent's decision regarding the historical significance of the Spates Bungalow was reached in a quasi-judicial proceeding supported by substantial evidence. The sufficiency of the evidence supporting that conclusion is not at issue here. Rather, the challe nge here is b ased on th e theory that R esponde nts failed to consider an additional factor, the economic in feasibility of pres erving the P roperty, in determining whether to place the Property within the historic district zone. Subjecting redevelopment of the Property (and particularly the bungalow) to a host of additional governmental protections and considerations not pertaining to property not so designated is a conse quenc e of R espon dent's ac tion. 4 Brown Casey, as trustees, transfe rred the Pro perty to the Betty Brown C asey Trust ("Trust"). The Trust rema ins the current owner. From 1980 until 1999, the Property was leased to a Montgomery County surveyor who used the bungalow primarily for the purposes of storage and some office space.7 When the surveyor, due to the bungalo w's deteriorating condition, declined to renew his lease and vacated the premises in 1999, a structural engineer was engaged to evaluate the Prope rty. The engineer determined that rehabilitation of the bungalow would not be cost effective, and concluded that d emo lition of th e buildin g wa s app ropr iate. Specific ally, the engineer's report indicated that the bun galow w as unusab le for com mercial leasin g due to its extensive disrepair. The reco rd indica tes th at Pe tition er's consultants estimated th e costs of restoration 7 The Property, prior to its historic designation, was located in an "O-1 Office Building" zone. "The purpose of the O-1 Zo ne is to prov ide office s pace for p rivate, quasipublic and public uses and complemen tary service uses and to provide a transition between general commercial and residential uses." Rockville City Code § 25-272(i). Land located within an O-1 Zone permissibly may be used for the purposes of multi-family residential units; certain institutional uses such as education, child care, churches and other places of worship; commercial office space; industrial uses; medical and dental services; and retail and commercial services. Fo r a comple te list of the perm issible uses of land within the various zones established in Rockville, see the "Table of Uses" codified in Rockville City Code § 25296. Multi-family dwellings units may be constructed subject to a maximu m density of sixty units per acre, "except that the Planning Commission may approve the development of up to one hundred (100) units p er acre in acc ordance w ith the optional method proce dures . . . " as set forth in Rockville City Code § 25-32 6 (b) - (d). Rockville City Code § 25-326 (a). Other special development standards for residential uses exist throughout the code. See, e.g., Rockv ille City Code § 25-328 (providing for reduction of the minimum lot area per dwelling unit pursuant to the Moderately Priced Housing Ordinance). While retail and commercial services uses are permitted in the O-1 zone, the services may not occupy more than 25% of the gross square footage of the structure, and "shall not be visible from any public right-ofway exc ept a m ajor hig hway." R ockville City Cod e § 25-3 18. 5 of the house at approxim ately $293,08 6.20, that the a ssessed va lue of the re stored Prop erty would be $318 ,000, and th at the amount expended to achieve such a result could not be recouped easily through rental income derived from lease of the Property. This evidence regarding the economic feasibility of restoration, based on our perusal of the record, has not been met yet with contrary evidence.8 In light of this financia l picture, the T rust began the building demolition process in June 2001 by obtaining a preliminary forestry sign-off regarding the preservation of trees on the Prope rty. A formal demolition permit application was filed with the Rockville Planning Department on 7 September 2001. The application was accepted a nd entered into the perm it computer system on 17 September 2001. At the time of filing of the applicatio n, the Prop erty was not designated as being w ithin a mun icipal historic dis trict.9 Sometim e in September of 2001, Petitioner co ntends a rep resentative o f the City staff in formed it that all requireme nts 8 As we will describe infra, however, it does not appear that Respondent had any meaningful reasons for adducing contrary evidence, if such existed, at this poin t. Th e Cit y, from the onset of the historic designation p rocess, wa s of the op inion that eco nomic feasibility would not play a role in the present controversy until, if at all, the Property was designated as historic and consideration of the permit application to raze the bungalow pursued to a conclusion. Subsequent indications to this Court, as well as the courts below, suggest that Responden t would take issue w ith the methodology used in a rriving at Petitioner's cost estimates, namely the failure of those estimates to take into consideration the application of Rockville's "smart codes" that might reduce appreciably the cost of restoration. 9 The record indicates that the Property w as identified as a "historica l resource" a s early as 1986. Nonetheless, it had not been designated formally as a historic site. 6 for issuance of a demolition permit had been satisfied and that a permit would be issued shor tly. 10 On 2 October 2001, however, Petitioner was informed by letter that the perm it application remained pending, subject to review o f the Prop erty by the Rock ville Historic District Commission ("HDC ")11 regarding the historical/architectural significance of the bungalow. Accord ing to that letter, P eerless Ro ckville Histo ric Preservation, Ltd. ("Peerless Rockville"), a third-party, non-profit historic preservation group, nominated the Property for historic designation due to its link to prom inent historica l figures in the local gove rnment, 10 The record is unclear exactly who informed Petitioner tha t the permit w as ready to be issued. W anda Sh iers, a represen tative of the Trust who was responsible for filing the demolition permit application and pursuing the permit's issuance, posited at the 17 June 2002 hearing before Respondent that she began meeting with City staff in July 2001 regarding the Trust's desire to raze the bungalow, and was given a checklist of agencies and public utilities that had to sign off on the project before the demolition permit application could be filed form ally. Petitioner's counsel declaimed at the 1 6 October 200 1 Historic District Commission meeting th at, after the pro per utilities signe d off on the project an d the perm it application was filed, an unnamed individual from the City Planning Department informed Ms. Shiers and Casey Management, another representative of the Trust, that no plans were necessary because it w as only a demolition permit application and that the permit would issue after the Forestry D epartmen t reviewed the Prope rty. Ms. Shiers's rec ollection of the correspondence between representatives of the Trust and the City is consistent with Counsel for Pe titioner's st atemen ts. 11 The Rockville Historic D istrict Commission ("HD C") is a five-member entity created by Rockville City Code § 25-71 under the authority of Maryland Code (1957, 2003 Repl. Vol.), Article 66B, § 8.03(a). Th e primary fun ctions of the HDC are to review permit applications for sites located within the historic district commission, Rockville City Code §§ 25-237, 25-238, as well as to assist the City in identifying sites for cultural and historical designation. C ITY OF R OCKVILLE , E NVIRONM ENTAL G UIDELINES F OR THE P ROTECTION AND E NHANCEMENT OF THE C ITY'S N ATURAL R ESOURCES 24-25 (ad opted by M ayor and Co uncil of the C ity of Ro ckville, J uly 1999 ). 7 as well as its arch itectural appe al. The M ayor and Co uncil of R ockville requested, as a result, that the HD C evalua te the Prope rty and make a recomm endation re garding its eligibility for historic designation.12 The letter continued that "the City of Rockville's Environmental Guidelines recommend that buildings over 50 ye ars old be evaluated for historic significance to the City in the event of a demolition permit application." The HDC open meeting was scheduled for 16 October 2001, at which time the HDC would hear testimony from all interested parties.13 In the event that the HDC made a recommendation in favor of designation, the matter would be transmitted to Respondent for further action. At the 16 October 2001 meeting, the parties, in addition to representatives of Peerless Rockville, were giv en the opp ortunity to presen t testimo ny and o ther evid ence. The record indicates that, at this mee ting, Coun sel for Petition er submitted evidence , premised on an assessme nt comple ted by the prop erty manager of Casey Management, that renovating the Property to the point that it could again be leased for storage wou ld require extensive repair. Counsel for Petitioner requested at the conclusion of the meeting that the record remain open 12 The stated purpose of the Maryland Historic Area Zoning Act is "to preserve sites, structures, and districts o f historical, arch eological, or a rchitectural significance an d their appurtenances and environmental settings." Md. Code (1957, 2003 Repl. Vol.), Article 66B, § 8.01(b)(1). It is under this Act that Respondents, the Mayor and City Council of Rockville, are delegated the authority to designate zoning boundaries for the purposes of identifying as historic specific piec es of prop erty. Article 66B, § 8.02 ("[E]ach local jurisdiction may designate boundaries for sites, structures, or districts which are deemed to be of historic, archeolog ical, or architectural significance, by following the procedures of the local jurisdiction for establishing or chang ing areas and classifications of zoning."). 13 Public notice of the hearing was sent by mail on 9 October 2001 to all surrounding property owners and interested persons. 8 for three weeks in order to allow for submission of additional information so that the HDC would be apprised fully of the situati on befor e ma king its recom men datio n. Co unse l's request was granted, and the parties were allowed to submit additional information, including various reports by their respective experts regarding the historical and architectural significance of the Property, as well cost estimates for its restoration. It was during this time that the Trust su bmitted fu rther eviden ce sugge sting that it would not be financially feas ible to restore the bungalow on the Prope rty if it were placed in the his toric distr ict zone . After further consideration, the HDC reached a unanimous decision that the Property be designated as a single-site historic district and forwarded its formal rec ommen dation to tha t effect to Respondent on 18 D ecemb er 2001 . The HDC, in rendering its formal recommendation that the property be de signated as historically/architectu rally significant, acknow ledged brie fly evidence of the bungalow's disrepair. The HDC nevertheless found that "[t]he Spates Bungalow at 115 Park Avenue me[t] seven of the twe lve criteria for e ligibility as a single site historic district or landmark site" and forwarded the matter to the Mayor and Council. The HDC, in doing so, observed that Petitioner's takings and economic feasibility contentions were " beyond the sco pe of [ the HD C's] eva luation [ at this po int in the procee dings]." A meeting was held on 28 January 2002 during which Respondent considered the HD C's recommendation for historic designation. Respondent, at that time, authorized HDC staff to prepare, o ver the obje ction of Pe titioner, an application for a proposed map amendment to include 115 Park Avenue within Rockville's historic district. A Historic 9 District Sectional Map Amendment Application was filed on 12 February 2002.14 The matter was referred to th e Rockv ille Planning Commission.15 A hearing date before the Mayor and Counc il was set. 16 The Planning Commission held its hearing on 8 May 2002 in order to consider the proposed map am endmen t and recom mended against re-zo ning the P roperty from O-1 to O -1 HD (H istoric District).17 The Mayor and Council held its hearing on 17 June 2002 to determine whether the Property should be placed in the Historic District Zon e. Petitioner again objected to the designation and presented additional testimony that the costs of restoring the Spates 14 Section 25-117 of the Rockville City Code requires that an application for a sectional or comprehensive map amendm ent (as opposed to a local zoning map amendment) be submi tted only b y the Plan ning C omm ission o r by the C ouncil. 15 The Planni ng Co mmiss ion is ch arged, inter alia, with the task of reviewing and making recommendations to the Mayor and Council regarding all applications for map and text amendm ents filed w ith the City Clerk . Accordin g to § 25-1 24 of the R ockville C ity Code, a copy of any map amendment application shall be sent to the Planning Commission. The C omm ission m ay subm it a recom mend ation fo r review by the M ayor and Coun cil. 16 Pursuant to § 25- 123 of the Ro ckville C ode, "[u]pon acceptance for filing of any [map amendment] application . . . , the City Clerk shall set the application for a hearing by the Council at a specified date, time and place, and cause public notice thereof to be given in accordance with the requirements of State law." Under the City Code, "[n]o application [for a zoning amendment] . . . may be granted unless a public hearing shall have been held thereto in accorda nce with th e requirem ents of State law," at which all parties in interest and citizens have an opportunity to be heard. Rockville City Code § 25-93. 17 The historic desig nation "act[ s] as an ove rlay for a specif ic parcel or assemblage of properties, [and] is placed on top of the underlying zone or zones, in the present case a Euclidian zone." Maryland Overpak C orp. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 395 Md. 16, 28, 909 A.2d 2 35, 242 (2006). Th e underlying zone, the O-1 zone in this case, remains on the o ffic ial Zonin g M ap fo r the City of Rockville, subject to the additional regulations conseq uential to the histo ric desig nation. Id. 10 Bungalow outweighed the added value of the bungalow to such a degree that the difference could no t be recou ped through rental inc ome derived from the revita lized Prop erty. 18 Respondent held another public meeting on 12 May 2003 and voted to leave open the record through 30 May 2003 for the parties to submit additional information. Respondent directed HDC staff on 27 May 2003 to prepare a proposed Ordinance to Grant Map Amendment Application establishing the sing le-site historic district encompassing 115 P ark Avenue. It was the Mayor and Council's announced intent that the ordinance be introduced at its General Session meeting to be held on 9 June 2003.19 The ordin ance in fac t was introduced on 9 June 2003. It was adopted unanimously by the Mayor and Council on 14 July 2003. Pe rtinent prefa tory parts of O rdinance N o. 19-03, in a ddition to pla cing emp hasis on the relative historic prominence of the previous owners of the land on which the bungalow is located, recited the following procedural and explanatory reasons for adoption: WHEREAS, the subject property was evaluated for historic, architectural and cultural significance to the City of Rockville, and the Historic District Commission found that the 18 McShea & Company, Inc., a commercial real estate company, opined that the maximum feasible $12 per squ are foot m onthly rent deriv ed from th e restored b uilding w ould be insu fficien t to recou p the ex tensive costs of renova tion. 19 A General Session is an open meeting conducted by R esponde nt to which all residents are invited to a ttend. The u ltimate goal of such a meeting is to invite citizen participation in the decision-making process and to open lines of communication between the citizens and the municipal government by allowing c itizens to prese nt their issues d irectly to the Mayor a nd Cou ncil. Rockv ille City Go vernm ent, Frequently Asked Questions: Council-Manager Form of Government, at http://www.rockvillemd.gov/FAQ/formofgov.htm (last visited 25 April 2007). 11 property met the criteria for local historic designation and recommended its placement in the Historic District; and WHEREAS, the Mayor and Counc il gave notice that a public hearing on said application would be held by the Mayor and Counc il of Rock ville in the Coun cil Cham bers in Ro ckville on the 17th day of June, 2002, at 7:30 pm, or as soon thereafter as it may be heard, at which parties in interest and citizens would have an opportunity to be heard, which notice was published in accorda nce with the requirements of Article 66B of the Annotated Code of Maryland; and WHEREAS, on the 17th da y of June, 20 02, the said application came on for hearing at the time and place provided for in said advertisement; and * * * * * WHEREAS, . . . The house known as the "Spates Bungalow" was built in 1923 and is in near original condition. The house has the hallmarks of the vernacular craftsmaninspired style of architecture: wide eaves with knee brackets, clapboard siding, exposed rater tails on the porch and dormer roofs, multi-paned windows used sing ly, paired and in strings of three, smaller casement windows flanking the fireplace, and a rusticated concrete block f ounda tion wh ere exp osed. The front porch, with a stepped lintel beam framing the porch opening, the short tapered squ are woo den colum ns on brick piers, and the flanged trim with suggestions of horizontal supports separating the beam from the clapbo ard, contain s most elem ents of popular craftsman style. The house embodies a distinctive character of a different time and place, and serves as a historical reminder of an early subdivision that has all but disappeared. It is one of only two structur es left o f "The Park." * * * * * The house is a representative bungalow built in the 1920's for a M ayor of Roc kville. This house form became a national expression of craftsmanship, healthful and functional 12 living and simp le beauty that harm onized w ith suburban, urban or rural surroundings. Mr. Spates had his bungalow built b y a local bu ilder in th e style of th e day in h is small to wn . . . . Absent from the o rdinance e stablishing the historic district was any apparent consideration of the financial feasibility of preserving the bungalow. As a result of the designation, the Property became subject to the requirements of §§ 8.01 - 8.17 of Article 66B of the Maryland Code, which restricts substantially Petitioner's ability to alter, develop, or, as in the present case, demolish the bungalow. Petitioner filed on 7 A ugust 200 3, pursuan t to § 25-100 of the Rockville City Code,20 a Petition for Judicial Review in the Circuit Court fo r Montg omery Cou nty. The Circu it Court issued on 15 O ctober 200 4 its memorandum opinion. The court ruled first that "[t]he [re-zoning] or altering the zoning of property is a valid legislative exe rcise of the p olice power by the Mayor a nd City Cou ncil" and determined, as a result, that the Mayor and City Council's decision would be upheld if based upon "substantial" or "fairly debatable" evidence. The Circuit Court concluded summarily that the finding of historical significance was neither arbitrary nor capricious, and affirmed the findings of the M ayor and Co uncil in that respect. In the second p ortion of its opinion, however, the court found legal error in "the failure of the Mayor and City Council to consider [in determining whether to designate the 20 Section 25-100 of the Rockville City Code provides that "[a]ny person aggrieved by a decision of the Council on any application for an amendment to the zoning map or by any decision by the Coun cil adopting or amending the [Master] Plan may appeal such decision to the C ircuit Co urt for th e Cou nty in acco rdance with th e Mar yland Ru les . . . ." 13 Property within the historic district zone] the unrefuted evidence submitted by Petitioner[] which established that it is not economically feasible to renovate the buildin g . . . ." The court therefore re manded the matter to the Mayor and City Council for consideration of that eviden ce. Petitioner noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Respondent noted a cross-appeal o n 19 Nov emb er 20 04. P etitio ner took issue with the Cir cuit C ourt's conclusion that the findings of architectural and historical significance were supported by substantial eviden ce. Respondent challenged the decision to remand to consider the economic infeasibility of renovation. The intermediate appellate court considered the following questions in the appea l and cross-a ppeal: 1. When the Mayor and Co uncil re-zon ed the sub ject property to the 0-1HD . . . zone was it exercising its " quasi-judicia l" factfinding function or a legislative function? 2. Was the Mayor and Council's decision to re-zone the T rust's property to the 0-1HD zone supported by substantial evidence? 3. Did the circuit court err when it remanded the case so that the Mayor and Co uncil could consider th e econom ic feasibility, vel non, of renovation of the Spates Bungalow? The Court of Special A ppeals filed its unreported opinion o n 9 Aug ust 2006. The intermediate appellate court determined first that the Mayor and Council, when it designated the Property as within the historic district, did so as the result of a quasi-judicial process. The reasoning behind this conclusion was that, because the matter concerned the re-zoning of an individual lot, and because the Mayor and Council permitted all parties to introduce evidence 14 in a judicial-like h earing, the ac tion taken b y Respond ent fell within the "piecemeal" catego ry of zoning actions traditionally reached after a quasi-judicial process. The nex t step in the Court of Special A ppeals's a nalysis, theref ore, w as to dete rmin e wh ethe r the Cou ncil's decision to re-zone the Property was supported by "substantial evidence." The cou rt determined that it was supported by su ch ev iden ce, th us ag reein g with the Cir cuit C ourt's conclusion in that regard. The court expla ined that, although the architectural and historical significance of the Pro perty was at lea st debatable , a rational fac t-finder in the Mayor and Cou ncil's position reasonably could conclude on the evidence before it that the Property was worthy of designation. The e videntiary sufficiency for this conclusion is not challenged before this C ourt. The Court of Spec ial Appeals's opinion as to the third issue , however, bears the brunt of a substantial p ortion of the challenges by Petitioner befo re us. The intermediate co urt concluded that "the only issu es essential to the council's determination of w hether a structure 'should' be preserv ed is the histor ic, archaeolo gical, or archite ctural signific ance of the structur e." "Financial hardship and economic feasibility," according to the court, "are reserved for the determ ination by the loc al historic district co mmission who is ex plicitly empowered to decide whether demolition or alteration of the structure should be allowed despite such significance." The intermediate court therefore reversed the judgment of the Circuit C ourt an d restore d to its or iginal fo rce the a ction of the M ayor and City Cou ncil. 15 The Trust filed tim ely with us a P etition for W rit of Certiora ri to review the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. We granted the petition on 6 December 2006, 396 Md. 9, 912 A.2d 646 (2006), and shall consider the following questions:21 1. Whether the Mayor and City Council of Rockville were required to consider, when determining whether to designate as historic a particular piece of property pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 20 03 Rep l. Vol.), Article 66B, §§ 8.01 - 8.17, the econom ic feasibility associated with preserving that property if so designated and, if required, whether the failure to do so constituted a regulatory taking of the Property without just compensation?22 21 The questions framed in this opinion are reworded from their original form in the Petition in order to express our understanding of the issues actually before us. The questions presented in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari were: 1. Whet her Ar ticle 66B § 8.01 e t seq., of the Maryland Annotated Code p recludes the Rockv ille Mayor an d Coun cil from considering econo mic feasib ility and financial h ardship when reviewing properties for historic designation and whether such an analysis is appropriate where the trigger for the review is a demolition permit application? 2. Whether the process followed by the City of Rockville in withholding Petitioners' dem olition perm it, pending h istoric review of the Property by the [HDC] and consideration of the map amendment to place the property in the historic district by the Mayor and Council, violated Petitioners' procedural due process rights? 22 Petitioner's brief, to our readin g, is s ome wha t unc lear i n this reg ard. P etitio ner's brief is divided into two portions. The first addresses whether the initial withholding of the permit, pending review by the HDC and Respondent of historical significance, violated Petitioner's right to procedural due process. The second major heading addresses whether the Mayor and Counc il was requ ired to cons ider financ ial hardship a nd econo mic feasib ility when reviewing the Properties for historic designation. Although the portions of the brief (continued...) 16 2. Where the trigger for review of historical significance is a demolition permit application, and the subject property is not designated as historic prior to the filing of such an application, but has been on the municipality's list of historic resources since 1986, does the withholding of issuance or final action on the permit application, pending review of the Property by the Historic District Commission and the M ayor and Co uncil, deprive the applicant o f a constitutio nally protected p roperty interest without due process of law?23 We answer both questions in the negative and therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. DISCUSSION A. Regulatory Takings and Consideration of the Economic Feasibility Associated With Iden tifying and Pr eserving Historica lly Designated P roperty 1. The Mayor and Council are Not Required to Consider Economic Feasibility at the Time of Historical Designation. Petitioner argues first that "[Article 66B, §§ 8.05 - 8.10, (the statutory scheme governing historic district development permits)] do[es] not . . . address situations such as the instant one, where a pro perty owner, not located in an historical district and upon whose property no historic designation restrictions then apply, files a demolition permit application 22 (...continued) pertaining primarily to economic feasibility do not refer in so many words to a regulatory takings thesis (Petitioner tackles that issue in the former section of its brief), Petitioner makes specific allusion to impairment of the econo mic viability of the Pro perty as a result of historic design ation. 23 As already indicated, the somewhat circular nature of the reasonin g in Petitioner's brief sheds little light on the substance of its argument beyond the "obvious shortcomings" alleged by Petitioner with regard to the action of the Mayor and Council and the analyses of the Circ uit Cou rt and C ourt of Specia l Appe als. 17 . . . and is then informed that the perm it will be then w ithheld until the property is evaluated for historical significance. In such cases, [according to Petitioner,] the issue of the underlying permit to demolish the structure must not be ignored in the designation process before the local legislature, and evidence relevant to the issue of demolition, such as econom ic feasibility and financial hardship, must not be precluded from consideration as was done in this case." Before approaching the merits of this argument, we pause to examine the procedures by which a property, under normal circumstances, may be designated as worthy of historic s ignifica nce fo r land u se purp oses, as well as the c onseque nces of h istoric designation as it relates to the procedures an applicant must follow in obtaining a permit for construc tion, alteratio n, or dem olitio n of improve men ts or s tructures on t he prope rty. It is well-settled that the adoption and administration of zoning procedures are an exercise of police power delegated to specific individual political subdivisions and municipalities of the State. Maryland Overpak Corp. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 395 Md. 16, 26, 909 A.2d 235, 241 (2006) (citing Superior Outdoor Signs, Inc. v. Eller Media Co., 150 M d. App. 47 9, 494, 822 A.2d 47 8, 506 (20 03); Mayor & Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enters., Inc., 372 Md. 514, 542, 814 A.2d 469, 486 (2002)). As we stated in Rylyns, [t]racing the entire panoply of re lated enablin g statutes in Maryland is a tad complex. The provisions empowering municipal corporations in Maryland are contained in Maryland Code (1957, 1998 R epl. Vol.), A rticle 23A, a nd with regard to home rule pow ers specifica lly, Art. 23A, § 9. Similar provisions detailing the pow ers for non -charter cou nties are fou nd in 18 Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2002 Supp.), Article 25. Further complicating the matter, the au thority of the counties of Montgom ery and Prin ce G eorg e's ar e con trolle d by Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2002 Supp .), Article 28. The land use provisions of Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2002 Supp.), Article 66B pertain prim arily to Art. 23A municipalities and Art. 25 non-charter co unties, although certain provisions apply to Ma ryland C ode (19 57, 199 8 Rep l. Vol.), A rt. 25A charter counties, as well as to Montgomery and Prin ce G eorg e's Counties, Art. 66B, §§ 1.02 and 7.03, and also to the City of Baltimore, Art. 66B, §§ 2.01-2.13 and 14.02. Rylyns, 372 Md. at 528, 814 A.2d at 476-77. Thus, empowered political subdivisions may adopt zoning pr ocedures for design ating as histor ic an ar ea or a par ticul ar pa rcel o f pro perty. See, e.g., Article 66B, § 8.02 ("For the purposes of this subtitle,24 each local jurisdiction may designate boundaries for sites, structures, or districts which are deemed to be of historic, archaeolo gical, or architectu ral significance, by following the procedures of the local 24 The stated purpose of any ordinance or resolution , adopted p ursuant to th e authority delegated by Article 66B, establishing a historic district or otherwise amending an existing district to includ e a certain pie ce of prop erty is to: (1) Safeguard the heritage of the local jurisdiction by preserving sites, structures, or districts which reflect elements of cultural, social, economic, political, archeological, or architectural histo ry; (2) Stabilize and improve the property values of those sites, structures, or d istricts; (3) Foster civic beauty; (4) Strengthen the local economy; and Promote the preservation and appreciation of those sites, structures, and districts for the education and welfare of the residents of each local jurisdiction." Article 6 6B, § 8 .01(c). 19 jurisdiction for establishing or changing areas and classifications of zoning."). The City of Rockv ille exercised its g rant. The historic designation process in Rockville ordinarily begins with the nomination of a property for historic designation. Although nomination originates, in most cases, with the property owner or an interested governmental authority, such as the Historic District Commissio n, sometimes a property is nominated by a third party, e.g., Peerless Rockville. According to the City of Rockville's "Historic District Eligibility Information" website, furthermore, it is the HDC's policy that "[a] structure that is the subject of a demolition application and is at least 50 years of age is automatically reviewed by Historic Preservation Office staff and the Historic District Commission (HDC) for significance to the City under the Enviro nmen tal Guid elines." City of Ro ckville, Historic District Eligibility Information, at http://www.rockvillemd.gov/historic/hd-criteria.html (last visited 11 May 2007). The Property (including the more-than-50-year-old Spates Bungalow) in the present case, in addition to being no minated b y Peerless Ro ckville, was the subject o f a demo lition permit applica tion. After receipt by the City of a nomination or the filing of a demolition permit application for an apt property, HDC staff evaluates the property in order to determine if it is eligible for designatio n. City of Rock ville, Historic District Eligibility Information, at http://www .rockvillemd .gov/historic/flowchart.html (last visited 11 M ay 2007). Th is process, at a minimum, involves a review of the H istoric Buildings Inventory maintained by 20 the City, as well as any Maryland Historic Trust documentation that may exist regarding the prop erty. Id. An eva luation meeting is scheduled for the next HDC meeting following completion of the review, w hich mee tings occur every third Th ursday of the month, w ith notice sent to the co mmission ers, the prop erty owner, an d all neighb ors within a quarter-mile radius of the p roperty. Id. If the nomination is uncontested, the HDC makes a recommendation pertaini ng to elig ibility for h istoric de signatio n. Id. This recommendation is transmitted for the Mayor and Council's review. If the nomination is contested, howev er, the HDC holds the re cord ope n for subm ission of ad ditional evide nce and th e evaluative decision carries over until another HDC meeting. After the subsequent meeting, the HDC provid es a wr itten rep ort to the Mayor and C ouncil. Id.25 In the event the HDC evaluation favors designation, the process continues with an application to amend the e xisting zonin g ma p. A prop osed ame ndm ent to the C ity's zoning map may take one of three forms: (1) a local amendment pertaining to a single parcel of land; (2) a sectional amendment covering a certain portion of the City; or (3) a comprehensive amendm ent, which co vers the entire City. Rockv ille City Code § 25-116. In the event of a local amendment, the application may be initiated by any municipal agency or any person with a finan cial or pr oprietar y interest in the pro perty. Rockville City Code § 25-117. If the 25 In the present case, the HD C evaluated the Pro perty at the 16 October 2001 HDC meeting, kept the record open at the request of Petitioner, and rendered on 18 December 2001 its final written recomm endation to the Mayor and Council that the Property was eligible for designation. 21 proposed amendment is either sectional or comprehensive, the applicatio n may be filed only by the City Planning Com mission or the M ayor and Council. Id. The City Clerk, upon acceptance of the application, transmits a copy to the Planning Commission. The Commission then completes an independent analysis of the property and submits to the Mayor and Counc il a recomm endation a s to wheth er it should be designated as historic. Th is document is included in the record and is considered by the Mayor and Council in reaching its final d ecision conce rning th e applic ation. R ockville City Cod e § 25-1 24. Approval by the Mayor and Council is required before any map amendment application may be g ranted. Action must be preceded by notice and a public hearing before the Mayor and Council, where all interested persons or entities have an opportunity to present their respective positions on the matter. Rockville City Code § 25-93.26 At the public hearing, "[t]here shall be a complete stenographic report of the testimony at the hearing, and a typewritten transcript thereof with all exhibits admitted at the hearing, together with the application, all staff and Planning Commission memoranda and recommendations in relation thereto and a list of those persons registering their appearance, shall promptly be incorporated by the Clerk in the application file and shall be considered a part of the record on the a pplicatio n." Ro ckville C ity Code § 25-93 (b)(3). Within 90 days of the da te of the 26 Upon filing of an application with the City Clerk, the City Clerk sets the application for hearing w ith the Mayor and Council. Rockville City Code, § 25-123. Written notice of the hearing must be sent at least 15 days before the date of hearing to the owners of the target property as well as to all owners either within the area of or immediately adjacent to the property, depending on the type of amendment proposed. Rockville City Code, § 25-122. 22 last hearing, un less the M ayor and Co uncil adopts a resolution stating otherw ise, Rockv ille City Code § 25-125, the Council "shall provide written notice of its decision on any application by first class mail to the applicant, the Planning Commission, and to any other person who has registered an appearance in writing prior to decision by the Council." Rockville City Code § 25-95. The only legislatively-declared criteria for designation of a property as historic is set forth in Artic le 66B , § 8.02, which states that "[f]or the purposes of this subtitle, each local jurisdiction may designate boundaries for sites, structures, or districts which are deemed to be of historic, archaeological, or architectural significance . . . ." What exactly constitutes "historical . . . or architectural significance" is not elucidated by the statute, but we glean from the record made before the HDC, Planning Commission, and the Mayor a nd Cou ncil in the present case that these governmental entities typically consider twelve characteristics of a property in reaching a decision concerning designation.27 As to historical and cultural significanc e, the City consid ers wheth er a proper ty: 27 The HDC's recommendation, for example, alluded to the fact that the Pro perty satisfied seven of the twelve criteria for eligibility for historic designation. Ordinance No. 19-03 granting the map amendment application, furthermore, stated that "WHEREAS, the subject property was evaluated for historic, architectural and cultural significanc e to the City of Rockville, and the Historic District Commission found that the property m et the criteria for local historic designation and recommended its placement in the Historic District . . . ." (emphas is added). The ordinance included the following language: "The house embodies a distinctive character of a different time and place, and serves as a historical rem inder of ea rly subdivision that has all but disappeared." This language follows closely the language used in the checklist recounted above. 23 (1) Has character, interest, or value as p art of the de velopme nt, heritage or cultural characteristics of the City; (2) Has character, interest, or value as part of the development, heritage or cultural characteristics of the Co unty; (3) Has c haracter, interest, or value as part of the developm ent, heritage or cultural characteristics of the State; (4) Has character, interest, or value as part of the development, heritage or cultural characteristics of the Nation; (5) Is the site of a significant historic event; (6) Is identified with a person or a group of persons who influenced society; or (7) Exemplifies the cultural, economic, social, political or historic heritage of the Country and its communities. As to arch itectural and d esign signif icance, the C ity looks to wh ether a prop erty: (1) Embodies the distinctive characteristics of a type, period or method of construction; (2) Represents the w ork of a master; (3) Possesses high artistic va lues; (4) Re presents a significant and distinguishable entity whose components may lack individual distinction; or (5) Represents an established or familiar visual feature of the neighborhood, community or county du e to its singular physical characteristic or landscape. City of Ro ckville, Historic District Designation Criteria Checklist (1999), at http://www.rockvillemd.gov/historic/HD-criteria.pdf (last visited 11 M ay 2007); see also City of R ockville , Historic D i s t ri c t E l i g ib i l i t y In f o r m a t i o n , at http://www .rockvillemd .gov/historic/h d-criteria.html. The econom ic feasibility of renovation is nowhere indicated as a required consideration f or the threshold determina tion whether a site is worthy of h istoric design ation. If the Ma yor and Co uncil conc ludes that a p roperty is historically significant, it passes an ordinance granting the zoning amendment application. The resultant historic designation acts as an ov erlay zoning o f the prope rty, and is placed on the top o f the ex isting zo ne. 24 A decision to p lace a parce l of proper ty within a historic district impacts directly the degree of latitude the property owner possesses in deciding how be st to utilize his, her, o r its land and improvements. The property becomes subject to Maryland C ode (195 7, 2003 R epl. Vol.), Article 66B, §§ 8.05 - 8.10. Pursuant to that regulatory scheme, "[b]efore a person may construct, alter, reconstruct, move, or demolish a site or structure located w ithin [the] designated district of [the ] local ju risdiction , . . . the person shall file an application with the historic district commission or historic preservation com mission." Article 66B, § 8 .05(a); see also Rockville City Code § 25-237 ("Applications for Historic District permits shall be submitted to the Historic D istrict Comm ission. Each application s hall be submitted on forms provided therefore by the Historic District Commission . . . ."); Rockville City Code § 25-238 ("All applications for Historic District permits shall be considered and acted upon by the Historic District Com mission in acco rdance w ith the provisio ns of State la w applica ble to such permits [(Artic le 66B , §§ 8.05 - 8.17)]." ). When the HDC receives an application for a demolition permit, for example, it will consider and either approve or reject the application, Article 66B, § 8.05(b), pursuant to a set of "guidelines" enumerated in § 8.06. The permissible consideration s are aime d at th e ext erna l fea tures of the prope rty, 28 Article 66B, § 8.07(a), and are governed by the following guidelines: 28 The term "external features" refers generally to the "appearance, color, texture or materials, and architectural design of the exterior" o f buildings located on the historically significant proper ty. Faulkner v. Town of Chestertown, 290 Md. 214, 224, 428 A.2d 879, 883 (1981) (citing A RDEN H. R ATHKOPF & D AREN A. R ATHKOPF, T HE L AW OF Z ONING AND P LANNING § 15.01 (4th ed. 197 5)). 25 (a) Guidelines.- (1) A local jurisdiction shall adopt guidelines for rehabilitation and new construction design for designated sites, structures, and districts that are consistent with those generally recognize d by the M aryland Histo rical Trust. (2) (i) The guidelines adopted under this section may include: 1. Design characteristics intended to meet the needs of particular types of sites, structures, and districts; and 2. Identification of categories of changes that are so minimal in nature that they do not affect historic, archeological, or architectural significance and require no review by a historic district commission or historic preservation commission. (ii) A historic district commission or historic preservation commission shall use the guidelines in the commission's review of applications. (b) Review of application.- In r eviewi ng app lication s, a commission shall consid er: (1) The histo ric, archeological, or architectural significance of the site or structure and its relationship to the historic, archeological, or architectural significance of the surrounding area; (2) The relationship of the exterior architectura l features of the structure to the remainder of the structure and to the surrounding area; (3) The general compa tibility of exteri or desig n, scale , proportion, arrangement, texture, and materials proposed to be used; and (4) Any other factors, including aesthetics, which the historic district commission or historic preservation commission considers pertine nt. Article 66B, § 8.06 (emphasis added). Unless the HDC is persuaded that the proposed action "will not materially impair the historic, archeological, or architectural significance of the site or structure," it must reject the permit application. A rticle 66B, § 8.09(a)(2). In the case of a historic demolition permit application, the HDC, in conjunction with the applicant, is obligated expressly to attempt to formula te an econ omically feasible plan for preservation of the property. Article 66B, § 8.09(a)(1). If no economically feasible plan initially is agreed upon, the HDC has 90 da ys from that da te to "negotia te with the owner and 26 other parties to find a means of preserving the site or structure." Article 66B, § 8.09 (b). In the event that no alternative can be negotiated by the parties, the HDC may approve proposed construction, reconstruction, alteration, moving , or demolition , despite the fa ct that the cha nges [ap ply to a historically designated property], if: (1) The site or structure is a deterrent to a major improvement program which will be of substantial benefit to the local jurisdiction; or (2) The retention of the site or structu re would : (i) Cause undue financial hardship to the owner; or (ii) Not be in the best interests of a majo rity of pers ons i n the com mun ity. Article 66B, § 8.10 (em phasis added). If, on the other hand, a property not designated for protectio n as a historic p roperty is the subject of a demolition permit, the procedure is different. Proposed activities with regard to impro veme nts or stru ctures o n prop erties no t subjec t to Artic le 66B , tit. 8 are governed by the basic building code, found at Cha pter 5, Article V of the Ro ckville City Code.29 In terms of technical s tandards, the City adopted, with some modifications, the Building Officials and Code Administrators International, Inc., (BOCA) National Building Code, 1996 Edition. Rock ville City Code § 5-86. U nder this reg ulatory schem e, a permit application must be submitted to the Rockville Community Planning and Development Services Department, Inspection Services Division, by the owner or lessee of the structure, 29 The stated purpose and intent of the basic building code "is to govern the design, construction, alteration, repair, addition, removal, demolition, use, location, occupancy and maintenance of all buildings and structures and their service equipment as herein denied, except as some of such matters may be described in public, local or general laws of the State, zoning and other ordinances or regulations having legal precedence." Rockville City Code § 5-67. 27 BOCA § 107.2, for any number of property development activities, including, but not limited to, construction, addition, alteration, or demo lition of structures located in the property. BOC A § 10 7.1. No work may be c omple ted with out a pe rmit. Id. Section 108.0 of the Building Code governs generally the issuance of permits. Upon application, th e Inspection Services D ivision exam ines all applications for perm its "within a reasonable time after filing." BOCA § 108.1. "If the application or the construction docum ents do not conform to the requirements of all pertinent laws, the code o fficial shall reject such application in writing, stating the reasons therefor. If the code official is satisfied that the proposed work conforms to the requirements of this code and all laws and ordinances applicable thereto, the code official shall issue a permit therefor as soon as practicable." Id. (emphasis added ). In other words, the technical and procedural requireme nts by which a d emolition p ermit is issued are less restrictive and more straightforward than if the property is designated properly as historic. Returning to consid eration of whether the Mayor and Co uncil of Rockv ille were required to consider econom ic feasibility whe n determin ing whe ther to design ate as historic the Property, we look first to the plain lan guage of the statutory sche me. Our g oal in construing any regulatory scheme is to "extract and effectuate the actual intent of the Legislature in enacting the statute." Reier v. State Dep't of Assessments and Taxation, 397 Md. 2, 26, 915 A.2d 970, 984 (2007) (citing Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223, 858 A.2d 484, 487 (200 4); Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003)). Our 28 inquiry in this regard begins with a reading of the plain language of the statutory text. Walker v. Dep't of Human Res., 379 Md. 407, 420, 842 A.2d 53, 62 (2004). If the legislative intent is clear from this plain language reading, there is normally no need to probe further, and our inquiry comes to an end. Id. (citing Allstate v. Kim, 376 Md. 276, 290, 829 A.2d 611, 619 (2003 )). Applying these p rinciple s to Artic le 66B , § 8.02, we observe that the statute is silent as to whether the local legislative body, in designating properties as historic areas, must consider the economic feasibility of preservation of a prop erty and any finan cial hardship to the landowner. By the same token, the absence from the statute of such criteria may portend that the Mayor and Council is not precluded under the statutory scheme from considering econom ic feasibility and financial hardship at this juncture; however, the issue here is whether the local legislature is required by the language of Article 66B to consider the econom ic impact of preservation at the time of determ ining wh ether a site is historically or architec turally sign ificant to be prot ected. W e conc lude tha t it is not. The singular co nsideration in dicated exp ressly by the Gen eral Assem bly in Article 66B, § 8.02, by which the local legislative body must consider amendments to the historic area zone is w hether a sub ject property ha s "historic, arch eological, or architectural signific ance." As indicated supra, this determination of significance appears to be guided, at least in Rockville, b y twelve enu merated c riteria deeme d characte ristic of a prop erty suitable for designation. Noticeably absent from the checklist is the economic impact of 29 preservation should the property be included in the historic district. It is only after the property is designated historic and a development perm it application is maintained by the landowner that the statutory sch eme con templates ec onomic f easibility and financial hardship as required factors in determining whether a permit should be issued and on what conditions. The plain language of the governing statutory scheme indicates that, rather than the lo cal legislative body charged with deciding finally the question of historic desig nation, it is the HDC in the first instance that is delegated the task of reviewing, approving, or rejecting any requests to alter, add to, or demolish the exterior of buildings on historic p roperties, A rticle 66B, § 8.05(b), and that more appropriately considers, among the other facto rs, the econo mic feasibility and financial hardship of retention, restoration, or renovation. Article 66B, §§ 8.06(b), 8.09, and 8.10. It is in those statutes governing the HDC's decision to grant or deny the underlying historic area development permit, and solely in those statutes, that the financial implications of preservation, no twithstanding the site's historic significance, are mandated by the legislative scheme for consideration. Article 66B, §§ 8.09, 8.10. Petitioner's demand that the Mayor and Co uncil's historic de signation de cision here s hould be vacated fo r failure to co nsider econ omic fea sibility because the Property, at the time of the filing and substantial completion of the review of the permit application for other than historic designation, is not compelling. The statutes make no distinction in terms of how and in what order, relative to the processing of a qualifying permit application, a property may be nom inated f or histor ic desig nation. 30 "[W]hen the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, a court may neither add nor delete language so as to 'reflect an intent no t eviden ced in th at langu age.' " Design Kitchen & Baths v. Lagos, 388 Md. 718, 729, 882 A.2d 817, 823 (2005) (quoting Condo n v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491, 632 A.2d 753, 758 (1993)). Nor ma y a court "construe th e statute with 'forced or subtle interpretations' that limit or extend its application." Lagos, 388 Md. at 729, 882 A.2d at 823-24 (quoting Condon, 332 Md. at 49 1, 632 A .2d at 758; Tucker v. Firem an's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 73, 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986)). Taking into consideration that econom ic feasibility is contemplated specifically as a consideration at a certain point in the statutory scheme, if the Legisla ture intende d that the M ayor and Co uncil consid er, in deciding whether an historic designation was appropriate, the economic feasibility of preserving a property in a situation such as the one presented in this case, it is not unreason able to assume that the Legislature would have provided explicitly for such a consideration in Article 66 B. Althou gh Article 6 6B neithe r contemp lates the factu al scenario presented here nor p recludes sp ecifically the M ayor and Co uncil from considerin g econom ic feas ibility, the statutory scheme does not place an affirmative obligation on the Mayor and Counc il to consider the factor in reaching a historic desig nation dec ision. Thus , failing to consider that factor in this case w as no t arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary to law. It was not arbitrary or unreasonable for the Mayor and Council to defer, in the first instance, to an administrative govern mental bo dy theoretically qua lified to cons ider such ec onomic 31 matters, i.e., the Historic District Commission,30 in the course of acting on the demolition permit application. By deferring in the first instance to the HDC's later consideration of economic feasibility and withh olding un til that body we ighs-in final action o n the dem olition perm it, pending evaluation of the historic significance of the Property, Respondent followed the City's established procedures pertaining to the review of proposed development-related activities. The Mayor and Council, on 26 July 1999 adopted, in Resolution No. 11-99, certain "Environmental Guidelines for the Protection and Enhancement of the City's Natural Resources." Resolution No. 11-99 (26 July 1999) reads as follows: WHEREAS, the preservation of the City's natural resources is important to the health, well-being and quality of life for the residents and workers in, and visitors to, the City of Rockville; and WHEREAS, developm ent activity with the City has, and will continue to have, an impac t on the C ity's natural resources; and WHEREAS, in September 1997 the Mayor and Co uncil appointed an Environmental Guidelines Task Force to consider and develop a comprehensive and cohesive method for the protection and enhancement of the City's existing natural resources during and after the development process; and 30 Specific ally, the HDC is composed of f ive members, each of whom is supposed to possess "a demonstrated special interes t, specific kno wledge, o r profession al or acade mic training in such field s as h istor y, arch itecture, a rchitectu ral histor y, plan ning , arch aeol ogy, anth ropo logy, curation, conservation, landscape architecture, historic preservation, urban design, or related disciplines." Article 66B , § 8.03(2)(i) and (ii). 32 WHEREAS, the Task Force drafted and submitted to the Mayor and Council Draft Environmental Guidelines ("Environmental Guidelines for the Protection and Enhancement of the City's Natural Resources, Final Draft Report to the Mayor and Council of Ro ckville, October 1998 ") designed to insure that adequate consideration is given the impact of development activity on the City's natural resources in an effort to avoid, minimize, and/or mitigate the impact on those resources; and WHEREAS, the Draft Environ mental Guidelines w ere thereafter referred to the Planning Commission for evaluation and recommendation after receiving public input; and WHEREAS, the Planning Commission held an open house on January 7, 1999 and a public hearing on the Draft Guidelines on Janua ry 20, 1999, an d, following a worksession held on April 28, 1999, did unanimously recommend that the Mayor and Council adopt the Drafter Environmental Guidelines with certain changes; and WHEREAS, the Mayor and Council concurs in the recommendation of the Planning Commission and finds such Environmental Guidelines to be in the public interest and to further the City's goal of protecting its natural resources. NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, BY MAYOR AND COU NCIL OF R OCK VILL E, MARYLAND that the attached docume nt entitled "Environmental Guidelines for the Protection and Enhancement of the City's Natural Resources, Final Draft Report to the Mayor and Council of Rockville, October 1998" is hereby adopted. (emph asis add ed). The purposes of the environmental guidelines, as adopted by Resolution 11-99, are to "establish a comprehensive and cohesive method to protect the city's existing natural resources during and after the development process," as well as to "provid[e] for the 33 identification of existing natural resources and presenting various environmental management strategies and criteria to govern development within the City of Rockville." C ITY OF R OCKVILLE , E NVIRONMENT AL G UIDELINES T ASK F ORCE, E NVIRONMENTAL G UIDELINES FOR THE P ROTECTION AND E NHANCEMENT OF THE C ITY'S N ATURAL R ESOURCES 5 (1999) (emphasis added) (hereinafter "E NVIRONMENTAL G UIDELINES"). To that end, the guidelines are intended to set forth the City's internal policies31 to be executed by City Staff, the Planning Commission, the HDC, and in some instances, the Mayor and Council, as early as poss ible in th e form al review proces s of pro posed land de velopm ent. Id. at 7. Under the adopted guidelines, it is the responsibility of an applicant to submit, prior to City staff review or approval of a proposed development project, a Natural Resources Inventory (NRI). W ith the stated p urpose of ensuring e nvironm entally sensitive design during the earliest phases of the development, particularly those stages of development which occur prior to permit application or approval, the NRI constitutes "a complete analysis of existing natural, cultural, historic, and archaeological resources and [which] contain[s] specific information covering the development site and the first 100 feet of adjoining land or the width of the adjacent lot . . . ." Id. at 9. In addition to the completion by the applicant of an N RI, a pre-submission meeting should occur between City Preservation staff and the applicant during which time the participants are supposed to determine the existence of 31 "These environmental guidelines are intended to set forth certain City policies and planning objectives, and to identify, for developers and citizens alike, environmental development standards and guides." E NVIRONM ENTAL G UIDELINES, supra, at 7. 34 resources on the site which possess cultural, historic, or archeological/architectural significance. Id. at 25. "As a general guide, [according to the guidelines,] any structure older than 50 years of age or possessing architectural significance, or a site associated with a person or even of importance to local, state, or national history or development, should be examined to determine significance." Id. Included in the given examples are dwellings and outbuildings. If the pre-su bmission m eeting results in the discove ry of a potentially significant resource, the structure should be inclu ded in th e NR I map, id. at 25, and "s hould be referred to the HDC and the MH T [Ma ryland Historic T rust] for a rec ommen dation as to their cultural and historic signific ance to the a rea. T he fi nal d eterm inati on of the site's legal designation as a historic district is made by the Mayor and Council through the Local Map Amendment process, which includes a public hearing." Id. at 40. Examining the proced ures emp loyed by the HDC and Mayor and Council in the present case, it was neith er improper nor unauthorized for the City to follow the adopted guidelines when it withheld issuance of the demolition permit, pending review of the historical significance o f the Pr operty. A ssumin g, arguendo, that we were to accept Petitioner's argument that the guidelines merely are "discretionary" and lack binding force of law,32 we do not accept the conclusion that it was arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise 32 Petitioner argues that it w as legal error f or the M ayor and Co uncil and the H DC to apply the guidelines to the demolition permit application because the "Environmental Guidelines" are goal-oriented "discreti onary" guidelines, rather than binding law. Because the environmental guidelines were adopted by resolution, rather than ordinance, something more informal in terms of its binding nature is implied. See Inlet Assoc. v. Assateague House (continued...) 35 improper for the City to administer its own adopted guidelines by utilizing the pendency of the demolition permit application as a trigger to consider the historic or architectural significance of the Property. The stated purpose of the guidelines are to prevent the premature destruction of natural resources without considering first their significance to the surrounding community. That the gu idelines ma y not be man datory does n ot mean th at it was "unw arranted, unfair to the property ow ner, and contra ry to the authority of the HDC" 32 (...continued) Condo. Assoc., 313 Md. 413, 427-28, 545 A.2d 1296, 1301-04 (1988). W e note add itionally the difference between goal-oriented standards for en vironmental quality and man datory regulations. See Rochow v. Maryland Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Com m'n, 151 Md. App. 558, 603-04, 827 A.2d 927, 954-55 (2003) (describing the differences between goal-oriented "standards for environmental noise" and mandatory noise exposure maximums) (citing Anne Arundel County Fish & Gam e Conse rvation As s'n, Inc. v. Car lucci, 83 Md. App. 121, 12627, 573 A.2d 847, 850 (1990) (distinguishing between 24 hour standards, which are based on averages, and day-night maximum exposure limits, which are not b ased on averag es), cert. denied, 320 Md. 800, 580 A.2d 218 (19 90)). The guid elines speak in terms of th e "goals" to be attained in protecting the City's natural, cultural, historic, and architectural resources, and contain some d iscretion ary langu age, see, e.g., E NVIRONMENTAL G UIDELINES, supra, at 25 ("The ex istence of sig nificant cultu ral, historic, or archeological resources on a site should be determine d at a pre-su bmission m eeting with City Preservation staff. As a general guide, any structure older than 50 years of age or possessing a rchitectural sig nificance, o r a site associated with a person or event of importance to local, state, or national histo ry or developmen t, should be examined to determine significance.") (emphasis added). At the same time, ho weve r, the gu idelines also co ntain m ore dire ctory lang uage. See, e.g., E NVIRONMENTAL G UIDELINES, supra, at 7-8 ("Deviations from these Guidelines may be allowed when it can be satisfactorily demonstrated that strict comp liance wo uld unreas onably impact development of the site or undermine other environmental or planning considerations, provided that it can be demonstrated that safety, City road standards, storm drainage, SWM, erosion and sediment con trol, forest conservation, stream protection, park buffers, engineering, design, and planning issues can be satisfactorily addressed. Deviations from these Guidelines may be allow ed where strict comp liance would con flict with infrastructure or other development components specifically authorized by an approved Concept Plan Application or Ex ploratory Application."). 36 for it to apply the guidelines. It is the HDC's stated policy, presumably in light of the aforementioned environmental guidelines, that "[a] structure that is the subject of a demolition application and is at least 50 years of age is autom atically reviewe d by Historic Preservation Office staff and the Historic District Commission (HDC) for significance to the City under the Environmental Guidelines." City of Rockville, Historic D istrict Eligibility Information, at http://www.rockvillemd.gov /historic/hd-crite ria.html. 33 The historic designation proceedings employed by the City in the present case were not imposed arbitrarily on Petitioner. Rather, Respondent followed those procedures outlined in the Environmental Guidelines. It was not improper for the City to determine historical and architectural significance as a precursor to a final decisio n wheth er to grant or r eject a perm it application to demolish a structure ove r 50 years old, regardless of the means by which the City becomes aware of the building's age.34, 35 33 Even were we to view the HDC's policy as self-serving and pub lished on its w ebsite solely as a consequence of the present litigation, the Environmental Guidelines, created and adopted by the City of R ockville years prior to the filing of the permit ap plication to demolish the Spates Bungalow, provide specifically for a review of historic significance prior to permit approval for development activities. 34 We reject Petitioner's argument that the Enviro nmental G uidelines w ere intende d to apply only to larger development projects, and not to relatively small sites such as 115 Park Avenue. Petitioner relies on the following language from the guidelines: "[These environmental guidelines] are intended . . . to be admin istered in con cert with other planning goals. Examples of other factors that shall be taken into consideration are: infrastructure requirements; open space objectives for public parks and forest conservation; and prior commitm ents to landow ners, neighb orhoods a nd individu al citizens, among others. Particular flexibility may be necessary where the Guidelines are applied to small lots and/or re-develop ment pro posals." E NVIRONM ENTAL G UIDELINES, supra, at 7 (em phasis a dded). (continued...) 37 That the Mayor and Council was not required to consider the economic feasibility of preservation of the Spates Bungalow at the stage of the process when it determined the Property worthy of historic designation is all the more reasonable when one considers the purposes underlying historic area zoning. In addition to "enhanc[ing] the quality of life by 34 (...continued) Indeed, "[t]hese Guidelines allow for flexibility to best achieve environmental and other planning objectives on a site-by-site basis." Id. "When flex ibility in a particular application of the Environmental Guidelines is requested,[however,] the developer will be expected to include a mitigating or offsetting component within the overall development proposal. In other words, give and take will be expected." Id. (emphasis added). The guidelines do not ind icate, as Petitioner argues, that the "Environmental Guidelines requireme nts were no t applicable to this property as they are intended to apply to sites w ith larger planned development." Nowhere in the guidelines is it stated that they were not intended to apply to small de velopm ent sites. The guid elines mere ly indicate that they sh ould be applied in a flexible manner when a smaller site is involved. 35 Nor did the City's referral to the H DC an d Mayor a nd Cou ncil constitute a f ailure to follow its own ordina nces an d regul ations. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 26 0, 268, 7 4 S. Ct. 4 99, 504 , 98 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1954). A plain reading of the BOCA code, which governs the issuance of development permits for property not declared historically significant at the time a demolition permit application is filed, indicates that permits may not be iss ued until it is de termined th at the perm it would otherwise compor t with other rules, reg ulations , ordina nces, or statutes. S ection 1 01.2 of the BO CA p rovide s, for example, that "[t]hese [BOCA] regulations shall control all matters concerning the construction, . . . , demo lition, . . . , and shall apply to existing or proposed buildings and structures, except as such matters are otherwise provided for in other ordinances or statutes, or in the rules a nd regula tions autho rized for pro mulgatio n under th e provision s of this code." (emphasis added). BOCA § 108.1, furthermore, requires "[t]he code official [to] examine or cause to b e examin ed all applica tions for pe rmits and am endmen t thereto with in a reasonab le time af ter filing ." Onl y "[when] the code official is satisfied that the proposed work conforms to the requirements of this code and all laws and ordinances applicable thereto, [that] the code official shall issue a permit therefor as soon as practicable." BOCA § 108.1. Thus, the BOCA provides that the permit authority must issue the permit as soon as possible on ly upon a find ing that the p ermit com ports otherwise with all applicable laws, regulations, and ordinances. 38 preserving the charac ter and desira ble aesthetic feat ures of a c ity . . . ," Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 129, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 2661-62, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978), 36 historic area zoning serves also the purpose of preventing the premature destruction of historically important structures, landmarks, and geographic areas without first considering adequ ately their significa nce. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 108, 98 S. Ct. at 2651, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 ("Historic and landmark preservation will be upheld absent arbitrary designation or a taking without just compensation since there is a valid public purpose to such ordina nces. The public purpose is to prevent the destruction of historic buildings without adequate consideration of their value or significance in enhancing the quality of life for all and to provide for the potential for preservation.") (emphasis added ); see also Article 66B , § 8.01(b)(1 ) ("It is a public p urpose in th is State to pres erve sites, structures, and districts of historical, a rcheologic al, or architectu ral significan ce and the ir appurtenances and en vironm ental set tings."); A rticle 66B, § 8.01(c)(1) (stating that one of the purposes of historic area zoning is to "[s]afeguard the heritage of the local jurisdiction by preserving sites, structures, or districts which reflect elements of cultural, social, economic, political, archeological, or architectural history[,] . . . [s]tabilize and improve the 36 For a more general discussion regarding the potential uses of zoning ordinance s in order to "enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and desira ble aesthetic features of a city," see, for example, New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S . 297, 304-0 5, 96 S. Ct. 2513, 2517, 49 L. Ed. 2d 5 11 (1976 ); Youn g v. Am erican Mini T heatre s, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 96 S. Ct. 2440, 49 L. Ed. 2d 310 (1976); and Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33, 75 S. Ct. 98, 102, 99 L. Ed . 2d 27 (1954). 39 property values of th ose sites, structu res, or districts[,] . . . [f]oste r civic be auty[,] . . . [s]trengthen the local economy[,] . . . and [p]romote the preservation and appreciation of those sites, structures, and districts for the education and welfare of the residents of each local jurisdiction."); Mayor & Alderman of City of Annap olis v. Anne Arunde l County , 271 Md. 265, 291, 316 A.2d 807, 821 (1974) ("Historic area zoning [is directed] only at the preservation of the exterior of buildings having historic or architectural merit."). When a permit application is filed for the demolition of a structure as old as the Spates Bungalow, it was not en tirely unreasona ble for the City to delay its too hasty or premature destruction without considerin g first the histor ic/architectural significance of the Property. We agree with the Court o f Special A ppeals that, "[u]nder th e statutory schem e set forth in Article 66B, the [M]ayor and [C]ouncil determine if a site should b e preserve d [i.e., that the site is valuable because it holds architectural, cultural, or historical significance]. Once that decisio n is mad e the H DC d etermin es how , and to w hat exte nt, a site is p reserve d." 2. Broadview Apartments Co. is Distinguishable From the Present Case. In support of the prop osition that it w as improp er for the M ayor and Co uncil to decline to consider economic feasibility during the historic designation process,37 Petitioner 37 Petitioners also argued before the Historic District Commission (by letter dated 16 October 2001) and again before the Mayor and Council (by letter dated 24 January 2002) that, in light of Broadview Apartments Co. v. Commission for Historical and Architectural Preservation, 49 Md. App. 538, 433 A.2 d 1214 (1 981), "eve n if the [H DC] w ere inclined to favor designation despite the facts disproving the [P]roperty's architectural and historical significance, consideratio n must be given to the impracticability of renovating and maintaining the [P]roperty. The Maryland Court of Appea ls has held that the designation of (continued...) 40 draws an analogy to Broadview Apartments Co. v. Com mission for Historical and Architectural Preservation, 49 Md. App. 538, 433 A.2d 1214 (1981). The Court of Special Appea ls conclude d in Broadview that Baltimo re City erred in f ailing to consider ec onomic feasibility before denying a demolition permit. Even though Broadview and the present case arose similarly fro m a dem olition perm it application proc ess, w e con clud e tha t Petition er's Broadview analogy is flawed. Under the City of Baltimore's historic zoning regulations at issue in Broadview, the Commission for Historic al and Architectural Preservation (CHAP) was created for the purposes of adm inistering the Ba ltimore C ity Code's historic z oning p rovision s. Those provisions, similar to the historic zoning regulations in Rockville, were aimed at preserving "area[s] in Baltimore City wherein there are loca ted structures which h ave historica l, cultural, educational and/or architectural value, the preservation of which is deemed to be for the education al, cultural, economic and general welfare of the inhabitants of Ba ltimore C ity." Baltimore City Code, A rticle 1, § 40(a). One of the CHAP's primary duties under the Code was to compile a proposed "Landmark List," subject to approval by the City Council, of structures both within and outside current historic zones, Baltimore City Cod e, Article 1, § 37 (...continued) a property as historic may result in a taking where renovation of the property is not econom ically feasible." Aside from the fact that Broadview was a Cou rt of Spe cial A ppeals's opinion from which th is Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari, 291 Md. 773, 433 A.2d 1214 (1981), the intermediate appellate court in that case declined expressly to address a takings claim a sserted b y the land owne r. Broad view A partm ents Co . v. Comm'n for Historical & Architectural Preservation, 49 Md. App. at 546, 433 A.2d at 1218. 41 40(k), which had "historical, cultural, educational and/or architectural value . . . " as defined by Baltim ore City C ode, A rticle 1, § 40(a). Broadview Apartments Co., 49 Md. App at 540, 433 A.2d at 1215. Once a property was approved by the City Council for inclusion in the Landmark List, after notice and hearing before the Counc il, that property bec ame sub ject to the City's historic zoning laws. Baltimore City Code, Article 1, § 40(q). Of particular consequence, the "principal restriction [once the historic designation takes effect] [wa]s that a permit must be obtained from the Commissioner of Housing and Community Development [] before any person may alter the exterior appearance of any structure within a historic district or on the landmark list." Broadview Apartments Co., 49 Md. App. at 540, 433 A.2d at 1215; B altimore City Cod e, Article 1, § 40(q)(1). Even though the Housing and Comm unity Develop ment Commission ("HC D") wa s the gove rnmental b ody that actually granted or denied a demolition permit, it was the CHAP that had ultimate authority over the permit application's fate.38 Id. Specifica lly, the permit cou ld be issued by the City, despite the historic, educational, cultural, or architectural sig nificance o f the prope rty, if the CHAP 38 Under the statutory sche me, the H CD co uld issue a p ermit only upo n the CHAP approva l, which came in the form of either a Certificate of Appropriateness or a Notice to Proceed. Broadview Apartments Co., 49 Md. App. at 540, 433 A.2d at 12 15; Baltim ore City Code, Article 1, § 40(q)(3). The CHAP would issue a Certificate of Appropriateness when it determined that alteration was "appropriate to the preservation of" th e structure. Broadview Apartments Co., 49 Md. App. at 540, 433 A.2d at 1215; Baltimore City Code, Article 1, § 40(q)(5)(i). A Notice to Proceed, on the other hand, came into play when the proposed alteration was not appropriate for preservation, but nevertheless was necessary because of some other factor, such as the financial hardship of preservation upon the p roperty owner. Broadview Apartments Co., 49 Md. App. at 540-41, 433 A.2d at 1215; Baltimore City Code, Article 1, § 40(q )(5)(ii). 42 determined that the proposed development activity was "w ithout substa ntial detrimen t to the public welfare and without substantial derogation from the intents and purposes of this ordinance, and denial of the application w[ould] result in substantial hardship to the applica nt." Baltimore City Code, Article 1, § 40(q)(5)(ii). If the CHAP concluded that the alteration was inappropriate and declined to authorize issuance of the perm it, then issuance was postponed for up to six months, during which time the CHAP would "meet with the applicant for the permit and . . . consult with civic groups, public agencies and interested citizens to ascertain what the City may do to preserve such building." Broadv iew Apa rtments Co., 49 Md. App. at 541, 433 A.2d at 1215-16 (quoting Baltim ore City C ode, A rticle 1, § 40(q)(9 )). In Broadview, forty-two structures, including the particular apartments at issue there, tentatively were approve d on 17 De cember 1976 for designation on the Land mark List. Broadview Apartments Co., 49 Md. App. at 542, 43 3 A.2d at 1216 . Broadv iew Ap artments Co. applied on 10 February 1977 for a demolition permit in order to clear the land and erect a parking structure which would accommodate the adjacent commercial space the company owned and op erated. Id. The CHAP notified Broadview by letter, dated 16 February 1977, that the property was going to b e recommen ded for designation, an d a formal recommendation followed two days later. Id. The Housing and Community Development Commission notified Broadview on 17 April 197 7 that it was withholding the permit pending 43 City Cou ncil revi ew of the pro perty. Id. The property was designated on the list officially by the Cit y Counc il on 10 June 1 977. It was not until two years later, and af ter a petition fo r writ of mand amus w as filed to compel issuance of the permit, that the City cond ucted a he aring on the demolition permit application. Broadview Apartments Co., 49 Md. App. at 542, 542 n.2, 433 A.2d at 1216, 1216 n.2. Despite a multitude of reports from experts reflecting the deteriorated condition of the property, the need for extensive repair, and the inability of the owner to recoup the costs through a ny conceiva ble rent structu re, the CH AP den ied Broad view's demolition permit on the grounds that "they were not convinced from the evidence that Broadview was under any economic hardship." Broadview Apartments Co., 49 Md. App. at 543, 544, 433 A.2d at 1216, 12 17. With th e exception of one report, which was significantly flawed according to the interm ediate appe llate court, all w ritten accoun ts relied upon by the CHAP concerning economic feasib ility stated, in a conclusory manner and without any supporting data, that reno vation w as feas ible. Broadview Apartments Co., 49 Md. App. at 544, 433 A.2d at 1217. After the Baltimore City Court upheld on 15 July 1980 the CHAP's decision to deny the permit to dem olish the structur e, Broadview Apartments Co., 49 Md. App. at 544, 433 A.2d at 1217, Broadview noted an appeal to the Court o f Special A ppeals. In tha t appeal, Broadview advanced the following argumen ts: 1. [The] CHAP's decision denying the permit was arbitrary, capricious, and not supported by substantial evidence; 44 2. 3. The preservation law does not provide objec tive standards for its criteria to guide [the] CHAP in its decision making and th erefore is un constitutiona lly vague; and Denial of the dem olition permit constitutes an unconstitu tional "taking" un der the 5th a nd 14th Amendments. Broadview Apartments Co., 49 Md. App. at 539, 433 A.2d at 1214. The Court of Special Appeals bega n its analysis by confirming that "[a]lthough ev ery restriction imposed by government upon a landowner's use of his property will not be considered a taking, w here the restric tions depriv e the landowner of all reasonable, beneficial uses of the property, compensation must be paid." Broadview Apartments Co., 49 Md. App. at 544-45, 433 A.2d at 1217 (citations omitted). A ccording to the court, "the sole evidence in the record before [the] CHAP which supported its decision was the study [which] . . . failed to include any debt service, any recovery of the purchase price, and failed to include the cost of replacing the roof, even though the City itself . . . agreed that replacement of the roof was nece ssary." The Court of Special Appeals concluded, as a result, that the CHAP arbitrarily ignored, in derogation of its duties und er Baltimore City Code, A rticle 1, § 40(q), substantial eviden ce in the record regard ing sub stantial h ardship . The Court declined expressly to reach the landowner's second and third arguments that the preservation laws were unconstitutionally vague and that the failure to consider econom ic feasibility constituted a regula tory taking . Broadview Apartments Co., 49 Md. App. at 546, 433 A.2d at 1218. 45 Petitioner's argumen t in the present case, adva nced in its rep ly brief, that "the Pr operty herein was never listed in an Historic Resources Inventory and the Trust was never given notice that the Property was being surveyed for such designation, whereas the Broadview site had already been 'tentatively' approved for inclusion on the landmark list and the owner never pressed the issue of financial hardship until two years after formal designation[,] [Broadview Apartm ents Co., 49 Md. App. at 542, 433 A.2d at 1216][,]" undermines its attempted analogy to Broadview. The Court of Special Appeals in Broadview addressed wh ether the Baltimore City Court w as correct in affirming the Commission for Historical and Architectural Pres erva tion's denial of a demolition permit. In the present case, Petitioner's application for a demolition permit neither has been denied nor granted.39 The HD C has no t acted finally 39 Although consideration of the demolition permit application by the HDC was not stayed formally by the Mayor and Council or the Circuit Court while Petitioner pursued judicial review of the historical designation decision, the procedural progression of the case produced a like result through implied acquiescence. The 2 October 2001 letter sent from Respondent to Petitioner sta ted expressly that the permit review process was going to be paused pending an evaluation of the historic/architectural significance of the Property by the HDC and Respondent. The Property was placed in the historic zone on 14 July 2003, and Petitioner sought promptly thereafter, on 7 August 2003, judicial review of the designation. The series of appeals leading up to the present case before this Court ensued in close succession. Specifica lly, the Circuit Court rendered its memorandum opinion on 15 October 2004. Cross-appeals were noted on 19 November 2004 with the Court of Special Appeals. The intermediate appellate court filed its opinion on 9 August 2006, and Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari from this Court shortly thereafter. By virtue of filing a petition for judicial review immedia tely following the designa tion of the P roperty as with in the historic distric t, Petitioner, in effect, elected to defer pursuing a final decision on the permit application, where ec onomic f easibility and hard ship clearly wo uld be in pla y, in favor of litigating the historic designation deci sion -making proc ess f ully, i.e., approach ing the dispu te in seriatim, rather than proceeding concurrently, before having possibly to proceed before the HDC. 46 on the application. As we stated supra, the designation process that Petitioner now challenges was a precursor needing resolution before confronting necessarily the required criteria actually and finally addressed in Broadview, i.e., a final decision on the application for the dem olition p ermit. Broadview does not stand for the proposition that the failure to consider economic hardship in the historic designation process is improper when, in that case, the feasibility of preserv ation was not broug ht to issue un til some time a fter the historic designation process was resolve d. At be st, Broadview requires, in the present case, that the HDC, when it considers economic feasibility or hardship, have an adequate factual basis for its findings and conclusions in rendering a final disposition on the demolition permit application. The procedural postures of Broadview and the present case are somewhat similar in a sense. The process by w hich the property in Broadview became designated for historic zoning protection began with its inclusion as a proposed historic and architectural preservation district on a "Landmark list" under A rticle 1, §§ 40 (j) and (k) of the Ba ltimore City Code . Broadview Apartments Co., 49 Md. App. at 542, 433 A.2d at 12 16. This is akin to formal nomination for historic designation under the Rockville City Code. A nuanced view of the Co urt of Spe cial Appe als's opinion in Broadview suggests a tacit judicial approval of the procedure there employed, i.e., withholding action on the permit application pending an evaluation of the historical significance of the structur e. See Broadview Apartm ents Co., 49 Md . App. at 54 2, 433 A .2d at 1216 . While the property in Broadview 47 may have been a bit further along in the designation evaluation process than the Spates Bungalow when the respective demolition permit applications were filed, neither p roperty was designated formally as historic at the time of filing the applications. Thus, the Broadview property and the Spates Bungalow were subject to normal BOCA code require ments a t the time of the in itial pend ency of th eir respe ctive pe rmit app lications . Although the Property here was not recommended formally for designation until after the permit application was filed, the record indicates that the Property was listed as a historical resource as early as 1986. Specifically, a "Maryland Inventory of Historic Properties Form," created originally for the Maryland Historical Trust in 1985 by Peerless Rockville, suggests an architectural significance basis for possible designation of the Prop erty. Although updated in 2001, after the present controversy arose, the substance of the original inventory form mirrors close ly the more co ntempora neous ev aluations of the historic and arc hitectur al signif icance of the P roperty. Also the record refers to a study completed in 1999 by an architectural historian employed by the State Highway Administration (SHA) addressing the impact on the area of the Property by a proposed intersection improvement at Maryland Routes 28 and 355. In that stud y, Kelly Steele, the SHA's architectural historian, completed a "Maryland Historical Trust [National Register] - Eligibility Review Form." Although the box concerning eligibility for historic designation was checked "No," the te xtual analysis nonethele ss revealed an arguab le basis for eligi bility. Specific ally, despite Ms. Steele's assessment that the Property was not 48 associated sufficiently w ith historically signific ant events, tren ds, or person s to render it eligible for design ation, she sub mitted that it oth erwise w as eligible because "it embodies distinctive characteristics of a type of architecture." According to Ms. Steele, the Spates Bungalow was "an excellent example of the Craftsman style," and stood "as a rare and outstanding representative of Craftsman architecture in Rockville, Maryland." The imp ort of these conflicting observations suggests at least that the Property's possible historical and/or architectural significance was considered long prior to its formal nomination for designation. In that respect, the "procedu ral trajectories" o f the facts in Broadview and the present case are similar enough that we conclude that the Court of Special Appeals's tacit approval of the historical designation procedure there is confirmatory of that employed here. 3. The Mayor and Council's Refusal to Consider Economic Infeasibility at This Juncture Did Not Work a Taking o f the Prop erty Without Just Compensation. Petitioner contends next that, because "consideration of f inancial hardship [w a]s intricately tied to the decision of whether certain structures should be preserved[,]" by placing the Property in Rockville's Historic District Zone without considering during the designation process the economic infeasibility and the resultant financial hardship to the Trust of rehabilitating the Property, the Mayor and C ouncil's decision effected a reg ulatory taking of the Property without due process of law or just compensation. In other words, the Trust argues that "the placement of the Property within the City's Historic District Zone has rendered the Property economically inviable." We find that Petitioner misinterprets the 49 procedures and the property interests at stake in this case in th e posture in which it reaches us. It is well-settled that zoning regulations are a valid exercise of a government's police power so long as the limitations impos ed are in the public interest and are related substantially to the health, safety, or ge neral w elfare o f the co mmu nity. See, e.g., County Comm'rs of Queen Anne's County v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 364, 228 A.2d 450, 454 (1967); Anne Arundel County Comm'rs v. Ward, 186 Md. 330, 338, 46 A.2d 684, 687 (1946) ("[Z]oning, in general, is a valid exercise of the police p ower."); Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 125- 26, 98 S . Ct. at 26 59-60 , 57 L. Ed. 2d 631("[I]n instanc es in whic h a state tribunal reasonably concluded that 'the health, safety, morals, or general welfare' would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land, [the Supreme Court] has upheld land-use re gulations that destro yed or advers ely affected re cognized real property interests. Zoning laws are, of course, the classic example, . . . , which have been viewed as permissible governmental action even when prohibiting the most beneficial use of the property.") (citations omitted). This exercise of the local legislature's police power is not absolute, however, and, if it goes too far, may constitute a regulatory taking of the land. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 127, 98 S. Ct. at 2660-61, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 ("[A] use restriction on real property may constitute a 'takin g' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substa ntial public pu rpose, or pe rhaps if it has an undu ly harsh impact upon the owner's use of the property.") (citations om itted); Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 50 393, 414-1 5, 43 S . Ct. 158 , 159-6 0, 67 L . Ed. 2d 322 (1 922) (stating that, while a c ertain piece of property may be regulated to a certain extent in support of an im portant pub lic policy, the regulation may nevertheless be recognized as a taking if it goes so far as to make any economical use of th e property com mercially impra cticable); accord Mary land-N at'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Chadwick, 286 Md. 1, 9-10, 405 A.2d, 245 (1979) ("[A] governmental action, while not rising to the status of a compensable 'taking' of property, may amount to an inva lid deprivation of property rights withou t due process of law . . . ."). "This Court has repeatedly stated that the preservation of arc hitecturally or histor ically significant areas is a valid exercise of the governmental powe r." Belman v. State, 322 Md. 207, 211, 586 A.2d 1281, 1283 (1991) (citing Donne lly Adver. Corp . v. City o f Baltim ore., 279 Md. 660, 671, 370 A.2d 1127, 1133 (19 77); City of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc., 268 Md. 79, 91, 299 A.2d 828, 835 (1973)). T hus, in orde r for the zon ing regulatio n to constitute a taking of p rivate prope rty or otherwise constitute a deprivation of due process, Petitioner must "affirmatively demonstrate[] that the legislative or administrative determination deprives him of all beneficial use of the property . . . . But the restrictions imposed must be such that the property cannot be used for any purpose. It is not enough for the property owners to show that the zoning action results in substan tial loss o r hardsh ip." Mayor & City Counc il of Baltimore v. Borinsky, 239 Md. 611, 622, 212 A.2d 508, 514 (1965); see also State v. Goo d Sam aritan H osp. of M d., Inc., 299 Md. 310, 324-25, 473 A.2d 892, 899 (1984) ("For government restriction upon the use of property to constitute a 'taking' in the 51 constitutional sense, so that compensation must be paid, the restriction must be su ch that it essentially deprives th e owne r of all bene ficial uses of the pro perty."); Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 34, 410 A.2d 1052, 1060 (1980) ("To constitute a taking in the constitutional sense . . . the state action must deprive the owner of all beneficial use of the prop erty. . . . [I]t is not enough for the property owner to show that the state actio n causes substantial loss or hard ship."); Governor v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 436-37, 370 A.2d 1102, 1117 ( 1977) , aff'd, 437 U.S. 117, 98 S. Ct. 2207, 57 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1978); Mayor & Counc il of Rockville v. Stone, 271 Md. 65 5, 663-64, 319 A .2d 536, 541 (197 4); Stratakis v. Beauchamp, 268 M d. 643, 654 , 304 A.2d 244 (197 3); Cabin John Ltd. P'Ship v. Montgomery Co., 259 Md. 661, 670 , 271 A.2d 174 (197 0); Zoning Bd. of Howard Co. v. Kanode, 258 Md. 586, 596, 267 A.2d 13 8 (1970); Skipjack Cove Mar ine, Inc. v. Co unty Com m'rs for Ce cil County , 252 Md. 440, 250 A.2d 260 (1969); Franklin Constr. Co. v. Welch, 251 Md. 715, 248 A.2d 639 (1968); see also S TANLEY D. A BRAMS, G UIDE TO M ARYLAND Z ONING D ECISIONS 10-2 (4th ed. 2002) ("[U]nless a physical taking has occurred, a con tenti on b y a property owner that the action of a local zoning authority is confiscatory and thereby constitutes an unconstitutional 'tak ing' . . . without just compensation will fail unless it can be demonstrated by substantial evidence that the legislative determination deprives him of all beneficial use of the property and that the property cannot be used for any reasonable purpose under its existing zo ning."). 52 Essential to the successful assertion of any regulatory takings claim is a final and authoritative determination of the permitted and prohibited uses of a particular piece of prop erty. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo C ounty, 477 U.S. 340, 348-49, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2566, 91 L. Ed. 2d 285 (1986) ("A court cannot determine whether a regulation has gone 'too far' unless it k nows how far the regulatio n goes."); see also Taylor Invs. Ltd. v. Upper Darby Twp., 983 F.2d 1285, 1292 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that there is no deprivation of a concrete property interest when a municipality has not yet rendered a final decision regarding revocation of a specific use permit). Only when the governmental authority makes a final determination of the legal rights of the parties is it possible to ascertain whether all reasonab le uses of the land are frustrated to the point that a regulatory taking has occurred. Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S . 172, 186, 1 89 n.11, 10 5 S. Ct. 3108, 3116, 3118 n.11, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1985) (stating that until there is "a final decision regarding the application of th e zonin g ordin ance a nd sub division regulati ons to its proper ty," "it is impossible to tell wheth er the land re tain[s] any reaso nable beneficial use or whether [existing] ex pectation inte rests ha[ve] be en destroyed." ); see also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S. Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1980) (stating that there must by some concrete controversy pertaining to the application of the pertinent zoning regulations in order to successfully assert an "as-applied" takings claim ). This concept is otherwise known as "ripeness for review." See Maryland Reclamation Assocs., Inc . v. Harford County , 342 Md. 476, 502-06, 677 A.2d 567, 580-82 (1996) (explaining the practical differences 53 between exhaustion of administrative remedies and ripeness, and concluding that a zoning ordinance does not deprive the landowner of any concrete property interests when the ordinance does n ot decide finally the permitted uses of a particular parcel of land). Although not on point here, we find instructive nonetheless the Court's reasoning in Maryland Reclamation Associates, Inc. In that case, Maryland Re clamat ion As sociates , Inc., a Maryland corporation, co ntracted to purchase a tract of land in Harford County for the purposes of establishin g a rubble landfill. Maryland Reclamation Assocs., Inc., 342 Md. at 480, 677 A.2d at 56 9. The corpora tion sought first to include its proposal in the Ha rford County Solid Waste Management Plan, which the then-incumbent County Council approved initia lly. Id. Four days af ter Maryland Reclamation settled on its acquisition of the prop erty, 40 howev er, and after in itial Phase I pe rmit approval for the rubble fill by the State,41 the County's new ly-elected Cou ncil adopte d a series of ordinance s removin g from the Waste Management Plan Maryland Reclamation's property and increasing the minimum acreage requireme nts for rubble landfills to the p oint that the sm all tract of land no longer qualified for Maryland Re clam ation 's intende d use. Maryland Reclamation Assocs., Inc., 342 Md. at 40 Maryland Reclam ation Asso ciates, Inc., consummated the sale under the assumption that the property would be able to be used as a rubble landfill based on its inclusion in the waste management plan. Also important at closing was the approval of the first phase of a three phase permit proces s neces sary to op erate a la ndfill. Mary land R eclam ation A ssocs., Inc. v. Harfo rd Coun ty, 342 Md. 476 , 481, 677 A.2d 5 67, 569-70 (199 6). 41 By the time of settlement, the Phase I permit was approved, and the reports and studies necessary for Phase II and III app roval were submitted to the reviewing governmental authorities. 54 481-483, 677 A.2d at 570-71. In light of these newly-passed ordinances, Maryland Reclamation, in order to operate a rubble landfill on the property, wo uld have to obtain a lotsize variance. In stead of ap plying for suc h a varianc e, the corpo ration filed an appeal w ith the county zonin g board o f appeals challenging the o rdinance s' app lication to the prop erty. Maryla nd Reclamation Assocs., Inc., 342 Md. at 486, 677 A.2d at 572. Losing the administrative appeal and subseque nt judicial revie w in the Circuit C ourt for H arford C ounty and the Court of Special Appeals, Maryland Reclamation convinced us to issue a writ of certiorari. The corporation presented before this Court four arguments, two of which w ere grounded on the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 24 of the Maryland Decla ration o f Righ ts. Maryland Reclamation Assocs., Inc., 342 Md. at 487-88, 677 A.2d at 572-73.42 The other two issues invoked the doctrines of "zoning estoppel" and preemption, Maryland Reclamation Assocs., Inc., 342 Md. at 488, 677 A.2d at 573, neither 42 When asked at oral argument whether it was mounting a takings argument, Maryland Reclamation insisted that it was not. Despite this, how ever, "[b]oth in th e circuit court and in its brief in this Court, [the petitioner] relied upon principles and cases relating to the question of whether particula r gov ernm enta l regulati on of a la ndowne r's use of his p roperty had gone so far as to constitute a 'taking' of the property with out just com pensation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment and/or Article III, § 40, of the Constitution of Maryland." Maryland Reclamation Assocs., Inc., 342 Md. at 488, 677 A.2d at 573. Our analysis relied in large part on the U .S. Supre me C ourt's reasoning in Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U .S. 172 , 186, 18 9 n.11, 1 05 S. C t. 3108, 3 116, 31 18 n.11 , 87 L. E d. 2d 12 6 (198 5), a case which, as we discuss infra, involved directly whether a county's change in zoning regulations work ed a reg ulatory tak ing of th e lando wner's p roperty. See Maryland Reclamation Assocs., Inc., 342 Md. at 502-03, 677 A.2d at 580-81. 55 of which is pertinent here. Of relevance, Maryland Reclamation contended that it had a "constitution ally protected property interest in the Harford County Solid Waste Management Plan," as well as "vested rights in the permit process," which the county deprived the landowner of in violation of the due process clause when it enacted the use-restrictive ordinances. Maryland Reclamation Assocs., Inc., 342 Md. at 487, 677 A.2d at 573. The petitioner, in support o f this conten tion, relied on f ederal case law addr essing situatio ns in which a landow ner posses sed some cognizab le property right in a land-use permit, its approva l, or the approval process itself. Id. Relying upon the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in William s Plann ing Co mm'n , we conc luded that the corporation "h a[d] not sh own tha t it ha[d] a constitution ally protected pro perty interest wh ich ha[d] b een denie d withou t due process of law." Maryland Reclamation Assocs., Inc., 342 Md. at 499, 677 A.2d at 579. More specifically, we held that "[u]ntil there is some governmental determination that [the landowner] cannot proceed to operate a rubble landfill [, its inten ded us e of the proper ty,] under its state permit, its [cause of] action is not ripe for judicial decision." Maryland Reclamation Assocs., Inc., 342 M d. at 506 , 677 A .2d at 58 2. In William son Pla nning C omm 'n, the case upon which we relied p rincipally in Maryland Reclamation, a developer, the respond ent's predecessor in interest, obtained approval of a p relim inary plan to su bdiv ide a large trac t of la nd in Will iams on C oun ty, Tennessee. William son Pla nning C omm 'n, 473 U.S. at 177, 105 S. Ct. at 3111, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126. At the time of the preliminary plan approval, the County's regulations required that 56 developers seek approval of subdivisions in two steps. The first step was the submission for approval of a pre liminary p lan indic ating, inter alia, the basic dimensions of the site, the number of intended dwelling units, and the intended infrastructure of the subdivision. Once approved, this "initial sketch plan" served as the basis for a more detailed final plat which, once approved finally by the Williamson County Regional Planning Commission, was authenticated and rec orded. Id. On 3 M ay 1973, th e Co mmissio n approv ed th e dev elop er's preliminary plan. Id. In 1977, h oweve r, the Coun ty changed its zoning ordinance to reduce the permissible density of dwelling units for "cluster" development of residential properties. William son Pla nning C omm 'n, 473 U.S . at 178, 105 S. Ct. at 311 2, 87 L. Ed . 2d 126. T his ordinance, as applied to the subject p roperty, wou ld affect dire ctly responden t's ability to develop the land as originally intended . For reasons not explained in the opinion, the Regional Planning Comm ission initially continued to ap ply the pre-197 7 regulation s to respondent's initial final plat submissions, allowing respondent to develop sections of its tract of land under the form er dens ity standar ds. Id. In 1979, however, the Commission reversed its position and began disapproving proposed final plats for the undeveloped remainder of the tract based on the failure to comply with the density requirements adopted by the 1977 ordina nce. William son Pla nning C omm 'n, 473 U.S. at 178-79, 181-82, 105 S. Ct. at 3112, 3114, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126. Respondent filed suit against the C omm issio n and the Cou nty, alleging that, by refusing to approve the remaining plats, the governmental units effected a 57 taking of its property without just compensation. William son Pla nning C omm 'n, 473 U.S. at 182, 105 S. Ct. at 3114, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126. In conclud ing that respo ndent's claim was not ripe for judicial review, the Court began its analysis by stating that "a claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a prop erty interest is not ripe until the g overnm ent entity charge d with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the prope rty at issue." William son Pla nning C omm 'n, 473 U.S. at 186, 105 S. Ct. at 3116, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126. Important in shaping the Court's view was the fact that, when the Comm ission rejected responde nt's plat as not conforming to the revised ordinance, "respondent did not then seek variances that would have allowed it to develop th e property according to its proposed plat, notwithstanding the Commission's finding that the plat did not comply with the zoning ord inance and subd ivision regulations." Williamson Planning Com m'n, 473 U .S. at 187 -89, 105 S. Ct. at 3117-18, 87 L . Ed. 2d 126. W hether a governmental regulation e ffects a taking of property depe nds, accord ing to the C ourt, in large measure on "the eco nomic im pact of the challenged action and the extent to w hich it interferes with [th e lando wner's] reason able inv estmen t-backe d expe ctations ." Williamson Planning Com m'n, 473 U.S. at 191, 105 S. Ct. at 3 119-2 0, 87 L . Ed. 2d 126. "Those factors simply cannot be evaluated u ntil the admin istrative agen cy has arrived a t a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in questio n." William son Pla nning C omm 'n, 473 U.S. at 191, 105 S. Ct. at 3120, 87 L. Ed. 2d 58 126. In other words, the party asserting that a takin g has occ urred mu st be able to demons trate some actual, concrete injury occasioned by the imposition of a final application to the property of the challenged regulatory sche me or d ecision . Williamson Planning Com m'n, 473 U.S. at 192-93, 105 S. Ct. at 3119-20, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126. In light of tho se principles o f law, the C ourt conclu ded that [r]esort to the proced ure for ob taining varian ces wou ld result in a conclusive determination by the Commission whether it would allow responde nt to develop the subdivision in the manner respondent proposed. The Comm ission's refusa l to approve the preliminary plat does not determine that issue; it preven ts respondent from developing its subdivision without obtaining the necessary variances, but leaves open the possibility that respondent may develop the subdivision according to its plat after obtaining the variances. In short, the Commission's denial of approval does not conclusively determine whether respondent will be denied all reasonable beneficial use of its property, and therefore is not a final, reviewable decision. Williamson Plann ing Co mm'n , 473 U.S. at 193-94, 105 S. Ct. at 3120, 87 L. Ed. 2d 12 6; see also Hodel v. Virgin ia Surfa ce Min ing & Re clama tion As s'n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 297, 101 S. Ct. 2352, 2371, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1981) ("There is no indication in the record that appellees have availed themselves of the opportunities provided by the [Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977] to obtain administrative relief by re questin g either a varianc e . . . or a waiver from the surface mining restriction."). The denial of a proposed plat, in other words, was not the equivalent of the denial of a variance and, "[b]ecause respondent ha[d] not yet obtained a final decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations to its property . . . ," the Court concluded that "responde nt's claim 59 [wa]s not ripe [for judicial decision]." Williamson Planning Com m'n, 473 U.S. at 186, 105 S. Ct. at 3116, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126. Just as the parties' claims were not ripe for judicial review in Williamson Planning Com m'n and Maryland Reclamation Associates, Inc., we conclude that P etitioner's regulatory takings claim in the present case likewise is premature. Whether Petitioner may maintain a regulatory takings claim depends on final action on the demolition permit application, during which deliberation p rocess the f actor of un due finan cial hardship of preserv ation must b e confronted squarely by the HDC and Respondent. Determining that the Property should be deemed historic does not termina te the proceedings between the parties to such a decree that all that remains to be done is to enforce by execution the disposition of the c ontrov ersy. See, e.g., Grimb erg v. Ma rth, 338 Md. 546, 551-52, 659 A.2d 1287, 1289-90 (1995) (quoting In re Buckler Trusts, 144 Md. 424, 427, 125 A. 1 77, 178 (1 924); Walbert v. Walbert, 310 Md. 657, 661, 531 A.2d 291, 293 (1987)). In the absence of such a final determination of the permitted use of the Property, and in particular the fate of the Spates Bungalow, there is no way of ascertaining whether Petitioner has been deprived of a concrete property interest sufficient to render any governmental action a taking. As the intermediate appellate co urt noted, Pe titioner equate s historic designation of the Prop erty w ith denia l of th e dem olitio n permit w hen, in ac tuali ty, the former does not lead necessarily to the latter. To the contrary, once the Property was designated as historic, the HDC still must review the permit application under the re gulatory schem e set forth in A rticle 60 66B, §§ 8.01 - 8.17, at which time there will be ample opportunity for all interested parties to have adju dicated fu lly the issues concerning the economic feasibility of preserving the Spates Bungalow. As we have stated supra, whether a regulation has such a n econom ic impact on a property that it interferes with all reasonable investment-backed expectations depends in large part on whether that reg ulation works a regu latory takin g of the p rope rty. Williamson Plann ing Co mm'n , 473 U.S. at 191, 105 S. Ct. at 3119-20, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126. The entire purpose of Article 66B, §§ 8.09 and 8.10, two provisions which have yet to be applied by the HD C to the now- design ated Pr operty, co nsider p recisely tho se econ omic im pacts. In short, the filing of the local map amendment to rezone the Property with a historic district overlay zone did not "seal its fate," and the Mayor and Council's decision to designate the Property as histori cal still leaves open the real p ossibility that the Trust yet may be able to demolish the Spates Bungalow.43 Until there is some governmental determination by the HDC, or otherwise,44 that Petitioner may not proceed with its demolition plans or other 43 Pragma tists and skeptics may deem this a ssumption "pollyannish;" b ut it is the only objective one that may be drawn from this record. 44 Maryland Code (1957, 2003 Repl. Vol.), Article 66B, § 8.15, provides that "[a]ny person aggrieved by a decision of a historic district commission or historic preservation commission may appeal the decision in the manner provided for an appeal from the decision of the zoning board or commission of the local jurisdiction." Rockville City Code provides furthermore that "[a]ny person aggrieved by an decision of the [Historic District] Commission may appea l the same to the Circuit Court for [Montgomery County]. Such appeal shall be taken acco rding to the M aryland Rule s as set forth in Chapter 1 100, Sub title B." Rockville City Code § 25-75. This includes any decision related to the issuance or denial of a permit application for the demolition of the structu re located w ithin the municipal boundaries of the City of Rockville. 61 financially fruitful uses of the Property, there is no way to determin e with any pa rticularity how histo ric designatio n ultimat ely will affect the u se of the P rope rty. 45 As a result, the 45 Paul T. Glasgow, Rockville City Attorney, was of the opinion that the bifurcated procedure employed b y the City in this case was proper. In response to Petitioner's argument made at one of the initial hearings regarding h istorical design ation of 11 5 Park A venue tha t, under Maryland law, the City was required to consider economic feasibility of restoring the property at that point in time, he replied: Well, at this point, . . . , the issue is really no t joined, so to speak. The case that was referred to here was the situation where there was a pending perm it before the agency. Here w e're not at that step . . . . We 're at the point no w of de signati[ng] th is as a historic designation. After that, then depending upon what the property ow ner wan ts to do, they will have to come in for a permit. At that time, depending upon what they're asking for and what the commission determine s, then the qu estion wo uld be appropriate, you know, is there an issue of economic unfeasibility or is there no economic possibility of saving the structure? Then that would be the time when that is right - when they actually come in for a permit seeking demolition. At this stage, though, that issue does not come up. He con tinued: At this point in time, it's just a question of whether or not this particular property has such a historic significa nce that it should be considered and placed in - - or architectural significance or archeolo gical significa nce that it sho uld be in the historic district. If, as the Mayor said, you determine that it is of such signif icance, then it is put in the distric t. At that point, on a case-by-case basis, then th ey would address the question of feasibility of renovation and whether or not an econo mically feasible plan could be develo ped to preserve the structure or what have you. So that right now that is not an issue under M aryland law where you are right now. That could become an issue before the Historic District Commission when a permit is presented for some sort of (continued...) 62 takings claim is not ripe for judicial resolutio n. Maryland Reclamation Assocs., Inc., 342 Md. at 506, 677 A.2d at 58 2. As this C ourt stated in Mayor of Rockville v. Stone, 271 Md. 655, 664, 319 A.2d 536, 542 (1974), "[i]t is not with a deaf o r a totally unsympathetic ear that we listen to the de tails of the financial disaster which may result because of this rezoning. Nevertheless, [there has been no final denial of th e demolition permit], and , according ly we do not f ind that t his prop erty has be en unc onstitutio nally con fiscated ." Petitioner nonetheless maintains that "[t]his matter is ripe for judicial review because the City, b y withholding the Trust's de molition pe rmit for ove r five years or im properly terminating the demolition review permit process, may be viewed to have made a final decision with resp ect th ereto and the T rust's proposed use of the Prop erty." To th e con trary, no dispositive action has been taken in terms of the demolition permit application. The permit review process was never resolved finally. Rather than press that process to a conclusion in parallel proceedings to the instant litigation or via a petition for writ of mandamus, Petitioner apparently opted to litigate the dispute piece-meal, crossing its metaphorical fingers that success in a one-front war would obviate the need to go before the HDC again. We do not assume that the five year delay in acting on the permit application equates to "a final decision with respect thereto." See supra, note 39. As stated earlier, historical designation does not auto mati cally e quate to a denial of th e demolition permit sought. The HD C, in the w ake of R esponde nt's historic desig nation dec ision, still must 45 (...continued) dem olitio n or f or alterin g the struc ture in so me w ay. 63 determine the fate of the demolition permit by considering the various relevant factors enum erated a bove, w hich inc lude the econo mic fea sibility of re storation . If Petitioner was as convinced, as it so adamantly contended in the proceedings below, that it was en titled legally to the dem olition perm it,46 it should have petitioned the Circuit Court in a separate action, as did the prop erty owner in Broadview, 49 Md. App. at 542 n.2, 433 A.2d at 1216 n.2,47 for a writ of mandamus immediately upon discovering that issuance of the permit was being withheld pending historic review. A writ of mandamus issues generally "to compel inferior tribunals, public officials or administrative agencies to perform their functio n, or perfor m some particular du ty imposed up on them w hich in its nature is imperative and to the performance of which duty the party applying for the writ has a clear leg al right." Goodwich v. Nolan, 343 M d. 130, 145, 680 A.2d 1040, 1047 (1996) (quoting Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 514, 331 A .2d 55, 72 (1975); 46 While Petitioner in its brief attempted to argue tha t it was not in sisting on a p roperty right in the permit itself, it made reference repeatedly that "the designation process in this case was triggered only after the Tru st (1) filed an application for a demolition permit; (2) had been notif ied by the City that all requirements for the demolition permit had been satisfied; (3) was advised that the City would sign the permit; and (4) was told it could pick up the permit." Petitioner also argued in its brief to this Court that "[s]ubsection 108.1 [of the BOC A], 'Action o n Applica tion,' requires tha t permits be exam ined 'within a reasonab le time after filing' and that if the revie wer 'is satisfied' that the 'prop osed wo rk confo rms' to code requirements and 'applicable' laws and ordinances, the Development Services Dep artm ent 'shall i ssue ' the p ermit 'as s oon as pr actic able .' " 47 There, Broadview sought in a separate cause of action a writ of mandamus on the grounds that, because of the two year delay betw een the da te of application for a demolition permit and the eventual hearing on the permit application, the Commissioner of Housing and Comm unity Deve lopme nt was "witho ut autho rity to with hold th e reque sted pe rmit." Broadview, 49 M d. App . at 542 n .2, 433 A .2d at 12 16 n.2. 64 Geor ge's Creek Coal & Iron Co. v. County Comm 'rs, 59 Md. 255, 259 (1883)). Although a mandamu s petition may have been d enied by the Circuit Court, as did the S uperior Court of Baltimore City in Broadview, which denied the petition in light of the fact that the time limitations imposed by Baltimore City's historic zoning perm it pro cess wer e not man dato ry, Broadview, 49 Md. App. at 542 n.2, 433 A.2d at 1216 n.2, the petition for writ of mandamus might have encouraged Respondent to address the demolition permit application issue.48 4. Respondent's Failure to Consider Econom ic Feasibility At This Juncture Was Not A Deprivation of Property Without Due Process of Law. Petitioner argues finally that the Mayor and City Council's failure to consider the econom ic impact was a denial of d ue proces s because the historic designation proceedings "contravened the rule requiring a pre-deprivatio n hearin g, absen t any exig ent circu mstanc es." Petitioner finds support in Pitsenberger, 287 Md. at 30 , 410 A.2d at 105 8, where this Cou rt held that, "[a]t a minimum, due process requires that a deprivation of property be preceded by . . . notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. . . ." (emphas is added). Because there has been no infringement of a constitutionally protected property right sufficient to maintain a claim based on denial of due process, through the final determination of Petitioner's legal rights to use the Property as originally intended, 48 It should also be noted tha t, even if the C ourt of Sp ecial App eals's opinion in Broadview may be read to stand for the propo sition that failure to consider econom ic feasibility may amount to a taking, we note that the takings claim in Broadview was ripe because there was a final disposition by the CHAP and the HCD on the merits of the demo lition pe rmit app lication. 65 Williamson Plann ing Co mm'n , 473 U.S. at 197-205, 105 S. Ct. at 3122-26, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126 (rejecting a landowner's property-based procedural due process claim on the grounds that the zoning ordinances at issue did not determine finally the permitted uses of the targeted land); Pitsenberger, 287 Md. at 27-28, 410 A.2d at 1057 ("[T]he state action [complained of] must result in a 'd eprivatio n' of the c omp laina nt's interest, a nd su ch in teres t must be a 'pro perty' interest within the meaning of the due process clause.") (citation s omitted), w e find no m erit in the Trust's d ue proces s argume nt. "Because the power to regulate land use necessarily places the local governm ent in the position of potentially circumscribing a citizen's rights or expectations as to the desired use for a given piece of real property, our appellate courts repeatedly have identified the source of those p owers an d set forth the minimum p rocedures necessary to insure that these powers are exercised in an ap propria te man ner." Rylyns, 372 Md. at 533, 814 A.2d at 47980. "[O]nce it is determined that an interes t is entitled to due process protection," therefore, "[a]t a minimum, due process requires that a deprivation of property be preceded by ' . . . notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.'" Pitsenberger, 287 Md. at 30, 410 A.2d at 1058 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579, 95 S. C t. 729, 7 38, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1 975); Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (19 76) (citations o mitted)); Boitnott v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 356 Md. 226, 244, 738 A.2d 881, 891 (1999) ("Procedural due process ensures that citizens are afforded both notice and an op portunity to be heard, where substantive rights are at issue.") 66 (citations omitted); Burke v. Fidelity Trust Co., 202 Md. 178, 188, 96 A.2d 254, 260 (1953) ("[D]ue process does not necessarily mean judicial process. It is su fficient if there is at some stage an opportunity to be heard suitable to the occasion and an opportunity for judicial review at least to ascertain whether the fundamental elements of due process have been met.") (citations omitted). "Fundam entally, due proc ess requires th e opportu nity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" Pitsenberger, 287 Md. at 30, 410 A.2d at 1058. The record in the present case indicates clearly that notice was given and hearings were conducted with respect to the adoption of Ordinance No. 19-03. It is equally clear that Petitioner, or its representative(s), was present at all of the pertinent hearings and participated meaning fully in the decision-making process. At the initial HDC evaluation hearing conducted on 16 October 2001, Petitioner, along with other interested parties, was given an opportun ity to present ev idence in o pposition to design ation. Petitioner's counsel's request was granted to keep open the record for submission of additional evidence. Petitioner took advantage of this additional time to submit, in addition to cost estimate s of ren ovation , a report by its expert, Daniel Koski-Karell, Ph.D., concerning what he perceived to be the Prop erty's lack of historical significance. At the 28 January 2002 meeting of the Mayor and Counc il, convened for the purpose of considering the HDC's recommendation for histo ric designation, Petitioner was again present and participated in the meeting. Counsel for Petitioner spoke also at the Planning Commission's 8 May 2002 hearing regarding the 67 proposed map amen dmen t. She spok e in oppos ition to the des ignation, as d id Dr. Ko skiKarrell. At the 17 June 200 2 Mayor a nd Cou ncil meeting , Petitioner aga in was pre sent, through representatives, and had the opportunity to object and present evidence in opposition to the proposed designation. Thus, a series of full and fair hearings was given on the issue of the historical/architectural significance of the Property, which was the purpose of the proceedings. Respondent issued a written opinion in which it entirely apprised Petitioner of the f acts relie d upon in designating the P rope rty. In order for th e historic designation proceedings to bear the flaw of a violation of due process, it must be concluded that Petitioners were not given the opportunity to be heard "at a meaning ful time and in a mean ingful m anner." Pitsenberger, 287 Md. at 30, 410 A.2d at 1058. As we stated supra, the hearings given prior to reaching the designation decision were not inadequate. The Mayor an d Council gave due consideration to the f actors pertinent to the designation proceedings, i.e., the historic, cultural, and architectural significance of the Spates Bunga low, wh ile reserving p roperly for the u ltimate disposition on the demolition permit application the determination of economic feasibility and financial hardship of preservation. Because there rema ins an app ropriate opportun ity for Petitioner to p resent its evidence (even add itional eviden ce, if it wishes ) before the HDC regarding e conomic feas ibility, we conclude that the designation procedures followed by Respondent did not deprive Petitioner unconstitutionally of its right to due process. There was no "bending" of the public hearing process as Petitioner alleg es and, w hile conflatio n of the ec onomic issues 68 likely would have shortened the period of time before final resolution of the demolition permit application, Petitioner has failed to show sufficiently how the procedure followed amounted to a denial of due process. B. Petitioner's Additional Contentions That It Was D enied Procedural Due P rocess Are N ot Prop erly Pre served F or App eal. Petitioner posits an additional alternative contention that the City's withholding of the demolition permit, pending consideration for historic designation, denied the Trust's constitutiona lly protected rights to procedural due process guaranteed by Article 24 of the Maryland Declaratio n of Righ ts. Specifically, Pe titioner argues that: (1) the City Code provides no safeguards in terms of how long a demolition permit application may be delayed pending review of historical/architectural significance of implicated structure; (2) the HDC review process provides no statutory guidance for timeliness for making a recommendation to the Mayor and Council; and (3) Section 25-123 of the City Code sets no time-frame for when the City Clerk must set a hearing before the Mayor and Council concerning the zoning map amendment application. Petitioner argues, in other words, that the lack of time limitations governin g the review process creates a situation where City officials have unfettered discretion in re viewing th e Property, w hich conc eivably could delay indefinite ly a final d ecision on the p ermit ap plication . An appellate court, under normal circumstances, will not render an opinion on a question posed in a case unless it appears clearly in the record that the issue framed in the question w as raised in or decided by the trial court. Md. Rule 8-131(a). In the context of 69 appellate review b efore this C ourt, furthermore, the Maryland Rules provide for additional limitations: Unless otherwise provided by the order granting the writ of certiorari, in reviewing a decision rendered by the Court of Special Appeals or by a circuit court acting in an appellate capa city, the Court of Appea ls ordinarily will co nsider only an issue that has been raised in the petition for certiorari or any cross-petition and that has been preserved for review by the Court of Appeals. Whenever an issue raised in a petition for certiorari or a cross-petitioner involves, either expressly or implicitly, the assertion that the trial court committed error, the Court of App eals may consider whether the error was harmless or non-prejudicial even though the matter of harm or prejudice was not raised in the petition or cross-petition. Marylan d Rule 8-131 (b) (em phasis a dded). It is well-settled that the term "ordinarily" in Rule 8-131 implies that this Court has some discretio n, although in freq uently invoked, to address and decide questions notwithstanding a failure to raise the issues in the petition for writ of certiorari or in the proceedings below . See, e.g., Purnell v. S tate, 375 M d. 678, 6 86 n.5, 8 27 A.2 d 68, 73 n.5 (2003); Crown Oil & Wax Co. v. Glen, 320 Md. 546 , 561, 578 A.2d 1 184, 1191 (199 0); Yarema v. Exxon Corp., 305 Md. 219, 231 n. 9, 503 A .2d 239, 24 5 n. 9 (198 6); Taub v. State, 296 Md. 439, 441, 463 A.2d 819, 820 (1983). In th at vein, an ap pellate court may render an opinion regarding a questio n not previou sly raised w here the is sue involves the tr ial co urt's subject matter jurisdiction over the action, the court's personal jurisdiction over the parties (unless waived) or when the issue is otherwise "necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another ap peal." Ma ryland Rule 8 -131(a); County 70 Counc il of Prince George's County v. Offen, 334 Md. 499, 508, 639 A.2d 1070, 1074 (1994) ("Ordinarily, an appellate court will consid er only those issues that were raised o r decided by the trial court, unless the issue concerns the jurisdiction of the court to hear the matter.") (citing Md. R ule 8-131 (a)); Moats v. City of Hagerstown, 324 Md. 519, 524-25, 597 A.2d 972, 974-75 (1 991); Yarema, 305 Md. at 231 n. 9, 503 A .2d at 245 n . 9; Smith v. Taylor, 285 Md. 143, 147, 400 A.2d 1130, 1133 (1979)). W e decline to exercise our discretion to address Petitioner's arguments regarding the lack of statutory time limitation s in the historic designation process. This Court has held that "questions, including Constitutional issues, that could have been but were not presented to the administrative agency may not ordinarily be raised for the first time in any action for judicial review." Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance v. Levitsky, 353 Md. 188, 208, 725 A.2d 1027, 1036-37 (1999 ); see also Finucan v. Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance, 151 M d. App . 399, 42 3, 827 A .2d 176 , 190 (2 003), cert. granted, 377 Md. 275, 833 A.2d 31 (2003 ), aff'd, 380 M d. 577, 8 46 A.2 d 377 ( 2004) , cert. denied, 543 U.S. 862, 125 S. Ct. 227 (2004 ), reh'g denied, 543 U.S. 1016, 125 S. Ct. 648 (2004). In the present litigation, there is no rea son that the g eneral rule sh ould not ap ply with equal force to arguments not made before either the municipal zoning authority or the intervening review ing cou rts. The only instances Petitioner points to wh ere it purportedly referred to procedural due process violations, prio r to the petition for writ of certiorari, briefing, and oral argument 71 before this Court, oc curred in a 2 4 January 20 02 letter to the Mayor and Council regarding the authorization of the HDC staff to file the zoning map amendment application. There, Petitioner argued that by withhold ing the dem olition perm it, requiring an HDC review of the historic significa nce of the Property and proceedin g to consider the filing of a zoning map amendment to place the Property in the H istoric D istrict Zo ne, the C ity had cre ated ". . . a presumption of historical value [of the Property] that has caused the property ow ner, who se property righ ts are in jeop ardy, to bear the burden of proving that the site is not historic . . . c ontrary to due pro cess." Aside from the fact that this particular issue regarding the allocation of burdens of proof was not raised again or decided before the circuit court or intermediate appellate court, the original due process argument relied upon does not involve the same subject matter as the alternative argument raised here concerning the lack of statutory time limitations. While the lack of time limitations may be related loosely to the issues of procedural due process, we find too attenuated the link between the absence of time limitations and the theory that the failure to consider economic feasibility is a violatio n of du e proce ss. See Crown Oil & Wax Co., 320 Md. at 560-61, 578 A.2d at 1191 (determining that in some situations, a new argument may be presented on appeal when it does not present a new issue, but is instead an addition al argum ent und er the um brella of an alrea dy preser ved issu e on ap peal). JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED; COSTS TO B E PAID BY PETITIONER. 72

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