Bowen v. City of Annapolis

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Edgar A . Bowen , et al. v. City of A nnapolis No. 34, September Term, 2007 STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: If statutory langua ge is clear and u nambigu ous, this Court looks to the plain language of the statute. Under the plain language of Section 3.36.150A of the Co de of the C ity of Annap olis, retired emp loyees are entitled to receiv e increases in th eir pension b enefits in tandem with any increase in pay scale given to active employees of the same rank and years of service. As a result of the adoption of the Yarger and Hendricks Study, the City gra nted active e mployees inc reases in their s alaries, both on a City-wide basis as well as on an individual basis. Therefore, Petitioners are entitled to the same percentage of increase in their pension benefits as any increase given to active employees of the same rank and years of service as the retired employee. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - REQUIREMENTS: In actions for declaratory relief and judgmen t, where the controversy is appropriate for resolution by declaratory judgment, the Circuit Court must enter a written order declaring the rights of the parties. Ancillary relief may be included within the written order. Failure to enter such a judgm ent will result in remand of the case for the entry of an appropriate declaration; however, the Court, in its discretio n, may fir st review the me rits of the contro versy. In the Circu it Court for A nne Aru ndel Cou nty No. C-04-95442 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 34 September Term, 2007 EDG AR A . BOW EN, JR ., et al. v. CITY O F ANN APOL IS Bell, C.J. Raker Harrell Battaglia Greene Wilner, A lan M. (R etired, Spec ially Assigned) Cathell, D ale R. (Retire d, Specially Assigned), JJ. Opinion by Greene, J. Filed: December 14, 2007 This is principally a case of statutory interpretation involving our construction of Section 3.36.150A1 of the Code of the City of Annapolis ( C ity Code ). 1 Fifty-nine retired police officers and firefighters for the City of Annapolis ( Petitioners ) challenge the C ity's interpretation of Section 3.36.150A1 which would deny them increased pension benefits in tandem with raises given to their active du ty counterparts. Each Petitioner had filed a separate claim with the City's Director of Human Resources requesting a pension increase after the City modified the pay scale for active duty city employees.2 When the Director 1 Section 3.3 6.150A 1 reads in re levant part: Each retired member's pension shall be increased by the same percentage as any increase in the pay scale for members of the same rank and years of service who are on active d uty. If no increase in the pay scale for members of the same rank and years of service who are on active duty is provided in the annual budget, then the m emb er's pension shall be increased, effective July 1st of that year, by such cost of living adjustm ent as the City Council, in its disc retion, shall provide by resolution. If the member had elected to be covered under the normal service retirement benefit formula described in Section 3.36.040(A)(2), the annual adjustment to the member's retirement benefit shall not exceed four percent of the amount of the annuity the member was receiving immedia tely before the d ate the adjus tment is made. (Emphasis add ed). 2 Prior to filing individual claims with the Director of Human Resources, on October 1, 2002, Petitioners filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County requesting a judgment for retroactive and prospective increases in their pensio n benefits in tandem with raises g iven to their active duty counterparts. Their request was made through an action for declaratory and injunctive relief. The City moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that Pe tition ers h ad fa iled t o exhaust the ir administrative r eme dies. Spe cific ally, the City contended that Petitioners were required, under S ection 3.36 .170A, to f ile their (contin ued...) denied their individu al claims on the same b asis, Petitioners and other retired employees collectively appealed to the C ity's Civil Service Board.3 Preliminarily, the Board decided it would not consider sixty-one of the sixty-two claims, finding the retired employees collective appeal improper under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23.4 The Board then denied the only claim pending before it - that of Edgar A. Bowe n, Jr. ( Bowen ) - on its merits. Thereafter, dissatisfied with the decisions of the Director of Human Resources and the Civil Service Board, Bowen and fifty-eight other retired employees filed a complaint for 2 (...continued) pension-related grievances with the City s Director of Human Resources and, if thereafter aggrieved by her decision , appeal that d ecision to the City s Civil Service B oard. The Circuit Court agreed w ith the City and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The Circuit Court determined that the Director of Human Resources and the Civil Service Board, pursuant to Section 3.36.170A as well as the overa ll statutory scheme of the City Code, were authorized to resolv e, in the f irst instan ce, disp utes ov er retired emplo yees pen sion be nefits. 3 While the number of Petitioners before us in this appeal is fifty-nine, there were originally sixty-two retired police officers and fire fighters in the collective appeal to the City s Civil Service Board. Three of the individuals who a ppealed to the Civil Serv ice Board did not join in the action fo r declaratory an d injunctive relief filed in th e Circuit C ourt. 4 Rule 23, e ntitled Class Actions, re ads in releva nt part: (a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all memb ers is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. -2- declaratory and injunctive relief and judgment in the Cir cuit C ourt for A nne Aru ndel County. Specific ally, Petitioners requested that the Circuit Court make the following declaration, pursuant to Maryland Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 3-403 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article: a. That pursuant to the equalization provision of the Code of the City of Annapolis § 3.36.150A1, plaintiffs are entitled to an increase in their pension payments equal to the pe rcentage o f pay scale increase received by active members of the same rank and years of service pursuant to the pay plans ado pted by the C ity of Annap olis effective July 1, 1995 and July 1, 2001 to implement the recomm endations o f the Yarg er Study and the Hend ricks Study; b. That plaintiffs are entitled to an adjustment in their pensions retroactive to July 1, 1995 and July 1, 2001, the dates that pay scales were increased f or active m embers p ursuant to R esolution R-26-95 and R-12-01 implementing the recommendations of the Yarger Study and the H endricks Stu dy. In addition, Pe titioners soug ht a judgment increasing their pensions both prospectively and retroactively pursuant to the equalization provision of the City of Annapolis Code § 3.36.150A1 by a percentage increase equal to the pay scale increase received by active members of the Police and Fire Department pursuant to Resolution R-26-95 and R-12-01 implementing the recommendations of the Yarger Study and the Hendricks Study, [and] for interest on the retroactive payments. The Circuit Court heard the matter and reversed the Board s decision. The City noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. In a reported opinion, the intermediate appellate court held that the so-called equalization provision contained in Section -3- 3.36.150A1 applied only to cost-of-living adjustments made in the active duty employees pay scale. City of Annapolis v. Bowen, 173 Md. 522 , 537, 920 A.2d 5 4, 63 (2007). On June 13, 2 007, we granted P etitioners' reque st for a writ of certio rari, Bowen v. Annap olis, 399 Md. 595, 925 A.2d 634 (2007 ), to review the following three questions: 1. Did the Court of Special A ppeals err as a matter of law by denying [Petitioners]' motion to dismiss the City's appeal, on the grounds that the Circuit Court's review of the stipulated record of th e Civil Service Board s decision was an action in the nature of mandamus? 2. Did the C ourt of Sp ecial Appeals and the Civil Service B oard err as a matter of law by ruling that each [Petitioner] was not entitled to have his pension increase d by the same percentag e as the pay sca le increases granted to active members of the Annapolis Police a nd Fire Departm ents who had the same rank and years of service as each [Petitioner], pursuant to Code § 3.36.150A1? 3. Did the Civil Service Board err as a matte r of law w hen it summarily dismissed 61 o f 62 grievance ap peals of [Petitioners]? We answer questions tw o and three in the affirmative and question one in the negative; therefore, we shall affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Special Appe als. BACKGROUND I. Retirement System Like other cities across Maryland, the City of Annapolis maintains a retirement system for its police officers and fire fighters. The retirement system is codified at Section 3.36 of the City Code. Of pertinent interest to this appeal is Section 3.36.150A, entitled Cost-ofLiving Adjustments, which discusses, in part, the adjustment of retirement pension benefits -4- for retired em ployees. It reads in pertinent pa rt: The retirement pension benefits of any member, and the annuity benefits of any eligible survivor of a deceased member, shall be adjusted according to the following: A. For (1) any member hired prior to August 1, 1972, (2) any member hired on or after August 1, 1972 and prior to August 1, 1979 who does not elect to be covered by Section 3.36.020(A )(11)(c)(ii) (pertaining to normal service retirement after twenty-five years of active service), and (3) the eligible survivors of a deceased member falling into category (1) or (2), the p ension be nefits for service retirement or disability retirement being paid to the member, or the annuity bene fits being paid to eligible survivor(s) of such a deceased member, shall be adjusted according to the following: 1. Each retired member's pension shall be increased by the same percentage as any inc rease in the pay scale for members of the same rank and years of service who are on active d uty. If no increase in the pay scale for members of the same rank and years of service who a re on active duty is provided in the annual budget, then the member's pension shall be increased, effective July 1st of that year, by such cost of living adjustm ent as the C ity Council, in its discretion, shall provide by resolution. If th e memb er had elec ted to be covered under the normal service retirement benefit formula described in Section 3.36.040(A)(2), the annual adjustment to the member's retirement benefit shall not exceed four percent of the amount of the annuity the member was receiving immediately before the date the adjustment is made. (Emp hasis ad ded.) II. Changes in the City's Pay Scale Structure The City also retains a pay scale structure similar to many other governmental jurisdictions. The pay scale is divided into a hierarchy of grades and, w ithin eac h grade , a hierarc hy of step s. -5- In 1993, the C ity hired Yarge r and Ass ociates, Inc. to review salaries and job classifications within the City's civil service structure and provide recommendations on a reclassification that would "make the City's pay level reasonably comparable to the appropriate labor market pay levels." The firm provided the City with a report (the "Yarger Study") that recommended that the City increase its current pay level by ten percent or two grades. In 1995, the City Council adopted the recommendations set forth in the Yarger Stud y. Annap olis, Md., Re solution N o. R-26-9 5 (May 22 , 1995). A s a result of th is adoption, all active employees, including active du ty police officers and fire fighters moved up two pay grades, but back two steps within the pay scale structure. This change left all active employees earning relatively the same salary as they were earn ing prior to the change.5 The adoption of the Yarger Study, according to the City, resulted in employees receiving 5 The Court of Special Appeals, in this case, explained the reasoning for the relative ly static salaries de spite the ado ption of the Yarger S tudy: Before the Yarger Resolution, the salaries within each grade were about 5% higher than those in the preceding grade, and the salary for each step within a grade was about 5% higher than the preceding step. The 1993 Y arger Study recommended that th e City increase its pay levels by 10%, the equivalent of a two grade increase. Although the Yarger Resolution did move all active-duty employees up two grades, it simultaneously moved them down two steps on the pay scale. Thu s, the 10% increase ass ociated w ith the highe r-paid grades was immediately offset, according to the City, by a 10% decrease associated with the lower-paid steps. Bowen, 173 Md. App. at 528, 920 A.2d at 57-58. -6- increased opportunities for additional in-grade increases, through the merit system. Under this plan, an active duty employee could receive an increase in pay equal to approx imately five percent on his or her anniversary date of employment with the City if he/she achieved a satisfactory rating on a review from his or her su perior(s). In ad dition, the City C ouncil granted active City employees a two percent cost-of-living adjustment ("COLA") or increase in their salaries. The City also granted retired employees, including Petitioners, a two percent COL A incre ase in th eir pens ion ben efits. Thereafter, in 2001, the City hired Hendricks and Associates, Inc., to conduc t a subsequent review o f the City's job classifications and pay scale structure. The firm issued a report ("the Hendricks Study") recommending an entirely new classification system. The Hendricks Study proposed compressing the then-current pay scale from forty grades to twenty grades and compressing the number of steps within each grade from eleven to ten. The study also proposed increasing the increment between in-grade steps from 5 p ercent to 5.36 percent. In addition, the Hendricks Study proposed th e reassignm ent of all City positions to grades based upon job evaluations to be completed. The City Council adopted the proposed plan on June 11, 2001, to be effective on July 1, 200 1. Ann apolis, M d., Resolution No. R-12-01 (June 1 1, 2001). As a result of the adoption, "[e]mployees w ere placed in whatever step within a newly assigned grade [that] would bring them closest to, but not less than, 102% of their curre nt salaries." Em ployees we re still eligible to rece ive meritbased salary increases o n the ann iversary date o f their emp loyment with the City. In -7- addition to the significant pay scale structu re change for active d uty City employees, th e City Counc il awarded retired employees a two-percent COLA increase, effective July 1, 2001. Annapolis, M d., Resolution No. R -14-01 (June 11, 20 01). III. Petitioners Seek In creases in Pensio n Benefits Fro m The C ity On October 1, 2002, Petitioners filed a "Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Retroactive and Prospective Increases in Annuity Payments" in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. In the complaint, Petitioners requested that the Circuit Court force the C ity to give Petitioners retroactive and prospective increases in their pension benefits in tandem with those salary increases g iven to their ac tive duty counterparts. Upon a motion to d ismiss filed b y the City, the Circuit Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, finding that Petitioners had not exhausted their administrative remedies under the City Code. T he Circuit Court found that the overall statutory scheme of the City Code and Charter, as well as th e languag e of Section 3.36 .170A, required that Petitioners first seek resolution of their pension disputes with the City s Director of Human Resources and then, if nece ssary, the C ity s Civil S ervice B oard. Intending to follow the administrative procedures set forth in the City Code, on or about Marc h 6, 2003, Bowen submitted a memorandum to the City's Director of Human Resources requesting that his retirement pension benefits be increased. According to Bowen, he was entitled to an increase in pension benefits equal to the same increase in percentage given in 20 01 to an active employee of the same rank and years of service a s he was a t his -8- retirement. Sixty-one other retired employees, also believing that they were entitled to increases in pension benefits, filed individual claims with the Director of Human Resources requesting that their individual pension benefits be increased in tandem w ith the salary increases received by active duty police officers and firefighters. Some requested retroactive increases from the 1995 an d 2001 c hanges in the pay scale stru cture; others re quested o nly an increase from the 2 001 chan ge in the pa y scale. By individu al letters dated J uly 29, 2003, the Dir ector of Hum an Re source s denie d each Petition er's claim . By one letter dated August 27, 2003, Bowen and the other sixty-one retired employees appealed the decision of the Director of Human Resources to the City's Civil Service Board. On October 8, 2003, the Civil Service Board held a hearing. At the beginning of the hearing, the City requested that the Civil S ervice Board "try each one of these individuals, these plaintiffs, separa tely." The City contended that the August 27, 2003, collective appeal "was an improper joinder purs uant to the Federal Rules" fo r two reasons: one, "eac h member s name and address is known to the plaintiff in this action, therefore the class is not too large which [sic] cannot be represen ted;" and, two, "there are specific f act-related claims that are involved," including the diff ering years in service and rank of each retired employee. The Board agreed with the City and determined that it would, at that time, "decide [ ] on a hearing involving Mr. Bowen only." Upon conclusion of the hearing, the Board took the matter under ad visement. On or about January 16, 2004, the Bo ard issued a written opinion denying Mr. -9- Bowe n's appeal. T he opinion stated in relev ant part: [The Board] is persuaded by the consistent and uniform past practice of the City of Annap olis in the administration of the Plan over a span of m any years; by its own empirical ex perience in the intent, structure and implementation of the reclassification studies; by the opinions of experienced experts which have considered and decided the issues under review; and by the argu men t of c ounsel for the Cit y. Thus the Board is not inclined to reject this long-standing interpretation of Section 3.36.150A1 as articulated herein. There is no credib le evidence in the r ecord of a n analytical, legislative, judicial, or administrative nature or of any precedent or pattern of past pra ctice to demonstrate a nexus between the structural reclassification of position s pursuan t to Chapter 3 subsection 3.12.050B of the Civil Service A dministration provisions o f the City Code and the su bsection 3.3 6.150A 1 "Cost-o f-living" pro visions of the POLICE AND FIRE RETIREMENT PLAN. Thus, this Board cannot conclude that an intentional structural reclassification of on-go ing active d uty positions w ithin its salary structure under subsection 3.12.050B generates the unintentional consequences of an add itional wind fall cost-of-living adjustm ent to pension benefits for inactive ex-employees who have been retired from service for many years, under a separate unrelated Chapter of the Annapolis City Code. Thereafter, on February 9, 2004, fifty-nine retired employees filed a "Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and R etroactive an d Prospec tive Increase s in Annu ity Payments" in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. 6 On June 17, 2004, the parties filed a joint stipulation indicating the issues they wis hed the C ircuit Court to review. Cross-motions for summary judgment were then filed. The Circuit Court held a hearing on 6 Three of the individu als who appealed to the Civil Service Board did not join in the action for d eclaratory and in junctive relief filed in the C ircuit Court. -10- the motions on February 23, 2005. On De cember 2 3, 2005, the Circuit Co urt issued its written opinion, reversing the Board's decision and remanding the case back to the Civil Service Board for further p roceeding s. The Circ uit Court held that the Board's interpretation of Section 3.36.150A1 was erroneous. According to the court, the City Code required Petitioners' pensions to be increa sed in tande m with inc reases give n to their active duty counterparts. The Circuit Court stated in its written opinion: The plain meaning of the statute in the case at bar is clear and unambiguous, dictating that retirees are entitled to any in crease in the pay sca le for members of the same rank and years of service who are on active duty. (E mphasis a dded.) Th ere is no oth er way to interpret this sentence but that the retirees are entitled to increases such as those from the Yarger and Hendricks studies. The statute even provides an alternative method for an increase in retirees' pension, b y providing tha t the City Council may pass a resolution to increase the retirees' pension, in th e event no increase in the pay scale of active members was given in a particular year. An increase in pension to which retirees are entitled is not limited by the second sentence of the ordinance, which allows a cost of living increase by resolution, but rather, the cost of living increase by resolution is an alternative method whereby retirees may still receive an annual pension increase, despite there being no increase in the pay scale for active members. Furthermore, the common and everyday meaning of the word any does not imply limitation unless the author or sp eaker exp licitly indicates, any, but or any, except. In this situation, no such indication is made in the Code that any pay scale increase depends on the purpose for which it is given to the active duty members. The Circuit Court also held that the Board's de cision to con sider only Mr. Bowen's claim at the October 8, 2003 hearing was erroneous as a matter of law. The Circuit Court then disposed of the case by a written order stating: -11- In accordance with the foregoing memorandum opinion, and upon consideration of the arguments of the parties and the record from the administrative agency below, it is on this 23rd day of Decem ber, 2005, b y the Circ uit Cou rt for A nne A rundel Coun ty, ORDERED, that the decisio n of the C ivil Service B oard of the City of An napolis be and hereby is R EVE RSE D; and it is furthe r, ORDERED, that the case be and hereby is REMANDED to the Annap olis City [sic] Service Board for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. The City noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. In a reported opinion, the intermediate appellate court reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court, holding that what had been refe rred to as the equalization clause of Section 3.3 6.150A 1 applied o nly to discretionary cost-of-living adjustmen ts granted by the City Coun cil. Bowen, 173 Md.App. at 537, 920 A.2d at 63 . Prior to reach ing the me rits of the app eal, however, the court denied Petitioners' motion to d ismiss, whe rein Petitione rs argued th at the intermediate appella te court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the City Code did not provide a right to appeal the Circuit Court's review of a local administrative decision. Bowen, 173 Md.App. at 530-35 , 920 A.2d at 59-62. T he court h eld that Petitioners' complaint in the Circuit Court "was in substance an action for a writ of mandamus," which is subject to review by the state appella te courts . Bowen, 173 Md.App. at 534, 920 A.2d at 61. We granted P etitioners request for certiorari. DISCUSSION I. The Court of Special Ap peals' Denial of Petitioners' Motion to Dismiss -12- Petitioners first contend that the Court of Special Appeals erred when it failed to grant their motion to dismiss. In the ir motion be fore the inter mediate ap pellate court, Petitioners argued that the C ourt of S peci al Appeals did no t hav e jurisdic tion to he ar the Cit y's appeal because, under Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), §12-302 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, an aggrieved party may not seek appellate review of a circuit cou rt's decision when that decision was made in the exerc ise of the circ uit court's appe llate jurisdiction. Pe titioners conte nded that th e Circuit Court un dertook an appellate review of the Civil Service Board s decision because Section 3.36.150F explicitly provides for judicial review of a Civil S ervice Bo ard decision . Petitioners then asserted that the City is not permitted to seek appellate relief in the Court of Special Appeals because the City Code does not pro vide su ch a righ t to an ag grieved party. In rejecting P etitioners' argument and denying their motion, the Court of Special Appea ls held that the C ity could appe al the Circu it Court's judgment because the Circu it Cou rt's review of the Civil Service Board was by way of a writ of mandamus filed by Petition ers. Bowen, 173 Md.App. at 532-34, 920 A.2d at 60-62. The court first dismissed Petitioners argumen t that Section 3 .16.150F , which pe rmits an appeal to the Circuit Co urt, applies to the instant c ase. Bowen, 173 Md.App. at 532, 920 A.2d at 60. The court held that the plain language of Section 3.16.150 discloses that it only applies to permanent status employees and their right to contest adverse disciplinary actions first before the City s Civil Service Board and then before the [Circuit Court for] Anne Arundel. Id. The -13- intermediate appellate court stated: [N]either [Section] 3.16.150 nor any of its subsections, including [Section] 3.16.150F, have any bearing whatsoever on police or fire retirees or their pension benefit claims. Id. The cou rt then expla ined that the [C]ircuit [C ]ourt has the authority to review the Board s decision pursuant to a compla int for a wr it of ma ndam us, which it found to be the essenc e of Pe titioners comp laint. Id. Petitioners argue, in this Court, that the Court of Special Appeals denial was in error because "an appellate right is entirely statutory in origin, [so that] no appeal may be prosecuted unless the right is conferred by statute." Petitioners further assert that because Section 3.16.150F expressly auth orizes only a circ uit court s rev iew of th e decision of the Civil Service Board, the Court of Special Appeals did not have jurisdiction to review the instant case. The City asserts that the Court of Special Appeals was correct in denying the motion to dismiss bec ause the C ircuit Court w as not exerc ising appella te jurisdiction when it reviewed the Civil Service Board s decision. Rather than a petition for judicial review, the City contends that the complaint filed by Petitioners was substantively a common law writ of mandam us, which is subject to appellate review. The City maintains that the complaint could not have been a petition for judicial review because the City Code does not provide a statutory right to appeal to the Circuit Court for retired employees who have been aggrieved by a decision of the Civil Service Board. The City takes issue with Petitioners view that Section 3.16.150F provides a right to appeal, arguing that the express words of Section -14- 3.16.150A limit the applic ability of the app eal provisio ns of Section 3.16.150, including Subsection F, to "permanent status civil service employees," which Petitioners are not. The City contends that because the appeal provisions of Section 3.16.150 do not apply to retired employees, and because there are no other applicable C ity Code sectio ns pertaining to appeals before the Civil Service Board, "there [could have been] no statutory authorization for an appeal to the circuit court for judicial review of the C ivil Serv ice Bo ard's dec ision." Therefore, the City asserts, [t]he only basis for circuit court jurisdiction was the 'inherent power to review and correct action s by an adm inistrativ e age ncy w hich are a rbitrary, illegal, capricious, or unreasonable, which is undertaken by the circuit court through a writ of mand amus f iled by the aggriev ed party. We hold that the Court of Specials Appeals did not err in denying Petitioners motion to dismiss. W hile we rea ch the sam e end resu lt, we disagre e with the C ourt of Specia l Appeals labeling of Petitioners complaint as a common law w rit of mandamus. Petitioners complaint clearly and explicitly requests both declaratory and injunctive relief from the Circuit Court. We explain. Section 3.16.150 of the City Code states: A. A perm anent status c ivil service em ployee may app eal to the Civ il Service Board a disciplinary action consisting of a suspension without pay of any length , demotion or dismissal. Intolerable working conditions, administrativ e leave w ithout pay purs uant to Section 3.16.120(E) and other c omplaints e numerate d in the civil service rules may also be app ealed to the C ivil Service Board by permanent status employees. -15- B. An agg rieved em ployee shall file an appeal with the Civil Service Board not later than five working days after the date of notice of the disciplinary action und er Section 3 .16.120(D ). If the emp loyee files a timely request for an informal hearing unde r Section 3.16.120(F), the appeal with the Civil Service Board shall be filed not later than five working days after the date of the appointing autho rity's reply under that section. T he emplo yee's right to an appeal to the Civil Service Board sh all be waive d if not timely filed. If the employee files a timely request for a Civil Service Board hearing pursuant to this section, the imposition of discipline shall be suspended pending the decision of the board. Leave pursuant to Section 3.16.120(E) shall not be suspended pending the decision of the board. C. The Civil Service B oard shall schedule a hearing within a reasonable time not exceeding forty-five days following the date the appeal was filed. The hearing shall be open to the general public. The employee may be represented by counsel, present witnesses in the emp loyee 's behalf and examine and cross-examine all witnesses. During the course o f any investiga tion or hearin g the Civil S ervice Board may request any em ploye e of t he C ity to g ive te stimony. Notwithstanding any provision of the Charter or this code authorizing the City Attorney to serve as legal counsel to the Civil Service Board, in contested cases before the board, the City Attorney shall represent the interest of the City and the appointing authority and shall not render legal advice to the board. D. The Civ il Service B oard shall issu e a written d ecision within forty-five days after the conclusion of the h earing. If the Civil Service Board finds that the action of the ap pointing authority was in error, contrary to the personnel provisions of this code, or that the appointing authority failed to follow the proper p rocedure, th e Civil Service Board may reverse or modify the action and, if appropriate, may order reinstatement of the employee with or without loss of pay. Decisions of the Civil Service Board on all appeals shall be in writing, shall contain the reasons for the dec ision, and are final. E. A failure by the appointing authority or the Civil S ervice Bo ard to timely conduct a hearing or to timely issue a determination following a hearing shall not constitute a basis to reverse or modify any disciplinary action taken pursuant to this chap ter. -16- F. A party aggrieved by a decision of the Civil Service Board made pursuant to this section may appeal that decision to the circuit court for Anne Arundel County pu rsuant to M aryland Rule Title 7, Chapter 200 or its successor. For purposes of this subsection, an employee shall be considered "aggrieved by a decision of the Civil Service Board" if and only if the decision is to suspend the emplo yee for thirty or more consecutive days, to demote or to dismiss the employee. An appeal under this se ction must b e taken w ithin thirty days of the d ate of the decision appealed and shall be the exclusive remedy of the aggrieved party from that decision. It is clear from the plain language of the City Code that the provisions of Section 3.16.150 do not apply to the instant case.7 The plain language of Section 3.16.150A limits the applicability of these appeal provisions, including the right to seek judicial review of the Civil Service Board s decision in the Circuit Court for A nne Aru ndel Cou nty, solely to "perman ent status civil service employees. A prior section of the Code, Section 3.04.010, defines employee, as the person employed to perform the w ork of a p osition. Th is section also defines permanent status as the status given to a civil service employee who 7 Despite Petitioners position before the appellate courts, Petition ers clearly understood the nature of the Circuit Court s review when they filed their com plaint. On June 17, 2004, the parties filed a joint stipulation w ith the Circu it Court agre eing that the C ircuit Court s review of the case would be by non-statutory administrative review. The stipulation reads in relev ant part: Annap olis City Code Section 3.36 .170A does n ot expressly provide for judicial review of decisions by the Civil Service Board. In the absence of any statutory provision for an appeal of an agency decision, a review by the courts may be sought through a writ of mandamus, injunction, or otherwise, including a declaratory judgment action. Criminal Injuries Compensation Bo ard v. Go uld, 273 Md. 486, 502-503, 33 1 A.2d 55, 66 (1 975). -17- has successfully completed the probation period. There is no dispute that P etitioners are non-active, retired persons. As such, they are no long er employed by the City to perform the work of any position; therefore, Petitioners cann ot be considered pe rmanent status employees and Section 3.16.150F cann ot apply to Petitioners' claims. In addition, Chapter 3.36, entitled " Police a nd Fire Retirem ent," provides no authorization for retired members to seek a direct review of the Civil Servic e Board's d ecision in the Court o f Special A ppeals or even the Circuit Co urt. In the absence o f a statutory auth orization fo r judicial review of this adm inistrative proceeding, the Circuit Court could have only acted on Petitioners' complaint to review the Civil Service Board's actions by way of a common law or equity writ (e.g., mandamus, injunction, certiorari, or decla ratory jud gmen t). Harvey v. Marsh all, 389 Md. 243, 296, 884 A.2d 1171, 12 03 (2005 ); Criminal Injuries Compensation Bd. v. Gould , 273 Md. 486, 50001, 331 A.2d 55, 65 (1975). In the case sub judice, the Court of Special Appeals held that the compla int was in essence an action for a writ of mandamus, explaining that the complaint specifically requested that the court direct [the City] to pay [Petitioners ] all prospective and retroactive increases in their pension payments that they believed were due to them pursuant to [Section] 3.36.150A1. Bowen, 173 Md. App. at 534-35, 920 A.2d at 61. Assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner s complaint was in the nature of a writ of mandamus, the complaint, nonetheless, specifically sought other relief. Indeed, the compla int is titled Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Retroactive and -18- Prospective Increases in Annuity Payments and clearly and explicitly requests both declaratory and inju nctive re lief from the Circ uit Cou rt. The difference in the labeling of the subject matter of the complaint, whether as a writ of mandamus or a declaratory judgment or a request for injunctive relief, results in no change to the outcome of Court of Special Appeals decision. The Court of Special Appeals was correct in holding tha t it had the jurisdiction to review the Circuit Court judgment as, under our jurisprudence, actions for declaratory and injunctive relief filed in the C ircuit Court a re reviewa ble on app eal. See, e.g ., Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 932 A.2d 571 (200 7); Baltimore Imp. Car Serv. & Storage, Inc. v. Maryla nd Port A uth., 258 Md. 335, 265 A.2d 866 (1970). Therefore, the Court of Special Appea ls' denial of Petitioners' motion to dismiss wa s proper. II. The Circuit Court s Failure To Enter A Declaratory Judgment Before reaching th e substantiv e issues of th is case, we must first address an important procedural matter. This case came before this Court, in part, as an appeal of a declaratory action. In issuing its written opinion on o r about Decem ber 23, 2005, the C ircuit Court disposed of the case by stating: In accordance with the foregoing memorandum opinion, and upon consideration of the argum ents of the parties and the record from the administrative agency below, it is on this 23rd day of Decem ber, 2005, b y the Circ uit Cou rt for A nne A rundel Coun ty, ORDERED, that the decisio n of the C ivil Service B oard of the City of An napolis be and hereby is R EVE RSE D; and it is furthe r, ORDERED, that the case be and hereby is REMANDE D to the -19- Annap olis City [sic] Service Board for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. We hold the Circuit Court failed to enter a written declaration of the rights of the parties, as required by Maryland law. This Court, on numerous occasions, has reiterated that w hether a declaratory judgment action is decided for or against the plaintiff, there should be a declaration in the judgment or decree defining the rights of the parties under the issues made. Case v. Comptroller, 219 Md. 282, 288, 149 A.2 d. 6, 9 (1959 ); accord Bushey v. Northern Assurance Company of America, 362 Md. 626, 651, 766 A.2d 598, 611 (2001); Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 87, 660 A.2d 447, 455 (1995); Christ v. Maryland Dep t of Natural Resources, 335 Md. 427, 436, 644 A.2d 34, 38 (1994). To do otherw ise, we h ave he ld is erro r. See Ashton, 339 Md. at 87, 660 A.2d at 455, and cases cited therein. In Allstate Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 363 Md. 106, 117 n.1, 767 A .2d 831, 837 n.1 (20 01), we exp lained this requirement further: [W]hen a declaratory judgment action is brought and the controversy is appropriate for resolution by declaratory jud gment, the court must enter a declaratory judgment and that judgment, defining the rights and obligations of the parties or the status o f the thing in c ontroversy, must be in writing. It is not permissible for the court to issue an oral declaration. The text of the judgment must be in writing. No[t] since the 1997 amendment to Maryland Rule 2-601(a), is it permissible for the declaratory jud gment to be part of a m emorand um. Tha t rule requires that [e]ach judgment shall be set forth o n a separate docum ent. When entering a declara tory judgm ent, the cour t must, in a separate document, state in writing its declaration of the rights of the parties, along with any other order that is intended to be part of -20- the judgment. Although the judgme nt may re cite that it is based on the reasons set forth in an accompanying memorandum, the terms of the declaratory judgment itself must be set forth separately . Incorporating by reference an earlier oral ruling is not sufficient, as no one would be able to discern the actual declaration of rights from the document posing as the judgment. This is not just a matter of complying with a hyper-technical rule. The requirement that the court enter its declaration in writing is for the purpose of giving the parties and the public fair notice of what the court has determined. (Internal citations omitted ) (secon d emp hasis ad ded). Accord Salamon v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 379 M d. 301, 307 -08 n.7, 841 A.2d 85 8, 862-63 n.7 (2004 ); Jackson v. Millstone, 369 Md. 575 , 593, 801 A.2d 1 034, 1045 (200 2). This error by the Circ uit Court, ho wever, is not jurisdictional and is not fatal to our reaching the merits of Petitioners appea l. Bushey, 362 Md. at 651, 766 A.2d at 611; Salamon, 379 Md. at 307 n.7, 84 1 A.2d a t 862-63 n .7; Jackson, 369 Md. at 593, 801 A.2d at 1045. This Co urt may, in its discretion, review the merits of the controversy and remand for the entry of an appropriate declaratory judgment by the circuit court. Bushey, 362 Md. at 651, 766 A.2d at 61 1. Theref ore, as this Co urt did in Bushey, we shall order that on remand, the Circuit Court shall enter an appropriate declaratory judgment order consistent with this opinion, stating the rights of the parties. The Circuit Court may include, in addition to the declaration of rights, ancillary relief as necessary (e.g., directions to the Civil Service Board to implem ent the declaratory judgment). III. The Civil Serv ice Board's D etermination T hat Section 3.36.15 0A1 Do es Not Ap ply to Permit Petitioner s To Receive Increases In T heir Pension P ayment In Tandem With Pay Scale Increases Given T o Active City Employ ees. -21- Petitioners arg ue that the C ivil Service Board erred in determining that Mr. Bowen "was not entit led to have his pension increase d by th e sam e per cent age a s 'any' p ay scale increases granted to active mem bers of the Po lice and Fire Departm ents who had 'the same rank and years of service' as" Mr. Bowen. Petitioners contend that the statutory language of Section 3.36.150A1 is clear and unam biguous in its intent: "The 'Old Plan' in S ection A is based upon any pay scale increases for active members, with a discretionary cost-of-living provision . . . added in the second sentence of [Section] 3.36.150A1 as a 'safety net' if active members do not get a pay scale increase in a given year." Petitioners argue, in reading the sentence at issue in Se ction 3.36.1 50A1, th at "'any' increase in the pay scale means any increase in the pay scale, regardless of how it is denominated by the City." Petitioners assert that any other reading of this operative sentence results in a "reinvent[ing of] the reading" of the statute: "U nless this Court construes the clear, mandatory language of the first sentence of [Section] 3.36.150A1 as it is written, [Mr. Bowen] will never get an increase in [his] pension[], unless the C ity Council, in its complete discretion, decides at some time to give [retired emplo yees] a co st-of-liv ing adju stment." The City m aintains that the phrase "inc rease in the pay scale" contained in Section 3.36.150A1 is ambiguous, requiring this Court to look beyond the plain language of the provision to its legislative history. The City argues that while there is no dispute that active employees received an increase in pay following the implementation of the Yarger and Hendricks Studies, . . . it does not follow that an 'increas e in the pay scale' occurred when the -22- public safety pay scale was readjusted in 1995 and 2001. The City contends that the implementation of both the Yarger a nd Hen dricks Stud ies, the provisio n's title and preamble, and the code's legislative history indicate that the "equalization provision" deals only w ith cost-of-living adjustment increases, not whole-scale changes to the pay scale structure. We disagree with the City s position and hold that Section 3.36.150A1 is clear and unambiguous in its inten t. A. Standard of Review In the case sub judice, we are reviewing the administrative decision of the C ivil Service Board . As this Court h as prev iously exp lained, the basis of judicial review of an administrative decision may be by explicit statutory authorization or by a common law or equity writ. Harvey, 389 Md. at 296, 884 A.2d at 1203; Gould, 273 Md. at 500, 331 A.2d at 64-65. Regardless of the basis for judicial review, the standard of the review is the same. Harvey, 389 Md. at 296, 884 A.2d at 1203 ( [A]n administrative proceeding, even if not subject to judicial review under the APA, would be subject to judicial r eview , of essentially the same scope, in an action for mandamus, certiorari, injunction or declaratory judgment [under the framework of Heaps, Gould, and the ir proge ny] ). See also Goodwich v. Nolan, 343 Md. 130, 147, 680 A.2d 10 40, 1048 (1996 ); Silverman v. Maryland Deposit Ins. Fund Corp., 317 M d. 306, 325 -26, 563 A .2d 402, 41 2 (1989); Dickinson-Tidewater, Inc. v. Supervisor of Assessm ents of Anne A rundel C ounty, 273 Md. 245, 255-56, 329 A.2d 18, 25 (1974). -23- Like statutory reviews of administrative actions, we shall confine our appellate review to that of the dec ision of the Civ il Servic e Boa rd itself. Dep t of Public Safety and Corr. Serv. v. Demby, 390 Md. 580, 614, 890 A.2d 310, 330 (2006); Consumer Protection Division v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 160, 874 A.2d 919, 939 (2005). In reviewing the administrative decision of the Civil Servic e Board, w e utilize the stan dard of rev iew set for th in the state Administrative Procedure Act to determine if the actions of the Board are arbitrary, illegal, capricious or unreasonable. Gould, 273 Md. at 50 0-01, 331 A.2d at 65 ( [T]his C ourt, in a long line of cases, has co nsistently held that the Legislature cannot divest the courts of the inherent power they posses to review and correct actions by an administrative agency which are arbitrary, illegal, capriciou s or unreaso nable. ); Harvey, 389 Md. at 296, 884 A.2d at 1203. U nder the A dministrative Procedu re Act, we may: reverse or modify the decision [o f the adm inistrative body] if any substantial right of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because of a finding, conclusion, or decision: (i) is unconstitu tional; (ii) exceeds s tatutory authority or jur isdiction of the final decision maker; (iii) results from an unlawful procedure; (iv) is affected by any other error of law; (v) is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted; or (vi) is arbitrary or capricious. -24- Md. C ode (19 84, 200 4 Rep l. Vol.), § 10-22 2 of the State G overnm ent Art icle. In other words, in reviewing the Civil Servic e Board s factual fin dings, we shall utilize the substantial evidence test, asking whether the factual findings or the inferences made from thos e fin ding s are reasonably su pported by the administrative record, when viewed as a who le. See Maryland Aviation Administration v. Noland, 386 Md. 556 571,873 A.2d 1145, 1154 (2005); Spencer v. Board of Pharmacy, 380 Md. 515, 529-30, 846 A.2d 341, 349 (2004). In reviewing the Civil Service Board s legal conclusion s, we shall determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law . United Parcel Srv., Inc. v. People s Counsel of Baltimore C ounty, 336 Md. 569, 577, 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994); accord M otor Vehic le Admin. v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241, 252, 923 A.2d 100, 106 (200 7). In doing so, we giv e the administrative agency's interpretation and application of the statute which [it] a dministers c onsiderab le weight. Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 M d. 59, 69 , 729 A .2d 376 , 381 (1 999). See als o, e.g., Montgomery County v. Glenmont Hills Associates, ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (2007) (filed November 30, 2007) (slip op. at p. 22) ( [A] reviewing court should give deference and considerable weight to the interpretation of a statute by the agency created to administer it. ); Anderson v. General Casualty Ins. Co., ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (2007) (filed November 14, 2007) (slip op. at p. 7) ( [W]e give significant weight to the agency s experienc e in interpreting a statute the agency administers. ). In other words, we accord a degree of deference to the position of the administrative agency in our review of the -25- administrative agency s legal conclusion, especially when the statutory language [of the statute at hand] is ambiguous. Macke Co. v. Comptroller, 302 Md. 18, 22-23, 485 A.2d 254, 257 (1984); accord Banks, 354 Md. at 69 n.2, 729 A.2d at 381 n.2. Desp ite this conside rable deference granted to the administrative agency, it is [still] within ou r prerogative to determine whether an agenc y's [interpretation an d] conclus ions of law are correct, an d to remedy the situa tion if fo und to b e wron g. John A. v. Bd. of Education, 400 Md. 363, 382, 929 A.2d 126 (2007). On the other hand, when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, administrative constructions, no matter how well-entrenched, are not given weight by this Co urt. Id; see also, e.g., Noland, 386 Md. at 572 n.2., 873 A.2d at 1155 n.2; Maryland Division of Labor and Industry v. Triangle General Contractors, 366 Md. 407, 417, 784 A.2d 534, 539 (2001 ). B. Interpretation of Section 3.36.150A1 In Kushell v. Department of Natural Resources, 385 Md. 563,576-78, 870 A.2d 186, 193-94 (2005), we summarized the traditional notions of statutory interpretation: The lega l issue in this case is one of statutory interpretation. The cardinal rule of statuto ry interpretation is to ascertain an d effectu ate the intent of the Legislature. Statutory construction begins with the plain language of the statute, and ordinary, popular understanding of the E nglish language d ictates interpretat ion o f its terminology. In construing the plain language, "[a] court may neither add nor delete language so as to reflec t an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute; nor may it construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its applica tion." Statutory text "'sho uld be read so that no word, clause, -26- sentence or phrase is rendered superfluo us or nuga tory.'" The plain language of a provision is not interpreted in isolation. Rather, we analyze the statutory sche me as a w hole and a ttempt to harmonize provisions dealing with the same subject so that each may be given effect. If statutory language is unambiguous when construed according to its ordinary and everyday meaning, then we give effect to the statute as it is w ritten. "If there is n o ambigu ity in that language, either inherently or by reference to other relevant laws or circumstances, the inquiry as to legislative intent ends; we do not need to resort to the various, and sometimes inconsistent, external rules of construction, for 'the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and said wha t it me ant.'" (Interna l citations omitted .) Under the ordinary use of the English language, we find the plain text of Section 3.36.150A1 to be clear and unambiguous, supporting Petitioners' position. The phrase "any increase in the pay scale for members of the same rank and years of service who are on active duty" means just what it says - retired police officers and fire fighters are entitled to receive increases in their pensions in tandem to any increases in salaries that active police officers and firefighters of the same rank and same number of years of service receive from the City. We can read no other plausible meaning in this sentence. Notably, the City concedes that [t]here is no dispute that active duty employees received an increase in pay following the implementation of the Yarger and Hendricks Studie s. The City claims, however, that Petitioners cannot receive these step increases because Sections 3.12.070C1 and 3.12.070C2 of the City Code prohibit the granting of these pay increases without the favorable review from a supervisor. The City explains: These -27- clauses show that retirees cannot receive the benefit of in-grade increases because, as retirees, it would be impossible for them to receive a favorable recommendation from a supervisor, as they no longer perform a job. Therefore, the City claims, retired employees cannot receive pension benefit increases in tandem with increases given to active employees based o n satisfa ctory job r eview s. The City s conclusion misconstrues the plain language of Section 3.36.150A1. As the Circuit Court pointed out in its written opinion, "the common and everyday meaning of the 'any' does not imply limitation." There is no ambiguity that "any increase in pay scale" means any increase in pay scale, without limitation. While the active employees step increases are subject to a satisfactory rating from a supervisor, the plain language of Section 3.36.150A1 operates without any limitation, permitting a retired employee to receive the same percentage of an increase as an active emp loyee of the sa me rank a nd years of se rvice receive d on his or her a nniver sary date d ue to a s atisfacto ry review . Moreover, the City Council s perceived purpose of Section 3.36.150A1 (e.g., for explicit cost-of-living adjustments only) plays no role in our reading of the clause. The determination of whether retired employees shall receive a similar increase in their pension benefits is based solely on the plain language of the sentence. While it may be argued that the City may not have intended such a result when it codified Section 3.36.150, this Court may not rewrite a statutory provision that is plain and unambiguous on its face to force an interpretation that is not in line with the plain language of the statu te. See Price v. State , 378 -28- Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1 221, 122 6 (2003) (n oting "[a] co urt may neither add nor d elete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute; nor may it construe the statute with forced or subtle interpre tations that limit or extend its applic ation"). It is clear from the re cord that the Yarger a nd Hen dricks studie s resulted in changes, indeed increases, in the pay scale of active City employees.8 The City, thus, was and is still obliged, under Section 3.36.150A1, to increase eligible Petitioners' pension benefits by the same percentage of increases received by active employees of the same rank and years of service.9 Therefore, we reverse the judgment of Cou rt of Specia l Appeals as to its interpretation of Section 3.36.150 A1. Our ruling also re quires a remand of the case to the Circuit Court w ith direction to remand the case to the Civil Service Board for proceedings 8 At oral argument, counsel for the City conceded that the adoption of the Hendricks Study resulted in an increase of at least two percent in the pay scale for active employees. Counsel for the City explained that the Hendricks Study reclassified active City employees into new grades and steps where the employee would earn at least 102% of his or her preHendricks Study salary. Under our interpretation of Section 3.36.150A, eligible retired employees are entitled to the equivalent increase in their pension benefits. Instead of granting its retired emp loyees an incre ase in their pension benefits equivalent to the increase given to active em ployees of the same rank and years of s ervice, the C ity gave retired employees a separate two percent C OLA in their pensio n benefits. It is o ur view th at this action by the City Council did not satisfy the City s duty and obligation to increase retired employees pension b enefits by the sa me perce ntage as any increase in the pay scale for active employees. 9 We offer no opinion on whether the language of Section 3.36.150A 1 would permit an increase in pension ben efits for a retired employee if there was no active employee, with the same rank and years of service as the retired employee when he or she retired, receiving an in crea se in salary. -29- consistent with this opinion, including individual hearings to determine whether each Petitioner is eligible, under the plain language of Section 3.36.150A1, as interpreted by this Court, t o receiv e an inc rease in his or he r pensio n bene fits. IV. The C ivil Service B oard's R efusal To Consid er 61 O f The 62 Appea ls Lastly, Petitioners complain that the C ivil Service Board erred w hen it refused to consider sixty-one of the appeals becau se Petitioners did not file individual appeals with the Civil Service B oard. At th e Octo ber 8, 2003 hearing, the City objected to the collective appeal made by Petitioners, arguing that it was "an improper joinder pursuant to [the] Federal rules" because of the "specific fact[-]related questions" (e.g., their rank and years of active service) relating to each Petitioner. The Civil Service Board agreed with the City, stating: Having been duly informed by counsel, having studied the preliminary matters that were submitted, the procedural decision of this Board will be that it should have as it guide the p rinciples laid down by Federal [R ]ules of [C ]ivil [P]rocedure Ru le 23 and th at it should not approve a class action in essence w here it's fact spe cific to each individual claim and the court has n ot instructed th is Board w ith respect to any decision it made, if any, concerning whether or not it was appropriately filed as a class action in the Circuit Court. What the court has done is simply to say that the lead plaintiff, Mr. Bowen, has not exhausted his adm inistrative rem edies and w ithout prejud ice to what the court may say respecting a class action, this B oard will decide tod ay on a hearin g involving Mr. Bo wen on ly on the issue of whether or not M r. Bowe n has an a ppropriate c laim in view of the Board's interpretation of the codes sections of the City of Ann apolis and that will be the procedural decision. Petitioners argue that this decision is in error because the certifica tion of a clas s is beyond the board's jurisdiction. Rather than using Federal Rule 23 for its analysis, -30- Petitioners utilize the state analog - Maryland Rule 2-23110 - to argue that the certification of a class for litigation purposes lies solely with the judiciary, rather than an administrative agency. In addition, P etitioners argu e that fairnes s and justice s hould allow a collective appeal to the Civil Service Board because a single issue, "the interpretation of Code 3.36.150A1[, ] affect[s] all Retirees equally." Petitioners explain: "[T]he City [ ] denied each of the 62 grievances on exactly the same grounds, . . . notwithstanding their different rank or years of service at retirement." A. The City does not provide this Court with a substantive argument addressing Petitioners contention that the Civil Service B oard erred in failing to consider sixty-one of the sixty-two claims; rather, the City asserts that this issue has not been preserved for our review because it was not properly raised in the Court of Special App eals. Sp ecif ically, the City contends that while Petitioners listed this issue in their brief before the Court of Special Appeals, Petitioners did not offer any argument in support of it. The City argues that 10 Maryland R ule 2-231 provides in relevant pa rt: (a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4 ) the represen tative parties w ill fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. -31- Petitioners failure to add ress the issue w ith argument violates Maryland Rule 8-504(a)(5) which requires that [a] brief sha ll . . . include . . . [a]rgum ent in support of the party s position. The City asserts that this Court need not consider [this issue] further. The City s arg umen t is witho ut merit. In the most basic form, the City contends that because Petitioners did not present the Court of Special Appeals with sufficient argument of this issue, they may not now raise the issue before this Court. This argument ignores a basic rule of appella te jurispruden ce: A party may not ap peal a judg ment wh olly in its fav or. Paolino v. McCormick Co., 314 Md. 575, 579, 552 A.2d 86 8, 870 (19 89). Petitioners received a favorable judgment from the Circuit Court and thus had no duty to raise this issue or any other issue before the intermediate appellate court. Rather, the duty to raise issues for appellate review belongs squa rely w ith th e agg rieved party: in this case, the City. See Paolino, 314 Md. at 579, 552 A.2d at 870, and the cases cited th erein. The C ity appealed the judgmen t of the Circ uit Court to the Court of Special Appeals; therefore, Petitioners had no duty to argue issues not presen ted by the City befo re the C ourt of Specia l Appe als. We hold that this iss ue is prope rly preserved for our review as it was raised below in the administrativ e proceed ing, in the Circuit C ourt, and in the Petitioners petition for wit of certiora ri, whic h we g ranted. See Maryland Rule 8-1 31(a) and (b). 11 11 Maryland R ule 8-131 , entitled Sco pe of revie w, reads in relevant p art: (a) Generally. The issues of jurisdiction of the trial court over the (continued...) -32- B. We hold that the Civil Service Board's decision to dismiss sixty-one of the sixty-two administrative appeals was unreasonable. The Board relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to dismiss the appeals, explaining that the Circuit Court, in its remand instructions, did not pro vide the C ivil Service B oard with any guidanc e in the handling of this issue. Such reliance on the Federal Rules was erroneous. The Fed eral Rules o f Civil Procedure govern the procedure of civil suits in United States district courts. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 ("These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equ ity or in (...continued) subject matter and, unless waived under Rule 2-322, over a person may be raised in and decided by the appellate court whether or not raised in and decided by the trial court. Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the Court may decide suc h an issue if necessary or d esirable to guide the trial court or to avoid th e expens e and dela y of another a ppeal. (b) In Court of Appeals--Additional Limitations. (1) Prior appellate decision. Unless otherwise provided by the order granting the writ of certiorari, in review ing a deci sion rend ered by the Court of Special Appea ls or by a circuit court acting in an appellate capacity, the Court of Appeals ordinarily will consider only an issue that has been raised in the petition for certiorari or any cross-petition and that has been preserved for review by the Court of Appeals. Whenever an issue raised in a petition for certiorari or a cross-petition involves, either expressly or implicitly, the asse rtion that the trial court committed error, the Court of Appeals may consider whether the error was harmless or non-prejudicial even though the matter of harm or prejudice was not raised in the petition or in a cross-petition. -33- adm iralty, with the ex ceptions state d in Rule 81. They shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."). These rules, including Federal R ule 23, bind neither state co urts nor state or local administrative agencies. The Civil Service Board is an administrative board of the City of A nnapolis an d is not a federal district court; therefore, Federal Rule 23 , which governs a federal district court s treatment of class actions, is not applicable in proceedings before that Board. Furthermore, the stated procedure and rules governing matters before the Civil Service Board - codified primarily at Section 3.16.150 - do not prohibit the collective appeal of a common issue of law or f act. Even if such a rule existed , these provis ions are inap plicable in appeals brought before the Civil Service Board by retired employees because Section 3.16.150 is applic able on ly to "perm anent s tatus em ployees," as expl ained a bove. In addition, Section 3.36.170A, the only section which arguably governs disputes over retirement pension benefits, contains no prohibitions against collective appeals.12 Without 12 Section 3.36.170A mandates the p rocess w hich retired e mployees m ust follow in resolving disputes concerning their pension benefits. In relevant part to such disputes, Section 3.3 6.170A states: The director shall resolve in the first instance all disputes under the plan, including all matters pertaining to eligibility to participate in the plan, and amount of benefits under the plan; provided, that any person aggrieved by the director s determina tion has the rig ht to appea l to the City s Civil Service Board for reconsideration, except in the case of disability retirement pension determinations, which shall be appealed to the Public S afety Disability Re tirement B oard, as pro vided in Section 3.36.175. (contin ued...) -34- rules or regulation s prohibiting collective ap peals of co mmon issues of law or fact and without devising alternative means to review the sixty-one others claims in a timely fashion, we hold the Civil Service B oard s failure to consider the sixty-one othe r claims was an unreasonable action. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCU IT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY TO ENTER AN APP R O PRIATE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IN CONFORMANCE WITH THIS OPINION. THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT SHALL BE A SEPARATE DOCUMENT WHICH DECLARES THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES AND MAY INCLUDE SUCH ANCILLARY RELIEF AS NECESSARY. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID ONE QUARTER BY PET ITIONERS AND THREE QUA RTE RS B Y RE SPO NDE NT. 12 (...continued) -35-

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