Haas v. Lockheed
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
Suzanne Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corporation, No. 5, Sept. Term 2006. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION - DISCRIMINATORY DISCHARGE - STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - ACCRUAL OF CAUSE OF ACTION - ACTUAL DATE OF DISCHARGE Suzanne Haas was hired by Lockheed Martin Corporation in 1998 as a human resources professional in the Mission Systems division. She worked in that capacity for approxim ately one and one-half years at the level of performance typical for new employees and received largely po sitive ev aluation s from her sup ervisors . In June 1999, h owev er, a supervisor and Ha as herself noted her difficulty in observing close attention to detail. Haas sought a psychiatric evaluation in January 2000, which yielded a diagnosis of Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) and learnin g disabilities. H aas made her superv isors aware of this diagnosis and assured them that medication was alleviating the symptoms of her disorders. In May 2000, as part of a restructuring at Lockheed, Haas began splitting her work time between Mission Systems and a new human resources department under a new supervisor, Dr. Candice Phelan. D espite wh at seemed initially to be a mutually amicable working relationship and Haas s assurances that her ADD would not adversely effect her work, an apparent conflict arose. Haas alleged that Dr. Phelan persistently disparaged her work and performance at Lockheed and made allusions to the desirability of Haas working for another employer. Haas also received a below standard rating from Dr. Phelan in a performance evaluation, which led to the implementation of a disciplinary procedure called a Performance Improvement Plan. In April 2001, Phelan informed Haas that certain of her responsibilities were being transferred to a new position in the company for which H aas w ould have to a pply. Haas was not selected for the new position but, instead, was notified on 9 October 2001 that she was to be laid off effective 23 October 2001. Haas s last day of work was 23 October 2001. On 22 October 2003, Haas filed suit in the C ircuit Court f or Mon tgomery Co unty alleging that her discharge was motivated by discrimination based on a false perception by Lockheed and Dr. P hela n tha t she had a disabili ty and was unable to prop erly perform her job duties. Lockheed moved for summary judgment on the ground that Haas s claim was barred by the two year sta tute of limitations for discriminatory discharge actions. Lockheed argued that Haas s claim accrued on the date of the layoff notification, 9 October 2001, thus making the Complaint untimely as filed after 9 October 2003. The Circuit Court granted summary judgmen t to Lockheed. Haas appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court. The Court of Appeals now reverses the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. Section 42(b) of Article 49B of the Maryland Code imposes a two year limitation on discrimination actions filed pursuant to a Montgomery County law which was invoked here by Haas to challenge substantively her discharge. The County law did not define, however, the term discharge . The Court of Appeals examined the plain meaning of the word and concluded that discharge was meant to describe the actual termination of employment rather than the mere notification of an impending termination. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals rejected the U.S. Supreme Court s Ricks/Chardon rule derived from Ricks v. Delaware State College, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) and Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981) (per curiam), defining a discharge as the notification of an employee s termination. The Court of Appeals found more persuasive the opinions from a minority of sta tes (particularly H awaii, California, and New Jersey) rejecting th e Ricks/Chardon rule in favo r of a brigh t line rule. The minority approach adopted in this case simplifies for employers, employees, and courts the determination of wh en a dis crimina tory disch arge ac tion acc rues. Im portan tly, the bright line rule furthers the anti-discrimination remedial purpose of Article 49B by sustaining meritorious claims that otherwise may have been barred by adherence to the Ricks/Chardon rule. The Court also rejected the Ricks/Chardon rule becau se of its poten tial to propag ate unripe suits and frustrate the conciliation process for termination notifications not yet effectuated. Circuit Co urt for Mo ntgomery C ounty Case # 247016V IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 5 September Term, 2006 SUZANNE HAAS v. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinion by Harrell, J. Raker an d Battaglia, JJ ., Dissent. Filed: January 9, 2007 We issued a w rit of certiorari in this case, 393 Md. 16 0, 900 A .2d 206 (2 006), to consider a matter of first impressio n in the repo rted opinion s of the app ellate courts of this State: what circumstances should be looked to in determining the point of accrual for a cause of action claiming discriminatory discharge under Maryland Code (1957, 1998 R epl. Vol.), § 42 of Article 49B . In addressing this query, we are required to determine, in the context of discriminatory discharge cases filed pursuant to Montgomery County, Md., Code § 27-19, whether the occurrence of the alleged discriminatory act means (1) the notification of an employee s impendin g discharg e, or (2) the ac tual cessation of an em ployee s emp loyment. Md. Cod e, Art. 49B, § 42(b) (em phasis added). I. FACTS1 In October 1998, Petitioner Suzanne Haas was hired as a Program Admin istrator in the Lockheed Martin Corporation s Mission Systems division. At the time of her hiring, she possessed a Master s deg ree a nd w as ne ar co mpletion of her D octo rate, lack ing o nly a finished dissertation. From the date of hiring until October 1999, Haas worked under the supervision of Katie Sterrett, who ga ve Haas largely positive fo rmal, as we ll as informa l, performance reviews. By all accounts, Haas initially achieved the level of performance expected of new employees. In June 1999, however, Sterrett noted, and Haas acknowledged, a problem w ith Haas s a ttention to deta ils. This difficulty persisted for several months and, 1 The facts supplied in this opinion are either undisputed or, where the context indicates, assu med to be true solely for purposes of our analysis where summary judgment was granted against the non-moving party, Haas in this case. Myers v. Kayhoe, 391 Md. 188, 203, 892 A.2d 520, 529 (2006) (citing Livesay v. Baltimore, 384 Md. 1, 10, 862 A.2d 33, 38 (2004). in January 2000, Haas sought a psychiatric evaluation of the situation. Tests yielded a diagnosis of Attention Deficit Disorder ( ADD ) and learning disabilities, both of which were to be treated with medication. Several months later, Haas informed h er new superviso r, Amy Lowenstein, of the diagnosis and assured her that the medication was alleviating the adverse symptoms of her condition. In June 2000, Lowenstein completed an annual personnel review, called a Contribution Assessment , of Haas s performance at Lockheed. The conclusion c lassi fied Haa s as a con tribu tor to the com pany.2 In May or April 2000, as part of a structural reorganization at Lockheed, Haas began dividing her work time between her Missions Systems position and a new post in the consolidated human r esources u nit called Corporate Shared Services. In this role, Haas reported to a supervisor in the Learning Services unit of Corporate Shared Services, Candice Phelan, who also was aware of Haas s medical condition. Haas and Phelan exchanged correspondence where Haas clarified that her medical condition would have no adverse effect on her work and Phelan expressed her confidence in their future working relationship. Nonetheless, a conflict arose shortly after Haas began assuming more responsibilities under the supervision of Phelan. 2 Haas also received a contributor rating in her first Contribution Assessment by her former supervisor, Sterrett. The Contribution Assessment process provides an overall rating of employees on a 1-5 sca le (1 being the highest perfo rmance), with con tributor representing a 3 on that scale. The two inferior ratings of marginal contributor and unsatis fact ory entail disciplina ry action for the failure to meet the employer s expectations. The two superior ratings, superior contributor and high contributor , are characterized by the employee consistently exceeding his or her job standards. 2 Petitioner, in her later filed complaint, alleged a number of instances where Phelan exhibited a general disapproval of Haas s work and assertedly made undue and frequent criticisms of her perform ance. Am ong these instances w ere claims th at Phelan c onsistently suggested that Haas should not be assigned tasks involving writing, mathematical calculations, exercis e of jud gmen t, comp uters, or a ttention to detail. Petitioner also alleged that Phelan told Petitioner that she should cons ider a teachin g career, as o pposed to remaining at Lockheed Martin. Phelan purportedly went so far as to forwa rd to Haas, unsolicited, a job postin g from outside the company. Petitioner assigned a malevolent motive to the remarks and actions of Phelan, in contrast to the praise she apparently received from customers and others who encountered her work. Reprimands from Phelan continued for what Haas described as various minor deficiencies in Haas s performance, such as spelling errors in written work that allegedly passed without criticism when committed similarly by other employees. In April 2001, Phelan informed Haas that the functions Haas performed at Learning Services were to be transferred to the company s Institute for Leadership Excellence ( ILE ) at some time in the near future. On 10 April 2001, the Director of the ILE, Dorothea Mahan, posted on the company s Career Network website link a notice for an opening for a staff position dedica ted, inter alia, to the logistical and planning functions previously performed by Haas fo r Learning Services. H aas applied for this position, but neither was selected for an interview nor offered the position. Mahan explained, in a deposition taken following the 3 filing of Haas s complaint, that, in her view, Haas lacked the requisite experience in event planning to serve the needs of the position. It is uncertain exactly when Haas was informed that her applica tion was u nsuccessf ul, 3 but it suffices to say that she was not aware that she had not been selected for the ILE position until shortly before she received a notification of layoff. On 11 June 2001, Phelan placed Haas on a Performa nce Improvem ent Plan ( PIP ), a type of formal discipline apparently meant to direct the improvement of the disciplined employee s performance. Phelan dispatched a memorandum to Haas confirming the topics discussed at a meeting between the two to review the PIP, including Phelan s perceptions of Haas s shortcomings in judgment, planning, and attention to detail. Also part of the P IP discussion was a reference to the theft of a laptop under Haas s control while at a business meeting. The PIP memorandum indicated that a failure to correct the issues highlighted therein might subject Haas to further disciplinary action, including dismissal. Petitioner disputed the accuracy of various issues raised in the PIP w hen it was issued, as ec hoed in her complain t, along with the contention that, with regard to the laptop theft, she was disciplined more severely than other employees in similar situations. Petitioner further stated in her complaint that Phelan s issuance of the PIP and its contents were merely subtexts to harm 3 A notation made in the records of the Lockheed Martin Training and Development Department for the ILE staff position indicated that the decision to reject Haas s application was made on 17 September 2001. Haas, however, does not appear to have been notified of that decision at that time. Haas apparently became aware of the rejection of her application on 8 October 2001. 4 Petitioner s standing at the company and simultaneously disqualify her from any po ssible promotions, transfers, or other opportunities at Lockheed.4 Nonetheless, Phelan dispatched a memorandum to Haas on 24 September 2001 indicating that the relevant aspects of her performance had improved sufficiently and, as a result, she was being taken off the PIP. On 28 June 2001, Phelan completed an annual Contribution Assessment of Haas, in which she rated Haas as a marginal contributor. Although Phelan indicated that she was impressed with several of Petitioner s very positive attributes , she stated that Petitioner exhibited below-standard performances in judgment, compliance with com pany policy, attention to detail, and planning. Petitioner, at the time, disputed the reliability of her lower rating because she believed that Phelan had not taken into account positive feedback from two cu stomer s she se rviced. Phelan composed a memorandu m to Haas, dated 9 O ctober 200 1, with the subject line Notification of Layoff, indicating that Haas s position was to be eliminated effective 23 October 2001. The text of the memorandum made reference to the layoff as a Reduction in Force . It also contained a description of the company s severance benefit plan, a contact with outplacement services , and a request to complete an exit interview prior to Haas s last day of work. 4 Petitioner states that Lockheed Martin policy prevents any employee currently the subjec t of a PI P from being c onside red for any prom otions o r transfe rs. 5 Haas, pointing to her supervisors alleged reactions to her diagnosed ADD, filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on 22 October 2003 alleging, under Montgomery County Code § 27-19, disability discrimination in Lockheed s termination of her employment. Lockheed responded with a Motion to Dismiss, filed on 25 November 2003, contending that the Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and raising certain con stitutional issues , the latter of w hich are no t relevant to this Court in the posture the case reaches us. As a result of Lockheed s arguments challenging the constitutionality of § 27-19, Mon tgomery County, Maryland, moved to intervene, which was allowed, and opposed Lockheed s motion.5 The Circuit Court, after a hearing, denied the Motion to Dismiss. Following discovery, on 1 November 2004, Lockheed filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which Haas opposed. Lockheed s posited in its summary judgment motion that Haas s claim was timebarred in the first instance b ecause it accrued upon notice of her layoff, rather than upon her final day of work. Maryland Code, Article 49B, § 42(b)(1) provides: An action under [the relevant local anti-discrimination ordinance] shall be commenced in the circuit court for the county in which the alleged discrimination took place not later than 2 years after the occurrence of the alleged discriminatory act. Lockheed also contended that Haas had not proven in her complaint that she was improperly regarded as being disabled by her supervisors under Mo ntgomery County Code § 27-6 and additionally that the acts challenged 5 Montgomery County did not participate in the proceedings before us. 6 as discriminatory were legitimate business acts. Haas responded in her opposition that the relevant statute of limita tions only bega n to run upon her final day of employment. She also submitted that the issues of her bein g regarded as disabled, and whether she was discriminated against on that basis, were material facts in dispute, which could not be resolved on summary judgment. After a hearing, the Circuit Court granted summ ary judgment to Lockheed upon the statute of limitations ground. Haas filed a timely app eal to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court in a reported opinio n. Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 166 M d. App . 163, 88 7 A.2d 673 (2 005). Haas petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted. II. ANAL YSIS A. Standard of Review of the Grant of Summary Judgment This case requires us to review the Circuit Court s grant of su mmary judg ment in favor of Respondent Lockheed Martin. We consid er, de novo, first, whether a material fact was placed in genuine dispute, thus requiring a trial, and, second, if trial by a fact-finde r is not required, whether the Circuit Court wa s legally correct in granting summary judgmen t. Livesay v. Baltimo re Coun ty, 384 Md. 1, 9, 862 A.2d 33, 38 (2004) (citing Walk v. Hartford Cas. In s. Co., 382 Md. 1, 14 , 852 A.2d 98, 10 5 (2004)). The standard f or review ing the grant of sum mary judgm ent is well-settle d in Maryland: Maryland Rule 2-501 indicates that a motion for summ ary judgmen t is appropriate on all or part of an action on the ground that there is no genuine 7 dispute as to any mate rial fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A motion for summary judgment may be supported by affidavit. When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment we mu st determine whether a material fa ctual issue ex ists, and all inferences are resolved against the moving party. [E]ven where the underlying facts are undisputed, if those f acts are susceptible of more than one permissible inference, the choice between those inferences should not be made as a matter of law, but should be submitted to the trier of fact. The function of a summary judgment proceeding is not to try the case or to attempt to resolve factual disp utes but to de termine w hether there is a dispute as to material facts sufficient to provide a n issue to be tried. A material fact is one which will somehow affect the outcome of the case. An appellate court reviewing a summary judgment examines the same information from the record and determines the same issues of law as the trial court. We are often c oncerned with wh ether a dispu te of materia l fact exists when reviewing th e gra nt of a sum mary judgment motion . We recen tly reiterated the standard of review for a trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment in Myers v. Kayhoe, 391 Md. 188, 892 A.2d 520 (2006): The question o f whethe r a trial court's grant of summary judgment was proper is a question of law subject to de novo review on app eal. Livesay v. Baltimore, 384 Md. 1, 9, 862 A.2d 33, 38 (2004). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment under Md. Rule 2-501, we independently review the re cord to determine whether the parties pro perly generated a dispute of material fact and, if not, w hether the m oving par ty is entitled to judgment as a ma tter of law . Id. at 9-10, 862 A.2d at 38. We review the record in the light mo st favorab le to the nonmoving party and construe any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts against th e mov ing par ty. Id. at 10, 862 A.2d at 38. Id. at 203, 892 A.2d at 529. United Servs. Auto. Ass n v. Riley, 393 Md. 55, 86-87, 899 A.2d 819, 825-26 (2006) (some internal citations ommitted). There are no ma terial facts in genuine dispute here bearing on the legal ground upon which summary judgment was granted. The parties agree that, on 9 October 2001, Petitioner 8 was issued a written notification of her layoff, which was to become effective on 23 October 2001. Petitioner s employment at Lockhe ed ceased on 23 O ctober 200 1. Theref ore, we sh all consider whether the grant of summary judgment by the Circuit Court in favor of Lockheed Martin based on the applicable statute of limitations, was co rrect as a matter o f law. Livesay, 384 Md. at 9, 862 A.2d at 38. B. The Date of Accrual for Wrongful Discharge and the Ricks/Chardon Rule Section 42 of Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl. Vol.), Article 49B authorizes individuals in Prince George s, Montgomery, and Howard Counties to pursue p rivate, civil claims of discrimination, pursuant to the provisions of the respective county codes, and seek both damages and injuncti ve relief . The provision of the Montgomery County Code relevant here makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge any individual on the basis of the disability of a qu alified in dividu al. 6 The County Code defines disability not only in 6 Sec. 27-19. Discriminatory employment practices. (a) A person must not because of the race, color, religious creed, ance stry, national origin, age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, family responsibilities, or genetic status of any individual or disability of a qualified individual, or because of any reason that would not have been asserted but for the race, color, religious creed, ancestry, national origin, age, sex, marital status, disability, sexual orientation, family responsibilities, or genetic status: (1) For an employer: (A) fail or refuse to hire, fail to accept the services of, discharge any individual, or otherwise (contin ued...) 9 terms of an actual physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of an individual s major life activities , but also being regarded as having such an imp airmen t. Montgom ery County, Md., Code § 27-6. Petitioner has staked her claim on the notion that her supervisor s at Lockh eed mistak enly regarded her as being disabled. N o contentio n is advanced here that Petitioner is not entitled to the protection afforded by County Code § 2719 and we ass ume, arguendo, that she is so entitled.7 A private, civil action brought under this regulatory scheme must be filed within two years of the occurrence of the alleged discriminatory act. Md. Cod e, Art. 49B, § 42(b). The Circuit Court granted, and the Court of Special App eals affirmed, summ ary judgment for Lockheed on the ground that Petitioner s cause of action for discrimination was time-barred by the statute of limitations imposed by Maryland Code, § 42(b) of Article 49B. Esse ntial ly, as the reasoning of the Circuit Court went, Haas s cause of action accrued no later than on 9 October 2001, the date she received Phelan s layoff memorandum, thus requiring the initiation of suit by no later than 9 October 2003. Having filed her Complaint 6 (...continued) discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, o r privileges of emplo yment . . . . (emphasis added ). 7 Petitioner and Respondent do not raise, and thus we do not consider here, the issue of any disputed f acts not material to the legal ground upon which summary judgment was granted, i.e. the statute of limitations. 10 on 22 October 2003, Haas s claim was time-barred. The trial court and the intermediate appellate court both f ound pe rsuasive on this question the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Ricks v. Delaware State College, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) and Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981) (per curiam), reasoning that the term discharge , as used in § 27-19 of the County Code, meant the notification of discharge from emp loyment, as opp osed to the d ate of the co mplete cessation o f employm ent. While both of these cases, one of which construes the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,8 are relevant authorities because our courts traditionally seek 8 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (2000), construed in Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498 , 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980). Title VII is the federa l analog to Art. 49B of the Maryland Code. Specifically, § 2000e-2 provides: § 2000e-2. Unlawful employment practices (a) Employer practices It shall be an unlawfu l employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges o f employm ent, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or n ational o rigin . . . . (emphas is added). W hile Title VII d oes not inclu de the disab led within its express protection, the statute s sim ilarity to Article 49 B in its general prohibition of discrimination in the employment context provides a useful comparison. 11 guidance from federal cases in interpreting Maryland s Article 49B,9 they do not bind us here.10 In Ricks, Columbus R icks, a black Liberian prof essor at Delaware State College, 9 Molesw orth v. Brandon, 341 M d. 621, 6 32-33 , 672 A.2 d 608, 61 4 (1996); Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 561 A.2d 179 (198 9); Pope-Payton v. Realty M gmt. Servs., Inc., 149 Md. App. 393, 402 n. 6, 815 A.2 d 919, 92 4 n.6 (200 3); Comm n on Human Relations v. Suburban Hosp., Inc., 113 Md. App. 62, 86, 686 A.2d 706, 718 (1996 ), vacated on other grounds, 348 Md. 41 3, 704 A.2d 44 5 (1998). 10 Maryland appellate courts have interpreted state statutes, rules, and constitutional provisions differently than analogous fede ral provisions on num erous occasions, even where the state prov ision is mod eled after its fe deral coun terpart. Maryland courts sometimes prefer interpretations of state statutes varying from similar federal statutes, as exemplified by Carroll v. Housing Opportunities Commission, 306 Md. 515, 523, 510 A.2d 540, 544 (1986) ( A large body of decisional law has been developed in the federal courts interpreting the federal standard [for determining a statutorily set amount in controversy], which, while not binding, is a logical reference. (quoting Pollokoff v. Md. Nat l Bank, 288 Md . 485, 49 1, 418 A .2d 120 1, 1205 (1980 ))), Quality Discount Tires, Incorporated v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, 282 Md. 7, 12, 14-23, 382 A.2d 867, 870, 871-876 (1978) (holding that the a principal enunciated by the Supreme Court as to the Sherman Act did not pre clude p laintiff's s uit und er the M aryland A ntitrust A ct), and State v. Bailey, 289 Md. 143, 151-52, 422 A.2d 1021, 1026 (1980) (addressing the possibility of differing standards for w iretaps under similar state and fed eral statutes). For examples of divergent rule constructions, see Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681, 695-96, 887 A .2d 564 , 572 (2 005), Pinkney v. State, 350 Md. 201, 235, 711 A.2d 205, 222 (1998) (noting the Supreme Court s interpretation of a rule governing in absentia trials is not binding on M aryland c ourts fo r a simila r rule), State v. Matusky, 343 Md. 467, 490, 682 A.2d 694, 705 (1996) (acknowledging that the Supreme Court s interpretation of the federal statement against penal interest hearsay exception, while persuasive, is not binding on the states), and Walker v. S tate, 338 Md. 253, 260, 658 A.2d 239, 242 (1995) (dealing with rules for in absentia trials). For cases addressing the notion that state constitutional provisions, even when read in pari materia with fede ral doppleg angers, ma y be interpreted differently from those counterpart federal provisions, see Dua v. Comcast Cable of Maryland, Incorporated, 370 Md. 604, 621, 805 A.2d 1061, 1071 (2003) (cataloguing cases) and Aero Motors, Incorporated v. Motor Vehicle Administration, 274 Md. 567, 587, 337 A.2d 685, 699 (1975) ( Although Art. [24] o f the Ma ryland Decla ration of R ights has lon g been eq uated w ith the due process clause of the Fourtee nth Amendment by judicial construction and application, (contin ued...) 12 alleged that the College discriminated against him on the basis of his national origin when he wa s denie d tenur e after s erving severa l years on t he fac ulty. 449 U.S. at 252 , 101 S.Ct. at 501. After the Board of Trustees formally voted against tenure for Ricks following a reconsideration by the Faculty Committee on Promotions and Tenure, Ricks pursued an internal grievance process through the Board s Edu cationa l Policy C omm ittee. Id. While this grievance was pending, the College followed its policies regardin g the termination of non-tenured junior faculty members, which included an offer of a one-year terminal contract. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 252-53 , 101 S.Ct. a t 501. Rick s signed the contract an d, within eight days thereafter, the Board of Trustees informed Ricks that his grievance was denied. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 253-54, 101 S.Ct. at 501-02. After the Equal Employment Opportu nity Commission (EEOC) issued a right to sue letter to Ricks, he filed suit in federal District Court alleging that he had been the subject of 10 (...continued) the two provisions are not synonymo us. ); see also Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91, 175, 786 A.2d 631, 681 (2001) (Raker, J., dissenting) ( Although this Court has generally interpreted Article 24 in pari materia with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, w e have interpreted it more broadly in instances where fundamental fairness demanded that we do so. ). Judge Raker s dissent in Borchardt cited some example s in the crimin al context, such as placing stricter limits on prosecutorial discretion to enter nolle prosequi and the optional merger of crim inal off enses. Id. We have also read Maryland s due process clause more broadly than the federal constitution in granting the right to c ounse l, see Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 M d. 347, 3 58, 363 , 464 A .2d 228 , 234, 23 7 (198 3), cited in Das v. Das, 133 Md. App. 1, 28, 754 A.2d 441, 456 (2000), and the protection from self-inc riminatio n, Choi v. State, 316 Md. 52 9, 535 n. 3, 560 A .2d 1108, 1111 n . 3 (1989). Put in a more homespun idiom, and paraphrasing a frequent motherly admonition, Just be cause [ Georg ia] ran o ff a clif f does n t mea n [M aryland] h as to fo llow su it. 13 discrim ination. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 502. The District Court dismissed the action as untimely for the reason that the applicable statute of limitations of 180 days became engaged on the day the College offered Ricks the terminal one-year contract and th erefore Ricks failed to file his EEOC complaint before the expiration of the relevant limitations period. Ricks, 449 U.S . at 254-55, 1 01 S.Ct. at 502. The U.S. Court of A ppeals for the Third Circuit reversed, ho lding that R icks s cause of action a ccrued up on the exp iration of his terminal contrac t, rather th an on its offer. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 255, 101 S.Ct. at 503. The Third Circuit relied h eavily on pub lic policy reasoning that to require litigation to commence contemp oraneou sly with the employee s last days on the job would reduce productivity and confound conciliation attempts in light of the possibility that the initial decision to terminate may be reversed before it became effectuated. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 255-56, 101 S.Ct. at 503. The Third Circuit extolled the benefits of a bright-line rule based on the final day of work as a better guide for both employees and courts regarding the triggering of limitations. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 503. The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit, holding that the limitations period commenced upon the College s notification to Ricks that he was denied tenure and offered a terminal contrac t. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 261-62, 101 S.Ct. at 506. The Court analyzed the timeliness issue by first identifying precisely the unlawful employment practice of which [Ricks] comp lains, b ased on the alleg ations c ontaine d in Ric ks s co mplain t. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257, 101 S.Ct. at 503 -04. Findin g in Ricks s compla int that he had not alleged any 14 discriminatory acts through the time of his actual discharge, the Court op ined that he could not breathe new life into his complaint for denial of tenure by arguing later that his discharge was als o discrim inatory. Id. (citing United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 1889, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977)) ( Mere continuity of employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of action for employment discrimination. ). The Court, in its analysis, hew ed to the acts of d iscrimination alleged in the complain t, notwithstanding when th e effects of thos e acts ar e man ifested . Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258, 101 S.Ct. at 504 ( The proper focus is upon the time of the discrimina tory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts become most painful. (quoting Abramson v. Univ. of Hawa ii, 594 F.2d 202 , 209 (9th Cir. 1979))). Because Ricks failed to allege that the manner in which h is employme nt was term inated diffe red discrimin atorily from the manner in which the College ter minated other profes sors who also had b een denie d tenure, th e only discriminato ry act for the C ourt to consid er was the den ial of ten ure. Id. The Court noted that the result reached in Ricks was dictated by the p articular facts in that case and that the widely varying circumstances of other discriminatory discharge cases require that the principles discussed in Ricks be app lied on a case-b y-case ba sis. Id. at n.9. Less than one year after Ricks, the Supreme C ourt granted certiorari in another tenu re denial case, Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6. In Chardon, several non-tenured administrators in the Puerto Rico Department of Education were notified by letter that their appointments would conclude within a certain time frame. 454 U.S. at 6-7, 15 102 S.Ct. at 28. One employee contested th e legality of the term ination by filing a lawsuit, which was dismissed by a federal District Court as time-barred, premised on the reasoning that the cause of action accrued upon the receipt of the termination notification letters. Chardon, 454 U.S. at 7, 102 S.C t. at 28. The U .S. Court of Appea ls for the First C ircuit reversed the District Court, holding that the accrual date was the actual day that the appointm ents ended . Chardon, 454 U.S. at 6, 102 S.Ct. at 29. The Suprem e Court, in turn, reversed the First Circu it stating that its decision was contrary to the holding in Ricks, which could not be distinguished from Chardon. 454 U.S. at 7-8, 102 S.Ct. at 29. Specifically, the Court noted that in each cas e, the operativ e decision w as made and notice given in advance of a designated date on which employment terminated. Chardon, 454 U.S. at 8, 102 S.Ct. at 29. B ecause the administrators in Chardon did not allege any discriminatory acts following the decision to terminate their appointments, the Court held that the limitations period on their claims commenced on the date they were notified of their impending termina tions. Id. As Petitioner and Respondent in the present case demonstrated in their briefs and at oral argument, there exists a split across jurisdictions as to the acceptance of the eponymous Ricks/Chardon rule .11 It appears that the majority of states12 have ado pted this rule in 11 Following oral argum ent in this Court on 7 September 2006, Respondent requested by letter that we take judicial notice of the co ntent of a letter, dated 3 September 2006, from Mr. Michael Dennis, the Compliance Director of the Montgomery County Office of Human Rights, purporting to state that the Office administratively follows the Ricks/Chardon rule (contin ued...) 16 discriminatory discharge cases.13 There are, however, a number of states that rejected the 11 (...continued) in its calculus of the statute of limitations for employment discrimination complaints. Petitioner, no t surprisingly, opp osed the req uest. Maryland Rule 5-201, which governs judicial notice of adjudicative facts, provides that [j]udicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding. Ru le 5-201(f). Respondent requests that we view the letter as establishing a fact that is not subject to reasonab le dispute in th at it is . . . capable of accurate an d ready determ ination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasona bly be questioned. Rule 5-2 01(b). The letter proffered by Respondent neither is the type of source n or are its conte nts the type of facts we may recognize for judicial notice purposes under the Rule. The content of the letter composed by Mr. Dennis is not based on a statute, ordinance, or regulation. What is more, even if it could be viewed as some manner of policy statement by the Office of Human Rights, it does not convey a previously published policy, that is, one capable of reliably accurate and ready determ ination. We have re fused to notice judicially the unwritten, unpublished policies of various division s of go vernm ent in thi s State. See, e.g ., Cook v. Sherry, 268 Md. 26, 30-31, 299 A.2d 811, 813-14 (1973) (declining to take judicial notice of the City of Cumberland Police Departm ent s unw ritten policy of ha ving all promotions made on a pro bationary basis for one year following the date of appointm ent ); Anne Arundel County v. Cushman, 255 Md. 153 , 161-62, 257 A.2d 150, 154-55 (1969) (holding that a coun ty s release of pro posal and specification s for was te collection c ontracts did not qualify as a published statute or o rdinance for jud icial notice pu rposes); accord Powell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 173 S.W.3d 68 5, 689-90 (M o. Ct. App. 2005); Dep t of Human Resources v. H aggard, 327 S.E.2d 798, 79 9-800 (Ga. Ct. A pp. 1985). Accord ingly, we den y Respond ent s reque st. 12 We are concerned primarily with th e decisions of state app ellate courts in adopting or rejecting the Ricks/Chardon rule becau se the rule, cra fted by the U .S. Suprem e Court, clearly is binding on federal courts. Thus, cataloguing federal circuits that follow the rule, applying it to different statutory schemes , is of no moment here. See, e.g ., Stephenson v. Am. Dental Ass n, 789 A.2d 124 8, 1250-51 (D.C . 2002). 13 Vollemans v. Town of Wallingford, 2006 WL 2244 35, at *4-5 (C onn. Sup er. Ct. 2006) (unpublished decisio n); Allen v. Lieberman, 836 N.E.2d 64 , 70 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Keene v. Marion County S uperior C t., 823 N .E.2d 1 216, 12 18 (Ind . Ct. Ap p. 2005 ), vacated on other grounds, 849 N.E.2d 1141, 1142 (Ind. 2006); Eastin v. Entergy Corp., 865 So.2d 49, 53-54 (L a. 2004); Stephenson, 789 A.2d at 1251-5 2 (D.C. 20 02); Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. DeMora nville, 933 S.W .2d 490, 49 2-93 (Te x. 1996); Weber v. Moses, 938 S.W.2d 387, (contin ued...) 17 Ricks/Chardon rule in favor of the approach that considers, in applying a limitations period to a discrimination claim, a discharge to have occurred upon the actual cessation of employment. 14 Of the states that adopted Ricks/Chardon and held that a discriminatory 13 (...continued) 393 (Tenn. 1996); Wagher v. Guy s Foods, Inc., 885 P.2d 1197, 1204-05 (Kan. 1994) (discrimination in hiring case); Wheatley v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 636 N.E.2d 265, 268-69 (Mass. 1994) (fin ding facts in Ricks inapposite, but holding that date of unequivocal notice marks accrual); Hinm an v. Y akima Sch. D ist. No. 7 , 850 P .2d 536, 539 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993); Turne r v. IDS Financial Srvs., Inc., 471 N.W .2d 105, 10 7-08 (M inn. 1991) ; St. Petersburg Motor Club v. Cook, 567 So.2d 488, 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. A pp. 1990); Naylor v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm n , 378 S.E.2 d 843, 84 5-46 (W . Va. 1989 ); Hilmes v. Dep t. of Indus., Labo r, & Human Relations, 433 N.W .2d 251, 25 3-54 (W is. Ct. App. 1 988); Quicker v. Colo. Civil Rights Co mm n, 747 P .2d 682 , 683 (C olo. Ct. A pp. 1987); Humphreys v. Riverside Mfg. Co., 311 S.E.2 d 223, 22 4-25 (Ga . Ct. App. 1 983); Queensborough Cmty. College of City Univ. of N.Y. v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 363 N.E.2d 349, 349 (N.Y. 1977) (memorandum) (pre-dates Ricks). See also Clarke v. Living Scriptures, Inc., 114 P.3d 602, 604-05 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (adopting Ricks for purposes of breach of employment contract case); Cintron v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 127 P.R. Dec. 582 (P.R. 1990) (statute provides for date of a ccrual); Smith v. C ity of Gard endale, 508 So.2d 250, 252 (Ala. 1987) (citing to Ricks in affirmin g the dismis sal of a discrim inato ry zoning case as timebarred because the homeowner s action accrued when he received notice of the set back ordinance violation); 86 Op. Att y Gen. I014 (Del. 1986) (citing to the Ricks/Chardon rule in stating that an individual claiming discrimination in employme nt should b e allowed to file a charge as early as possible). 14 Collins v. Comerica Bank, 664 N.W.2d 713, 716 (Mich. 20 03); Alderiso v. Med. Ctr. of Ocean County , 770 A.2d 275, 277, 281 (N.J. 2001); Renegar v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 549 S.E.2d 227, 229 (N.C. Ct. A pp. 2001 ); Oker v. Ameritech Corp., 729 N.E.2d 1177, 1179-80 (Oh io 2000); Stupek v. Wyle Labs. Corp., 963 P.2d 678, 68 2 (Or. 1998); Romano v. Rockwell Int l, Inc., 926 P.2d 1114, 11 22 (Cal. 19 96); Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co., 879 P.2d 1037, 1043-44 (Haw. 1 994); In re Pritchard, 627 A.2d 102, 103 (N.H. 19 93); Allison v. Jumping Horse Ranch, Inc., 843 P.2d 753, 756 (Mont. 1992) (ho lding that a d ischarge cla im does not acc rue unt il all salary b enefits are term inated). See also Kuhn v. Oehme Carrier Corp., 255 F. Supp. 2d 458, 467 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (applying Pennsylvania law) (holding that accrual began, at the latest, on the plaintiff s last day of work); Fellows v. Earth Const., Inc., 794 F. Supp. 531, 536 (D. Vt.1992) (applying Vermont law) (holding that accrual began, at (contin ued...) 18 discharge action accrues upon the employee s receipt of an anticip atory discharge notice, many have done so with little analysis or discussion. For example, in Quicker v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the Colorado Court of Appeals simply acknowledged that no Colorado authority previously interpreted Colorado s discriminatory discharge statute for limitations purposes and adopted the Ricks holding to fill the vacuum. 747 P.2d 682, 683 (1987). In Humphreys v. Riverside Manufacturing Company, the Court of Appea ls of Georgia merely offered naked citations to Ricks and Chardon in its adoption of the rule. 311 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1983). These cases, and the others following Ricks/Chardon, appear to us to adopt the rule out of convenience because their state provisions are sufficiently similar to Title VII and that the Supreme Court has spoken on the federal side of the issue. On the other hand, thos e state appe llate courts charting a different course than that plotted by Ricks and Chardon tend to devote themselv es to greater analysis and consideration of the issues raised by the accrual question, perhaps due in part to a pe rceived ne ed to justify mo re fully why they deviate from the majority view . The divergent opinions from Hawaii, California , and New Jersey seem to us to epitomize best the arguments gainsaying adoption of the Ricks/Chardon rule. The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Company, 879 P.2d 1037 (1994), produced the 14 (...continued) the latest, on date of plaintiff s d ischarge); Shields v. Gerhart, 582 A.2d 153, 156 -57 (Vt. 1990) (rejecting the Ricks/Chardon rule in a retaliatory license revocation case wh ere court held that claim accrued w hen plaintiff withdrew applications for a new license). 19 first substantial opinion contrary to the Ricks/Chardon rule. The court there dealt with an employment discrimination regulatory scheme nearly identical to the one involved in the present case. Ross, 879 P.2d at 1038 n.2. In fact, the Hawa ii regulatory scheme, like the one in Maryland, involves one statute prohibiting a discriminatory discharge, compare Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378- 2, with Montgomery County, Md., Code § 27-19, and another setting forth the limitations period . Compare Haw. Rev. S tat. § 378 -4(c), with Md. Cod e, Art. 49B, § 42(b). In both cases, the meanings assigned to the statutory words discharge and occurred becam e dispo sitive. Ross, 879 P.2d at 1044. In rejecting the Ricks/Chardon rule, the Hawaiian court examined the plain language of the statu tes invo lved. Id. That examination yielded a finding that discharge is commo nly understoo d to mean the terminatio n of emp loyment and that occur red ordina rily refers to the pa st happ ening o f some event. Id. Taken together in the context of an alleged discriminatory discharge, the w ords conv eyed a sense th at the statute of limitations on ly commences after the termin ation fr om em ploymen t. Id. The Ross court buttress ed its holding that accrual occurs upon actual discharge by touting the virtues of a bright line ru le benefitting employees and employers alike. 879 P.2d at 1044-45. As a practical matter, the court noted that m ost employees do not become aware of their legal remedies, or even suspect that they have a viable claim for discrimination, until after the actual discharge. Ross, 879 P.2d at 1045. Acc ordingly, a bright line rule favors the resolution of such claims on their merits, which in turn furthers the remedial purposes of the statutory scheme in the 20 first instanc e. Id. Because employers ultimately control the time that notice of dischar ge is delivered and the actual termination is executed, the threat of stale claims may be limited effe ctive ly. Id. Finally, a bright line rule brings certainty and simplicity to an otherwise confounding decision of when an employee might be, or should have been, aware of his or her cau se of ac tion. Id. In the age discrimination case of Romano v. Rockwell International Incorporated, the Supreme Court of California echoed the same considerations noted by the high court of Hawa ii: the plain language and remedial purpose of the wrongful discharge statute, limited burden on the employer, and simplicity of a bright line. 926 P.2d 1114, 1122-23 (1996). The Romano Court added that were it to adopt the Ricks/Chardon rule such w ould pro mote premature and poten tially destructive claim s, in that the em ployee wou ld be require d to institute a complaint . . . while he or she still was employed, thus seeking a remedy for a harm that had not yet occurred. 926 P.2d at 1123. The chances of conciliation between the employer and employee seriously would be jeopardized and judicial economy could be hampered by the possibility that su its will be filed based on a notice of termination that might later be resc inded. Id. Moreo ver, it was no ted that Ross distinguished the academ ic setting of the factual contexts of Ricks and Chardon from the o ther types of w orkplaces, in that a notification of termination in the other e mploymen t contexts do es not lead in evitably to an actual discharge, as it does where denial of tenure is involved at an academic institution. 926 P.2d at 1125 . Ross was also noted as criticizing the rationale of Ricks for being c ontrary to 21 the customary principles of limitations law because it requires an employee to dispute a termination that has not take n place yet. Id. (quoting Chardon, 454 U.S. at 9, 102 S.Ct. at 29 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). The New Jersey cases departing from the Ricks/Chardon line of a uthority, Alderiso v. Medical Center of Ocean County, Incorporated, 770 A.2d 275 (N.J. 2001) and Holmin v. TRW Incorporated, 748 A.2d 114 1 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2000), also discussed many of the same points raised by the Hawaiian and Californian high courts. The analysis in Alderiso started with an evalua tion of the p lain meaning of the statutorily undefined term discharge. 770 A.2d at 280, 279. After settling on discharge as meaning the last day of paid salary, the New Jersey court referred to the reasoning in Justice Stevens s dissent in Ricks as more persuasive support for the clearer and simpler rule for the commencement of limitations on the actual te rminatio n date. Alderiso, 770 A.2d at 281. The Holmin case, whic h dealt with a claim for f raudulent in duceme nt to retire, rather than a discriminatory discharge, analyzed and discarded the Ricks/Chardon rule for many of the same reasons already discussed supra. 748 A.2d at 1142. Holmin rejected the Ricks/Chardon rule as arbitrary and criticized those cases adopting it as lacking any persuasive discussion of a sound policy basis for doing so. 748 A.2d at 1151. Rather, the court praised the more compelling points made in the cases antedating the U.S. Supreme Court s decisions in Ricks and Chardon:15 the termination 15 E.g., Moses v . Falstaff, 525 F.2d 92, 95 (8th Cir. 197 5); Egelston v. State Univ. College, 535 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1976); Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. (contin ued...) 22 decision may be rescinded before its effective date; a bright line rule brings clarity to both the conciliatory and litigation processes; and no viable a ction can ex ist until the termination actually o ccurs. Id. C. We Reject the Ricks/Chardon Rule as Applied to the Present Case 16 We find the collective rationales of the Hawaii, California, and New Jersey cases persuasive in interpreting our statu tory schem e. Like the statutes involved in those cases, the pertinent language in Art. 49B of the Maryland Code and § 27-19 of the Mo ntgomery C ounty 15 (...continued) 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821, 99 S.Ct. 87, 58 L.Ed.2d 113 (197 8); Krzyzewski v. Metro. Gov t, 584 F.2d 802, 806 (6th Cir. 197 8); Rubin v. O Koren, 621 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1980). 16 The parties have briefe d and arg ued the pre sent case as if it placed us at a jurisprudential crossroads requiring that we choose, for all employment discrimination claims, the path of the Ricks/Chardon rule or the minority alternative epitomized in the decisions of the high courts of Hawaii, California, and New Jersey discussed supra. Although we choose the latter in the present case, that may not necess arily be the case were we confronted with a context similar to that found in Ricks and Chardon. Even the Ricks Court acknowledged that its general principles must be applied on a case-by-case basis given the wide ly varying c ircums tances of disc riminato ry termina tion com plaints. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258 n.9, 101 S.Ct. at 504 n.9. Considering Ricks and Chardon in their particular context (the world of academic tenure decisions) and, more importantly, their appropriate analytical focus of identifying pr ecisely the un lawfu l emplo yment pr actice plead, Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257 , 101 S.Ct. a t 503; Chardon, 454 U.S . at 8, 102 S.C t. at 29, we m ight entertain a renewed argumen t that Ricks and Chardon should be followed in such circumstances. Where the only claimed discriminatory act is associated with the denial of tenure, regardless of whether employment in some capacity continues for some period, the cause of action for alleged wrongful denial of tenure properly may accrue from the notice of denial of tenu re and not at some subsequent cessation o f continue d employm ent. That, of course, is not the case with regard to Haas s circumstances as pled in her complaint. Thus, we shall leave for another day whether the Ricks/Chardon rule would be adopted in Maryland regarding an allegation of discriminatory denial of ac ademic tenure (or a tenu re-like situation). 23 Code are not defined in the legislation. We therefore must utilize the principles of statutory construction to determine the meaning of occurrence in Art. 49B, § 42(b) and discharge in Montgomery C ounty Cod e § 27-19 (a)(1)(A). W e begin w ith the familia r comma nd to effectuate the plain meaning of the language as conceived by the ordinary, popular understanding of the E nglish la nguag e. Adventist Health Care Inc. v. Md. Health Care Comm n, 392 Md. 103, 124 n.13, 896 A.2d 320, 333 n.13 (2006) (quoting Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223 , 858 A.2d 484 , 487 (2004)). The C ourt of Specia l Appeals appears to have sidestepped this principle in favor of relying on fede ral decisional law construing Title VII as a surrogate for analysis of the meaning of the terms used in the Maryland enactments. Haas, 166 Md. App. at 177, 887 A.2d at 681-82. While it certainly is permissible to have recourse to federal law similar to our own as an aid in construction of Maryland statutory law, it should not be a substitute for the pre-eminent plain me aning inquiry of the statutory language under e xamin ation. See Bea tty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 738 n.8, 625 A.2d 1005, 1011 n.8 (1993) (citing Metro. Mortgage Fund, Inc. v. Basiliko, 288 Md. 25, 27, 415 A.2 d 582 (19 80); State v. Gross, 134 Md. App. 528, 621, 760 A.2d 725, 774 (2000) (admonishing that persuasive federal law may be looked to, but not necessarily to the exclusion of indepe ndent judgmen t and analysis by Maryland courts). Consultation with several popular dictionaries reveals that the commonly understood, plain meaning of discharge concurs with the view that a discharge occurs at the time the 24 employee is terminated actually from e mploymen t.17 In this regard, we agree with our sister courts who r eache d the sa me resu lt. See, e.g ., Alderiso, 770 A.2d at 280; Romano, 926 P.2d at 1122; Ross, 879 P.2d 1037, 1044. Even were we to consider alternatively that the meaning of discharge was ambiguous, we are not bound by the Supreme Court s interpretation of Title VII in our interpretation of Art. 49B, as noted earlier, notwithsta nding the a rguable similarity in the two re gulatory schemes.18 Were we confronted with ambiguity regarding legislative intent, it is our duty to announce a rule that we are convinced is best supported by sound jurispruden tial policy germa ne to the pu rsuit of legislativ e intent. 19 We said re cently 17 The Comp act Oxfo rd English Dictionary defines discharge as dismissal from service, employment, or office. 442 (2d ed . 1991). That dictionary then defin es dismissa l and its alternative dismission as the deprivation of office, dignity, or position; discharge of service. Id. at 449. Likewise, dismiss means to send away or remove from office, employment, or position; to discharge, discard, expel . Id. The emphasis in this definition unmistaka bly rests on the sending away of an employee rather than a notification of such an impending action. Other r eferen ce mate rials pro vide sim ilar defin itions. See Black s Law Dictionary 475 (7th ed. 1999 ); Webster s New Universal Una bridged Dictionary 519 (2d ed. 1983); Ballan tine s L aw D ictionar y 352 (3d ed. 196 9). Resource was had to similar dictionaries extant in 1974, the original vintage of the s tatutory lan guage in ques tion. Harvey v. Marsh all, 389 Md. 243, 260 n.11, 884 A.2d 1171, 1181 n.11 (2005). No substantive differences with their successors was noted. 18 Respondent devoted a great deal of content in its brief to addressing the similarities between Art. 49B and T itle VII. Also, the Court of Special Appeals cited to a number of Maryland cases in which ap pear statem ents that Ar t. 49B wa s either mod eled on, or c losely related to, Title V II. Haas, 166 Md. App. at 175, 887 A.2d at 680 (citing Univ. of M d. at Baltimore v. Boyd, 93 Md. App. 303, 311, 612 A.2d 305 (1992); Pope-P ayton v. Re alty Mgmt. Srvs., Inc., 149 M d. App. 39 3, 402 n.6, 8 15 A.2d 919 (200 3); Comm n on Human Relations v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 280 Md. 35, 40-43, 371 A.2d 645 (19 77)). 19 See supra note 10. W e also note th at the Supre me Cou rt of New Jersey similarly claimed responsibility for interpreting its own laws independently of persuasive federal (contin ued...) 25 in Stoddard v. State that when supervening policy considerations outweigh the consensus interpretation of a rule according to the principles of statutory construction, we should not hesitate to make our conclusions based upon policy. 389 Md. 681, 704 n.6, 887 A.2d 564, 577 n.6 (20 05). Stoddard held, contrary to the majority of other federal and state jurisdictions, that a decla rant s lack of intent to communicate a belief in the truth of a particular proposition is irrelevant to the determination of whether the words are hearsay when offere d to pro ve the tru th of tha t propo sition. 20 389 Md. at 703, 887 A.2d at 577. We hold that, for the purpose of claims filed pursuant to § 42 of the Maryland Code, Article 49B, a discharge occurs upon the actual termination of an employee, rather than upon notification that such a termination is to take effect at some future date. In doing so, we find more persuasive the reasoning employed by those states that have rejected the Ricks/Chardon rule in fa vor o f the one we a dopt today. 19 (...continued) precedent in its decision on the same issue now b efore u s. Alderiso, 770 A.2d at 281 ( Although federal decisional law may serve to guide us in our resolution of New Jersey issues, we bear ultimate responsibility for the safe passage of our ship. (quoting State v. Cooke, 751 A.2d 92 , 99 (N.J. 2000), in turn quoting State v. Hem pele, 576 A.2d 793, 800 (N.J. 1990))). 20 The Stoddard Court was interpreting the codified version of the common law hearsay rule contained in the Maryland Rules, which are enacted by this Court. It matters not that the Stoddard Court w as construin g a rule of its own creation because the same principles of construction are applied in that endea vor as in the inter pretatio n of sta tutes. Gen l Motors Corp. v. Seay, 388 Md. 341, 352, 879 A.2d 1049, 1055 (2005). In particular, the Court must still ascer tain obje ctively the intent of the rule s drafte rs. Id. 26 First, we consider the remedial nature and purpose of Article 49B. Our cases consistently refer to Article 49B as being remed ial in natu re. See, e.g., Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 370 Md. 38, 52-53, 803 A.2d 482, 490 (2002 ); State v. Sheldon, 332 Md. 45, 63-64, 629 A.2d 753, 763 (1993) ( [W]hat is necessary are laws which remedy the effects of pernicious beliefs , see e.g. Maryland Code (1957, 19 91 Rep l. Vol.) Art. 49 B (antidiscrimination laws), and which thereby force justice on those who are as yet unw illing to embrace it in their hearts and minds. ) (emphasis added and removed ); Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 322 M d. 467, 4 84-85, 588 A.2d 760, 76 8 (1991); Makovi v. SherwinWilliams Co., 316 Md. 603, 626, 561 A.2d 179, 190 (1989) ( In cases of discharge motivated by employme nt discrimina tion prohibite d by Title VII and Art. 49B the statutes cre ate both the right . . . and remedies for enfor cing that ex ception. ) (em phasis add ed); Vavasori v. Comm n on Human Relations, 65 Md. App. 237, 243, 500 A.2d 307, 310 (1985) ( The remedy of Art. 49B was created, regulated, and enforced by the State. ) (emp hasis added). The remedies provided by Article 49B further the crucial objective of eliminating discrimination and advanci ng equal opp ortunity. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 63-64, 629 A.2d at 763; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. v. Comm n on Human Relations, 290 Md. 333, 344, 430 A.2d 60, 66 (1981) ( The legislature in enacting and amending Article 49B leaves no room to doubt its intent and purpose, i.e., to eradicate the vestiges of discrimination in the categories designated. ); Comm n on Human Relations v. Amecom Div. of Litton Sys., Inc., 278 Md. 12 0, 124, 360 A.2d 1, 4 (1976). 27 As a remedial statute, § 42 of Article 49B should be construed liberally in favor of claimants seekin g its prot ection. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ. v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 383 Md. 527, 554 , 860 A.2d 909 , 919 (2004); Harris v. B d. of Educ . of Howa rd Coun ty, 375 Md. 21, 38, 825 A.2d 365, 375 (2003) (quoting Victory Sparkler & Specialty Co. v. Francks, 147 Md. 368, 382, 128 A. 635, 640 (1925)) ( The Maryland act is remedial an d should receive a liberal construction so as to give to it the most ben eficial operation . . . . ); Marsheck v. Bd. of Trs. of the Fire & Police Employees Retirement Sys. of the City of Baltimore, 358 Md. 39 3, 403, 749 A.2d 774, 779 (2000 ); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256, 674 A.2d 951, 957 (1996) (quoting Harris on v. Jo hn F. P illi & Sons , Inc., 321 Md. 336, 341, 582 A.2d 12 31, 1234 (1990 )) ( [R]emedial statu tes are to be lib erally construed to suppress the evil and advance the remedy. ). Nonetheless, we observed that [t]he general rule of liberally construing remedial statutes is approached with caution when the scrutinized legislative scheme contains a statute of limitations. Marsheck, 358 at 403, 749 A.2d at 779. The workers compensation scheme at issue in Marsheck, howev er, differs m arkedly from the anti-discrimination scheme in the present case. Neither the Worke rs Comp ensation A ct,21 nor its implementing regulations,22 contain provisions requiring good faith attempts at conciliation and negotiation before litigation may be pursued. Both Article 49B and the 21 Md. Code (1957, 1999 Repl. Vol.) Labor & Empl. Article, §§ 9-101 et seq. 22 Code of Maryland Regulations 14.09.01 et seq. 28 Montgomery County anti-discrimination scheme mandate that such efforts be made.23 Although § 42 allows a co mplainan t, such as the P etitioner, to file a p rivate civil suit to contest an alleged discriminatory discharge, subsection (c) of § 42 expressly requires that the complainant wait at least 45 days after he or she has filed a complaint with the county agency responsible for handling such matters. This provision presumably is meant to further judicial economy by having the County screen out non-me ritorious claim s as well as to encourage the conciliation of meritorious ones.24 The Ricks/Chardon rule frustrates this conciliation process whenever the actual discharge occurs afte r the expiratio n of the 45 day waiting period required by § 42(c). 25 Because the rule establishes that accrual begins upon notification, it behooves discharged employees to file a lawsuit as soon as possible to avoid having their claims barred under the statute of limitations. Thus, when the 45 day waiting period has run, but the employee has 23 Art. 49B, § 10(c); Banach v. Comm n on Human Relations, 277 Md. 502, 513-14, 356 A.2d 24 2, 249-50 (1976); McNutt v. Duke Precision Dental an d Orthod ontic Labs., Inc., 698 F.2d 676, 678-79 (4th Cir. 1983) ( Moreover, the enforcement schemes contemplated by Maryland s Article 49B and 42 U .S.C.A. § 1981 are completely different. Maryland s administrative proceeding is designed primarily to eliminate the discrimination by conference, conciliation, and persuasion. If a process of conference, conciliation and persuasion is to be effective, claims must be fresh. The older they are the less the likelihood of successful administrative ad justment. ) (citation omitted); Montgom ery County Code 277(g). 24 Haas w aited the pres cribed 45 d ays to file her suit in Circuit Court. In the present case, however, the goal of conciliation was not as prime a consideration because Haas was able to s ecure o ther em ploymen t subseq uent to h er termin ation. 25 This is not the case here, whe re Petitioner w as terminated 14 days after the notification of her layoff. The principle remains true nonetheless. 29 not yet been actually discharged, the Ricks/Chardon rule motivates the employee to file a lawsuit regardless of whether the conciliation process is concluded. As the states opting for other than the Ricks/Chardon rule have p ointed out, th is choice repre sents a poo r public policy where either a chilling effect on the employee filing in the most timely manner occurs, or the employee sues his or her employer bef ore the termination becomes final, thus dooming any chanc e at con ciliation. See Holmin , 748 A.2d at 1151; Romano, 926 P.2d at 1123. To be sure, the Ricks/Chardon rule provides an effective means of avoiding lawsuits for discriminatory discharge: the sharp employer might set the effective date of termination at one day after whatever the statutory period is will have run its course. The majority of employees put on notice that they are slated to be ter minated a t some relativ ely remote date in the future likely would hesitate to institute a claim for discrimin atory discharge ; first, because the action may not appear final because it is so far in the future and; second, because they reasonably are apprehensive about suing the party with w hom they cu rrently have, and may try to maintain, a job. In the same v ein as the co nciliation consideration is the contention that the Ricks/Chardon rule propagates the filing of claims not yet ripe for adjudication. Under the rule, it is possible theoretically that employees who challenge their putative discharge c ould arrive for their day in c ourt befor e they actually are dis charged f rom emp loyment. Further, Ricks and Chardon create a paradoxical situation w here an employee, at the time he or she is notified of the termination yet to come, must posse ss the prescience to know of the future 30 discriminatory acts that continue[] until, or occur[] at the time of, the actual termination of his [of her] employment. Ricks, 449 U.S . at 257, 101 S.Ct. at 504; see also Chardon, 454 U.S. at 29, 102 S.Ct. at 8. If employees desire to challenge their terminations spec ifica lly, as opposed to other discriminatory acts preceding it, they probably ought not be expected to file a claim disputing events that have not yet come to pass. A significant consideration supporting our conclusion today is the relative sim plicity in applica tion of a bright lin e rule in t his con text. For courts, the determination of a statute of limitations question is made simpler thereby, obviating the need for the sometime tortured analysis under the discovery rule for when n otice is adequate. For employees, the rule we announce today is clear and logical. Most workers reasonab ly expect that, un til actually discharged, they have no claim for wrongful discharge because there has yet to be harm that may be rem edied. See Ross, 879 P.2d at 1045. The rule we announce today best facilitates the remedial purposes of Article 49B by making certain that meritorious suits are not foreclosed for purely technical reasons. For employers, our holding makes clear how the ir record-keeping and termination proceedings must be ap proached in order to d efend pro perly against a wrong ful discharg e action. Em ployers are far le ss inconve nienced, if at all, by our holding today than employees would be if we followed the Ricks/Chardon rule. The en tirety of the termination process is w ithin the control of the emp loyer, as opposed to the employee who should not have to guess whether or what type of termination notice is final so that he 31 or she then may de cide whe n to sue an employer w ho is still paying a w age and p roviding benefits. This delicate situation is best resolved in this manner. Our holding should not deter employers from offering their employees advance notice of terminations. Indeed, there should be no great burden or adverse eff ect on employers because notice perio ds typically would not be of great duration in advance of the actual discharge. Our rule prevents the possibility of employers using exceptionally long notice periods for the purpose of d eterring an employee from filing a discharge claim out of apprehension that they will be terminated earlier than scheduled. The specter of e mployers ha ving to def end again st stale claims is n ot a persuasive argumen t. We have noted that [o]ne principal purpose of statutes of limitations is to provide defenda nts with notice of a claim within a sufficient period of time to permit the defendant to take necessary steps to gather and preserve the eviden ce nee ded to d efend agains t the suit. Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Christensen, 394 M d. 227, 256 , 905 A.2d 340, 357 -58 (2006 ); see also Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 333 Md. 324, 338, 635 A.2d 394, 401 (1994). From the defenda nt s perspec tive, the statute o f limitations is remed ial. Marsheck v. Bd. of Trs. of the Fire & Police Employees Retirement Sys. of the City of Baltimore, 358 Md. 393, 40405, 749 A.2d 774, 779-80 (2000). Once the limitation period passed, the statute, which once provided opportunity, closes the window and the claim is barred thereafter. The legislature, in drafting such legislation, implicitly recognizes that as time p asses, difficult evidentiary issues arise, suc h as pro of of th e cause of injur y, faded m emorie s, and the availability of 32 witnes ses. Marsheck, 358 M d. at 404-05 , 749 A.2d at 780; Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 665, 464 A.2 d 1020, 1 026 (198 3); Bertonazzi v. Hillman, 241 Md. 361, 367, 216 A .2d 723 , 726 (1 966). Statutes of limitation are also meant to eliminate, after the allotted time, the financ ial uncertainty de fendants e xperience while pote ntial claims rem ain unlitigated. Marsheck, 358 Md. at 405, 749 A.2d at 780. The time allotted usually has little, if any, specific grounding in em pirical logic, but simply represents the legislature s judgment about the reasonable time needed to institute suit. Marsheck, 358 Md. at 405, 749 A.2d at 780 (quoting Doe v. Maske ll, 342 Md. 684, 689, 679 A.2d 1087, 1089 (19 96)). The concerns animating the statute of limitations defense in most cases simply are not present here. As we have noted, employers ordinarily are in control of the termination process, so they may not maintain credibly an argument that they would be without ad equate notice of a wrongful discharge action. The decision and execution of a discharge, along with records thereof, eas ily may be orches trated in harmon y with our holding today to ensure that an employer-defendant is not caught unaware of an unlawful discriminatory discharge claim. In the majority of instances, the time elapsed between the rendition of notice and effectuation of a termination is not so long as to foster relevant evidence falling victim to fading memories, missing documentation, or other spoiliation concerns. The voluminous record of thorough depositions, internal e-mails, and other materials created in the present case is testament to this prediction. We also observe, merely in passing, that [t]he statute of limitations, as a defense that does not go to the merits, is disfavored in law and is to be 33 strictly construed. Marsheck, 358 Md. at 405, 749 A.2d at 780 (quoting Newell v. Richards, 323 Md. 71 7, 728, 594 A.2d 1152, 1157 (19 91)). Fina lly, we resolve the contention that a statement regarding the Ricks/Chardon rule in Towson University v. Conte, 384 Md. 68, 96-97, 862 A.2d 941, 957 (2004), signaled our adoption of the rule. T he brief disc ussion of th e rule in the majority opinion in Conte was merely in response to an argument made by the diss ent in tha t case, id., and represented nothing more than a disputation that the rule, which dealt with a n allegation o f a civil rights deprivation, was inapposite to a breach of contract action. Id. In the present case, where Ricks/Chardon is arguably the most apposite, we hold that it should not be followed. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCU IT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY AND REMAND THE CASE TO THE C I R C UIT C O U R T F O R F U R T H ER PROCEEDINGS; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT. 34 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 5 September Term, 2006 SUZANNE HAAS v. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Dissen ting Op inion b y Battaglia , J., which Raker, J., joins in Part A. Filed: January 9, 2007 Battaglia, J., disse nting, in wh ich Rake r, J. joins in Part A : I respec tfully disse nt. A. Section 42 of Article 49B (b)(1) provides that claims for discrimination in Prince George s, Montg omery, and H oward C ounties be comme nced in the circuit court for the county in which the alleged discrimination took place not later than 2 years after the occurrence of the alleged discriminatory act. Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Rep. vol.), § 42 (b)(1) of Article 49B (emphasis added). Section 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code provides that an employer must not fail or refuse to hire, fail to accept the services of, discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual on the basis of race, gender, religion, or other discriminatory grounds. Montgomery County Code, § 27-19 (2001 ) (emph asis add ed). In this case, the Petitioner, Suzanne Haas, alleged in her complaint that [t]he actions of Lockheed [Martin] in terminating [her] from her position as Program Administrator constituted handicap discrimina tion because Lo ckheed clearly regarded Haas as being disabled on account of her Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. Although she physically left her employment on October 23, 2001, because of her employer s sufferance, the statute of limitations began to run on October 9, 2001, when Lockheed Martin notified Ms. Haas by letter of the termination of her position. 36 Our jurispruden ce, as well as that of the S upreme C ourt, federa l circuit courts of appeals, and the majority of our sister states supports this result. The majority, however, rejects not only our precedent, but the plethora of cases that rea ch the opp osite result in order to accommodate negotiation and conciliation between employers and em ployees, effo rts which the majority conce des were not the basis for Ms. H aas s delay in filin g suit. In Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980), the Supreme C ourt addressed the instant issue. In Ricks, a professor alleged that the Delaware State College discriminated against him in its decision to deny him tenure. The trial judge dismissed the professor s claim on the ground that it was untimely filed because the discriminatory act occurred w hen the co llege mad e its decision not to grant the professor tenure; therefore, the statute of limitations had begun to run on the date that the professor was officially notified of the college s decision, rather than when he left his employment. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court s ruling and held that the only alleged discrimination occurred and the filing limitations periods therefore commenced at the time the tenure d ecision w as made a nd comm unicated to [the professor]. Id. at 258, 101 S.Ct. At 504, 6 6 L.Ed.2d at 439-40 . The Sup reme Co urt noted tha t, although the alternative approach, in which the statute of limitations begins to run on the last day of employment, may provide a simpler approach, Congress has decided that time limitations periods commence with the date of the alleged unlawful employment practice , and that decision reflects a value judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of protecting 2 valid claims are outweighed b y the intere sts in pro hibiting the pro secutio n of sta le ones . Id. at 259, 260, 101 S.Ct. at 505, 66 L.Ed.2d at 440, 441, quoting Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463-64, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1721-22, 44 L.Ed.2d 295, 303 (1975). Further, the Court o bserved th at the alternative final day of e mploymen t rule could discourage employers from giving employees a grace period to seek employment elsewhere. Id. at 260 n.12, 101 S.Ct. at 505 n.12, 66 L.Ed.2d at 441 n.12. The Supreme Court revisited this issue in Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981), in which the plaintiffs alleged discrimination in the decision of the Puerto Rico Department of Education to term inate their employment. The trial court dismissed the claim as untimely, and the C ourt of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that the claims began to accrue not upon the plaintiffs notification of the employer s decision to terminate them, but when their employment was ac tually terminated. The Supreme Court, in reversing, concluded that the Chardon and Ricks cases were indistinguishable; in each ca se, the opera tive decision was ma de and n otice given in advance of a designated date on which employment terminated. Id. at 8, 102 S.Ct. at 29, 70 L.Ed.2 d at 8. Emphasizing that reasonable notice cannot extend the period within which suit must be filed, the Sup reme Court therefo re held that the statute of limitations began to 3 run when the plaintiffs were notified of their employer s final decision, not when their emplo yment ac tually term inated. Id.1 Although not controlling, Supreme Court precedent should be afforded deference because, as our colleagues on the Court of Special Appeals so recognized when they affirmed summary judgment for Lockheed Martin, Article 49B is patterned after Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act. Montrose Christian Sch. Corp. v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565, 580, 770 A.2d 111, 120 (2001) (stating that Article 49B of the Maryland Code was modeled after the federal anti-discrimination law ); Molesw orth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 632-33, 672 A.2d 608, 614 (1996) (concluding that, because Article 49B was modeled after federal law, the 1 The lower federal appellate courts have interpreted the Ricks/Chardon rule in termination cases to apply when the employee is notified of his or her termination from employmen t. See Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 2000)(statu te of limitations begins to run when employee is informed that she is being terminated); Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that action for discrimination began to accrue when the employee was notified of lay-off); Joseph v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 87 (2nd Cir. 1999) (stating that action for discrim inatory discharge begins to accrue when em ployee is notified of employer s discriminato ry decision); McCoy v. S.F., City an d Coun ty, 14 F.3d 28, 29 (9th Cir. 1994) ( The touchstone for determining the commencement of the limitations per iod is notice. ) ; Lever v. N.W. Univ., 979 F.2d 552 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that action for gender discrimination accrued from time that professor was informed that she would not be given tenure); English v. Whitfield, 858 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that discrimination claim brought under the Employee Protection Section of the Energ y Reorganiz ation Act was time-barred because the action began to accrue u pon the em ployee s notific ation of he r termination ); Janikow ski v. Bend ix Corp., 823 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that discrimination claim brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act began to accrue upon the employee s notification of his termination); Bronze Shields, Inc. v. N.J. Dep t of Civil Serv., 667 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that action for discrimination accrued w hen the Sta te Civil Service promulgated the eligibility roster for policemen wh ich gave notice to the plaintiffs o f the discriminatory decisio n). 4 Court may look to the legislative history of Title VII o f the Federa l Civil Righ ts Act to discern the legis lative inte nt behin d Artic le 49B ). The General Assembly passed the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Law, codified at Article 49B, in response to the federal enactment of Title VII and acted so quickly that Article 49B went in to effe ct one d ay befor e its fed eral cou nterpar t. See Makovi v. SherwinWilliams Co., 316 Md. 603, 607, 561 A.2d 179, 181 (1989). As Title VII has been updated at the federa l level, the Gene ral Assem bly has harm onized A rticle 49B to federa l law. See 1973 Md. Laws, Chap. 493; Molesw orth, 341 Md. at 632-33, 672 A.2d at 614 (explaining that Chapter 4 93 of the A cts of 197 3 states that it w as passed to generally con form the S tate Fair Employment Practices Law to the 1972 A mendm ents of Title V II, Federal C ivil Rights Act of 19 64.); Md. Co mm n o n Hum an Relatio ns v. Ma yor and C ity Counc il of Baltimore, 280 Md. 35, 40-43, 371 A.2d 645, 674-49 (1977) (noting that the Genera l Assembly s amendm ents to Article 49B w ere neede d to conform Maryland la w to the 19 72 amen dments of Title VII and looking to Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act to define person as used in the newly conf ormed an d reenacte d §18 of Article 49B ). The M ontgom ery County Code also mirrors the unla wful em ployment pra ctices prohib ited by Title VII a nd Article 49B, differing only because the County Code contains a more expansive list of unlawful practices. Montgom ery County Code § 27 -1 (b) (2001) ( The p rohibitions in this article are substantially similar, but not necessarily identical, to prohibitions in federal and state law. ). 5 Considering the mimicry of state and local laws to Title VII, it is appropriate to consider federa l preced ents w hen inte rpreting state and local law s. The Majority concludes incorrectly that the plain meaning o f discharge concurs with the view that a discharge occurs at the time the employee is terminated actually from employment. As used in § 27-19, the aspect of discharge that constitutes the occurrence of the alleged d iscriminatory ac t is the decision by the employer to terminate the employee. Maryland and Montgomery County s statutory scheme focuses on the discriminatory act and provides that an employer must not discharge any individual, and that an employee has two years after the occurrence of the alleged d iscriminatory ac t to file a claim. Montgo mery County Code, § 27-19 (a); Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Rep. vol.), § 42 (b)(1) of Article 49B. The notice to terminate incorporates the allegedly discriminatory decision and provides the basis for a claim under § 49B. An alleged discriminatory act occurs upon notice of termination. As the Supreme Court has stated, the proper focus is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the a ct beco me pa inful. Chardon, 454 U.S . at 8, 102 S.C t. 28 at 29, 70 L.Ed.2d a t 9 (empha sis in original). Moreover, notice of termination is a very significant event especially when the employee questions the legality of the employer s decision and it is likely to cause the employee menta l and em otional s ufferin g. The Majority relies o n judicial dec isions in Hawa ii, California, and New Jersey that have declined to follow the Ricks/Chardon rule, but fails to consider that the reasoning of 6 those courts was influenced by the underlying statutes and facts of those cases, all of which are significantly different than the statutes and facts in the case sub judice. In Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Company, 879 P.2d 1037 (Haw. 1994), the statute of limitations at issue was 90 days long, as opposed to M arylan d s g ener ous t wo ye ars. The Ross court based its decision on an analysis of the plain language, but then proceede d to further ju stify its departure from the Ricks/Chardon rule by emphas izing that less sa vvy employee s would f ail to pursue the filing of an administrative complaint within ninety days if the statute of limitations started u pon no tice. Id. at 1045. Maryland s two year statute of limitations guarantees the protection against discrimination by employers even for less savvy employees while also protecting employers from the burden of defending employment decisions th at are long p ast. 2 The employee in Romano v. Rockwell, International, Inc., 926 P.2d 1114 (Cal. 1996), was given notice in December 1988 that he would be terminated when he reached 85 service points under the c ompany retire ment plan , which w ould occur May 31, 1991. Thus, Romano had approximately one and a half years notice of his unequivocal termination. In construing the state s one year statute of limitations, the Supreme Court of California relied on Ross and emphasized that adoption of Ricks/Chardon would require an employee to initiate a 2 In this particular case, Haas consulted with her attorney prior to signing the October 9, 2001 layoff notice, made allegations against the company in November 2001, and filed a charge of disability discrimination with the EEOC in Ma rch 200 2. Haas did not file her lawsu it in Mo ntgom ery Cou nty Circu it Cour t until O ctober 2 2, 2003 . 7 complaint while s till emplo yed. Romano addresses a unique se t of facts an d a shorter sta tute of limitations. H aas, like the m ajority of emp loyees, received two we eks notice of her impending termination. If an em ployee in M aryland choo ses not to file a claim wh ile still working, the emplo yee is in no way impeded from filing a claim in the next 102 weeks. Even when a Romano-like situation d evelops, the Suprem e Court ha s made it clea r that, [i]t is true that the filing of a lawsuit might tend to deter efforts at conciliation. But this is the natural effect of the choice Congress has made in explicitly requiring that the limitations period commence with the da te of the alleg ed unlaw ful employment practice . Ricks, 449 U.S. at 259 n.11, 101 S.Ct. at 505 n.11, 66 L.Ed.2d at 440 n.11, quoting Johnson, 421 U.S. at 461, 95 S.Ct. at 171, 44 L.Ed .2d at 302 (internal citations omitted). Furtherm ore, if the parties are able to reconcile their differences, the employee may nonetheless feel he or she was discrim inated a gainst a nd file a civil suit. The New Jersey cases also are not persuasive. In Alderiso v. Medical Center of Ocean County, Inc., 770 A.2d 275 (N.J. 2001), a one year statute of limitations was at issue and the employee was given oral notice of termination. Maryland s statute is two years and Haas was given u nequiv ocal no tice in w riting. Holmin v. TRW, Inc., 748 A.2d 1141 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2000), considered a claim for fraudulent inducement to retire, a claim subject to a six year statute o f limitatio ns. Many of our sister courts, which also have espoused the date of notification approach, have done so on the grounds that it promotes and protects many important public policies. 8 The Utah C ourt of A ppeals in Clarke v. Living Scriptures, Inc., 114 P.3d 602 (Utah Ct. App. 2005), stated that a contrary approach would discourage employers from providing post-termination benefits. See, e.g., Nation v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1981) ( [A] rule focusing on the date of termination of econom ic benefits might dissuade an employer from extending benefits to a discharged employee after the employee has ceased working. ); Bonham v. Dresser Indus., 569 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1977) ( [W]e would . . . view with disfavor a rule that penalizes a company for giving an employee periodic severance pay or other extended benefits after the relationship has terminated rather than severing all ties when the employee is let go. ). Id. at 606. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin in Hilmes v. Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 433 N.W.2d 251 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988), emphasized that [k]eying an occurrence of discrimination to a time prior to termination can afford the employee an opportun ity to prevent rather than rectify wage loss and other harmful effects of the discriminatory practice. Id. at 254. The Supreme Court of Minnesota determined in Turner v. IDS Financial Services, Inc., 471 N.W.2d 105 (Minn. 1991), that the date of notification was the correct m easure bec ause at that tim e the plaintiff immed iately attains a lame duck status and, prior to actual discharge, may well incur em ployment ag ency fees an d sustain damages for mental anguish and suffering . Id. at 108. The last-day-of-employment approach, embraced by the majority for reasons not implicated in the present case, discourages employers from extending employment and other benefits beyond the date of notification, which provides employees a much needed grace 9 period to locate alternative employment; conversely, the date-of-notification approach motivates both the em ployer and em ployee to beg in conciliation as soon as possible, po ssibly avoiding wage loss and other harmful effects of the alleged discriminatory decision. The date-of-notification approach also recognizes and compensates for the fact that employees begin to accrue damages, both emotional and financial, from the time that the employer comm unicate s wha t could b e a discr iminato ry decisio n. B. More importantly, how ever, I believe that the majo rity is wrong in rejecting the Supreme Court s Ricks/Chardon Rule because it fits tongue and groove with this Court s long adherence to the disco very rule, which provides that the statute of limitations beg ins to run when the plain tiff disc overs, or through the exercise of due diligence, should have discovered, the injur y, damag es or po tential cla im. See Feldman v. Granger, 255 Md. at 288, 291-97, 257 A .2d 421 , 422-2 6 (196 9). See also D ual Inc. v. Lo ckheed M artin Corp., 383 Md. 151, 167-68, 857 A.2d 1095, 1104 (2004); Bank of N .Y. v. Sheff, 382 Md. 235, 244, 854 A.2d 1269, 1275 (20 04); Frederick Rd Ltd P ship v. Brown & Sturn, 360 Md. 76, 95-96, 756 A.2d 963, 973 (2000); Lumsden v. Design Tech Builders, Inc., 358 Md. 435, 442-43, 749 A.2d 796, 800 (2000); Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 314 Md. 433, 452, 550 A.2d 1155, 1165 (1988); Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 M d. 137, 145 , 215 A.2d 825, 830 (1966); Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179, 187, 100 A. 83, 86 (1917). We adopted the discovery rule because it provides a dequate tim e for diligen t plaintiffs to initiate an action while also ensuring 10 fairness to defend ants by encou raging the p rompt filing of claims, su ppressing s tale or fraudu lent claim s, and av oiding inconv enienc e whic h may ste m from delay. Frederick Rd Ltd. P ship , 360 M d. at 94-95, 7 56 A.2d at 973; Lumsden, 358 Md. at 441-42, 749 A.2d at 799-800; Pennwalt Corp., 314 Md. at 441, 550 A.2d at 1159; Pierce v. Johns-M anville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 665 , 464 A.2d 1020, 10 26 (1983 ); Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 75, 394 A.2d 299, 302 (1978); Feldman, 255 Md. at 297, 257 A.2d at 426 ( [T]he discov ery rule . . . gives to the individual exercising reasonab le diligence th e full benefit of the statutory period in which to file suit, while at the same time protecting the defen dant fro m stale claims, as was intende d by the sta tute. ). The discovery rule h as been ap plied to determine the time of accrual of a plethora of various civil actio ns. See, e.g., Callahan v. Clemens, 184 Md. 520, 41 A.2d 473 (1945) (involving an action f or negligen t construction ); Mattingly v. Hopkins, 254 Md. 88, 253 A.2d 904 (1969) (applying rule to action against civil enginee ring firm); Leonhart v. Atkinson, 265 Md. 219, 289 A.2d 1 (1 972) (invo lving acco unting ma lpractice claim ); Watson v. Dorsey, 265 Md. 50 9, 290 A .2d 530 (1 972) (app lying rule to legal m alpractice cla im); JohnsManville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. at 70, 394 A.2d at 299 (applying the rule to an action sounding in negligence and strict liability for latent diseases); Lumsden, Inc., 358 Md. at 435, 749 A.2d at 79 6 (involving action for b reach of im plied statutory w arranty); Bank of N.Y., 382 Md. at 235, 854 A.2d at 1269 (applying rule to action for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty); Dual Inc., 383 Md. at 151, 857 A.2d at 1104 (involving action for tortious 11 interference with contractua l relations). M oreover, in Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 431 A.2d 677 (1981), we concluded that there wa s no valid reas on w hy [th e discovery] rule s sweep sh ould not b e applied to prevent an injustice in other types of cases , and held that the rule was applicable generally in all [civil] actions. Id. at 636, 431 A.2d at 680. In Arroy o v. Board of E ducation o f Howa rd Coun ty, 381 Md. 646, 851 A.2d 576 (2004), we we re called up on to determine when a school guidance counselor s claim against the Howard County Board of Education for wrongful termination began to run upon notification of his termination, or upon the date of his actual termination. We conclude d that, pursuant to Section 10-222 (h) of the State Government Article, the employee was required to exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial r elief. Id. at 660, 851 A.2d at 584-85. Accordingly, the statute of limitations for the e mployee s claim beg an to run when the administrative agency made its final determination to terminate him. Id. at 667, 851 A.2d at 589. W e explic ated tha t, in mea suring w hen the statute o f limitatio ns beg an to ru n, [t]he dispositive issue . . . is ascertaining when the plaintiff was put on notice that he m ay have bee n injured. It is m anifest to this Court, after viewing Hahn and its progeny, that the statute of limitations on petitioner s civil claim of wrongful termination began to run wh en he kne w or reaso nably should have known of the claime d wro ng don e to him , i.e., his dismissal as an emplo yee of the HCP SS. Id. at 669, 8 51 A.2 d at 590 . Thus, [i]t was the act of the State Board, in its affirmance of the County Board s decision to terminate petitione r from his employmen t, that was the final decisio n of the ad ministrative agency and signified an exhaustion of petitioner s administrative 12 remedies. It was no later than this point that petitioner s injury accr ued. And it was no la ter than this point that he knew, or should have k nown of the injury. Id. at 671, 8 51 A.2 d at 591 (secon d emp hasis ad ded). Although Arroyo involved an action under the State Government Article, the principles set forth in tha t case equa lly apply to the case sub judice. The statute of limitations on Ms. Haas s claim began to run when she knew or reasonably should have known of the claimed wrong done to her, that time being when she was notified by Lockheed Martin that her position was being eliminated. For these reasons I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and hold th at Ms. H aas filed her actio n in an u ntimely fa shion. Judge Raker has authorized me to state that she joins in Part A of this dissenting opinion. 13
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
