Attorney Grievance v. Mba-Jonas

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket (Subtitle AG) No. 53 September Term, 2005 Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Victor Mba-Jonas Bell, C. J. Raker Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by Bell, C. J. Filed: March 20, 2007 Bar counsel, acting on behalf, and with the approval, of the petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Comm ission of M aryland, filed in th is Court, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751,1 a Petition For Disciplinary or Remedial Action charging th e respond ent, Victor Mba-Jonas, with violating Rules 1.15, Safek eepi ng P rope rty, 2 8.1, Bar Adm ission and Disciplinary Matters,3 and 8.4, M isconduc t,4 of the Maryland Rules of professional Conduct, as adopted 1 Maryland Rule 16-751, as relevant, provides: (a) Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action. (1) Upon approva l of the Commission. Upon approval or direction of the Commission, Bar Counsel shall file a Petitio n for D isciplina ry or Rem edial A ction in t he Co urt of A ppeals . 2 Maryland R ule 1.15 pro vides, in pertin ent part: (a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Ch apter 600 o f the Ma ryland Rules. O ther proper ty shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the representation. (b) A lawyer may deposit the lawyer's own funds in a client trust account for the sole purpose of paying bank service charges on that account, but only in an amount necessary for the purpose. (c) Unless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a different arrangement, a lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer o nly as fee s are ear ned or e xpens es incu rred. 3 Pertinently, Rule 8.1 provides: An ap plicant for ad mission or re instatemen t to the bar, or a la wyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary ma tter, shall not: * * * * (b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful d ema nd for inform ation from an ad miss ions or disciplinar y auth ority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise by Maryland Rule 16-812, Maryland Rules 16-604, Trust Ac count - Required Deposits, 5 16607, Commingling of Funds, 6 and 16-609, Prohibited Transactions,7 all pertaining to his protecte d by Rul e 1.6. 4 Rule 8.4, as relevant, provides: It is professio nal miscon duct for a la wyer to: * * * * (b) com mit a crim inal a ct tha t refl ects adverse ly on the la wyer s ho nesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) en gage in condu ct that is p rejudici al to the a dminis tration o f justice . * * * * 5 Maryland Rule 16-604 provides: Except as otherwise permitted by rule or other law, all funds, including cash, received and accepted by an attorney or law firm in this State from a client or third person to be delivered in whole or in part to a client or third person, unless received as payment of fees owed the attorney by the client or in reimbu rsement fo r expense s properly adv anced on behalf of the client, shall be deposited in an attorney trust account in an approved financial institution. This Rule does not apply to an instrument received by an attorney or law firm that is made payable solely to a client or third person and is tra nsmitte d directl y to the clie nt or third person . 6 That Rule provides: a. General Prohibition. An attorney or law firm may deposit in an attorney trust account only those funds required to be deposited in that account by Rule 16-604 or permitted to be so deposited by section b. of this Rule. b. Exceptions. 1. An attorney or law firm shall either (A) deposit into an attorney trust account funds to pay any fees, service charges, -2- attorney trust accoun t, and Maryland Code (2000, 2004 Repl. Vol., 2006 Supp.) §§ 10-304, Deposit of trust m oney,8 10-3 06, M isuse of t rust m oney,9 and 10-307, Disciplinary action,10 or minimu m balanc e required b y the financial in stitution to open or maintain the account, including those fees that cannot be charged against interest due to the Maryland Legal Services Corpora tion Fund pursuan t to Rule 16-610 b 1 (D), or (B) enter into an agre ement w ith the financ ial institution to have any fees or charges deducted from an operating account maintained by the attorney or law firm. The attorney or law firm may deposit into an attorney trust account any funds expected to be adva nced on b ehalf of a client and ex pected to be reimbu rsed to the atto rney by the client. 2. An attorney or law firm may deposit into an attorney trust account funds b elonging in part to a client and in p art presently or potentially to the attorney or law firm. The portion belonging to the attorney or law firm shall be withdrawn promptly when the attorney or law firm becomes entitled to the funds, but any portion disputed by the client shall remain in the account until the dispute is resolved. 3. Funds of a client or beneficial owner may be pooled and commin gled in an a ttorney trust acco unt with the funds he ld for oth er clients or bene ficial ow ners. 7 Rule 16-609 provides: An attorney or law firm may not borrow or pledge any funds required by these Rules to be deposited in an attorney trust account, obtain any remuneration from the financial institution for depositing any funds in the account, or use any funds for any unauthorized purpose. An instrument drawn on an a ttorney tru st accou nt may no t be draw n payabl e to cash or to be arer. 8 Maryland Code (2000, 2004 Repl. Vol., 2006 Supp.) § 10-304 of the B usiness Occupations and professions Article provides: (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a lawyer expeditiou sly shall deposit tru st money into a n attorney trust ac count. -3- of the B usiness Occu pations and Pr ofessio ns Artic le. We referred the case, pursuan t to Rules 16-752 (a), 11 to the Honorable M aureen Lam asne y, of the Circuit C ourt for Prin ce Georg e s Coun ty, for hearing p ursuant to R ule 16757 (c).12 After a he aring, at wh ich the respo ndent w as represen ted by counsel, the court (b) Subs ection (a) of this section do es not app ly if there is a cour t order to the c ontrary. (c) N otwith standin g subse ction (a) of this se ction or any othe r law, a lawyer may disburse, at settlement in a real estate transaction, trust money that the la wyer rec eives in the trans action. 9 Section 10-306 proscribes a lawyer s use [of] trust money for any purpose other than the purpo se for w hich the trust mo ney is entr usted to the law yer. 10 Section 10-307 provides: A lawyer who willfully violates any provision of this Part I of this subtitle, except for the requirement that a lawyer deposit trust moneys in an attorney trust accoun t for charitab le purpose s under §§ 10-303 o f this subtitle, is subjec t to discip linary pro ceedin gs as the Marylan d Rule s provid e. 11 Rule 16-752 (a) provides: (a) Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the record. The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery, filing of motions, and hearing. 12 Maryland Rule 16-757 (c) provides: (c) Findin gs and co nclusions. T he judge s hall prepare and file or d ictate into the record a statement of the judge's findings of fact, including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and con clusions of law. If dictated into the record, the statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless the time is extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record no later than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The clerk shall mail a copy -4- found the follo wing f acts by cle ar and c onvinc ing evid ence. During the investigation of a complaint made by a client of the respondent, Hastings New bury, Bar Counsel determined that the escrow account of the respondent did not include any record of the disbursement of his own fee as part of the settlement in the Newbury case. On March 8, 2004, the respondent entered into a Conditional Diversion Agreement with th e Attor ney Grie vance Com mission . .... Pursuant to the Diversion Agreement, respondent obtained a monitor, who made a written report to the Comm ission in a letter dated June 24, 200 4. The report involved four cases, which the respondent settled and in which funds were dispersed to clients. Additional irregularities were d etected in three c ases: tho se invo lving D avis Eb o, Anth ony Ebo , and Yawa Doghboe. Ultimately, in a letter dated May 20, 2005, the Att orney Grievance Comm ission revok ed the Co nditional D iversion A greemen t. In the case of Davis Ebo, Respondent settled the case for $5,500. Mr Ebo received $2,616.00, a medical provider received $1,000.00, and the respondent s fee was $1,933.33. The disburs emen t left a sh ortfall o f $49.3 3. In the case of Anthony Ebo, the matter was settled for $5,500.00. At the conclusion of the disbursement , $50.00 was left from the settlement that was not disbursed. Neither figure matches the settlement sheets or the monito r s report. Y awa D oghbo e[] rece ived a $ 7,000.0 0 settlem ent and $2,125 .00 is unaccou nted. Ther e is no recor d that it was e ver depo sited in the esc row acco unt. of the statement to each party. -5- After reviewing the four ca ses include d in the mo nitor s report, the investigator obtained the bank records of the respondent s escrow account and further irregularities were found. On three occasions, from June of 2003 until June of 2004, the account was overdrawn. First, on June 9, 2003, a deposit of a $2,286.00 check from State Farm was made. The payee w as State Farm and under the column labeled description was the name Felisha Ikpeama. A $100.00 deposit occurred on that day. On June 13, 2003, a check payable to Hillary Ikpeama as settlement of an accident in the amount of $4,490.00 was deducted from the a ccount. Th is caused the account to have a negative balance of $431.26. A cash deposit of $300.00 was made: the account was still negative in the amount of $131.26. Two overdraft fees in the amount of $30.00 took the account to a negative balance of $191.26 on June 16, 2003. On June 23, 2 003, a dep osit from M [AIF] In surance [o n] behalf o f another c lient, Monico Navaro, was made in the amount of $1,000.00. The account balance was then $808.78. Obviously, the settlement meant only for Monico Navaro was used for other purposes. Secondly, on August 21, 2003, another client, Chile Mwaiwu, received a check from the respondent for $2,466.80 as settlement of his claim. The check was post dated for August 26, 2003; however, the client presented it for payment immedia tely. This created a negative balance of $2,308.61. Fin ally, on June 29, 2004, the respondent wrote a check for Metro Med & Rehab for -6- $2,000.00 on behalf of client G erri Belt and dated it the 30th. The check was presented for payment on the 2 9th and honor ed at tha t time. The account was again in the negative in the amount of $1,234.90. A $2,500.00 deposit of insurance proceeds brought the account to $1, 265.10. Ad ditio nally, the respondent also represented Yawa Doghboe in early 2004 and settled his case. The settlement money was not deposited into his escrow account; howe ver, the responde nt s accoun t reflects $4,875.00 in disbursements. His disbursement sheet reflects $6,595.00. The respondent testified to the careless nature of the management of his escrow account: he did not reco ncile the acc ount mo nthly, he left PIP money in the account to cover fee s and he lef t fees in his es crow acc ount. Ad ditio nally, he maintained inaccurate settlement sheets and kept very few records. When requested, he had to get copies of his escrow account records from the bank to provide to the Commission; he did not keep a ledger and po st dated che ck[s] to acc ommo date clients. From the forego ing finding s of fact, the hearing court concluded that the respondent commit ted most, but not all, of the charged violations. Reiterating that the respondents records do not ref lect the disbu rsement o f his fee, tha t some of th e funds a ssociated w ith the Ebos, Dogh boe, Mw aiwu and B elt representations were no t used for the persons intended and that the responde nt did not ke ep, or preser ve comp lete records o f his -7- representations, it concluded that Rule 1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Rules 16-60 4 and 1 6-607 were v iolated. The hearing court also found that the respondent violated Rule 8.4 (a). It did not find any other Rule 8.4 violation, however. It explained: ... [T]he respondent did not have the intent to deceive. The offenses occurred due to sloppiness, not dishonesty. There was no forg ery, fraud, lack of can dor or a ttempts to conc eal his re cords o r his acts . Nor did the hea ring court co nclude tha t there was a violation of Rule 8.1. W hile it acknowledged that the resp ondent did not respon d as prom ptly as would have bee n ideal, he did respond. Indeed, the hearing court found the responde nt to be quite candid and forthco ming. Accordingly, it concluded that he did not knowingly fail to respond to a lawfu l dema nd for inform ation. No mention was made by the hearing court of Rule 16-609 or any of the charged statutory violations. It made mitigation findings, as follows: First, while the respondent s maintenance of his account was in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and clearly he did not maintain it as required, this fact does not reflect an ulterior motive. Clearly, he had no intent to defraud or steal from his clients. In fact, many of his problems resulted from his desire to accomm odate his clien ts and to keep them satisfied w ith his representation. In the cases of Davis Ebo and Anthony Ebo, he gave them more in settlement tha[n] previously agreed. This created inaccurate settlement sheets that resulted in the filing of the c omplaint b y the bar coun sel. He gave Ch ile Mwaiwu and Hassan Samuser post dated checks to spare them a trip back to his office, the latter resulting in the negative balance of August 21, 2003. -8- Secondly, during this period of time, the respondent was de aling with extremely distracting family problems. His mother was suffering from a life threatening illness, which eventually took her life. His brother-in-law, who was without insurance, required dialysis. While his wife w as available to help, she and the respondent are the pare nts of six (6) ch ildren and h is wife ma intained em ployment as w ell. As a result, the respondent was forced to cut back on his practice. He was coping with stress at work and at home. Lastly and mos t importantly, the re sponden t testified without contradiction that he has taken the appro priate remedial actions to maintain h is escrow account in accordance with the Rules of Profession al Condu ct, and that his accou nt is now in orde r. Only the petitioner has filed exceptions. It does not c hallenge o r take exce ption to the hearing co urt s finding s of fact, on ly its conclusions of law. Thus, the findings of fact made by the hearing court are established. Rule 16-759(b )(2)(A). 13 See Attorney Grievance Com m'n v. Logan, 390 M d. 313, 319 , 888 A.2d 359, 363 (2005); Attorney Grievance Com m'n v. Hodgson, 396 Md. 1, __, 912 A.2d 64 0, 644 (2006). Specifically, the petitioner submits that the hearing court erred in failing to find that the respondent violated Rule 16609 and § 10-306, both relating to the misuse of the respondent s trust account. It argues that the propriety of such find ings is patent when [t]he fact that the Respondent did not keep Monico Nava ro s fun ds intac t, used other client funds to cover post dated checks and the 13 Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(2)(A) provides: (A) If No Exceptions Are Filed. If no exceptions are filed, the Court may treat the findings of fact as established for the purpose of determining appropriate sanctions, if any. -9- Yawa Dogboe [14] disbursements, as well as never accounting for $2,125.00 of the Dogboe settlement is considered. It also disagrees with the conclusion that a Rule 8.1 violation had not been established. In support of this exception , the petitioner relies on the testimony of its investigator, and the inferences it draws from that testimony, with regard to the respondent s failure to produce, at the investigator s request, reco rds addition al to the settlement sheets, banks statements and cancelled checks the respondent did produce. Maintaining that the investigator s testimony in this regard is uncontradicted, it asks this Court to sustain the exception. The petitioner s fin al exception relates to the hearing court s failure to find a violation of Rule 8 .4 (d). Satisfied, a pparently, that the hearing co urt adequa tely explained w hy it did not find a Rule 8.4 (c) violation, in addition to the Rule 8.4 (a) violation, it asserts that the explanation does not suffice insofar as Rule 8.4 (d) is concerned. On the contrary, the petitioner argues, the causes of the misconduct found by the hearing court tend to affect, if not implicate, the integrity of the process of admin istering ju stice. Thus, it asserts, [b]ased on Judge Lam asney s findings, the Respondent should be found to have violated Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 (d). We review de novo the hearing court's conclusions of law , Rule 16-759(b)(1); 15 14 In the hearing court s Findings of Fact And Conclusions of Law, this name is spelled Dog hboe. 15 Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(1) provides: (1) Conclusions of Law. The Court of Appeals shall review de novo the circuit co urt judg e's conc lusions of law . -10- Hodgson, 396 M d. at ___, 91 2 A.2d a t 644; Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Mc Laughlin , 372 Md. 467, 493, 813 A.2d 11 45, 1160 (2002); Atto rney G rievance Com m'n v. Joehl, 335 Md. 83, 88, 642 A.2d 194, 196 (1994) (noting that the ultimate decision as to whether an attorney has engaged in p rofessional miscondu ct rests with this Court). Exceptions to conclusions of law will be overruled when, the fact findings not being clearly erroneous, the conclusions are supported by the facts found. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Manger, 396 Md. 1 34, 146 -147, 9 13 A.2 d 1, 8 (2 006). As we have seen, the hearing court relied on its findings in the two Ebo matters and the settlements involving Doghboe, Mwaiwu and Belt to conclude that funds intended for their use or benefit were not used for the persons intended and, thus, to conclude that the respondent violated Rule o f Prof essiona l Cond uct 1.15 and R ules 16 -604 an d 16-6 07. Rule 16-609 prohibits the use of funds deposited in an attorney s trust account for any unauthorized purpo se. Sim ilarly, § 10-306 of the Business Professions and Occupations Article proscribes the use of trust money for any purpose other than the purpose for which the trust money is entrusted to the lawyer. The misconduct found by the hearing court, the failure to use funds for the benefit of the person intended, is as supportive of a violation of Rule 16-609 and § 10-306 as it is of a violation of the Rules as to which there has been no challenge, if not more so. We sustain the petitioner s exception to this conclusion. -11- With respect to the petitioner s exception to the failure to find a violation of Ru le 8.4 (d), that the respo ndent eng aged in co nduct preju dicial to the ad ministration o f justice, we note that the hearing court was unequivocal that, in addition to certain discrete violations related to his escrow account, including overdrawing his trust account on several occasions, the respondent managed his escrow account careless[ly], failing to reconcile it monthly, maintained inaccurate settlement sheets and kept very few records. In Rheb v. Bar A ss n of Baltimore City, 186 M d. 200, 46 A .2d 289, 29 1 (1946), th is Court considered the interpretation of the phrase, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. We made clear in that case that conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, delegates or confirms to the courts the power and duty to consider particular conduct of one w ho is an office r of the c ourt, in relation to the pr ivileges and duties of a p ublic calling that specially invites complete trust and confidence, id. at 205, 46 A.2d at 291; see Attorney Grievance Comm'n of M aryland v. Post, 350 Md. 85, 100, 710 A.2d 935, 942 (1998), and that it should not be given restricted meaning. Rheb, 186 Md. at 205, 46 A. 2d at 291. Thus, In the last analysis the duty rests upon the courts, and the profession as a whole, to uphold the highest standards of professional conduct and to protect the public from imposition by the unfit or unscrupulous practitioner. Id. The manner in which an attorney has handled his or her escrow account has been held to be co nduct p rejudici al to the a dminis tration o f justice . Post, 350 Md. at 99, 710 A.2d at 942. See Atto rney G rievance Com m'n of Ma ryland v. Pow ell, 369 Md. 462, 469, 800 A.2d -12- 782, 786-87 (2002) (concluding that conduct constituting violations of MRPC 1.15(a) and Maryland Rule 1 6-607 also vio lated R ule 8.4 ( d) of th e Rule s of Pro fession al Con duct). Accordingly, we sustain the petitioner s exception as to Ru le 8.4 (d). We overrule the petitioner s oth er exceptio n. That there is testimony contradicting the respondent and on the basis of which the hearing court could have found a rule violation, but did not, is not a basis for sustaining an exception to a conclusion of law. That is the substance and the essence of the petitioner s argument for our concluding that the respondent violated Rule 8.1. We decline the invitation to do so. The petitioner reco mmend s as sanction an indefin ite suspensio n. Reiterating the violations the hearing court found that the respondent committed, it distinguishes this case from those in which a more lenient sanction was imposed, Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Obi, 393 Md. 643, 904 A. 2d 422 (2005) (30 day suspensio n); Attorney Grievance C omm n v. Rose, 383 Md. 385, 859 A. 2d 659 (2004) (indefinite su spension w ith the right to rea pply in 6 month s); Attorney G rievance C omm n v. McC lain, 373 Md. 196, 817 A. 2d 218 (2003) (30 day suspens ion); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. DiCicco, 369 M d. 662, 882 A. 2d 1014 (2002) (indefinite suspension with the right to reapply after 90 days), on the basis that, unlike in those cases , Respon dent was given an o pportunity to cure his escrow account and failed to make any corrective changes to the account. The opportunity to which the petitioner refers, and mentions expressly, is the fact that the respondent entered into a Conditional Diversion Agreement where he was to properly maintain his escrow account by keeping -13- record s and to stop co mmin gling m onies in that acc ount. The respon dent, as indicate d, has ta ken no excep tions. H e has, however, made a recommendation as to sanction: that the Court impose a reprimand. He relies on Obi, which he distinguishes on the basis that, there, the respondent was also convicted of a Rule 8.1 (b) violation, by knowingly failing to respond to Bar Counsel s lawful demand for information in a disciplinary matter. Moreover, the respondent emphasizes the he aring court s observation that many of the respon dent s prob lems we re the result of his desire to accom moda te them and k eep the m satisf ied with his repre sentatio n. The purpose and goal of attorney discipline are well settled: to protect the public and not to puni sh the e rring atto rney. Atto rney G rievance Com m'n of Maryland v. Rees, 396 Md. 248, 254, 913 A.2d 68, 72 ( 2006) . See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Parker, 389 Md. 142, 155, 884 A.2d 104, 112 (200 5); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Culver, 381 Md. 241, 28384, 849 A.2d 423, 448-49 (2004). In Rees, we summarized: That purpose is achieved, the public is protected, when the sanctions a re comme nsurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the inte nt with which they were com mitted. Attorney G rievance C omm'n v . Stein, 373 Md. 531, 533, 819 A.2d 372, 375 (2003 ). While the circumstances of each case-the nature and effect of the violations-are critical, and ordinarily decisive, factors in determining the severity of the sanction to be imp osed, Parker, 389 Md. at 155, 884 A.2 d at 112, the re are other im portant fac tors we ha ve identifie d, including the lawyer's state of mind which underlies the misconduct, actual or potential injury flowing from the misconduct, the d uty of this Cou rt to preserve the integrity of the profession, the risk to the public in allowing the Respondent to continue in practice, and any mitigating or aggravating factors , Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 396, 794 A.2d 92, 105 (2002), the attorney's remorse for the miscond uct, Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Wyatt, 323 Md. 36, 38, 591 A.2d 467, 468 (1991), the likelihood of repetition -14- of the misc onduc t, Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Freedman, 285 Md. 298, 300, 402 A.2d 75, 76 (1979), an d the attor ney's p rior g rievance histo ry. Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Phoebus, 276 Md. 353, 362, 347 A.2d 556, 561 (1975 ). Id. at 254-55, 913 A.2d at 72. This case does bear a resemblance to Obi, and a striking one. In addition, th e respondent is correct, the respondent in Obi was fou nd to have failed to coopera te with bar counsel. On the other hand, it is unlike Obi in that we have sustained the petitioner s exceptions with regard to charged Professional Conduct Rule 8.4 (d), Rule 16-609 and § 10306. Furthermore, the responde nt, as the petition er points ou t, was affo rded the op portunity of a conditional diversion agreement. That agreement was terminated when the monito r charged with checking and keeping an eye on the respondent s escrow account, signaled a problem and it was learned that the respondent had not changed his accounting practices. These differences with Obi, more than the one emphasized by the respondent, support a sanction different from, and greater than, what w e imposed in that case. M oreover, we are satisfied that it should require the respondent to demonstrate lessons learn ed an d, cri tically, that the sloppiness which has characterized his handling of his escrow account will no longer obtain. The appropriate sanction, therefore, is, we believe, an indefinite suspension with the right to re apply fo r readm ission af ter 90 d ays. -15- IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY G R I E V A N CE COMMISSION AGAINST VICTOR MBAJONAS. -16-

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