Attorney Grievance v. Mahone

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Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Mahone, Misc. Docket AG No. 7, September Term, 2006 HEADNOTE: ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE Our goal in matters of attorney discipline is to protect the public and the p ublic s confiden ce in the le gal p rofe ssion rather than to pu nish the a ttorn ey. ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE We protect the public by imposing sanctions that are commensu rate with the nature and gravity of the atto rneys violations and the inte nt with which they were committed. The severity of the sanction depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, taking account of any particular aggravating or mitigating factors. Under the circumstances, the appropriate sanction is a reprimand where the attorney disrupted court proceedings in one instance; and, in another instance walked out during the court proceedin gs to show his disdain for the trial judge. The mitigating factors were that the attorney s clien ts were not prejudiced as a result of his miscondu ct and that there were no prior disciplinar y proceedings filed against the attorney. In addition, by imposing a reprimand in this case, we are able to se nd a clear m essage to th e Bar that d eliberately disruptive behavior by attorneys in court proceedings will not be tolerated. In the Circu it Court for M ontgom ery County Case No. 21 070-M IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. D ocket A G No . 7 September Term, 2006 ____________________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. DANIEL Q. MAHONE ___________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene Wilner, A lan M. (R etired, Spec ially Assigned), JJ. ____________________________________ Opinion by Greene, J. ____________________________________ Filed: April 10, 2007 The Attorney Grievance C ommission of M aryland ( Petitioner ), by Bar Counsel acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751,1 filed a Petition For Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals against Daniel Q. Mahone ( Respondent ). The petition charged that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d) (misconduct) 2 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Condu ct ( MR PC ), in his representatio n of clients , in three cases that were pending in the Circuit Court for Washington County. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-752(a), 3 we referred the matter to the Honorable Nelson W. Rupp, Jr., of the Circuit Court for Montgom ery County, to conduct an evidentia ry hearing and render findings of fact and recommend conclusions of law. After a two-day hearing on the merits, Judge Rupp filed on December 20, 2006, the 1 Maryland Rule 16-751, in relevant part, provides: (a) Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action. (1) Upon approval of Commission. Upon approval of the Commission, Bar Counsel shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals. 2 MRPC 8 .4(d) provides: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: *** (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. 3 Rule 16-752(a) provides: (a) Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, the Court of App eals may enter an order designating a judge of any circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the record. The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation with Bar Counsel and the attor ney, to enter a scheduling order defining the extent of discovery and setting dates for the c omple tion of d iscove ry, filing of motion s, and h earing. following findings of facts and conclusions of law: FINDINGS OF FACT (1) Respondent represented Christopher Abbott in the case of Jennifer Abbott v. Christopher Abbott, case no. 21-C-0420231-CT, in the Circuit Court for Washington County. This matter arose from a child custody dispute. A hearing was scheduled on August 26, 200 5, 9:30 a.m. before the Hon orable Donald E. Beachley. The evening before the hearing the parties reached a settlement re garding v isitation. When the case was called a t 9:38 a.m ., Respo ndent w as not p resent in court. Mr. Abbott testified that he expected Respondent to be present to represent him. Mr. Abbott testified that he and Respondent had discussed the substance of the consent order the night before the hearing. Mrs. Abbott s attorney prepared the consent order. On the morning of the hearing, Mr. Abbott was left, without the benefit of counsel, to review the consent order with opposing counsel in the hallway of the courthouse. M r. Abbott signed the consent order, which w as filed in op en Cou rt, and the hearing concluded at 9:40 a.m. without Respondent appearing. Judge Beachley testified that he learned that Respondent arrived after the hearing s con clusion. Howev er, there was no evidence that Responden t notified the Court upon his arriv al or apo logized for his ta rdiness . Mr. Abbott testified that he was pleased with the representation provided by Respondent. Mr. Abbott further testified that Respondent helped Mr. Abbott become a part of his son s life. Respondent was discourteous to the Court by failing to timely appear fo r the Cour t hearing; by failing to notify the Court that he would be tardy; and by failing to either explain his tardiness or apologize once he arrived. Moreover, Respondent failed to be present to protect his client s interests at the Court hearing. (2) Respondent represented Diana Sue Grimm in her divorce proceedings in the case of Diana Sue Grimm v. Bodie Elwood Grimm, case no. 21-C-04-18468 DA, in the Circuit Court for -2- Washington County. Respondent filed a Petition for Contempt in that case on the groun ds that Mr. Grimm allegedly violated the pendente lite order that awarded Ms. Grimm use and possession of the parties marital home. On September 2, 2005, a contempt hearing in that matter was held before the Honora ble Donald E. Beachley. Upon disagreement w ith the Court s findings, Respondent engaged in an extensive pattern of disruptive and disrespectful behavior, interrupting Judge Beachley on several occasions. During the initial stages of the hearing, Judge Beachley advised Respondent that it was impolite to interru pt the C ourt. At another point during the hearing, Respondent told Judge Beachley if the Court made a mistake, the Court ought to be big enough to admit that. In addition, Judge B eachley had to ask Resp ondent to refrain from packing up his materials while he was rendering his opinion from the bench. Subsequent to the Court s decision to dismiss the Petition for Contempt, there was a contentious exchange between Respondent and opposing counsel. Respondent interrupted opposing counsel when opposing counsel tried to address the issue of attorney s fees. Judge Beachley then accused Respondent of being discourteous, at which point Judge Beachley and Respondent engaged in an argum ent in regard s to Responden t s tardiness at the August 26, 2005 hearing. During this exchange, Respondent repeatedly accused Judge Beachley of demonstrating a lack of courtesy. When opposing counsel attempted to resume his argum ent, he wa lked towards Responden t s table and said to him: If you stand u p one more [sic], I w ill not stan d for th at-you cu t me of f. Fina lly, Respon dent once again told Judge Beachley that he ought to b e big enough to recog nize when he makes an error. Judge Beachley responded that such remarks were condescending, and Respondent accused Judge Beachley of having an I can do no wrong attitude. Ms. Grimm testified during the attorney grievance proceedings that she was present during the September 2, 2005 hearing and was pleased with Respondent s representation of her interests. Ms. Grimm testified that Respondent was an effect ive adv ocate f or her. At the Responde nt s request the Court listened to the -3- recording of the Septemb er 2, 2005 hearing b efore Judge Beachley. It is Respondent s position that the recording of the September 2, 2005 hearing mitigates Respondent s conduct as it demonstrates a lack of courtesy and respect toward him by Judge Beachle y. The Cou rt conclude s the opposite. Judge Beachley allowe d Resp onden t to be fu lly heard. It is clear that Respondent repeatedly interrupted Judge Beachley and opposing counsel and pursued a pattern of disrespectful behavior to the bench. The Court finds no mitigation to support Responden t s condu ct. (3) Respondent represented Diana Sue Grimm , the mother in a CINA procee ding, In the Ma tter of Geor ge G., et al., case no. 21-I-04-50576-50583. A lengthy he aring wa s held on May 5, 2005 before the Honorable Judge Frederick C. Wright, III. At the end of the hea ring, while Ju dge Wr ight was re ndering h is opinion, Respondent suddenly interrupted and accused Judge Wright of performing a disservice to Ms. Grimm. At that time, Respondent informed Ms. Grimm that he was leaving the hearing, and he invited her to accompany him. Judge Wright asked Ms Grimm if she wished to walk out of the courtroom with Respo ndent. R espon dent ad vised M s. Grimm that she could stay but that he w as going to leave. Wh ile Judge Wright was rendering his opinion from the bench, Respondent walked out of the courtroom and abandoned his client, Ms. Grimm. Elisha Elliott, Esquire was also p resent at this hearing. Ms. Elliott had been Ms. Grimm s CINA counsel. After Respondent left the hearing, Ms. Elliott came forward and Judge Wright appointed her to represent Ms. Grimm for the remainder of the hearing. Ms. Grim m testified th at she did not feel that Respondent s be havior prejudice d her in any wa y. Responden t s abandonment of his client in the course of Judge Wright s benc h opinion was a vio lation of his d uty to represent her interests. Respondent had an obligation to continue to repre sent M s. Grim m. Even though Ms. Elliott was able to adequately continue to represent Ms. Grimm s interests, there was no evidence to suggest that Respondent knew that Ms. Elliott would be able to co ntinue with the represen tation of his client. Responden t s blatant interruption of Judge Wright was an -4- overt and public display of disdain for the Court and constituted disrespect for the administration of justice. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW It is undisputed that Respondent failed to appear for the hearing held on August 26, 2005. While Respondent s absence appeared unintentional, he failed to notify the Court that he would be tardy; he failed to explain or apologize for h is tardiness to the Court; and he failed to be p resent to pro tect his client s interests. On September 2, 2005, Respondent s behavior before Judge Beachley was disruptive and disrespectful to the Court. The Court had to address Respondent s offensive and disruptive conduct during the Court proceedings. On May 5, 2005, Respondent interrupted Judge Wright and exited the courtroom in the course of Judge Wright s bench opinion, which disrupted court proceedings. Respondent abandoned his client when he left the M ay 5, 2005 pro ceedings. Respondent is a zealous advocate on behalf of his clients. How ever, his aggressive tactics cause him to lose his perspective. He has displayed a pattern of disrespect toward the Court. He has failed to recogniz e that he is an officer of the Court a nd has a d uty to his clien ts, the C ourt an d the pu blic. Responden t s conduct d uring each of the three proceedings does not appear to have resulted in any actual prejudice to his clients. Moreover, each of the court proceedings was concluded in spite of Responden t s disruptive behavior. However, when taken as a whole, Responden t s conduct in failing to appear in court, interrupting the judge and opposing counsel, an d refusing to listen to the jud ge render h is opinion undermines the jud icial system and the public s faith in the system. It constitutes a lack of respect for the judicial process. For these reasons, Respondent s conduct is prejudicial to the admin istration of justic e in violation of Rule 8.4(d) of the Maryland R ules of Pro fessional C onduct. Respondent filed written exceptions to the hearing judge s findings of fact and conclusions of law. First, Respondent contends that the hearing judge failed to make -5- findings of mitigation on the basis of Respondent s Equitable Grounds Defense, which suggests that the complaints filed against him in these proceedings w ere a product of judicial retaliation and resentment. In support of this position, he claims that when Judge Wright confronted him outside the courtroom in the hallway exclaiming, his desire that Respondent not practice law in W ashing ton Co unty, Ma ryland[,] that the ju dge s c onduc t, in that instance, confirms that the motivation of the persons who filed the complain ts in the instant case is guided by the desire to punish [him] rather than to vindicate the administration of justice. Secondly, Respondent excepts on the grounds that his lateness for court on one instance hardly suppo rts a finding, b y clear and co nvincing evidence, that he intended any discourtesy to the Court. In addition, he excepts to the finding that his absence at the hearing resulted in any disintegration of Mr. Abbott s rights. Thirdly, he excepts to the hearing judge s failure to find that (1) Judge Beachley initiated the pattern of interruption of counsel; (2) the court goaded Respondent during the hearing; (3) Judge Beachley was discourteous to counsel; and (4) Judge Beachley lost control of the proceedings and created a hostile and oppressive court environment because of his disdain and disrespect for Respon dent. Finally, Respondent asserts that his conduct in walking out of the courtroom during Judge Wright s disposition of the case was a speech protest and not a substantial disruption of the court proceedings. Furthermore, he contends that Judge Wright could not have thought that Respondent s conduct was contemptuous because the judge did n ot hold -6- him in direct contempt and did not file a complaint about [that] incident until four (4) months later on September 15, 2005. Either party may file post-hearing written exceptions to the findings and conclusions of the hea ring jud ge. Maryland Rule 16-758.4 Spe cific ally, Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(2)(B) provides: (B) If exceptio ns are filed. If exception s are filed, the C ourt of A ppeals shall determine whether the findings of fact have been proven b y the requisite standard of proof set out in Ru le 16-757(b). The Court may confine its review to the findings of fact challenged by the exceptions. The Court shall give due regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnes ses. We accept a hearing judge s fin dings of f act unless w e determin e that they are clea rly erroneous. Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50, 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006). As to the sc ope of ou r review, w e take into co nsideration w hether the f indings of fact have been proven by the requisite standard of proof set out in Ru le 16-757 (b). This R ule provides that Bar co unsel has th e burden of provin g the averments of the petition by clear and convincing evidence, and the attorney who asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of mitigation or extenuation has the burden of proving the defense or matter of mitigation or extenuation by a prep ondera nce of the evid ence. Guida, 391 Md. at 50-51, 891 A.2d at 1095 4 Maryland R ule 16-75 8 provide s, in pertinent p art: (b) Exceptions; recommendations. Within 15 days after service of the notice required by section (a) of this Rule, each party may file (1) exceptions to the findings and conclusions of the hea ring judge a nd (2) reco mmend ations concerning the app ropriate dispos ition un der Ru le 16-7 59(c). O nly Resp onden t filed w ritten ex ception s. -7- (citing Rule 16-757(b)). Weighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving any conflict in the evidence are tasks proper for the fact finder. State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733, 750, 720 A.2d 323, 331 (1998 ). With regard to the hearin g judge s c onclusion s of law, o ur review is de novo. Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Harrington, 367 Md 36, 49, 785 A.2d 1260, 126768 (2001). Respondent had a full opportunity to be heard as to his claim of mitigation. The hearing judge pointed out that he listened to the recording of the September 2, 2005 hearing before Judge Beachley and concluded, contrary to Respondent s assertions, that the record of that hearing demonstrated that Respondent repeatedly interrupted Judge Beachley and opposing counsel and pursued a pattern of disrespectful behavior to the bench. In addition, the hearing co urt specifica lly found no m itigation to support Respon dent s con duct. This is consistent with the hearing court s other findings as to the case inv olving Jud ge Wrigh t. According to the hearing judge, Respondent s blatant interruption of Judge Wright was an overt and public display of disdain for the Court and constituted disrespect for the administration of justice. The hearing judge ma de no findings as to w hether Respond ent proved by a preponderance of the evidence any mitigating factors. As to Respondent s theory of mitigation, based upon an Equitable Grounds Defense, the allegation that the trial judge goaded Responden t or that the complaint filed against him was in retaliation are not sufficient mitigating factors. Assuming arguendo that Respondent was enticed by Judge -8- Beachley to react inappropriately or that the complaint filed against him was in retaliation for his aggressiveness or that Judge Wright was biased against him 5 , those factors could not excuse Respondent s obligation, as an officer of the court, to respect the legal system. Notwithstanding Respondent s apparent opinion regarding the individual occupying the office of judg e, Resp onden t owes a duty of respec t to the of fice. In the present case, it is implicit, however, in the c ourt s finding of misconduct that the hearing jud ge did not f ind in Respo ndent s favor as to his Equ itable G round s Defe nse. To be certain, we have never said that a hearing court must spell out every reason that supports its decision or explain why every other hypothes is is inconsisten t with its conclusions. Moreover, even if the hearing court had determined that Judges Beachley and Wright were disc ourteous to Respon dent or that the complaint against him constituted a retaliation, under no circumstances, could this Court justify Respondent s reactions as appropriate. It is elementary that Respondent s disruption of court proceedings and walking out of those proceedings did not constitute an appropriate response to what he has alleged 5 From our review of the record filed in these proceedings it is undisputed that Elisha Elliott, Esquire, initially represented Mrs. Grimm , but recommended that Respondent represent Mrs. Grimm in the CINA case. Approximately halfway through the hearing, Judge Wright took a rece ss and ente red the hallw ay wearing h is robe. He approach ed Ms.E lliott shaking his finger and stating, re ferring to Respondent, you know I don t want you bringing him up here. Respondent was present in the hallway wh en Judge Wright m ade this comment and Ms. Elliott confirmed for Respondent what the ju dge had s aid. Further, th is confrontation followed an earlier motion filed by Respondent in the Abbott case that Judge Wright recuse him self from h earing the re quest for exceptions and the case on the merits. Judge Wright did not rule on the mo tion for recu sal, in effect d enying it, becau se, in his capac ity as Adm inistrativ e Judg e, he ha d assign ed the c ase to Ju dge B eachle y. -9- constituted judicial misco nduct. Thus, without any hesitation, w e overrule Respo ndent s excep tions to th e hearin g judge s findin gs of f act. Furthermore, we agree with the hearing judge s conclusions of law that Respondent violated MR PC 8 .4(d). No t only did Respondent violate the rules of professional resp onsi bility, his behavior which amounted to a pattern of disrupting the court proceedings and culminating in walking out w hile the trial judge rendered his oral opinion from the bench, constituted a direct contempt of court. As indicated by Respondent at oral argumen t, by walkin g out, he wante d the jud ge to kn ow ho w he f elt. See Md. Rule 15-2 02(b); State v. Roll and Scholl, 267 Md. 714, 733, 298 A.2d 867, 879-80 (1973) (noting that contempt of court involves conduct which is directed against the dignity and authority of the court, or a judg e act ing judic ially, is an act which obstructs the administration of justice, and tends to bring the court into disrepute o r disrespect); Mitchell v. S tate, 320 Md. 756, 764, 580 A.2d 196, 200 (1990); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Alison, 317 Md. 523, 536, 565 A.2d 660, 666 (1989) (noting that an attorney s failure to recognize that his misconduct which involved a pattern of inappropriate, rude, vulgar, insulting and sometimes criminal acts was prejudicial to the administration of justice and warranted a 90-day suspension from the practice of law). Under the circum stances of this case, both trial judges showed remarkable restraint in not finding Respondent in contempt. We do not interpret the exercise of restraint by either judge as an indication that Respondent s conduct was not a substantial disruption of the procee dings. -10- Having overruled Respondent s exceptions and concluding that Respondent violated MRPC 8.4(d), we next determine the proper sanction. Recently in Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Lee, 393 M d. 546, 563 , 903 A.2d 895, 905 -06 (2005 ), we reaff irmed that [t]he purpose of discipline un der the M RPC is n ot to punish the lawyer, bu t to protect the public a nd the pub lic s confide nce in the leg al profession. We protect the public through sanctions against off ending atto rneys in two ways: through deterrence of the type of conduct which will not be tolerated, and by removing those unf it to continue in the practice of law fro m the rolls of those authorized to practice in th is State. The p ublic is protected when san ctions are imposed that are commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which they were committed. The appropriate severity of the sanction depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case, taking account of any pa rticular a ggrava ting or m itigating factors . (Citatio ns and quotatio ns omi tted.) As to the m itigation stand ards to wh ich we or dinarily adhere , we have said: The mitigating factors listed in the ABA Standards include: absence of a prior disciplinary record; absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; personal or emotional problems; timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify consequences o f misconduct; full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; inexperience in the practice of law; character or reputation; physical or mental disa bility or impairme nt; delay in disciplinary proceedings; interim rehabilitation; imposition of other penalties or sanctions; remorse; and finally, remoteness of prior offenses. Lee, 393 Md. at 564 , 903 A.2d at 906 (citations omitted). The appropriate sanction in th is case is a reprimand. Petitioner recommends that we impose a suspension to send a clear message to the Bar that deliberately disruptive conduct by attorneys in court cannot be tolerated. We can send that message, in the present case, without disrupting Respondent s practice of law. See Attorney Grievance Comm n v. -11- O Neill, 285 Md. 52, 57, 400 A.2d 415, 418 (1979) (stating, under the circumstances of that case, that imposing a reprimand means it will forever appear in a reported Maryland case that the attorney sanctioned has been foun d to be a liar); Attorney Grievan ce Comm n v. Tolar, 357 Md. 569, 585 , 745 A.2d 104 5, 1054 (2000) (hold ing that a pub lic repriman d would serve the purpose of protecting the public just as well as a s hort suspen sion ); Attorney Grievance Com m n v. J aseb, 364 Md. 464, 475, 773 A.2d 516, 522 (2001) (concluding that a reprimand was an appropriate sanction considering, among other factors, the attorney s lack of prior misconduct and the lack of prejudice to the c lient); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Lee, 390 Md. 517, 527, 890 A.2d 273, 279 (2006) (holding that a reprimand will serve notice to the respondent and the Bar that this Court con siders an attorney s lack of diligence and lack of comm unicatio n with h is client, se rious m atters ). Even though we view counsel s conduct a s constituting a direct contem pt of court, we do not hold that every contempt of court committed by an attorney warrants the sanction of suspension from the practice of law or disbarment. The hearing judge noted that Respondent is a zealous advocate. The preamble to the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct encourag es attorneys to ac t zealously in adv ocating their clien t s cause s. See Preamble: A lawyer s responsibilities. MRPC (noting that an attorney is required to provide zealous advocacy under the rules of the adversary system). As noted by the hearing judge in this case , Respo ndent s aggr essive ta ctics cau se[d] h im to los e his pe rspectiv e. Furthermore, at oral argument before this Court, Respondent conceded that his conduct of -12- walking out of the court while the judge was rendering his decision did nothing to enhance the administratio n of justice o r rectify what h e perceive d to be judic ial unfairness. Obv ious ly, in the presen t case, Resp ondent, at the very least, again, c ould have noted an objection and stated his reasons on the record as to any point that he wished to preserve for appellate review.6 Instead, he chose to insult the trial judge and in one instan ce show his disdain for the court by walking out du ring the judg e s explana tion of his rea sons for h is ruling. Such behavior cannot be tolerated by the court and clearly violates the attorney s duty to his client an d the court. Fort unately, in this case, Respondent s clients were not prejudiced as a result of his miscond uct, and there is no rec ord o f any prior disciplinary proceedings filed against Respo ndent. An observation that we made in Alison, 317 Md. at 536, 565 A.2d at 666, bears repeating here: Nearly 100 years ago, Justice M itchell, on behalf of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, said: The bar have great liberty and high 6 For example, in the Abbott case, Resp ondent filed exception s to the Master s Rep ort and Recommendation. Before the case could be heard by a judge on the exceptions, Mrs. Abbott requested and obtained an emergency hearing. Over the objection of Respondent, the Circuit Court proceeded with the emergency hearing. In that proceeding, Judge Wright awarded physical custody of the minor child of the parties to the moth er, pending the exceptions hearing, with seven h ours a week v isitation, on Saturdays, to the father. Respondent duly noted his objections to the proceeding and the judge s Order, and filed an appeal on behalf of M r. Abbo tt. In an u nrepor ted opin ion, Abbott v. Abbott, No. 02531, filed July 14, 2005, September Term 2004, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the trial court s c ustody an d visitatio n decis ion. -13- privileges in the assertion of their clients rights as they view them, but, on the other hand, they have equal obligations as officers in the administration of justice; and n o duty is more fundam ental, more unremitting, or more imperative than that of respectful subordina tion to the co urt. The fo undation o f liberty under our system of government is respect for the law as officially pronounced. The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and his temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-restraint are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the eff ectiven ess of a n army. (Citatio ns omi tted.) As we have said, the appropriate sanction is a reprimand. IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT; I N C L UD I N G C O S T S O F A L L TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-715, FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST DANIEL Q. MAHONE. -14-

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