Allen v. State

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Ronald Robert Allen v. State of Maryland, No. 5, Sept. Term 2007 CRIMINAL LAW - CRIMINAL LAW ARTICLE, § 7-203, UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL OF PROPERTY - 2002 RECODIFICATION AND REVISION OF STATUTE HAD NO EFFECT ON ELEMENTS OF CRIME STATUTES - REVISIONS DURING RECODIFICATION - SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES - RECODIFICATION NORMALLY DOES NOT CHANGE THE MEANING OF TH E RECODIFIED STATUTE, UNLESS TH E LEGISLATURE SO INSTRUCTS STATUTES - CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION - AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION THE INTENT OF THE PLAIN MEANING RULE IS TO IMPLEMENT THE PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATURE AND SHOULD NOT BE INVOKED TO RENDER PORTIONS OF A STATUTE SUPERFLUOUS AND NUG ATORY OR TO CREATE AN ILLOGICAL RESULT. Circuit Co urt for Prince George s County Case No. CT040270 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 5 September Term, 2007 RONALD ROBERT ALLEN v. STATE OF MARYLAND Bell, C.J. Raker Harrell Battaglia Greene Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, specially assigned) Cathell, Dale R. (Retired, specially assigned) JJ. Opinion by Harrell, J. Bell , C.J., join s jud gme nt on ly. Filed: November 8, 2007 This case reaches the Court thro ugh our g rant of a Pe tition for W rit of Certiorari filed by Ronald Robert Allen (Petitioner) seeking review of a judgment of the Court of Special Appea ls finding no error with the evidentiary sufficiency of his conviction of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle under Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article § 7-203 (2002). We also granted the State s C ross-Petition to consider w hether the Maryland Legislature, in the course of its 2002 recodification of the substantive statutory criminal law, focusing particularly on Criminal Law Article ( CL ) § 7-203, added an element to the crime of unauthorized use of a vehicle beyond that previously required under the predecessor statute.1 1 The relevant statute, as revised in 2002 and extant at all relevant times in the present case, provides: CL § 7-203. Unauthorized removal of property. (a) Prohib ited. Without the permission of the ow ner, a person may not ente r or be on th e premises of another, and take and carry away from the premises or out of the custody or use of the other, or the other's agent, or a governmental unit any property, including: (1) a vehicle; (2) a motor vehicle; (3) a vessel; or (4) livestock. (b) Penalty A person w ho violates th is section is gu ilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction: (1) is subject to imprisonment for not less than 6 months and not exceeding 4 years or a fine not less than $50 and not exceeding $100 or both; and (2) shall restore the property taken and carried away in violation o f this section o r, if unable to restore the property, shall pay to the owner the full v alue of th e pro perty. (continued...) 1 (...continued) (c) Prohibited defense It is not a defense to this section that the person intends to hold or keep the property for the person's present use and not with the intent of appropr iatin g or c onvertin g the prop erty. Prior to the 2002 recodification, the relevant statute, codified at Md. Code, Article 27 § 349 (1957), read: § 349. Unauthorized use of livestock, boat, or vehicle. Any person or persons, his or their aiders or abettors who shall enter, or being upon the premises of any other person, body corporate or politic in the State, shall, against the will and consent of said person or persons, body corporate or politic or their agents, wilfully take and carry away any horse, mare, colt, gelding, mule, ass, sheep, hog, ox or cow, or any carriage, wagon, buggy, cart, boat, craft, vessel, or any other vehicle including motor vehicle as defined in the laws of this State relating to such, or property whatsoever, or take and carry away out of the custody or use of any person or persons, body corporate or politic, or his or their agents, any of the aboveenumerated property at whatsoever place the same may be found, shall upon conviction thereof in any of the courts of this State having criminal jurisdiction be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall restore the property so taken and carried away, or, if unable so to do, shall pay to the owner or owners the full value thereof, and be fined not less than fifty nor more than one hundred dollars, or be imprisoned in the county or city jail, or the house of correction, for not less than six months nor more than four years, or be both fined and imprisoned as aforesaid, in the discretion of the court, although it may appear from the evidence that such person or persons, his or their aiders and abettors, took and carried away the property or any portion of the same enumerated in this section, for his or their present use, and not with the intent of appropriating or converting the same. The provisions of Article 52, § 13, shall (continued...) -2- We shall hold that the Legislature in its 2002 recodification did not add a new requirement such that a defendant must be shown to have been on the real property fro m whe re a vehicle is taken and to have pa rticipated in the taking of the vehicle in order to be convicted of unauthorized use under CL § 7-203. We further shall hold that the record evidence, and reasonab le inferences drawable therefrom, were legally sufficient to convict Petitioner of unauthorized use. As a result, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. I. Ronald Robert Allen was tried in the Circuit Court for Prince George s County on three counts of theft and one count of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. After a two-day trial, a jury convicted Allen under Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article § 7-203 (2002), of the crime formally entitled unauthorized removal of property, but more commonly referred to as unauthorized use of an automobile. The parties do not dispute the direct facts. Early on 28 October 2003, General Motors delivered several new Hummer motor vehicles to Moore Cadillac s Virginia dealership. While normally the delivery driver dropped the associated paperwork and two sets of keys for each Hummer into a night drop slot at the dealership, on this occasion he noticed that one of the Hummers, a gray-colored one, had only one set of keys. On 5 November 2003, when a prospective purchaser inquired about that Hummer, employees of the dealership could not locate it and reported it stolen. 1 (...continued) not apply to this section. -3- The veh icle was loc ated whe n Office r Gerald Caver of the Prince G eorge s C ounty Police Department no ticed a gray Humm er, driven by Petitioner, during his patrol in the County on 5 December 2003. While checking on his in-board compute r vehicle tag numbers in search of stolen tags, a hit came back for the H ummer, le ading him to stop the vehicle. Officer Caver checked the vehicle identification number with the dispatcher and confirmed the vehicle was the one reported stolen from Moore Cadillac s V irginia dealers hip. A sing le set of m anufa cturer s origina l keys we re in the v ehicle. The grand jury charged Petitioner w ith felony theft, m otor vehicle theft, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle,2 and misdemeanor theft of the license tags. The State nol prossed the misdemeanor theft count at the close of its case-in-chief at trial. Allen moved for a judgment of acquittal on the other three charges. With regard to the count of unauthorized use, he argued that the State failed to establish the re quired elem ents, and sp ecifically that the S tate did not offer any evidence that he entered on the property of the Virginia dealership and took the Hu mmer off its lo t. His m otion fo r acquitt al was d enied. In his defense, Allen and his mother testified. His mother testified that Allen w as in Florida when the Hummer disappeared from Moore Cadillac. Petitioner testified that he did not take the Hummer from the dealership and did not know that the Hummer was stolen. He claimed that the Hummer belonged to an acquaintance, Marcus Robinson, from whom he 2 The State later moved to amend the charge of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle to a charge of unauthorized control over property. Upon Petitioner s objection, the court denied the State s motion on the ground that the proposed amendment was substantive. -4- borrowed the vehicle o n 5 Dec ember 20 03 to go to breakfast. Marcus Robinson did not testif y. At the close of all the eviden ce, Allen ren ewed h is motion fo r judgmen t of acquittal. The co urt den ied the m otion an d the ca se was sent to th e jury. The judge s instru ctions to the ju ry included on es consisten t with the Maryland Pattern Instructions on the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, and the requirement of impartiality. The ju dge also ins tructed the jur y that it [i]s your duty to decid e the facts an d apply the law to those f acts. .... In evaluating the evidence, you should consider it in the light of your own experiences. You may draw any reasonable inferences or conclusions from the evidence that you believe to be justif ied by co mmo n sense and you r own experie nces. .... There are two types of evidenc e, direct and circums tantial. The law makes no distinction be tween the weight to b e given to either direct or circumstantial evidence. No greater degree of certainty is required of circumstantial than of direct evidence. In reaching a verdict, you should weigh all of the evidence presented whether direct or circumstantial. You may not convict the defendant unless you find that the evidence when considered as a whole establishes guilt beyond a reason able do ubt. You are the sole judges of whether the witness should be believed. In making this decision, you may apply your own common sense and every day experiences. .... You have hea rd testimony about Marcus Robinson who was not called as a witness in this case. If a witness could have given important testimony on an issue in this case and if the witness was peculiarly within the pow er of the de fendant to produce but was not called as a witness by the defendant and the absence of that witness was not sufficiently accounted for or explained, then you may decide that the testimony of that witness -5- would h ave been unfavor able to the d efendan t. After explaining intent to the jury, the judge identified the elements needing to be proven in order to convict as to each of the three charges. With regard to the charge of unauthorized removal of property (unauthorized use), the judge stated: Unauthorized removal of property. Without the permission of the owner, a person may not enter or be upon the premises of another and take and carry away from the premises or out of the custody or use of the other or the other s agent or a government unit any property including a motor vehicle. No ex ception s were taken to this instru ction. The jury found Allen guilty of one count of unauthor ized use. H e was sen tenced to four years imprisonment, all but 90 days suspended, with three years probation upon release from incarceration. On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Allen argued that the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to support a conviction of unauthorized use under CL § 7-203. Allen v. State, 171 Md. App. 544, 551, 911 A.2d 453, 457 (2006). Specifically, he pointed to the language of the statute, last revised in 2002, asserting that the plain language requires proof both that a person , sans permission, entered or was present on the real property where the motor vehicle was taken and participated in the taking of such property from the premises or out of the custody or use of the owner. Id. In this case, the evidence did not establish sufficiently either that he was p resent at the V irginia dealership and removed the Hummer or, when d iscovered b ehind the w heel, that he k new that th e Hum mer wa s stolen. Id. In -6- repl y, the State argued that the 2002 revision of CL § 7-203 did not work a substantive change in the elements of the offen se from th e predece ssor statute and case law interpreting it and that it on ly was neces sary to prove th at Allen pa rticipated in the continued use of the Hummer under circumstan ces manif esting an inte nt to deprive the true owner of possession. Id. In its reported opinion, the intermediate appellate court traced the history of the unauthorized use statu te. Id. at 551-54, 911 A.2d at 45 7-59. The court detailed the statute s several revisions and the case law interpreting the iterati ons. Id. According to the court, the case law decided prior to the 2002 revision suppo rted the S tate s arg umen ts. Id. at 554, 911 A.2d at 459. Th e court note d, howe ver, that no on-point cases had been decided since the 2002 revision an d that the rev ision work ed a substa ntive chan ge in the statu te s meanin g from that vers ion exis ting bef ore 200 2. Id. Specifically, the court held that, under a pla in meaning reading, the statute now requires proof both of entry upon the premises of another by a defendant and the unlawful taking and ca rrying aw ay of pro perty. Id. at 557, 911 A.2d at 460. Based on its view of the current statute, the court next considered the sufficiency of the evidence suppo rting A llen s co nviction . Id. at 561, 911 A.2d at 463. The court noted Maryland s recognition that a jury may infer, from the unexplained possession of recently stolen goods, that the pos sessor is the thief . Id. at 562, 911 A.2d at 463 (citing Painter v. State, 157 Md. App. 1, 12, 848 A.2d 692, 698-99 (2004). Our appellate brethren concluded that the passage of one month between the discovery that the Hummer was missing from the -7- Virginia dealership and the arrest of Allen beh ind the wh eel of the v ehicle in Prince George s County did not destroy th e proba tive eff ect of th at perm issible in ferenc e. Id. at 562, 911 A.2d at 463-64. The court noted that the jury was free not to credit Allen s testimony and alibi evidence and also to consider that he did not call Robinson to testify in corroboration of his tend ered de fense. Id. at 562-63, 911 A .2d at 463-64. The interm ediate appellate court had no difficulty concluding that the State presented evidence from which a jury rationally could f ind that A ppellan t violated CL § 7 -203. 3 Id. at 561, 911 A.2d at 463. Before us, as before the intermediate appellate court, Allen asserts that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to support his conviction of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Agreeing with the intermediate appellate court s interpretation of CL § 7-203, Petitioner claims that the evidence presented at trial by the State failed to place him on the car dealership s property in V irginia or to sh ow that, when found operating it, he knew that the Hummer was stolen. The State, in its cross-petition, asks that we consider whether the 2002 revision to CL § 7-203 affected a substantive change by adding a new element or elements to the offense of unauthorized use. Even were we to conclude that such a substantive change o ccurred, the State urges that the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to s uppor t the jury s v erdict. 3 The Court of Special Appeals, on its initiative, considered whether Maryland had jurisdiction to prosecute Allen for violating CL § 7-203 in as much as the Hummer was stolen in Virginia. Allen v. State, 171 Md. App. 544, 557-61, 911 A.2d 453, 460-63 (2006). The court concluded that territorial jurisdiction existed because the car obviously was transported into Maryland. Id. at 560-61, 911 A.2d at 462-63. -8- II. The history and interp retation of th e unauth orized use statute is of apical importance to proper analysis o f this ca se. In 1880, the Legislature created the progenitor of this crime when it enacted a sta tute establishing the misdemeanor crime of larceny of the use of any horse or other animal or any carria ge or ot her veh icle. Wright v. Sas, 187 Md. 507, 511, 50 A.2d 809, 810 (1947). Over time, changes were made to the statute, through recodifications and targeted revision s. Id. at 511, 50 A .2d at 810. The controlling text of the statute, however, was ch anged very little. Id. The penultimate relevant version, prior to the changes made in the 2002 recodification, was Maryland Code Art. 27, § 349, entitled unauthorized use of lives tock, boat, or v ehicle. It read in pertinent p art: Any person or persons, his or their aiders or abettors w ho shall enter, or being upon the p remises of any other person, body corporate or politic in the State, shall, against the will and consent of said per son or pers ons, body co rporate or p olitic or their agents, wilf ully take and ca rry away any . . . motor v ehicle . . . , or take and carry away out of the custody or use of any person or persons, body corporate or politic, or his or their agents, any of the above enumerated property at whatsoever place the sam e may be found , shall upon convic tion ther eof . . . be adjudged guilty of a misd emeanor. As noted by the Court of Special Appeals, this iteration of the crime of unauthorized use had four elements, (1) an unlawful taking; (2) an unlawfu l carrying awa y; (3) of certain designated personal property; (4) of another. Allen v. State , 171 M d. App . 544, 55 2, 911 A.2d 453, 458 (2006) (citing In re Lakeysha P., 106 Md. App. 401, 411, 665 A.2d 264, 269 (1995)). This Court s jurisprudence interpreted the unauthorized use statute in the -9- disjunctive, holding that it contem plated tw o ways o f satisfyin g these elemen ts. Thomas v. State, 277 M d. 257, 269 , 353 A.2d 240, 247 -48 (1976 ). First, one may enter the premises of another and tak e prope rty away. Id., 665 A.2d at 248. Second, one may take property from wherever it is locate d. Id. As to this second means of committing the unauthorized use offense, this Court and the Court of Special Appeals have affirmed many convictions, notwithstanding the absenc e in those rec ords of ev idence linking the defendant with the original taking o f the pro perty, because admitted evidence supported a finding th at a defendant had the intent to depriv e the ow ner of p ossessio n. See Lee v. State , 240 Md. 160, 213 A.2d 503 (196 5); Spence v . State, 224 Md. 17, 165 A.2d 917 (196 0); Anello v. Sta te, 201 Md. 164, 93 A .2d 71 (19 52); Banks v. S tate, 2 Md. A pp. 373, 23 4 A.2d 7 98 (1967 ); Johnson v. State, 2 Md . App. 4 86, 236 A.2d 4 1 (196 7). The 2002 (an d current) version of the unauthorized use statute, entitled unauthorized removal of property, is codified at Criminal Law Article § 7-203 of the Maryland Code. The recodification of the substantive criminal laws, of which § 7-203 was a part, came about as the result of a four year effort to reorganize and simplify the criminal code, consummated by the adoption of Chapter 26 of the Acts of 2002. Allen v. State, 171 Md. App. 544, 551-52; 911 A.2d 453, 457 (2006); G ENERAL R EVISOR S N OTE TO A RTICLE , MD. C ODE C RIM . L AW A RT. (2002). As the ge neral revisor s note reco gnizes: [T]he principle function of a Code is to reorganize the statutes and state them in simpler form. Consequently any changes made in them by a Code are presumed to be for the purpose o f clarity rather than change of meaning. Therefore, even a change in the -10- phraseology of a statute by a codification thereof will not ordinarily modify the law, unless the change is so radical and material that the intentio n of the L egislature to modify the law appea rs unm istakab ly from th e langu age of the Co de. G ENERAL R EVISOR S N OTE TO A RTICLE , M D. C ODE C RIM . L AW A RT. (2002) (quoting Welch v. Humphrey, 200 Md. 410 , 417, 90 A.2d 68 6, 689 (1952)). The revised Criminal Law Article is organized by Title, setting out va rious crimes , including T itle 7. Theft and Related Crime s. Title 7 is further broken into Subtitles and Parts. Notably, unauthorized use of proper ty, or § 7-203 unauthorized removal of p rope rty as it is ca lled f ormally, falls within Part II, Un lawful U se of Go ods. It reads in pertinent p art: (a) Prohibited. Withou t the permission of the ow ner, a person may not enter or be on the premises of another, and take and carry away from the premises or out of the custody or use of the other, or the other s agent, or a governm enta l unit any p rope rty, includin g . . . a mo tor veh icle . . . . The annotation to this section in the bound volume o f the Cod e also includ es a Revis or s note stating that [t]his section is new language derived without substantive change from former Art. 27, § 349. When the Legislature enacted this and the other sections of Chapter 26 of the Acts of 2 002, all of th e above la nguage, in cluding the Revisor s notes appeared in the legislation. In addition and of m ore meaningful import, the session law included Section 13, which read, AND BE IT FURTH ER ENACT ED, That it is the intention of the General Assemb ly that, except as expressly provided in this Act, this Act shall be construed as a nonsubstantive revision, and may not otherwise be construed to render any substantive chang e in the c riminal la w of th e State. -11- III. On the issue of the meaning of CL § 7-2 03, the Court of Sp ecial Appeals s interpretation of the statute enjoys no deferential appellate review. Helinski v. Harford Memorial Hospital, Inc., 376 Md. 606, 614, 831 A.2d 40, 45 (2003). We review the issue de novo. A review of the question regarding the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial requires us to ask whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Rivers v. State, 393 Md. 569 , 580, 903 A.2d 9 08, 915 (2006). IV. A. The first issue we encounter is whether, when the Legislature enacted Chapter 26 of the Acts of 2002, it intended to work a substantive change in the elements of the crime of unauthorized use. This Court often has had occasion to consider the impact of recodifications on the meaning of includ ed statutory provisions vis a vis prior iterations of the relevant statutes. When a substantial part of an Article is revised, a change in the phraseology of a statute as part of a recodification will ordinarily not be deemed to modify the law unless the change is such that the intention of the Legislature to mo dify the law is unmistakable. Comptroller of the Treasury v. Blanton, 390 Md. 528, 538, 890 A.2d 279, 285 (2006) (quoting Rettig v. State , 334 Md. 419, 427, 639 A.2d 670, 674 (1994)); see also Pye v. State , 397 Md. 626, 634, 919 A.2d 632, 637 (2004). Furthermore, [r]ecodification -12- of statutes is presumed to be for the purpose of clarity rather than change of meaning and, thus, even a change in the phraseology of a statute by a codifica tion will not o rdinarily modify the law unless the change is so radical and material that the intention of the Legislature to modif y the law appea rs unm istakab ly from th e langu age of the Co de. Blanton, 390 Md. at 538, 890 A.2d at 285 (quoting Md. Div. of Labor and Indus. v. Tria ngle Gen. Contractors, Inc., 366 M d. 407, 422 , 784 A.2d 534, 543 (2001)); see also Tipton v. Partne r's Mgmt. Co., 364 Md. 419, 773 A.2d 488 (200 1); Riemer v. Colu mbia M ed. Pla n., Inc., 358 M d. 222, 747 A.2d 67 7 (2000); Blevins & Wills v. Baltimore County, Maryland, 352 Md. 62 0, 724 A .2d 22 (19 99); Giant Food, Inc. v. Dep t of Labor, 356 Md. 180, 738 A.2d 856 (1999 ); DeBusk v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 342 Md. 432 , 677 A.2d 73 (1 996); Rohrbaugh v. Estate of Stern, 305 M d. 443, 505 A.2d 11 3 (1986); Duffy v. Conaway, 295 Md. 242, 455 A.2d 95 5 (1983); In Re Special Investigation No. 236, 295 Md. 573, 458 A.2d 75 (1983); Office & Prof. E mploy ees Int'l Union v. MTA, 295 Md. 88, 453 A.2d 11 91 (1982); Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek, 272 Md. 143, 321 A.2d 748 (197 4); Welch v. Humphrey, 200 M d. 410, 9 0 A.2d 686 (1 952). The Legislature is presumed to be aware of our prior holdings when it enacts new legislation and, wh ere it does no t express a c lear intention to abrogate the holdings of those decisions, to have acquiesced in those holdin gs. Pye, 397 Md. at 635-36, 919 A.2d at 637 (2007); Plein v. Dep t of Labor, 369 Md. 421, 437, 8 00 A.2d 757, 767 (2002); The Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howa rd Coun ty, 371 Md. 243, 257 , 808 A.2d 795, 803 (2002); Jones v. Sta te, -13- 362 Md. 331, 337-38, 765 A.2d 12 7, 130-31 (2001); Williams v . State, 292 Md. 201, 210, 438 A.2d 1301, 1305 (1981). Thus, there is a strong presumption that the Legislature did not intend, in recodifying the unauthorized use statute as part of its general recodification of the State s criminal laws in 2002, to change the elements or judicial interpretation of that statute from th at previo usly rend ered. Overcoming that presumption in this case, the Court of Special Appeals held, and Petitioner embrace s, the notion th at application of the plain meaning rule to the 2002 version of CL § 7-203 requires that both presence on the premises of a nother and taking and carrying away property are required elements of the offense. Allen, 171 Md. App. at 555, 911 A.2d at 459 (200 6) (emphasis in original). The court concluded, therefore, that the Legislature effectively eliminated the possibility that a defendant could be convicted of unauthorized use without proof of his or her pre sence on the premise s of the initial the ft. Id. at 555-56, 911 A.2d at 459-6 0. In holding that the 2002 statute contained no ambiguity, the Court of Special Appeals declined to consider the legislative history as an aid in construing the statute, and thus took no account of the Revisor s note to the statute nor even alluded to the Ses sion law . Id. at 556, 9 11 A.2 d at 460 . As the Co urt of S pecial A ppeals aptly stated here, in construing and applying any statute, a court must discern the actual intent of the legislature in enacting it. Id. at 554, 911 A.2d at 459 (citing Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443-44, 903 A.2d 388, 395 (2006)). In that regard, it is well settled that the purpose of the plain meaning rule is to ascertain and -14- carry out the r eal legis lative inte nt. See, e.g., Dep t of Health & M ental Hyg iene v. Kelly , 397 Md. 399, 419 , 918 A.2d 470, 482 (2007); Oakland v. Mountain Lake Park, 392 Md. 301, 316, 896 A.2 d 1036, 1 045 (200 6); In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 57, 763 A.2d 136, 139 (2000). Beyond co ncurring w ith this thresho ld premis es, we depart from the reasoning of the inter media te appe llate cou rt in con struing t he eff ect of C L § 7-2 03. It is our view that the legislative in tent in enactin g CL § 7 -203 wa s not to change the elements of the crime of unauthorized use from thos e that existed im mediately prev ious to the recodification. In fact, the Legislature said just that several times in the course of enacting the recodification. In enacting Chapter 26 of the Acts of 2002, the Legislature stated that it is the intention of the Gene ral Assem bly that, except as expressly prov ided in this Act, this Act shall be construed as a nonsubstantive revision, and may not otherwise be construed to render any substantive change in the criminal law of the State. Section 13, Chapter 26 of the Acts of 2002. As adopted, Chapter 26 of the Acts of 2002, included also the Revisor s note to CL § 7-203 and the Revisor s note to the Chap ter.4 Con vers ely, nowhere in CL § 7-203 or in all of Chapter 26 o f the Acts of 200 2, did the Legislature indicate an intent to abrogate the extensive pre-existing case law interpreting the previous unauth orized u se statute . In Kaczorowski v. Mayor and C ity Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 525 A.2d 628 4 See also the Fiscal Note to H.B. 11 and THE 90 DAY REPORT - A LEGISLATION IN THE 2002 SESSION, E-1 (2002). -15- REVIEW OF (1987) we stated, in response to a plea that we adhere blindly to a plain meaning approach to a statute: [D]espite Kaczoro wski s plea s that we examine the trees so closely that we do not see the forest, the plain-meaning rule does not force us to read legislative pro visions in rote fashion an d in isolation. What we are engaged in is the divination of legislative purpose or goal . Indeed , as we have explained, the plain-meaning rule is not a complete, all-sufficient rule for ascertaining a legislative intention. The meaning of the plainest language is controlled by the context in which it appears. The aim or policy of the legislation, against which we measure the words used, is not drawn out of the air; it is evinced in the language of the statute as read in the light of other external manifestations of that purpose. Or as Justice Holmes once put it, the general purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule w hich gr amma r or form al logic m ay lay dow n. . . . ... When we pursue the context of statutory language, we are not limited to the words of the statute as they are printed in the Annotated Code. We may and often must consider other external manifestations or persuasive evidence, including a bill's title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed through the legislature, its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the context within which we read the particular language before us in a given case. Sometimes the langua ge in ques tion will be so clearly consistent with apparent purpose (and not productive of any absurd result) that further research will be unnecessary. But on other occasions much more extensive inquiry will be required. . . . [We] search for legislative purpose or meaning- . . . the legislative scheme. We identif[y] that scheme or purpose after an extensive review of the context . . . [including], among other things, a bill req uest fo rm . . . , prior leg islation . . . , a legislative committee report . . . , a bill title . . . , related statutes . . . , and amendm ents to the bill. [L]egislative purpose is critical, that purpose must be -16- discerned in light of co ntext, and . . . statutes are to be construed reasonab ly with reference to the purpose to be accomplished. The purpose, in short, determined in light of th e statute's context, is the key. And that purpose becomes the context w ithin which we app ly the plain-meaning rule. Th us results that are unreasonable, illogical or inconsistent with common sense should be avoided with the real legislative intention prevailing over the intention indicated by the literal meaning. Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 514 -16; 525 A.2d at 6 32-34 (internal citations omitted). The Court of Special Appeals s reading of CL § 7-203 leaves portions of the statutory language superfluo us and illogic al. The interm ediate appellate court s interp retation wo uld require that the prosecution prove an entry on the premises and either a taking of certain property from the premises or a taking of the property out of the custody or use of the person whose premises was entered. We are unable to conjure a realistic scenario where a person would do one, but not the other. At oral argument before us, Petitioner s counsel advanced several hypotheticals in an effort to meet that challenge, but without ultimate persuasive effect. Allen s first hypothetical imagined a defendant moving an owner s tractor from one spot on the owner s land to another. The second scenario, though no more convincing, wins points for creativity. In it, a defenda nt takes an o wner s sh eep across the own er s property to the border adjoining defendant s land to shear it, thus depriving the landowner of the use of the sheep. F inally, defense counsel imagined a situation where a defendant took an owner s boat and operated it upon the owner s private lake; thus, while not removing the boat from the owner s property, denied the owner of the boat s use. We deem illogical the notion that the Legislature would amend so significantly the prior crime of unauthorized use so as -17- sweep up these hypotheticals, while ignoring any situation where a d efendan t steals proper ty not on the owner s premises, 5 thus rendering, under the C ourt of Special Ap peals s interpretation of the statute , the second part thereof , superfluou s. We sha ll not hew to a plain language approa ch that b eggars comm on sen se. Frost v. State , 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994). Moreover, constructions of statutes should not render any clause or phrase surplusage, superf luous, m eaning less, or n ugator y. Dep t of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Kelly, 397 Md. 399 , 420, 918 A.2d 4 70, 482 (2007). We hold that the Legislature in 2002 d id not chan ge the elements of the crime of unauth orized u se wh en it reco dified th e form er statute as CL § 7-20 3. B. Having resolved the proper interpretation of CL § 7-203, we address whether the evidence of record, and any reasonable inferences ab le to be drawn theref rom, were sufficient to convict Allen of the crime of unauthorized use. We conclude that the evidence sufficiently supported his conviction. As noted above, we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial by determinin g wheth er the evide nce, view ed in a light m ost favora ble to the prosecution, supported the convic tion of A llen, such tha t any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Rivers v. Sta te, 393 Md. 569, 5 Very realistic examples of this kind of action abound. For example, cars, boats, and other vehicles are taken from public property, such as streets, or from third party private property, such as marinas or storage yards, on a daily basis. -18- 580, 903 A.2d 908, 914 (2006) (citing State v. Sm ith, 374 Md. 527, 533, 823 A.2d 664, 668 (2003)). It is not the province of a n appellate court to retry the case; rather, we review the evidence and all infere nces in a ligh t most favo rable to the S tate. Id., 903 A.2d at 914-15 (citing Hackley v. State, 389 Md. 387, 389, 885 A.2d 816, 817 (2005); State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 478 , 649 A.2d 336 , 337 (1994)). Petitioner argues that the evidence was legally insufficient for two reasons. First, he argues that the State offered no evidence placing him at the Virginia car dealership, and thus no evidence that he removed the Hummer from the dealership. Second, he argues that the State failed to prove that, when found behind the wheel of the stolen vehicle in Maryland, he knew that the Hu mmer was sto len. Allen notes that a month passed between the time of its disappearance and its reappearance in the possession of Petitioner and the vehicle was transported into Maryland from Virginia. He submits that this time and distance separation makes any inference unsustainable that h e remove d the Hu mmer fro m the Virg inia dealersh ip or knew the vehicle was stolen merely because he was found later driving it in Maryland. As Allen corre ctly points out, [t]h e term rece nt, when u sed in con nection w ith recently stolen goods, is a relative term, and its meaning as applied to a given case will vary with the circumstances of the case. Butz v. State , 221 Md. 68, 77, 156 A.2d 423, 428 (1959). We conclude, without difficulty, however, that a one mo nth gap , as a matter of law, does not break significantly the p ermissible inferential chain from the initial disappearance of stolen goods from the premises to the discovery of Allen in possession of the goo ds. Indeed , this -19- Court and the Court of Special Appeals have sustained such an inferential chain concerning far more motile and inconspicuous goods where disappearance and reappearance occurred in comparable or more lengthy time frames. See Cas on v. State, 230 Md. 356, 358-59; 187 A.2d 103, 104-05 (1963) (transistor radio: four mo nths); Butz, 221 Md. at 76-77; 156 A.2d at 427-28 (je welry box: tw o week s); Wynn v. State, 117 Md. App. 133, 170, 699 A.2d 512, 530 (1997 ), abrogated on other grounds by Wynn v. State, 351 Md. 307, 718 A.2d 588 (1998) (camcorder, antique watch, gym bag: ten m onths); Jordan v . State, 24 Md. App. 267, 275, 330 A.2 d 496, 50 1-02 (197 5) (guns: ten months); Anglin v. S tate, 1 Md. App. 85, 94, 227 A.2d 3 64, 368 , cert denied, 246 Md. 755 (1967) (jewelry box, earrings, and miscellaneous jewelry: one month and six months). W e further co nclude tha t a reasonab le jury could draw this inference despite Allen s testimony that he merely borrowed the car from Robinso n. As note d in t he ju ry instructions, the jury was free to credit (or no t) his statements in light of his f ailure to produce Robinson as a witness. 6 Petitioner s possession of the Hum mer and k eys, the recent tim e frame o f the salient ev ents, and his in ability to corrobora te his testimony with Robinson s testimony were sufficient for a ra tional jury properly to draw the inference that Allen committed unauthorized use of an automobile under 6 Part of the Court of Special Appeals s reasoning regarding the sufficiency question relied upon the testimony given by Officer Caver that upon being stopped . . . , [Allen] stated, without prompting, that the vehicle was not stolen and that it belonged to his brother. Allen v. State, 171 Md. App. 544, 562, 911 A.2d 453, 463 (2006). This evidence, however, was excluded by the trial court. Nonetheless, a reasonable jury could convict Allen based on the permitted inference from his possession of recently stolen property. -20- CL § 7-203. Indeed, as instructed by the trial court, the jury merely could have considered the evidence in light of its collective own experiences and drawn reasonable inferences or conclusions from the evid ence [as] justified by comm on sense and [the ir] own experiences. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED; COST S IN TH IS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER. Chief Ju dge Bell joins the judg men t only. -21-

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