Harford County v. Saks

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Harford County, et al., v. Saks Fifth Avenue Distribution Company, No. 36, September Term, 2005. Opinion by Bell, C.J. PROPERTY TAXES - M ONEY JUDGM ENTS - REFUNDS - INTEREST When taxpayer overpaid its personal property taxes, it was entitled to a refund of those monies, as to whic h both the interest on the refunded taxes and pre-judgment interest on that interest a re also p ayable. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 36 September Term, 2005 Harford County, M aryland, et al. v. Saks Fifth Avenue Distribution Company Bell, C. J. Raker *Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinion by Bell, C. J. Filed: April 17, 2007 *Wilner, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion. This case involves a claim for interest allegedly due to Saks Fifth Avenue Distribution Com pany, the respondent/cross-petitioner ( Saks ), from the petitioners /cross-respo ndents (collectively the petitioners ), Harford County, Maryland ( the County ) and the City of Aberdeen ( the City ).1 The genesis of the dispute is a private lease arrangement in respect to certain perso nal property 2 utilized by Saks in its distribution center. Under the terms of that lease, the lessor of the personal property was required to pay the taxes due in respect to the property, which Saks then was required to reimb urse, as part of its lease payments. During the period o f time releva nt in the case sub judice, the lessor paid the pe rsonal prop erty taxes and Saks reimbursed the lessor as required under the lease. The problem arose when, in the years 1998, 1999, and 2000, Saks inadvertently included the same personal property on which the lessor had already paid taxes, on its own personal property tax retu rns. That pe rsonal prop erty was assessed by the State Department of Assessments and Taxation ( the SDAT ) and, based on that assessm ent, both the C ounty and the City issued S aks additional personal p roperty tax bills. A s indicated, the property assessed was the same pers onal property on which the lessor had already paid personal property taxes. 1 The amount in controversy, the interest due Saks, if any is due, is stated in Saks s brief as being $313,468.54 from the County and $88,942.53 from the City. We assume these sums were calculated as of the date the taxes were refunded and, therefore, the exact amount of total interest now due and the amount of any pre-judgment interest will be a matter for calculation upon remand. 2 The nature of that personal property is not relevan t to the issue be fore the C ourt, although we do note that the original purchase cost of the most significant item-a complex conveyor-was $11,044,576.42. Saks paid the bills, not realizing that it was paying for the second time, the same taxes for which it had already reimbu rsed the lessor. In fact, Saks, by its mistake, was paying the taxes twice, once indirectly as part of its lease obligatio ns, by reimbursing the lessor who had paid the personal prop erty taxes, and once by paying directly to the petitioners, the very taxes for whic h it had reimbursed the lessor. The petitioners clearly were paid twice for the same taxes and do not argue otherwise. Nor do th ey dispute that re funds, w hich they both voluntarily paid, were due Saks. The only issue was whether Saks was due interest on the refunds. When the petitioners did not pay in teres t to Saks v olun tarily, Saks filed in the Circuit Court for Harford C ounty a suit against the petitioners claiming that interest was due. Saks did not prevail in the Circuit Court, prompting its appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. That court, in an unreported opinion, reversed the judgment of the Circ uit Court. Holding that interest was due Saks, it also remanded the case to the Circuit Court for a determination of whether, in addition to regular interest, pre-judgment interest on the refund interest due, was required to be paid by the petitioners. We granted a writ of certiorari upon the petition of the governmental entities and Saks s conditional cross-petition. Harford County v. Saks, 388 Md. 97 , 879 A.2d 42 (2 005). In the petition for certiorari, the petitioners asked: Whether the Court o f Special Appeals erred as a m atter of law when it interpreted and applied the refund provisions of Md. Code Ann., Ta x-Property (2001 Repl. Vol.) so as to create a new right to interest which was not present under t he prev ious co dificatio n. -2- Saks s conditional cross-petition asked this C ourt to cons ider, in the event that we granted the petitioners petition: Whether it is entitled, as a matter of right, to pre-judgment interest on the statutory su ms due from th e Cou nty and th e City. . . . We answer the specific question posed by the petitioners in the nega tive and tha t by Saks in the aff irmative . I. The general requirements applicable at the time of the present case w ere found in various sections of the Tax-Property Article. Section 11-1013 of the Tax-Property Article requires entities, s uch as Saks, to file annual reports to the SDAT. Upon those entities listing in those reports, as they were obliged to do, of their personal property situate in the 3 Maryland Code (1985 , 2001 Repl. Vo l.) § 11-101 of the Ta x-Property Article provides: (a) Annual filing. On or before April 15 of each year, a person shall submit a report on personal property to the Department if: (1) the person is a business trust, domestic corporation, limited liability company, limited liability partnership, or limited partnership; (2) the person is a foreign corporation, foreign limited liability company, foreign limited liability partnership, or foreign limited partnership registered or qualified to do business in the State; or (3) the person owns or during the preceding calendar year owned property that is subject to property tax. (b) Form and contents of report. The report shall: (1) be in the form that the Department requires; (2) be under oath as the Department requires; and (3) contain the information that the Department requires. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory provisions herein are found in this volume. -3- State of Maryland, the SDAT wou ld assess the v alue of th at property. 4 In addition to notifying the taxpayers of the assessments, local jurisdictions were sent certifications of the valuations. Based on those assessments, the local jurisdictions applied their tax rates and issued bills to the respe ctive taxpayers for person al property taxe s. The taxp ayers could appeal the assessments and the tax bills, pursuant to §§ 14-501 through 14-515 of the TaxProperty Article, but while the appeal was pending, the taxpayer, by posting a bond, pursuant to the provisions of § 14-514,5 would obtain a stay of the obliga tion to pay the tax bill. Unless its obligation was stayed, the taxpayer had to pay the tax bill, pending the outcome of the app eal. Gen erall y, appeals with respect to the amount of the SDAT s valuation of a taxpayer s personal property must be taken within 45 days of the date of the SDAT s notice of assessment. Section 14-504 provides: (a) In general. Fo r persona l property asse ssed by the Depa rtment, any taxpayer, a county, a mu nicipal corp oration, or th e Attorney Gen eral may submit a written appeal to the Department as to a value or classification in a notice of a ssessmen t on or before 45 days from the date of the notice. (b) Hearing required. If the requ irements of subsection (a) of this section are met, the D epartmen t shall hold a hearing as provided under § 14-5 10 of th is subtitle . (Em phasis a dded.) 4 Section 8-2 01(2) direc ted the SD AT to as sess busin ess tangible p ersonal pro perty that is su bject to p roperty tax [.] 5 Section 14 -514 prov ides, in relevan t part: An appeal of property tax does not stay or affect the collection or enforcement of the property tax or a classification, unless for personal property a person submits to the agenc y respon sible fo r collectin g the pr operty tax a bond [.] . . . -4- In the case of a taxpayer filing an inaccurate report in respect to personal property, howev er, the taxpayer, pu rsuant to § 1 4-505, has three years in w hich to file an app eal. 6 Section 14505 provides: (a) In general. For p ersona l prope rty assesse d by the D epartm ent, the owner who reported cost or market information for the personal property to the Department but failed to r eport the inf ormation a ccurately may appea l the value or classificatio n of the pe rsonal prop erty set forth in the notice of assessment by submitting a petition for review to the Department if: (1) the owner claim s that the personal property is valued at a h igher value than if the information had been reported accurately; and (2) the appeal is made within 3 years of the date of the notice of assessme nt. (b) Hearing required. If the requirements of subsection (a) of this section are met, the D epartmen t shall hold a hearing as provided under § 14-510 of this subtitle. (Emphasis added ).7 The specific section from which the present controversy arose was § 14-611 of the Tax-Pro perty Article. Sec tion 14-61 1 provide d, in respect to any refunds of taxes properly due a taxp ayer, that: [A]ny money paid by a taxpayer that e xceeds the amount p roperly charge able under the determination shall be refunded at the same rate of interest that the taxes would have borne if the taxes were determined to have been overdue. 6 To clarify one of the issues in the present case, § 14-504 applies when a taxpayer argues that the SDAT has made a mistake in valuing property reported to the SDAT. At the time in question, § 14-505 applied when the taxpayer appeale d a m istak e ma de by the taxpayer in reporting p rope rty to th e SD AT. Rat her than appeal p ursu ant to § 14-505 only, Saks, in an abundance of caution, appealed under both sections. In light of our decision that §14-505 is dispositive of the issue, we do not decide the issue on the basis of § 14-504, although we may discuss that section for the purposes of comparison. 7 Some of these prov isions have since been re-codified in § 11-103 of the Ta x-Property Article. We apply the statute in effect when this case arose. -5- (Emp hasis ad ded.) 8 Saks filed personal property tax returns with the SDAT, listing its personal p roperty for the relevan t years. That pro perty was asse ssed by the SD AT as f ollows: 1998 $12,955,240; 1999 - $15,918,999; 2000 - $14,354,790. Saks was issued tax bills based upon these assessments, and it paid those bills. Subsequently, Saks filed amended personal property reports in compliance with § 15-505.9 The SDAT then issued revised certifications of the assessm ents for the years in question: 1998 - $3,014,730; 1999 - $2,724,240; 2000 $1,796, 900. The re-assessments resulted in a determination that Saks had overpaid the County in the amount of $835,219.72 and overpaid the City in the amount of $453,576.00. The County and the City refunded those sums to S aks. Neithe r the Coun ty nor the City paid interest on the r efund ed am ount, h owev er, notwithstanding the language of § 14-611, the 8 The General Assembly has since enacted new provisions which, in part, supersede the section of the Tax-Article that was applicable to municipa lities when the present case arose. T he new section , which has no application in the present case, § 14-919, provides: Notwithstanding any other prov ision of this title, a m unicipal corporation may pay a claim for a refund of personal property tax without interest within three years after the refund claim is approved if the Department determines that the refund is a result of a failure to file a report when due or other taxpayer error. (Emp hasis ad ded.) 9 Saks submitted the affidavit of Michael W. Griffin, the SDAT s supervisor of assessme nts for tangible personal p roperty a position he has held since 1984 to the trial court in support of its motion fo r summary judgme nt. Mr. Griffin stated that from 1986 through 2002, it wa s the lon gstandin g administrative p olicy of the SDAT to treat amended returns as an appeal or petition for review under § 14-505. According to Mr. Griffin, the SDAT treated Saks s 1998, 1999, and 200 0 returns as a ppeals in acco rdan ce w ith th is po licy. In its memorandum opinion, the trial court relied o n Mr. G riffin s statem ent regardin g this issue. -6- statute in effect at the relevant time. Saks maintains that it is entitled to both the payment of interest on the refunded taxes and pre-jud gment inte rest on that inte rest. II. After denying the motion for summary judgment filed by Saks, the Circuit Court for Harford County dismissed the co mplaint for failure to state a claim. In light of our holding that the trial court erred in applying the law with respect to summary judgment and because we believe that it is unlikel y that the trial court would have dismissed the case sua sponte had it ap plied the correct standa rd, we w ill review the ma tter und er the co rrect stan dard. A party moves for summary judgment on the grounds that there is n o genuine dispute as to any ma terial fac t and tha t the part y is entitled t o judgm ent as a m atter of la w. 10 We review a trial court s de cision on a m otion for su mmary judg ment de novo. Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp ., 396 Md. 469, 478, 914 A.2d 735, 740 ( 2007). In conducting that review, we seek to determine whether any material facts are in dispute and, if they are, we resolve them in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 479, 914 A.2d at 7 41. If there are no material facts in dispute, the aim of the rev iew is to determine w hether the summ ary 10 See Maryland Rule 2-501(a) (2007), which provides: Motion. Any party may make a motion for summary judgment on all or part of an action on the ground that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The motion shall be supported by affidavit if it is (1) filed before the day on which the adverse party s initial pleading or motio n is filed or (2) ba sed on facts no t contain ed in the record . -7- judgment decisio n was correct as a ma tter of law . Hill v. Knapp, 396 M d. 700, 7 11, 914 A.2d 1193, 11 99 (2007 ); Haas, 396 Md. at 479, 9 14 A.2 d at 741 , citing Livesay v. Baltimore, 384 M d. 1, 9, 86 2 A.2d 33, 38 ( 2004) . The parties do not dispute the relevant facts of this case and prese nt two issue s, both pure ly legal. Accordingly, the only issue for us to resolve is whether those two issues were correctly decided, as a matter of law. III. A. We begin ou r disc ussion by reviewing th e statutory language relevant to Saks s entitlement to interest on a refund, as to which its entitlement is not disputed. The petitioners argue that Maryland C ode (1985, Rep l. Vol. 2001) § 14-905 o f the Tax -Property Article is the govern ing statu te and, a s such, they are only required to refund the amount of an overpayment of tax, without interest. Section 14-905, captioned County or municipal corporation property tax refund criteria, in relevant part, provides: (a) In general. Subject to § 14-919 of this subtitle, a person who submits a written refund claim to the appropriate collector for county or municipal corporation property tax erroneou sly or mistaken ly paid to the colle ctor is eligible for a refund of the amount paid that exceeds the amount t hat is properly and legally chargeable to or collectible from the person. (b) Criteria. A person who submits a written refund claim to the person authorized to collect a county or municipal corporation charge or fee for the amount paid in excess of the charge or fee properly and legally chargeable or collectible is eligible for a refund of the excess charge or fee. (c) Limitation. If the assessment on which county or municipal corporation property tax is payable has become final and has not been appealed as provided by Subtitle 5 of this title, a person is eligible for a refun d of coun ty or municipal corporation property tax under subsection (a) of this section only if the person paid a tax bill that is erroneous because of a mathematical error, -8- mechanical error, error in the property description, or other clerical error made by the taxing authority or assessing authority, and not because of an error of valuatio n. . . . Saks, on the o ther han d, argue s that § 1 4-611 is dispo sitive. That section provides: Subject to § 14-919 of this title, on the final determination of an appeal under Subtitle 5 of this title, any money paid by a taxpayer that exceeds the amount properly chargeab le under the determina tion shall be refunded at the same ra te of interest that the taxes would have borne if the taxes were determined to have been o verdue . Critical to its argument is the reference in § 14-611 to an appeal under Subtitle 5. There are two provisions in Subtitle 5 that deal with an appe al and, there fore, are po tentially relevant and applicable to the present case. They are §§14-504 and 14-505. Section 14-504 applies to the situation in w hich a va lue or classific ation in a no tice of assess ment is appealed.11 On the other hand, § 14-505 is applicable to the case sub judice, where the assessed tax amount has been overpaid. It addresses an appeal when the value or classification of assessed property has been reported inaccurately. That section states: (a) In general. For perso nal property ass essed by the D epartmen t, the owner who reported co st or market information for the personal property to the Department but failed to report the information accurately may appeal the value or classificatio n of the pe rsonal prop erty set forth in the notice of assessment by submitting a petition for review to the Department if: (1) the owner claims that the personal property is valued at a higher value than if the information had been reported accurately; and 11 Section 14-504, as relevant, provides: (a) In general. For perso nal property ass essed by the D epartmen t, any taxpayer, a county, a municipal corporation, or the Attorney General may submit a written ap peal to the D epartmen t as to a value or classification in a notice o f assess ment o n or bef ore 45 d ays from the date of the n otice. . . . -9- (2) the appeal is made within 3 years of the date of the notice of assessm ent. . . . The petitioners rely heavily on previous versions of the Maryland Tax Co de to argue that the requirements of § 14-611, in effect at the time of this case, were not met because Saks never filed an appeal within the meaning of §§14-504 and 14-505. In other words, according to the petitioners, the filing of an amended return did not constitute an appeal within the mean ing of §1 4-505, and it did not trigger the interest feature of [] [§ 14- 611]. They also contend that, because Saks did not app eal the SD AT s rev ised assessm ent to Maryland s Tax Co urt, it did not exh aust all adm inistrative remedies and, therefore, was precluded from seeking judicial review. Moreover, the petitioners assert that appeal, as that term is used in § 14-505, could only mean an appeal to the Tax Court and not a reevaluation by the SDAT of its own assessment. The petitioners argue, in addition, after an analysis of prior versions of the Tax Code, that the re-codification of the previous statutes, resulting in the statutes under review, was not intende d to be sub stantive. Thu s, they submit, because under the previous statutes, Saks would n ot have be en entitled to th e interest it claims, it is not en titled to it under th e statutes then in effect. 12 Saks, pred ictab ly, makes the opposite ar gument. It claims, on the contrary, that the 12 Counsel for the petitioners conceded at argument before the trial court that the petitioners had, in fact, b een applying the current sta tute and makin g refun ds, including interest pursu ant to the statute, to other taxpayers for some period of time. Those previous payments had not co me to the attention of the legal department, however, and if they had, he submitted, the legal department would have advised the petitioners against making the payments. -10- amended returns it filed constituted the petitions for review and, thus, were appeals, under §§14-504 and 14-505 of the Tax Co de. Therefore, it maintains, the money was refunded pursuant to § 14-611 and should bear interest, in accordance with its provisions. We agree that Saks filed an appeal within the meaning of § 14-505. The crux of the issue we must resolve is the meaning of a ppeal under § 14-505. We determine its meani ng by applying the p rincipals of statuto ry construction that we have so often stated and reiterated as hardly to need citation. The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain a nd effec tuate the intent of the Legislature. Centre Ins. Co. v. J.T.W., 397 M d. 71, __ , 916 A .2d 235 , 239 (2 007), quoting Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443-44, 903 A .2d 388, 395 (2006). We give effect to the statute as it is written if the statutory language is unambiguous when construed according to its ordinary and everyday meaning. Walzer v. Osborne, 395 M d. 563, 571 , 911 A.2d 427, 431 (2006); Baltimore Development Corp. v. Carmel Realty Asso c. s, 395 Md. 299, 319 , 910 A.2d 406 , 418 (2006); Chow, 393 M d. at 443-44 , 903 A.2d at 395. We do so on the tacit theory that the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant. Walzer, 395 Md. at 572, 911 A .2d at 43 2, quoting Witte v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 525, 801 A.2d 160, 165 (2002). Before looking b eyond the statu tory text to discern the meaning of a statute, there must exist an ambiguity within the statute, i.e., two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute. Carmel Realty, 395 Md. at 319 , 910 A .2d at 41 8, quoting -11- Chow, 393 Md. at 444, 903 A.2d at 39 5. If there is no am bigu ity, we con fine ourse lves to the text of the statute and refrain from adding or deleting word s. Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 662, 911 A.2d 1245, 1250 (2006); Carmel R ealty, 395 Md. at 319, 910 A.2d at 418. The text of a statute must be read in such a way that no aspect of it is rendered superfluous or nug atory. Chow, 393 M d. at 443, 90 3 A.2d a t 395; Collins v. S tate, 383 Md. 684, 691, 861 A.2d 72 7, 732 (20 04). Finally, we will no t read into the statute words that give it an interpretation that limits or extends its application beyond the words the Legislature used. Centre Ins., 397 M d. at __, 916 A.2d at 24 0; Chow, 393 Md. at 444, 903 A.2d at 395; Price v. State, 378 Md. 378 , 387, 835 A.2d 1 221, 1226 (200 3). There was, during the relevant time period,13 no ambiguity in the language of §§ 14504, 14-505, and 14-611. Section 14-611 unambiguously provided that, once a final determination is made of an appeal under Subtitle 5 of Title 14, any money a taxpayer overpaid was to be refunded at the same rate of interest that would have been applied to the taxes had they been overdue. 13 The General Assembly has, subsequently, by Chapter 529 of the Acts of 2002, repealed § 14-505 and modified § 14-611 to eliminate the requirement for payment of interest in the present context. Thus, the General Assembly appears to have addressed the concerns expressed by the petitioners and by Montgomery County, which filed an amicus brief, that interpreting the statute as it is written would create a windfall for Saks and other taxpayers similarly situated, by allowing them to benefit from filing an erroneous return. In essence, noting the interest rate on refunds, 18% for Harford County and 8% in the case of Montgomery County, the petitioners and Montgomery County argue that interpreting the statute as it was written would allow a taxpayer to make a good investment by mistakenly overpaying its taxes. This issue was a matter for the General Assembly. It acted. The General Assembly resolved the matter prospectively. -12- As mentioned above, the issue is wh at constitutes a n appeal u nder Sub title 5 of Title 14. This case concerns the assessment of personal property by the SDAT. Appeals of SDAT assessme nts of personal property may be brought under § 14-504, subsection (a) which permits any taxpayer claiming that the SDAT made a mistake in valuation or classification to file a written appeal to the SDAT addressing that value or classification, but the taxpayer must do so within 45 days of the no tice of assess ment. Th is provision is n ot applicab le to the present case. On the other hand, § 14-505 allows the ow ner of p ersona l prope rty, who reported cost or market information to the SDAT, but failed to d o so accu rately, to appeal the value of the personal property in the notice of assessment. Subsection (a) (1). This may be done by filing a petition for review w ithin three years o f the date of the notic e of assess ment. See § 14-505 (a) (2). Only § 14-505 (a) is applicable in the case sub judice. Although the petitioners do not dispute that Saks submitted amended returns for 1998 through 2000, they appear to dispute two things: the propriety and, thus, correctness of the SDAT s practice of tre ating the filing of amen ded returns as appeals or petitions for review and that Saks s appeals were final. In other words, they maintain that the conclusion of an appeal in the Tax Court is the only way a decision can become final, and th e Tax Cou rt never rendered a decision. We are not persuaded by the petitioners argument that filing an amended return does not constitute an appeal under § 14-505. Section 14-505 required, by way of app eal, that a petition for review be submitted by the owner w ho inaccu rately reported the value of h is -13- taxes to the SDAT. Section 14-501 defines a petition for review as a petition for reclassification or revaluation of property. According to the sworn affidavit of Michael W. Griffin, the SDAT s supervisor of assessments for tangible personal property during the relevant time period, the SDAT treated an amended return as a petition for review because it correct[ed] the value or classification of previously inaccurately reported cost or market inform ation[.] On this record, both common sense and logic dictate b oth this approach and the result reached by the Court of Special Appeals. The petitioners arg ument reg arding the f inality of appea l is misplaced as well. There was nothing in the statutory scheme that required, or even suggested, that when the SDAT reassesses property in a tax payer s favo r, the taxpayer still m ust appeal th at ruling, albeit a favorable one, to the T ax Cou rt.14 Dec ision s made under §§ 1 4-50 4 and 14-505 may be appealed to the Tax Court pu rsuant to § 14-512 (a), but there is no statutory requirement that they must be appealed to the Tax Court. This is especially so when, as here, the SDAT decision is favorable to the taxp ayer. To be sure, our case law generally requires a litigant to exhaust all administrative remedies prior to s eeking judicial r eview . See Furnitureland South, Inc. v. Comptroller, 364 Md. 126, 133, 771 A.2d 1061, 1065 (2001) (and cases cited therein). The present case, however, is distinguishable from those cases. In this case, Saks won its appeal with the 14 Despite its name, the Maryland Tax Co urt is an adm inistrative agen cy and not a judicial body. Shipp v. Bevard , 291 Md. 590 , 592 n.1, 435 A.2d 1114, 1115 n.1 (1 981), citing Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, 276 Md. 36, 38 -47, 343 A.2d 5 21, 522-28 (197 5). -14- SDAT. It, therefore, had no reason to appeal that favora ble decision to the Tax Court. Saks only wanted the decision of the SDAT enforced. It would have been illogical for S aks to appeal a decision in its favor, even had it been permitted to do so.15 Were we to hold otherwise, the Coun ty and the City w ould be in a pos ition where they could lose at the SDAT hearing, as they did, not appeal to the Tax Court, which they did not do, and never com ply with the full extent of the SDAT s decision because th ere wou ld be no w ay for Saks to enforce that decision in the Circu it Court. Such a result would be inconsistent with the use of the word appeal in §§ 14-504, 14-505 and 14-611. The petitioners argument depends quite heavily on the interpretation given previous versions of the T ax Co de. We fail to see how previous enactments of the Tax Code and the cases interpreting them shed any light on the interpretation of the unambiguously worded §§ 15 It is established as a general principle that only a party aggrieved by a court's judgment may take an appeal and that one may not appeal or cross-appeal from a judgment wholly in his favor, Montrose Christian School Corp. v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565, 578 n.3, 770 A.2d 111, 118 n.3 (2001), quoting Offutt v. Montgomery Co. Bd. of Educ., 285 Md. 557, 564 n.4, 404 A.2d 281, 285 n.4 (1979), although that party may, as an appellee and without taking a cross-appeal, argue as a ground for affirmance the matter that was resolved against it at trial. Id. See also Boitnott v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 356 Md. 226, 23334 n.7, 738 A.2d 881, 885 n.7 (1999); Ins. Comm r v. Equitable, 339 Md. 596, 612 n.8, 664 A.2d 862, 870 n.8 (1995); Paolino v. McCormick & Co., 314 Md. 575, 579, 552 A.2d 868, 870 (1989) ( [A]n appeal or cross appeal is impermissible from a judgment wholly in a party's favor ); Auto. Trade Ass'n v. Harold Folk Enter., 301 Md. 642, 648-49, 484 A.2d 612, 615 (1984); Joseph H. Munson Co. v. Sec. of State, 294 Md. 160, 167-68, 448 A.2d 935, 939-40 (1982), aff d, 467 U.S. 947, 104 S. Ct. 2839, 81 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1984). -15- 14-504 and 14-505. Even if the statutory scheme were ambiguous, which it is not, our case law has not interpreted the tax refund statutes as the p etitioners sug gest it does. B oth parties cite Baltimore County v. Xerox Corp., 286 M d. 220, 406 A.2d 91 7 (1979), in support of their argum ents. The petitioners, ignoring the actual rationale of the case, focus on the fact that in proceedin gs prior to the appeal in that case, X erox app ealed the m atter to the Tax C ourt. In that case, there was a disp ute between Xerox and the SDAT over the assessment of personal property for the tax years 1 970 thr ough 1 973. The SDAT deferred assessing the property for the subsequent years, 1974-1976, pending the outcome of the litigation. Earlier in the litigation, after the Tax C ourt had resolved an issu e in favor of Xe rox, the SDA T s petition for certiorari to this Court was granted. After hearing the case, this Court remanded the case fo r furthe r proce edings . State Dep t. of Assessments and Taxation v. Greyhound Computer Corp., 271 Md. 575, 320 A.2d 40 (1974). Thereafter, the parties reached a settlement agreement, under the terms of which the SDAT agreed that Xerox was owed a refund for 1970-1973. The SDAT then issued assessments for the years 1974 through 1976, resulting in taxes being o wed b y Xerox for tho se years. Although Baltimore County refused to pay the refund it owed Xerox, it demanded that Xerox pay the assessments. Xerox gave Baltimore County a ch eck for the differenc e betwee n the taxes d ue and the amount o f the refund it was due. It then filed suit against Baltimore County, arguing that once the settlement agreement was reached, it was due the refund from Baltimore County, without -16- further action o n its part. Xerox, 286 Md. at 223, 406 A.2d at 918. Conversely, Baltimore County argued that the refund was not owed until Xerox had paid all outstanding taxes and that, in any event, in o rder to collec t its refund, X erox had to exhaus t certain administrative remedies. Id. As relevant to the present case, the Circuit Court found that Xerox was entitled to the refund without further action and to interest on the excess payments it had made . Xerox, 286 Md. at 224, 406 A.2d at 919. The issue presented to this Court was, whether, upon a final determination that Xerox had paid money to Baltimore County in excess of the amount properly chargeable for ordinary taxes on tangible personal property, Baltimore County was obliged to refund such excess automatically without further action on the part of Xerox. Id. We held that the statutory scheme then in existence required Baltimore County to refund automatically the excess personal p roperty tax paid b y Xerox , with in terest. Xerox, 286 Md. at 230-31, 406 A.2d at 922. We reasoned: ... § 261 [16] requires that upon final determination of any appeal which re sults in a finding tha t money wa s paid in excess of the amou nt properly cha rgeable because of an improper assessment, the excess shall be refunded. In other words, § 261 provides for refund arising from overpayment due to an assessment duly challenged and found to be wrong. Section 261 does not predicate its duty of refunding the erroneous tax collection upon any mistake, 16 Maryland Code (1957, 1969 Repl. Vol.), Art. 81, § 261 provided: Upon final determina tion of any appeal, any money paid in excess of the amount properly chargeable under such determination, shall be refunded with interest at the rate of six per cent. (6%) per annum from the date of payment to the date of refund. T he source s of refun d shall be [a s] specified in the applicable provisions of §§ 213 to 219, inclusive, of this article. -17- either of law or of fact, and, indeed, any characterization of the overpayment as a mistake o r otherwise is immat erial. The clear legislative intent is that any money paid in excess of the am ount properly chargeable under a correct assessment must be refunded with interest. Id. at 227, 406 A.2d at 920-21 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Thus, in Xerox, we interpreted § 261, the statute then in effect, to require money paid in excess of the amount of taxes ow ed, to be ref unded w ith interest, once it was finally de termined th at an amo unt in excess of that properly assessable had been paid. At the time relevant to the present case, the language of § 14-611 provided that upon the final determination of an appeal, refunds were to be paid with the same rate of interest that the taxes would have borne if they were o verdue . Section 261 simply has no effect on the interpretation of § 14-611. The General Assembly is presumed to have been aware of our decision in Xerox when it enacted the version of § 14-611 in effect when this case was decided. Nor did the subsequent repeal and re-enactment of the statute to provide otherwise with respect to inte rest due, occ urring after th e inception of the present case, have any relevance to the resolution of that issue in this specific case.17 We hold that, becaus e appeals 17 The petitioners cite to other cases from th is Cou rt in supp ort of th eir argu ment. The first, Wasena Housing Corp. v. Levay, 188 Md. 383, 52 A.2d 903 (1947), is cited for the proposition that refunds are a matter of g race with the legislature. We do n ot see how this supports the petitioners argumen ts because it w as the statute in the case sub judice that gave Saks its right to a refund with interest. The petitioners also rely on MPT H Asso c. s v. State Dept. of Assessments and Taxation, 302 M d. 319, 487 A.2d 11 84 (1985 ). That case, to o, is distinguishable. There, we addressed whether an increased assessment made by an appeal board regarding the previous year s taxes automatically applies to the subsequent year. We determined that the increased assessment did not apply automatically and that the taxpayer (continued...) -18- under the version of §14-5 05, then in effect, were f inal once the provisions there in were complied with, as they were here, Saks was owed in terest on its refu nds, in accordan ce with §14-611, from the date of overpayment until the date the refund was paid.18 B. Saks argues on cross-petition that it is entitled to pre-judgment interest as a matter of right not as a m atter of discre tion on the interest awa rded, based upon the refunded 17 (...continued) was entitled to a refund without interest, but we did so on the grounds that the taxpayer did not have notice of the increased assessment, which prevented the taxpayer from availing itself of the normal administrative remedies. Id. at 327-28, 487 A.2d at 1188-89. That case, thus, simply has no relevance to the present case. Lady v. Princ e Georg e s Coun ty, 43 Md. App. 99, 403 A.2d 12 77 (1979 ), which is n ot binding o n this Court and, in any event, is also distinguishable, is heavily relied upon by the petitioners. In that case, the taxpayer timely and fully paid his real property taxes. Due to a computer error, Prince George s County did not properly record the payment and , in fact, recorded the taxes as b eing unpa id. In order to comple te a sale of the real property in question, the taxpayer paid the taxes a second time. Thus, in that case, there was no error in overevaluation as there was in the present case. The error in Lady, unlike the pr esent case, d id not conc ern the ass essment, va luation, or classification of prope rty...It [was] purely and sim ply a case of a vo luntary ov erpayme nt.... Id. at 106, 403 A.2d at 1281. Under the circumstances in Lady, the Court of Specia l Appeals applied Article 81, § 214, wh ich did not permit interest on a refu nd for voluntary overpayment, instead of Art. 81, § 261, which did. The circumstances of the present case involved the overevaluation of property which, under the statutory scheme in effect at the time the value o f Saks s p roperty was o verstated, pe rmitted Sak s to recover the refund with interest. 18 Maryland Code (1985, 2001 Repl. Vol.) § 14-603(a) of the Tax -Property Artic le provides that the rate of interest for a municipal corporation was two-thirds of 1% for each month or fraction of a month . . . Thus, this is the rate of interest the Circuit Court is to apply to the refund the City of Aberdeen paid Saks. Section 14-603(b) allows the governing body of a county which has adopted a charter form of government to set its own rate of interest for overdue taxes. Harford County is such a county. Thus, the Circuit Court is to apply the rate of interest that was in e ffect und er the applica ble section o f the Harf ord Cou nty Code, at the relevan t time (1998 -2000), fro m the date of Saks s overpayme nt until the date the refund w as paid to determine the amou nt of interest th e Coun ty owes Saks on the refund. -19- amounts of taxes. 19 We agree. We discussed pre-judgment interest in Buxton v. Buxton, 363 Md. 634, 770 A.2d 152 (2001). In that case, Judge Wilner, writing for the Cour t, reiterated the three basic rules governing the allowance of pre-judgment interest[,] id. at 656, 770 A.2d at 165, where prejudgment interest is payable as a matter of rig ht, where it is n ot allowed and wh ere its allowance is discretionary. We explained the rules, as follows: Pre-judgment interest is allowable as a matter of right when the obligation to pay and the amount due had become certain, definite, and liquidated by a specific d ate prior to judgment so that the ef fect of the debtor s withholding payment was to deprive the creditor of the use of a fixed amount as of a known date. First Virginia Bank v . Settles, 322 Md. 555, 564, 588 A.2d 803, 807 (1991); State High way Adm in. v. Kim, 353 Md. 313, 326, 726 A.2d 238, 245 (1 999); United Cable v. Burch, 354 Md. 658, 668, 732 A.2d 887, 892 (1999). As we explained in I.W. Berman Prop. v. Porter Bros. [], 276 Md. [1,] 16-17, 344 A.2d [65,] 75 [(1975)], th e right to pre-judgment interest as of course arises under written contracts to pay money on a day certain, such as bills of exchange or promissory notes, in actions on bonds or under contracts providing for the payment of interest, in cases where the money claimed has actually been used by the other party, and in sums payable under leases as rent. Pre-judgment interest has been held a ma tter of right as w ell in conversion cases where the value of the chattel co nverted is rea dily ascerta inable. See Robert C . Herd & Comp any v. Kraw ill Machinery Corp., 256 F.2d 946 (4th Cir.1958 ), aff d, 359 U.S. 297, 79 S. Ct. 766, 3 L. Ed. 2d 820 (1959). On the other hand, in tort cases where the recovery is for bodily harm, emotional distress, or similar intangible elemen ts of dama ge not easily susceptible of precise measurement, the award itself is presumed to be comprehensive, and pre -judgm ent inter est is not allowe d. In Taylor v. Wahby, 271 Md. 101, 113, 314 A.2d 100, 106 (1974), w e held that, in a tort action in which the claim is unliquidated and not reasonably ascertainable until the 19 We shall refer to the interest awarded based upon the re fund amou nts as refund interest and the interest o wed o n the ref und int erest as pre-jud gmen t interest. -20- verdict, interest runs from the time of verdict. Between these poles of allowance as of right and absolute non-allowance is a broad category of contract cases in which the allowance of pre-judgment interest is within the discretio n of the trier of f act. See Crystal v. We st & Callahan, 328 Md. 318, 343, 614 A.2d 560, 573 (199 2); I.W. Berman Prop. v. Porter Bros., supra, 276 Md. 1 , 344 A .2d 65. Buxton, 363 Md. at 656-57, 770 A.2d at 165. Gen erall y, pre-judgm ent interest as a matter of rig ht is the exception rather than the rule . . . . Ver Brycke v. Ver Brycke, 379 M d. 669, 7 02, 843 A.2 d 758, 77 7 (2004); East Park Ltd. P ship v. Larkin, 167 Md. App. 599, 624, 893 A.2d 1219, 1234 (2006). The exception applies in this case, ho weve r. Havin g conc luded, supra, that Saks was due interest on the refund monies, as a matter of rig ht, we hold that Saks als o is due pre-judgment interest on that refund interest. This is evident from the application of the rule regarding prejudgm ent inter est as a m atter of r ight to th e prese nt situatio n. First, Maryland Code (1985, Repl. Vol. 2001) § 14-611 of the Tax-Pro perty Article created an obligation on the part of the petitioners to pay Saks interest on the refund d ue it, i.e., the refu nd inter est. See Buxton, 363 Md. at 656, 770 A.2 d at 165; Ver Brycke, 379 Md. at 702, 843 A.2d at 777. Second, the amount of refund interest became certain, definite, and liquidated20 on the date that the refund w as made to Saks a sp ecific date p rior to judgm ent. See Buxton, 363 M d. at 656, 77 0 A.2d a t 165; Ver Brycke, 379 Md. at 702, 843 A.2d at 777. Third, the petitioners withholding of the refund interest deprived Saks of the use of that 20 The amount of refund interest was calculable, and thus fixed and ascertainable, pursuant to the statutory scheme, as explicated supra. -21- fixed and ascertainable amount of money (the refund interest) from the time that the refund was made until the present. See Buxton, 363 Md. at 656, 770 A.2d at 16 5; Ver Brycke, 379 Md. at 702-03, 843 A.2d at 77 7-78. The County and the City have, furthermore, had the use of any refund interest derived from Saks s refund m onies. Therefore, this is a case w here the money claimed has actually been used by the other party[.] Buxton, 363 Md. at 656, 770 A.2d a t 165. This holding is co nsistent with the purpose of awarding pre-judgment interest. As we stated in Buxton: Pre-judgment interest, we h eld in I.W. Berman Prop. v. Porter Bros., 276 Md. 1, 24, 344 A.2d 65, 79 (1975), is to compensate the aggrieved party for the loss of the use of the principal liquidated sum found due it and the loss of incom e from such fu nds. Buxton, 363 Md. at 652, 770 A.2d at 162. In other words, pre-judgment interest compensates the judgment creditor fo r his or her inability to use the funds that should have been in his or her hands at some earlier time and usually does not depend on what the debtor might have done with the money. Buxton, 363 Md. at 652, 770 A.2d at 162-63 (e mphasis in original); East Park, 167 Md.App. at 625, 893 A.2d at 1234. We hold that the refund interest should have been aw arded to S aks at the tim e it received its refund monies. Pursuant to § 14-611 of the Tax-Property Article, the County and the City had an obligation to pay Saks such refund interest at that time. The amount of refund interest was certain, definite, and liquidated (calculable) as of that specific date prior to judgment. Due to the petitioners failure to pay Saks the refund interest, Saks has been -22- deprived of the use of that money (the refund-interest) from the time of the refund. For these reasons Saks is entitled to pre-judgment interest as a matter of right on the amounts of refund interest. That pre-judgment interest shall be calculated at the legal rate of six percent per annum. Md. Const. Art. III, § 57 ( The Legal Rate of Interest shall be Six per cent. per annum; unless othe rwise prov ided by the G eneral As sembly. ) (em phasis added); Crystal v. West & Callahan, Inc., 328 M d. 318, 342 , 614 A.2d 560, 572 (1992); Maryland Nat l Bank v. Cummins, 322 M d. 570, 599 -600, 588 A.2d 12 05, 1219 (1991). Th e statute (§14-611) dictates the amount of refund inter est only. There is no comparable statute, applicable here, for pre-judg men t inte rest r ates. Accord ingly, the provisions of the Constitution control. We reverse the Court of Special Appeals s holding below that the issue of whether pre-judgment interest is required is a discretionary decision for the fact-finder and remand to the Circu it Court the issue of pre-judgment interest solely for calculation. IV. For the forego ing reason s, we hold that the Co urt of Spe cial Appe als was correct as a matter of law when it concluded that the County and the City owed Saks interest on the money they refunde d to it, in accordance with §§ 14-611 and 14-603, then in effect. Interest was due from the date of overpayment until the date the refund was paid. We hold that Saks also is entitled to pre-judgment interest at the rate of six percent per annum on the refundinterest it was owed by the County and the City under the relevant statutory provisions from -23- the date the refu nd was p aid until judgment consistent with this opinion is rendered by the trial court. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REMAND THE C ASE TO THE C IRCUIT COURT FOR HARFORD COUNTY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS IN THIS COURT, AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS, TO BE PAID BY PETITIONERS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS. -24-

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