Hill v. Knapp

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In the Circu it Court for B altimore C ity Case No. 24-C-05-005808 OT IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 45 September Term, 2006 CHRISTOPHER HILL v. DANIEL KNAPP Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinio n by Rak er, J. Filed: January 16, 2007 Christopher Hill, appellan t, was injured when a load of plywood dropped on him from a forklift while he was working on a pier in Baltimore. Hill filed a state common law negligence action against the forklift operator, appellee Daniel Knapp. The primary issue we must decide is whether the federal Longshore and Harbor W orkers Compensation Act ( LHW CA ), 33 U.S.C. § § 901-95 0, preem pts a state tort c laim for d ama ges b y a longshoreman against a co-employee in the twilight zone. We shall hold that the federal act pree mpts su ch a cla im. I. On Augus t 14, 2004, C hristopher H ill, a dockw orker, wa s on Pier C , Clinton Stre et, in Baltimore City, assisting the Rukert Terminals Corporation with the discharge of bundles of plywood f rom the ve ssel M/V TOFT ON. W hile performing this work, Hill was struck by a load of plywood dropped on him by a forklift operated by Knapp. Hill was a borrowed servant of Rukert, 1 Knapp was an emp loyee of Rukert, and the two were co-employees.2 1 The President of the Ruk ert Termin als Corpo ration, John L . Coulter, stated in his affidavit that Hill was an emplo yee of a te mpora ry labor su pplier, A erotek C omm ercial, a division of Aerotek, Inc. / Onsite Commercial, a division of Onsite Companies, Inc. ( Aerote k ). Coulter also reported that Aerotek supplied temporary labor to Rukert pursuant to a Services A greemen t. 2 Knapp argued initially that Hill was under the direct supervision of Knapp, but later submitted that, Knapp is not arguing that he was a supervisor of Hill for the purposes of the Maryland case law making certain supervisors immune from tort liability to workers whom they supervise. For our review of this case, it is uncontested that Hill and Knapp were coemplo yees. Hill filed a claim for compensation and medical expenses under the Maryland Workers Compensation Act, Md. Code (1999, 2006 Cum. Supp.), § 9-101 et seq. of the Labor & Employment Article,3 for accide ntal injury suffe red in the course o f employm ent. The Workers Compensation Commission notified Hill in O ctober 2 004 of his aw ard. Hill received compen sation begin ning on F ebruary 18, 20 04 at a rate o f $294 p er week a s well as necessary medical treatment and services as provided by the Labor and Employment Article, § 9-660 through § 9-664 and § 9-689 of the Maryland Annotated Code. The Commission s award listed Onsite C ommerc ial Staffing a s Hill s emp loyer. Hill was e ligible for comp ensation un der the LH WCA , but he did n ot file a claim u nder the A ct.4 Hill filed a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial in the Circuit Court for B altimore City against D aniel Kna pp on Jun e 2, 2005, a lleging that K napp w as negligen t in that he failed to observe dockworkers around him, failed to stop in order to avoid an accident, failed to keep his vehicle under control, and failed to operate his vehicle in a reasonable and prudent manner. Hill sought one million dollars in compensation for the emotional and physical damages he suffered. Knapp filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Hill filed a Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgme nt. The Circuit Court held a hearing and granted Knapp s motion, denied 3 Unless otherwise indicated, all subseque nt Maryland statutory referen ces herein s hall be to the Labor an d Employment A rticle, Md. Code (199 9, 2006 Cum . Supp.). 4 Generally, a claim for compensation under the Longshore and H arbor Workers Compensation Act must be filed within one year after the injury or death. 33 U.S.C. § 913 (a) (2006). -2- Hill s Cross-Motion for Partial Summa ry Judgment, and entered summary judgment in favor of Knapp. The Circuit Court determined that the remedies a state may apply within the twilight zone include tort remedies, but it is still necessary to decide whether a particular provision of state law is preemp ted by federal law. In analyzing w hether the LHW CA s prohibition against co-employee suits preempts state law, the trial judge examined the purpose of the preemption provision. The Circuit Court noted that Congress enacted the immunity provision because it was concerned with the hazardous work in which the parties to this suit were engaged and that de priving a w orker of th e immun ity conferred u pon him would frustrate the purpose of the Act. The Circuit Court held that the LHWCA preempted the state co-employee claim. Hill filed a timely appeal to the Cou rt of Special Appeals. We granted certiorari on our own initiative prior to decision by that court to consider (1) wheth er the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act precludes a state negligence claim against a coemployee in the twilight zo ne, and (2 ) whethe r an emplo yee who is e ligible for be nefits under the LHWCA is a covered employee under the Maryland Workers Compensation Act. Hill v. Knapp, 393 M d. 477, 9 03 A.2 d 416 ( 2006) . II. As originally enacted in 1927, the federal LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., established a compensation scheme for maritime employees injured on navigable waters of -3- the United States if recovery was u navaila ble thro ugh sta te work ers com pensat ion law . See Sun Ship, Inc. v. Penn sylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 717-18, 100 S.Ct. 2432, 2435, 65 L.Ed.2d 458 (1980); see also Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U .S. 114 , 82 S.C t. 1196, 8 L.Ed.2d 368 (1962) (describing history of the L HWC A); Peter v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 903 F.2d 935 (3d Cir. 1990) (providing detailed history of Supreme Court decisions interpreting LHWC A). As a result, longshoremen were provided, theoretically, with workers compensation coverage regardless of the location of their injury. Sun Ship, 447 U.S. at 718, 100 S .Ct. at 24 35. In practice, however, individuals in jured at the b oundary at w hich state remedies gave w ay to federal rem edies we re often fo rced to ma ke a jurisdictio nal guess before filing a claim, and an improper guess resulted in, at best, additional expense and, at worst, foreclosure of the claim by statute of limitation s. Id.; Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U .S. 249 , 254, 63 S.Ct. 22 5, 228, 8 7 L.Ed . 246 (1 942). Since passage of the LHWCA, several Supreme Court cases have interpreted the applicability of state and federal workers compensation in order to address the jurisdictional challenges of particular claims. W e note brief ly the historical development of the key cases to provide co ntext for ou r analysis of the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA and the leading Supreme Court case interpreting the 1972 a mend ments, Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylv ania, 447 U.S. 71 5, 100 S .Ct. 243 2, 65 L .Ed.2d 458 (1 980). In Davis, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a distinct border between federal and state com pensat ion sch emes d id not ex ist. Sun Sh ip, 447 U.S. at 718, 100 S.Ct. at 2435; -4- Davis, 317 U .S. at 256 , 63 S.C t. at 229. Instead, the Court recognized a twilight zone of concurrent jurisdiction where state and federa l covera ge ove rlapped . Davis, 317 U.S. at 256, 63 S.Ct. at 229. Because it was difficult to determine whether state or federal law should apply in the twiligh t zone, a ca se-by-case an alysis was requ ired to determ ine the permissible recovery schem e. Sun Sh ip, 447 U.S. at 718 , 100 S.Ct. a t 2435; Davis, 317 U.S. at 256, 63 S.Ct. at 2 29. In Calbeck, the Supreme Court further extended applicability of the LHWCA to all injuries sustained by employees on navigable waters w hether or no t a particular injury might also have been within the constitutional reach of a state workmen s compensation law. Calbeck, 370 U .S. at 117 , 82 S.C t. at 1198 . Calbeck did not make federal compensation the exclusive remedy, but indicated that either state or federal law could provid e com pensat ion. Sun Ship , 447 U.S. at 719, 100 S.Ct. at 2435-36; Calbeck at 126-32, 82 S.Ct. at 1203-06. The Supreme C ourt also held tha t the accepta nce of pa yments under the state act does not constitute an election of the remedy under state law precluding recovery under the Longshoremen s Act. Calbeck, 370 U.S. at 131, 82 S.Ct. at 1206. In 1972, Congress made signific ant am endm ents to th e LHW CA. See Oct. 27, 1972, Pub.L. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251. The purposes of the 1972 amendments were to extend the coverage of the LHWCA landward beyond the shoreline of navigable waters, to raise the amount of compensation available to longshoremen, to eliminate the longshore w orker s strict liability seaworthin ess remed y against shipo wners, to eliminate the shipowner s claims for indemnif ication from stevedores , and to prom ulgate certain administrativ e reform s. -5- Director, Office of Workers Compensation Programs, U.S. Dept. of La bor v. Perin i North River Associates, 459 U.S. 297, 313, 103 S.Ct. 634, 645, 74 L.Ed.2d 465 (1 983); see S.Rep. No. 92-11 25, at 1- 2 (197 2); H.R ep. No . 92-14 41 (19 72), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4698- 4711. The 1972 amendments extended coverage to protect additional workers, for example, by amending 33 U.S.C. § 903 (a) to include injuries that occurred upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel). 33 U.S.C. § 903 (a) (2006) (emphasis added to show 1972 amendment); Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251. Congress did not amend the sections of the LHWCA, adopted in 1959, that immunize workers from s uits by fello w em ployees. Both sections 933 (a) and 933 (i) preserve the right of longshore and harbor workers to recover damages from third persons other than the employer or a person or persons in his employ. 33 U.S.C . § 933 (a) (2 006) (em phasis added to show 1959 amendment); Aug. 18, 1959, Pub. L. 86-171, 73 Stat. 391. Section 933 (i), adopted in 1959, read s as follow s: The right to compensation or benefits under this chapter sh all be the exclusiv e remedy to an employee when he is injured, or to his eligible survivors or legal representatives if he is killed, by the negligence or wrong of any other person or persons in the same employ: Provided, That this provision shall not affect the liability of a person other than an officer or employee of the emplo yer. -6- S. Rep. No. 428, at 4-5 (1959); Aug. 18 , 1959, Pu b. L. 86-17 1, 73 Stat. 39 1; see also Bynum v. The S.S. Mormacteal, 188 F.Su pp. 763 (E .D.Pa. 196 0) (noting th at the 1959 amendm ents to § 933 insulate not only the employer, but also the f ellow em ployees of the injured party from a ny liability in d amag es to the injured party ). The Supreme Court interpreted Con gress 197 2 amend ments in Sun Ship, Inc., v. Pennsylv ania, 447 U.S. 715, 100 S.Ct. 2432, 65 L.Ed.2d 4 58 (1980 ). The five in dividuals injured in Sun Ship were eligib le for benefits under the 1972 amended LHWCA, but each individual instead filed a claim for ben efits under the Pennsylvania W orkmen s Compensation Act with s tate author ities. Id. at 716, 100 S.Ct. at 2434. The injured workers employer, Sun Ship, Inc., asserted that the federal LHWCA was the employees exclusive remedy because the employees were injured after the effective date of the 1972 amendments, which had expanded jurisdicti on of th e LHW CA la ndwa rd. Id. The Court stated the issue as follows: The single question presented by these consolidated cases is whether a State may apply its workers compen sation sche me to land-based injuries that fall within the coverage of the Longshoremen s and Harbor Workers Compensation Act (LHW CA), a s amen ded in 1 972. 33 U.S.C . §§ 901 -950. Id. Sun Ship focused on Congress intent through the 1972 amendments to provide relief for workers despite jurisd ictional challenges. The Supreme Court reviewed the history of twilight zone jurisd iction and n oted that Davis effectively established a regime of -7- concurrent jurisdiction and Calbeck subseque ntly further overlapped federal and state-law coverage for marine workers. Id. at 718, 1 00 S.C t. at 2435 . Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, emph asized that Davis and Calbeck were still relevant to the interpretation of the 1972 amendments. The Court stated as follows: Absent any contradicting signal from Congress, the principles of Davis v. Department of Labor, supra, and of Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co., supra, direct the conclusion that the 1972 extension of federal jurisdiction supplements, rather than supplants, state com pensat ion law . Given that the pre-1972 Longshorem en s Act ran concurrently with state remedies in the maritime but local zone, it follows that the post-1972 expansion of the Act landward would be concurrent as well . . . . The language of the 1972 amendments cannot be fairly understo od as preemp ting state wo rkers reme dies from the field of the LHWCA, and thereby resurrecting the jurisdictional monstrosity that existed before the clarifying opinions in Davis and Calbeck. Id. at 719- 20, 100 S.Ct. at 2 436. Justice Brennan emphas ized that Co ngress ado pted the 19 72 amen dments w ith knowledge that state programs provided fewer benefits and that Congress wanted to address the disparities between state and federal compensation schemes. The Supreme Court stated: Workers who comme nce their actio ns under s tate law w ill generally be able to make up the difference between state and federal benefit levels b y seeking relief under th e Longshoremen s Act, if the latter applies . . . we find no evidence that Congress was concerned about a disparity between adequate federal benefits and superior state benefits. Id. at 724, 100 S.Ct. at 2438-9. The Court held that a state may apply its workers compensation scheme to land-based injuries that fall within the expanded coverage of the -8- LHWCA and that injured longshoremen could receive an award under the state and federal acts because the two s chemes are com plementary rather than exclus ive. Sun Ship , 447 U.S. at 720, 100 S.Ct. 2436 ; Hess O il, 903 F .2d at 94 8-49. Sun Ship addressed state workers compensation programs generally and did not specifi cally cons ider the c ontext o f a state n egligen ce claim as is at issu e in this c ase. III. Before this Court, appellant Hill argues that the federal LHWCA does not preem pt a negligence claim autho rized by the M aryland Wo rkers Com pensation A ct against a coemployee for an injury that occurred wh ere there is concurrent state and federal jurisdiction, i.e. the twilight zone. Appellee Knapp maintains that appellant s state tort claim against co-employees is barred by § 933 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers Comp ensation A ct, which immunizes workers from suits by co-employees, and preempts state tort law. Appellee also argues that a ppellant is no t a covered worker under § 9-223 (a) of the Maryland Worke rs Comp ensation A ct and thus m ust seek co mpensa tion only through the LHWCA. IV. We review de novo the Circuit C ourt s grant o f summ ary judgmen t. Rockwood v. Uninsured Employers, 385 Md. 99, 106, 867 A.2d 1026, 1030 (2005). In reviewing a grant of summary judgm ent, we independ ently determine first whether a dispute of material fact -9- exists and only where such dispute is absent will we proceed to determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a ma tter of law . Rems burg v . Mon tgome ry, 376 Md. 568, 579 , 831 A.2d 18, 24 (20 03). We re view the re cord in the light mo st favorab le to the non-moving party and construe any reasonable inferences that may be draw n from the facts agains t the mo ving pa rty. Rockw ood, 385 Md. at 106, 867 A.2d at 1030. V. It is well established that the Maryland Workers Compensation Act does not exclude tort actions between co-employees, but it does exclude an action in tort by an employee against his emp loyer. M d. Cod e (2006 ), § 9-901 et seq. of the Lab. & Empl. Article; Suburban Hosp ital v. Kir son, 362 M d. 140, 145 -46, 763 A .2d 185, 20 5 (2000); Hutzell v. Boyer, 252 Md. 227, 232, 249 A. 2d 449, 452 (1969). We must discern whether the federal LHW CA, sec tions 933 (a ) and (i), preem pt a negligence claim authorized by the Maryland Workers Compensation Act against a co-employee for an injury that occurred whe re there is conc urrent st ate and federa l jurisdict ion, i.e. the tw ilight zo ne. Article VI, cl. 2, o f the United States Constitution commands that the laws of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of an y State to the Contrary notwithstanding. U.S. C ONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Under the Supremacy Clau se, C ongress may p reem pt a state law b y express lang uage, by intent to occupy the legislative field, or by implication to the extent that the state law ac tually conflicts -10- with federal law and such a conflict arises when state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. 5 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly , 533 U.S. 525, 541 , 121 S.Ct. 2404, 241 4, 150 L.Ed.2d 5 32 (2001); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 869-74, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 1919-22, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (200 0); Sweeney v. Savings First, 388 Md. 319, 327-28 & n.10, 879 A.2d 1037, 1041-42 & n.10 (2005 ). The LHW CA lack s an expre ss preemp tion clause re garding sta te negligence claims. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (2006). Nor do the 1972 amendments of the LHWCA and their interpretation in Sun Ship demonstrate a Congressional intent to preempt any state legislation affecting events occurring within the twilight zone.6 See id.; Sun Ship , 447 U.S. 715, 100 S.Ct. 2432. Thus, we focus ou r inquiry on w hether the sta te law actua lly conflicts with federal law. 5 The princ iples of con flict preemp tion also app ly when the s tate requirem ent actually conflicts with the federal requirement because compliance with both statutes is impossible. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217-1218, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963) (analyzing constitutionality of California statute that gauges maturity of avocados by standards different than those established by federal regulation). This aspect of conflict preemption is not relevant to the case sub judice because a conf lict of sta ndards is not at is sue. 6 In 198 4, Congress again overhauled the LHWCA. Congress did not modify the provisions granting immunity from co-employee negligence suits and did not amend the LHWCA to overrule Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pen nsylvania , 447 U.S. 715, 100 S.Ct. 2432, 65 L.Ed.2d 458 (1980). 33 U.S.C . § 933 (a), (i) (2006); Peter v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 903 F.2d 935, 950 (3d Cir. 1990). How ever, Congress did add a section providing that any amounts paid to an employee fo r the same injury . . . for which benefits are claimed under this chapter pursuant to any other workers compensation law or [the Jones A ct] . . . shall be credited against any liability imposed by this cha pter. 33 U.S.C . § 933 (e); Hess O il, 903 F.2d at 9 50. -11- Our analysis is guided by the frequently made statement that the purpose of Congress is the ultim ate touc hstone in eve ry preem ption ca se. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S .Ct. 2608, 2 617, 120 L.Ed.2d 4 07 (1992 ); Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S . 96, 103, 84 S.Ct. 219, 223, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963). In the absence of specific preemption language, we look to the structure and purpose of the statute as a whole as revealed not only in the text, but through this Court s reasoned understanding of the way in whic h Con gress in tended the statu te to aff ect long shorem en. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485-86, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 22 50-51, 135 L.E d.2d 700 (1996 ); Sweeney v. Savings First, 388 Md. 319 , 327, 879 A.2d 1 037, 1041 (200 5). VI. The legislative history of the 1959 amendments provides us with insight as to Congress purpose in immu nizing workers from n egligen ce suits b y fellow emplo yees. The House Report states that the House Subcommittee on Safety and Compensation was concerned with suits by injured workers against co-employees which have resulted in large recoveries ultimately paid by the emplo yer. H.R. R EP. 86-229, at 3 (1959). Sen ate Report No. 86-428 describes in even greater detail Congress rationale for immunizing co-employees from negligence suits. The Senate Report states, in pertinent part, as follows: The other major provision of the bill relates to the immunization of fellow employees against damage suits. The rationale of this change in the law is that when an employee goes to work in a hazard ous industry he encounters two risks. -12- First, the risks inherent in the hazardous work and second, the risk that he might negligently hurt someone else and thereby incur a large commo n-law da mage liab ility. While it is true that this provision lim its an emplo yee s rights, it wo uld at the same time expand them by immunizing him against suits where he negligently injures a fellow wo rker. It simply means that rights and liabi lities arising w ithin the emp loyee fam ily will be settled within the framework of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Work ers Co mpen sation A ct. S. R EP. N O. 86-428, at 2 (1959), reprinted in 1959 U .S.C.C.A .N. 2134, 2 135. This legislative history indicates th at Congre ss weighed the trade-offs between allowing or eliminating co-employee negligence suits and determined that injured workers were better served by avoiding protracted litigation and receiving certain, albeit som etimes smaller, payments. See Perron v. Bell Maintenance & Fabricators, Inc., 970 F.2d 1409, 1412 (5th Cir. 1992). Additionally, as mentioned in the House Report, employers benefitted by not being u ltimately re sponsi ble for d amag es awa rded in co-em ployee n egligen ce suits. Nothing in the legislative history of the 1972 amendments indicates that Congress changed its mind regarding the value of immunizing co-workers from negligence suits. 7 7 Our review of the Senate and House Reports as well as the relevant portions of the Congressional Record did not uncover any commentary focused on 33 U.S.C. § 933 or immunization of co-employees from tort claims. S. R EP. N O. 92-1125, at 2 (1972); H.R. R EP. 92-1441 (1972 ), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4708; C ONG. R EC. S30670-30674 (daily ed. Sept. 14 , 1972); C ONG. R EC. S36265-36274 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1972); C ONG. R EC. H36376-36389, H36390-36396 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1972); C ONG. R EC. S37283 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1972). In developing the 1972 amendments, Congress gave the most careful consideration to the recommendations of the N ational Comm ission on state workm en s compensation laws contained in its report issued on July 21, 1972. S. R EP. N O. 92-1125, at 2 (197 2); H.R . Rep. 9 2-144 1 (197 2), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4699. The National Comm ission s repo rt is also silent in regards to immunization of co-employees from (contin ued...) -13- Indeed, the 1972 amendments did not modify § 933 and it is implicit throughout the legislative history that fellow workers were no t to be held liab le in tort. Both th e Senate and House Reports state: It is important to note that adequate workmen s compensation benefits are not only essential to meeting the needs of the injured emplo yee and h is family, b ut, by assuring that the employer bears the cost of unsafe conditions, serve to strengthen the employer s incentive to provide the fullest measure of onthe-job safety. S. R EP. N O. 92-1125, at 2 (1972); H.R. R EP. 92-14 41 (19 72), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4 699 (em phasis a dded). Congress acknowledged that employers were only willing to increase benefits for injured workers if third party claims by longshoremen were reduced.8 Thus, Congress 7 (...continued) negligence suits. N ATIONAL C OMMISSION ON S TATE W ORKMEN S C OMPENSATION L AWS, T HE R EPORT OF THE N ATIONAL C OMMISSION ON S TATE W ORKMEN S C OMPENSATION L AWS, Washington, D.C.: U .S. Gov ernme nt Printin g Off ice, 197 2. Howeve r, one of the Repo rt s conclusions was that there is a continuing rationale for workers compensation programs and that workmen s compensation is preferable to negligence actions because the determin ation of neglige nce tends to be expen sive and the outcome uncertain a nd there is generally an intermingling of emplo yee and e mployer respon sibility in ac cidents . Id. at 11920. 8 Emplo yers had forestalled improv ements in the LH WCA for over twelve years because they were be ing subjecte d to dual payments to injured longshoremen through the doctrine of seaw orthiness. S. R EP. N O. 92-1125, at 9 (1972); H.R. R EP. 92-1441 (1972 ), reprinted in 1972 U .S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4703. The no-fault concept of seaworthiness was developed by the courts to protect seamen from the extreme hazards incident to th eir employment which frequently requires long sea voyages and duties of obedience to o rders not generally required of other workers. S. R EP. N O. 92-1125, at 10 (1972); H.R. R EP. 921441 ( 1972) , reprinted in 1972 U .S.C.C.A .N. 4698, 4 703. As s tated in the S enate Re port: (contin ued...) -14- amended the LHW CA in 1972 to eliminate the no-fault concept of seaworthiness and make vessels liable as third parties only on the basis of negligence. S. R EP. N O. 92-1125 , at 2 (1972); H.R. R EP. 92-14 41 (19 72), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4703. Although Congress preserved the right of injured workers to sue a vessel for negligence, the 1972 amendm ents significantly reduced the number of third-party actions and allowed emplo yers to apply their financial resources to pay improved compensation benefits instead of litigation costs. S. R EP. N O. 92-1125, at 9 (1972); H.R. R EP. 92-14 41 (19 72), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C .C.A.N . 4698, 4702. As a result, Congress place[d] vessels in the same position, insofar as third party liability is con cerned, as la nd-based third parties in non-maritime pursuits . S. R EP. N O. 92-1125, at 10 (1972); H.R. R EP. 92-14 41 (19 72), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4703. The House and Sen ate Repo rts note that the amendm ents 8 (...continued) Since 1946, due to a number of decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, it has been possible for an injured longshore man to av ail himself of the benefits of the Longshoremen s and Harbor Workers Comp ensation A ct and to sue the owner of the ship on which he was w orking fo r damage s as a result of his injury. The Supreme Court has ruled that such ship owner, under the doctrine of seaworthiness, was liable for damages caused by any injury regardless of fault. In addition, shipping companies generally have succeeded in recovering the damages for which they are held liable to injured longshoremen from the stevedore on theories of express or implied w arranty, thereby transferring their liability to the stevedore company, the actual employer of the longshoremen. S. R EP. N O. 92-1125, at 4 (1972). -15- continue to allow suits against vessels or o ther third partie s for neglig ence, but w e read this to allow only those third -party suits that were a lready allo wed u nder § 9 33 (a) a nd (i), i.e. suits in negligen ce against any other person or pe rsons in the s ame em ploy were s till preclud ed. Id. In order to improve the benefits available to employees from their employers, Congress extended coverage of the LHWCA to shoreside areas. S. R EP. N O. 92-1125 (1972 ); H.R. R EP. 92-14 41 (19 72), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698. The LHWCA was extended landward in 1972 specifically to eliminate the disparity in benefits available to longshoremen depending on the fortuitous circumstance of whether the injury occurred on land or over water. S. R EP. N O. 92-1125, at 13 (1972); H.R. R EP. 92-14 41 (19 72), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C .C.A.N. 4698, 47 08. Congress was particularly conc erned w ith a disparity between adequate federal benefits and inferior state benef its. Sun Ship , 447 U.S. at 724, 100 S.Ct. at 2439. It was Congress intent in extending the LHW CA lan dward to permit a uniform compen sation system to apply to employees who would otherwise be covered by this act for part of their activity. S. R EP. N O. 92-1125, at 13 (1972 ); H.R. R EP. 92-1441 (1972 ), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4708. As the Supreme Court stated in Sun Ship , we therefore find no sign in the 1972 am endmen ts to the LHWCA that Congress wished to alter the accepted u nderstand ing that fed eral jurisdiction would coexist w ith state compensation laws i n the tw ilight zo ne. Sun Ship , 447 U .S. at 722 , 100 S .Ct. at 24 37-38 . -16- We conclude that t he main p urposes o f the 1959 and 197 2 amend ments w ere to immunize longsh oreme n from co-em ployee n egligen ce suits, to provide a uniform compensation system for injured maritime wo rkers, regardless of whe ther their injury occurred on land or over water, and to eliminate dual recovery by employees indirectly from their employers through co-worker suits or directly through the seaworthiness remedy. We agree with appellant that the purpose of the 1972 LHWCA amendm ents is to supplem ent, not supplant, state law, thereby enhancing benefits to injured workers, but we are of the opinion that the LH WCA and M aryland law a re in direct conflict as to the maintenance of co-employee suits. We hold that allowing a state negligence claim stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress goals of immunizing longshoremen from co-employee negligence suits and providing longshoremen with a uniform compensation system.9 9 We ackno wledge that Co ngress does not cavalierly preempt state law causes of action and neither doe s this Court. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 2250, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1 996). Neverth eless, whe re state law c onflicts with federal law, preem ption o f state law is appro priate. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541, 121 S.Ct. 2404, 2414, 150 L.Ed.2d 532 (2001); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 86 9-74, 120 S.Ct. 191 3, 1919-22, 146 L .Ed.2d 914 (200 0). -17- Alabama considered this issue and reac hed the same conclusion a s we reac h tod ay. 10 Fillinger v. Foster, 448 So.2d 321 (Ala. 1984). In Fillinger, the longshoreman sued his coemployee for inju ries alleg edly susta ined w hile wo rking o n the job . Id. at 322. As is the case with appellant Hill, the longshoremen applied for state workers compensation benefits but did not apply for benefits under the LHW CA e ven tho ugh he was eli gible fo r them. Id. The Supreme Court of Alabama stated: We can perceive no greater conflict than that which would be presented if we allow ed this emp loyee to sue his co-employee because he was a land-based maritime w orker, and a maritime worker injured on a navigable waterway would be precluded from maintaining such a su it; therefore, w e are persu aded to hold that the exclu sivity provisio ns of 3 3 U.S.C . § 933 (i) app ly and that the state action was barred. Id. at 326. 10 The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that an employee who collected compensation benefits under the LHWCA m ay not file a cause of action against a negligent co-employee. Smalls v. Blackmon, 239 S.E.2d 640 (S.C. 1977). In Smalls, the individual filing the negligence claim had already collected under the LHWCA and the Court held that the co-employee was not subject to suit because of the imm unity granted him in 33 U.S.C. § 933. Id. at 641. Smalls was dec ided prior to Sun Ship , Inc. v. Penn sylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 100 S.Ct. 2432, 65 L.Ed.2d 458 (1980) and on different facts than the case sub judice, but the accident in Smalls occurred in the twilight zone and the court recognized that § 933 provided immu nity to the c o-emp loyee. Id. The Supreme Court of South Carolina noted that the language of § 933 has been interpreted such that it extends to the employer and fellow employee an absolu te civil immunity. Id. (quoting Nations v . Morris, 483 F.2d 577, 589 (5th Cir. 197 3), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1071, 9 4 S.Ct. 5 84, 38 L .Ed.2d 477). Smalls did not address the role of the South Carolina state workers compensation scheme. -18- We agree with the Alaba ma court s reasoning.11 Permitting a negligenc e claim disrupts the uniform ity of benefits Congress intended to provide to longshoremen in the 1972 amendm ents and does not further th e availability of no -fault compensation.12 Hill and Knapp were longshoremen operating within the jurisdiction of the LHWCA, and Knapp is entitled to the immu nity established in § 933, even where Hill did not file a LHWCA claim. Maryland law, which conflicts with this immunity, must therefore yield. 11 The Supreme Court of Louisiana has considered whether common law suits against fellow employees were preempted by the LHWCA and came to a different conclusion. Poche v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 339 So.2d 1212 (La. 1976). We are not persuaded by Poche for the following reasons. First, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided the issue prior to Sun Ship, Inc. v. P ennsylvan ia, 447 U.S. 715, 100 S.Ct. 2432, 65 L.Ed.2d 458 (1980), which acknowledged that federal law would pre empt a conflic ting state clause. Id. at 724 n.6, 100 S.Ct. at 2438 n.6. Second, the Louisiana Supreme Court based its conclusion on the election of remedies doctrine, w hich the United States C ourt of App eals for the F ifth Circuit held to be ina pplicab le in a L HW CA c ase. See Landry v. Carlson Mooring Service, 643 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir. 198 1); Fillinger v. Foster, 448 So.2d 321, 325 (Ala . 1984); Poch e, 339 So.2d at 1221. Third, the Louisiana Legislature amend ed the Louisiana w orkmen s compensation act to provide immunity for fellow employees before the Louisiana Supreme Court issued its decision in Poche. Poch e, 339 So.2d at 1224 (Summers, J., dissenting) (reiterating that the Legislature s amendments make it clear that no suit w ill lie in tort by an employee against a negligent co-employee for injuries or death sustained in the course and scope of their emplo yment ). Finally, following Poche would undermine Congress policy purposes for providing immunity to co-employees and we decline to endorse an element of state law that stands as an obstacle to Congressional intent. The Alabama Supreme Court also declined to follow Poche. Fillinger, 448 So.2d at 325. 12 We reco gnize that it is possible that Marylan d benefits, e ven witho ut the ability to file a negligence claim, may be superior to federal benefits and uniformity w ill not exist. Howeve r, as noted in Sun Ship , Inc. v. Penn sylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 100 S.Ct. 2432, 65 L.Ed.2d 458 (1980), this situation will be exceedingly rare. Id. at 724 n.7, 100 S.Ct. at 2438 n .7. -19- We note also tha t Sun Ship perceived that preemption of ce rtain clauses in a state compensation scheme might be necessary to ensure proper implementation of both the state and federal com pensat ion statu tes. Sun Ship , 447 U.S. at 724 n.6, 100 S.Ct. at 2438 n.6. Specific ally, the Supre me Cou rt acknow ledged tha t it is appropriate to preemp t a state compensation exclusivity clause that declares its award final because it was Congress intent to allow an injured worker who first seeks inferior state benefits to then make a claim under the LHWCA to obtain the difference between state and federal benefits. Id. The Supreme Court stated: Most often, state workmen s compensation laws will not be treated as makin g awa rds there under f inal or co nclusiv e. . . . Adm itted ly, if a particular state compensation law provision does indisputably d eclare its awards final, a conflict with the LHWCA may possible arise where a claimant seeks inferior state benef its in the first in stance. . . . At any rate, although the question is not directly before us, we observe that if federal preclusion ever need be implied to cope with this remote contingency, a less disruptive approach would be to preempt the state compensation exclusivity clause, rather than to preempt the entire state compensation statute. Id. (citation s omitte d.) In the case sub judice, where the state compensation scheme conflicts with federal law, state law is preempted.13 The 197 2 amend ments and Sun Ship allow M aryland to app ly 13 In Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272, 79 S.Ct. 266, 3 L.Ed.2d 292 (1959), the Supreme Court allowed a worker injured in the twilight zone to pursue a negligence action for damages against his employer instead of accepting federal LHWCA benefits. The Oregon statute involved in Hahn provided that if an employer covered by the statute failed to secure workers compensation coverage it would be subject to a negligence (contin ued...) -20- its workers compensation scheme to land-based injuries that fall within the expanded coverage of the LHWCA, but a related negligence claim against a co-employee is not permitte d beca use it co nflicts w ith the ex clusivity p rovision s in 33 U .S.C. § 9 33. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit consid ered whether a different exclusivity provision, 33 U.S.C. § 905 (a), barred a state tort suit by an employee injured in the twilight zone against his employer in Peter v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 903 F.2d 935 (3d C ir. 1990). 14 The court analyzed the preemption issue and noted that the 13 (...continued) action in which it would be denied common law de fenses . Id. at 273, 79 S.Ct. at 267. The employer in Hahn had not obtained coverage under the Oregon Workmen s Compensation Act and thus the employee was allowed to pursue a damages judgment against his employer. Id. at 273- 74, 79 S.Ct. at 267-68. In Hahn, the state negligence liability functioned as an incentive to ensure that employers participated in the state workers compensation scheme, which also ensured a seamless intersection between state and federal compensation coverage. See Peter v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 903 F .2d 935 , 947 (3 d Cir. 19 90). Hahn was decided prior to the 1959 amendments to the LHWCA, which granted immunity to coemployees in 33 U.S.C. § 933, and was decided prior to Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylv ania, 447 U.S. 715, 100 S.Ct. 2432, 65 L.Ed.2d 458 (1980), which acknowledged that preemption of certain clauses in a s tate comp ensation statu te was perm issible to ensure proper application of both sta te and f ederal c ompe nsation schem es. Id. at 724 n.6, 100 S.Ct. at 2438 n.6. The Maryland Workers Compensation Act contains a similar sanctions clause in § 9-509, but Hill s employer participated in the Act and therefore we do not address whether a tort claim against an employer would be preempted if an employer opted out of the Maryland Workers Comp ensation A ct. 14 33 U.S.C. § 905 (a) states as follow s: The liab ility of an emplo yer prescribed in section 904 of th is title shall be exc lusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee . . . except that if an employer fails to secure payment of compensation as required by this chapter, an injured em ployee . . . may elect to c laim compensation under the chapter, or to maintain an action at law or in admiralty for dama ges on accoun t of such injury or death. In such action the defendant may not plead as a defen se that the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow se rvant, or that th e employee a ssumed th e risk of his (contin ued...) -21- LHWCA, as amended in 1972, embraces a quid pro quo where the employer provides nofault comp ensatio n in exc hange for imm unity from tort liability f or dam ages. Id. at 951. The Third Circuit stated: We are unable to distinguish state imposed negligence liability from federally imposed negligence liability, and the appellant has tendered n o suggestio n as to why Congress might have wanted to grant immunity from the latter and not the forme r. The appellant s judgment based on Virgin Islands law is every bit as disruptive of Congress quid pro quo as would be a negligence judgment based on federal maritime law. Id. at 951-52. The cou rt conclude d that the ap plication of V irgin Islands to rt law in situations like this does not further the availability of no-fault compensation for injured maritime workers; it simply obstructs the purposes of LHWCA by depriving maritime employers of their side of LHWCA s quid pro quo. Id. at 953. Accordingly, the court held that § 905 (a) of the LHWC A and the Supremacy Clause bar a state or territorial tort recovery against the employer. 15 Id. at 953. Although the statutory exclusion p rovision inv olved in 14 (...continued) employme nt, or that the injury was due to the contributory negligence of the employee. For purposes of this su bsectio n, a contractor shall be deemed the employer of a subcontractor s employees only if the subcontractor fails to secure the payment of compensation as required by section 904. 3 3 U.S.C . § 905 ( a) (200 6). 15 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit came to the same conclusion in Rosetti v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 821 F.2d 1083 (5th Ci r. 1987 ), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008, 108 S.Ct. 703, 98 L.Ed.2d 654 (1988) ( Under the LHWCA, workers compensation is the exclusive remedy for an injured employee against his employer. ); Peter v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 903 F.2d 935, 95 2 (3d Cir. 1990). -22- the case sub judice differs, the Hess O il analysis supports our conclusion that state tort claims are preempted if they conflict with the LHWCA. We hold that a state law negligence claim against a co-employee, as authorized by the Maryland Workers Compensation Act, stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of the LHWCA. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 541, 121 S.Ct. at 2414; Geier, 529 U.S . at 869-74, 120 S.Ct. at 191 9-22; Hines v. Davido witz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). Allowing a negligence claim is in direct conflict with Congress intent to immunize longshoremen from coemployee negligence suits and to permit a uniform compensation system for injured maritime workers, regardless of whether their injury occurred on land or ov er water. In lig ht of this direct conflict, we hold that the exclusivity provisions of the federal LHWCA are controlling and pre empt n egligen ce claim s unde r the M aryland W orkers Com pensat ion Ac t. VII. We turn to appellee Knap p s assertion that Hill is not a covered employee under § 9-223 (a) of the Maryland Workers Compensation Act. We need not address th is issue because of our holding on the issue of pre emption. P reemption of the state n egligence c laim filed by Hill has rendered appellee Knapp not liable to Hill. Thus, Knapp no longer has any interest in Hill s ability to redeem benefits under the Maryland Workers Compensation Act or the LHWCA . Because Knapp lacks a sufficient interest in whether Hill is a covered -23- emplo yee, we decline to consider his position regarding Hill s status under the Maryland Worke rs Comp ensation A ct. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT. -24-

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