Attorney Grievance v. Sutton

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. Misc. AG 23 September Term, 2005 ______________________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION v. DAVID D. SUTTON ________________________________________ No. Misc. AG 24 September Term, 2005 _______________________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION v. DAVID D. SUTTON ______________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Wilner, J. ______________________________________ Filed: August 29, 2006 In July 2005, petitioner, Attorney Grievance Commission (AGC), through Bar Counse l, filed two p etitions again st David D. Sutton, respondent, alleging numerous violations of the Maryland Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct (MLRPC).1 Pursuant to Md. Rule 16 -752, we referred b oth petitions to Judge Lynn K . Stewart of the Circuit C ourt for Baltimore City to conduct a hearing and make findings and proposed conclusions of law. For the reasons stated below, we sustain the findings of misconduct, sustain some, but not all, of Bar C ounsel s ex ceptions, an d accept the recomm endation of Bar Counsel that respondent be disbarred. BACKGROUND Respondent is a solo practitioner who was admitted to the Maryland Bar on June 21, 2000. It appears that within two years after being admitted, respondent began having difficulty which re sulted in complaints from eight different clients between November, 2002 and December, 2004. Six out of the eight complaints are set forth in Bar Counsel s first petition, Misc. Docket AG No. 23, wherein Bar Counsel charged respondent with violating MLRPC 1.1 (com petenc e), 1.3 (d iligence ), 1.4 (communication), 1.5 (fees), 1.15 (safekeeping), 1.16 (declining or terminating representation), 8.1 (cooperation with Bar 1 The MLRPC w as revised in 2005. These matters arose under and are governed by the former Rules which, as applicable here, are not substantially different than the current Rules. -1- Coun sel), and 8.4 (misconduct). Bar Counsel s second petition, Misc. Docket AG No. 24, charged respondent with violating MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 , 8.1, and 8.4 s temming from his representation of one client in a bankruptcy proceeding and anoth er client in a tax sale matter. Misc. Docket AG No. 23 A. Complaint of Julius William Pitts, Sr. As his mother s caretaker, Ju lius Pitts applied , on behalf of his mother, for medical assistance from the M aryland Dep artment of Huma n Resou rces on or a bout June 9, 2003. A caseworker informed Mr. Pitts that his mother s assets exceeded the acceptable limit of $2,500 by approximately $1,700 and instructed Mr. Pitts to transfer ownership of his mother s life insurance policy to the William C. Brown F uneral Home . A few w eeks later, Mr. Pitts transferred ownership of the policy to the funeral home and reapplied for medical assistance in August, 2003. Upon reapplying, M r. Pitts was informed that, due to a change in regulations, h is transfer of ownership to the funeral home was not acceptable and that he should have transferred the ownership of the poli cy to himself a s the represe ntative of h is mother. This chan ge resulted in a denial of his second ap plication because his mo ther s assets were still greater than the accepta ble limit. Mr. P itts then filed an appeal, but be fore his appeal was he ard, h is mo ther pass ed aw ay. Mr. Pitts was ref erred to respondent and met with him in October, 2003. At this initial -2- meeting, respondent collected $1,000 of a total agr eed-up on fee of $1,5 00. A hearing on M r. Pitt s appeal was scheduled before an Administrative Law Judge for October 14, 2003. Respondent appeared on that day and requested a postponement, which was granted. The hearing was resch eduled fo r Octobe r 28. Resp ondent no t only failed to advise his client of the postpone ment but f ailed to app ear himself on the 28 th , and, as a result, the appeal was dismissed and the case closed. Respondent failed to advise his client of the dism issal. Mr. Pitts made sev eral attempts to contact respondent to determine the status of the m atter, all to no avail. Finally, in April, 2004, he filed a complaint with Bar Counsel. Bar Counsel requested a response to Mr. Pitt s complaint, but received none. The hearing jud ge conclu ded that, w ith respect to h is representa tion of M r. Pitts, respondent had violate d ML RPC 1 .1 by failing to compete ntly represent his client because he was not thoroug hly prepared for representing Mr. P itts at an initial hearin g or at a subsequent re-scheduled hearing, MLRPC 1.4 by failing to communicate with his client sufficiently and by failing to keep M r. Pitts inform ed of the sta tus of his case, and MLRPC 8.1 by failing to respond to Bar Counsel s numerous requests for information, and by failing to provide Bar Counsel with information regarding retention of the fee paid by Mr. Pitts. Respondent did not file exceptions to any of the hearing judge s findings of facts and conclusions of law. Bar Counsel excepted to her failure to find a violation of MLRPC 1.3, 1.5(a), 1.16(d), and 8.4(d). We will sustain Bar Counsel s exceptions with respect to MLRPC 1.3 and 8.4(d). We agree with Bar C ounsel that th e facts fully support a conclusion -3- that respondent failed to represent Mr. Pitts in a diligent and prompt mann er (1.3), and engaged in conduc t that is prejud icial to the admin istration o f justice . (8.4(d )). We sha ll overrule Bar Co unsel s exceptions as to M LRPC 1 .5(a) and 1.16(a). B. Complaint of Brenda A. Myers On December 20, 2002, Ms. Myers filed an application for disability retirement with her employer, the Social Security Administration (SSA), seeking retirement benefits under the civil service retire ment system. M s. Myers, who had been employeed by SSA for 35 years, suffered from lower back pain and headaches. On June 18, 2003, she received a letter informing her that, due to insufficie ncy of evide nce, she did not qualify fo r disability retirement benefits. On July 10, 2003, Ms. Myers requested reconsideration of the initial determination and met with respondent for the first time. At their initial meeting, Ms. M yers provided respondent with x-rays, doctors reports, correspondence regarding her claim and a signed release authorizing respondent to obtain medical information from her health care providers. Respondent did not charge Ms. Myers a flat fee or provide her with an up-front rate at this initial meeting. Within a few days after being retained, respondent mailed a letter to the SSA asking that Ms. M yers s application be reconsidered. On September 17, 2003, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) disallowed the request for reconsideration because there was insufficient documentation to supp ort it. Ms. Myers ha d until Octob er 27 , 200 3 th irty da ys -4- to appeal OPM s decision to the Me rit Systems Protection Board (Board). Respondent filed an incomplete and unsigned appeal w ith the Board on October 31, 2003, which resulted in the Board denying and dismissing the appeal because it was filed untimely. While respondent unsuccessfully attempted to obtain Ms. Myers s medical records fro m her hea lth care professionals, he failed to inform her that the pursuit of her claim hinged on providing the requested medical documentation. After several unsuccessful attempts to reach responde nt, and after re sponden t advised M s. Myers that h er application could be resubmitted, Ms. Myers re-filed an application on her own in November, 2004. On March 9, 2004, Ms. Myers filed a complaint against respondent with the AGC. Following two sepa rate requests for inform ation from Bar Co unsel, respondent provided Bar Counsel with Ms. Myers s entire file. During a conversation with Assistant Bar Counsel, respondent stated that he had never received a complaint before and was unclear as to the information that was being requested of him. At that time, however, there was a pending complaint against respondent that was filed by Mr. Pitts. Respondent further stated that he was unable to obtain the name of Ms. Myers s doctors fro m her, but a review o f his client file revealed th at the nam es of the ph ysicians were indeed pro vided to res ponden t. The hearing judge c oncluded that respon dent violated MLR PC 1.4 b y failing to comply with Ms. Myers s numerous requests for information and by failing to keep her informed of the progress of her case, MLRPC 8.1(a) by knowingly making a false statement to Assistant Bar Counsel that he had never had a complaint lodged against him when one -5- complaint had been previously dismissed and two were pending , and MLRPC 1.3 by not providing sufficient information to the OAH for reconsideration of his client s claim and for filing an untimely, incomplete and unsigned appeal on his client s behalf. Bar Counsel filed exceptions to the hearing judge s failure to find a violation of MLRPC 1.1. We sustain Bar Counsel s exception and co nclude tha t responde nt failed to provide Ms. M yers with com petent and thorough representatio n in representing her in her disability re tiremen t benef it claim. C. Complaint of Icelia Manns In early December, 2003, Ms. Manns was facing a mortgage foreclosure on her home by Chase Manhattan Mortgage Company, due to an arrearage on her mortgage of over $7,000. On December 30, 2003, she engaged respondent to file a petition for bankruptcy on her behalf. Respondent entered into a fee agreement with Ms. Manns, under which M s. Manns agreed to pay respondent a total fee of $1,000 $700 to be paid up front and the balance to be paid over time. Respondent advised Ms. Manns that the foreclosure would be delayed by the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Respondent filed a Chapter 13 petition on behalf of Ms. Manns in the United States Bankruptcy Court on Janua ry 27, 2004. Respondent failed to attend both an initial hearing and a rescheduled hearing with the Bankruptcy Trustee, howev er, and failed as well to file a bankru ptcy plan . Con sequ ently, the foreclosure proceeded and Ms. Manns lost her home. -6- Afterwards, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Request for Hearing, which were denied, and then attempted to negotiate with the mortgagee to extend the fixed terms of the m ortgag e. No a greem ent wa s ever re ached with th e mortg agee. Ms. Manns attempted numerous times to reac h respond ent, but respo ndent failed to answer her telephone calls or attend pre-scheduled meetings. Respondent also did not return any portion of the $700 that Ms. Manns paid him initially and failed to account for the time spen t on h er ca se. In July, 2004, Ms. Manns filed a complaint against respondent with the AGC. After sending respondent four requests for inform ation, an inve stigator we nt to respondent s office and interviewed him. During the interview, respondent was cooperative with the investiga tor and pro vided him with the requested docum ents regarding M s. Manns s claim. When the investigator followed up with further inquiries, however, respondent failed to respond. The hearing judge concluded that respondent violated MLRPC 1.1 by failing to appear at an initial and rescheduled he aring before the Bankruptcy Trustee and by failing to present a Chapter 1 3 bankru ptcy plan on b ehalf of Ms. Manns, MLRPC 1.4 by failing to return Ms. Manns s telephone calls, failing to a ttend pre-sch eduled m eetings w ith her, and f ailing to comm unicate with M s. Mann s to inform her of her o ptions or tha t a Chapter 13 plan was not possible given her inability to make payments, and MLRPC 8.1(b) by failing to provide Bar Counsel with an accounting of the fee that respondent collected from Ms. Manns and by failing to respon d to fou r reque sts poste d to him by Bar C ounse l. -7- Bar Counsel filed exceptions to the hearing judge s failure to find violations of MLRPC 1.3, 8.4(d), 1.5(a), 1.15(b), and 1.16(d). We sustain Bar Counsel s exceptions as to Rules 1.3 and 8.4(d) in that respondent failed to diligently represent Ms. Manns in the bankruptcy proceeding and engaged in misconduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice by failing to appear for a hearing before the Bankruptcy Trustee. We overrule Bar Counsel s other exceptions. D. Complaint of Queen Payton Ms. Payton s complaint was similar to that of Ms. Manns. Ms. Payton had filed a Chapter 13 proceeding in Bankruptcy Court, but a foreclosure proceeding against her home was scheduled for November 7, 2003. Respondent was retained by Ms. Payton to file a second Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding on her b ehalf in order to delay the scheduled foreclo sure. At their initia l meetin g, Ms . Payton entered in to an agree ment to pa y responden t a total flat fee of $1,500 $800 for filing of a new bankruptcy proceeding, $200 for filing fees for the second Chapter 13 bankruptcy action, and $500 for respondent s efforts to obtain a discharge under a pending Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. Ms. Payton paid an initial $700 to respondent and agreed to pay the remaining balance over time. In November, 2003, Ms. Payton received a letter from the bankruptcy trustee informing her that she could not be discharged under the pending Chapter 13 proceeding because respondent had filed a late claim with respe ct to unpaid Baltimore City real prope rty -8- taxes. Ms. Payton consented to an increase in the base amount in the bankruptcy plan, which apparently resulted in her obtaining a discharge. Respondent failed to file a second bankrupt proceeding on behalf of Ms. Payton. Following numerous attempts to reach respondent over a period of a couple of mon ths, Ms. Pa yton finally spoke with respo ndent and advised h im that she was unhappy with the services he provided and requested a partial refund of the fees she had paid him. Respondent eventually refunded $200 to Ms. Payton which represented the amount collected to pay the court costs associated with the second bankruptcy petition. It was only after Ms. Payton retained a new counsel was Ms. Payton successfu l in keeping her home. On June 18, 2 004, M s. Payton filed a complain t with Bar Counsel that respondent failed to provide s ervices agre ed upon in their fee agreement. Like the other cases herein, respondent failed to respond to Bar C ounsel s inquiries until after a second request was sent to him. He then failed to respond to further inquiries from Bar Counsel seeking additional information. In the Petition for Disciplinary Action, Bar Counsel alleged that respondent had violated MLRPC 1.3, 1.5, 1.16 and 8.1. The hearing judge concluded that respondent had violated only MLR PC 1.4 which was not alleged in Bar Co unsel s petition , by failing to respond to approximately ten attempts by Ms. Payton to reach him. Bar Counsel took exception to the hearing judge s conclusion since the charge was not included in the original petition. We sustain Bar Counsel s exception as to Rule 1.4 and hold that the hearing judge -9- erred in finding a violation. Similarly, we sustain Bar Counsel s exceptions to the hearing judge s failure to find a violation of MLRPC 1.3 and 8.1 . Respon dent violated Rule 1.3 by failing to act diligently in representing Ms. Payton in her bankruptcy action and Rule 8 .1 by failing to respond to Bar Counsel s inquiries. We will, however, overrule Ba r Counsel s exceptions as to MLRPC 1.5 and 1.16. E. Complaint of Kennedy Huddleston Mr. Huddleston retained respondent to handle a foreclosure matter. Mr. Hudd leston s wife, Sonia, died intestate on Ma y 29, 2002. T he house that they both res ided in wa s in his wife s sole name at the time of her death. M r. Huddles ton failed to open an estate for his wife and continued to make monthly payments to the mortgagor, Central Mortgage Com pany. Nine months after his wife s death, Mr. Huddleston informed the mortgage company of his wife s death but c ontinued to make m onthly payments. At some point, the mortgage comp any bega n to retu rn Mr . Huddleston s checks and com menced forec losure procee dings, w hich res ulted in t he prop erty being sold on Marc h 8, 200 4. With the sale of the house not ratified as of March 31, 2004 , Mr. Hu ddleston m et with and retained resp ondent to represent him in reclaiming the house. Mr. Huddleston provided respondent with the requisite paperwork to respond to the mortgagor s notice of foreclosure. After Huddle ston paid respondent a total fee of $1,000, respondent filed an exception to the sale of the house. On May 3, 2004, the substitute trustee answered the exception and on June -10- 17, 2004, the Court ov erruled the e xception b y an Amen ded Ord er. Mr. H uddleston tried to reach respondent on sev eral occasions but wa s told that he was either busy or in court. Respondent also failed to refund any portion of the fee that w as paid by Mr. Huddleston. On August 5, 2004 , Mr. Huddleston filed a complaint with the AGC. Bar Counsel tried four times to get re sponden t to respond to Mr. H uddleston s compla int, to no avail. Bar Counsel charge d respondent with violating MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, 1.16, 8.1 and 8.4. The hearing judge concluded that respondent violated only three of those Rules: (1) MLRPC 1.1 by undertaking representation of Mr. Huddleston s claim although respondent recognized from the beginning that the likelihood of success with M r. Huddleston s claim was limited, and by filing an exception to the sale of the house, but failing to follow through with his representation, (2) ML RPC 1 .4 by failing to retu rn Mr. H uddleston s telephon e calls and requests for information, and (3) MLRPC 8.1 by failing to respond to four requests for information from Bar Counsel regarding his handling of Mr. Huddleston s claim. Bar Counsel filed exceptions to the hearing judge s failure to conclude that respondent violated MLRPC 1.3, 1.5, 1.16, and 8.4 and to her finding of a violation of Rule 1.4. We w ill sustain Bar Counsel s exceptions to MLRPC 1.3 because the facts support a finding that respondent failed to dilige ntly represent M r. Huddles ton in his foreclosure action. Similarly, we will sustain his exceptio n to MLRPC 8.4 because respondent s conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice. We agree with Bar Counsel that it was error for the hearing judge to find a vio lation of M LRPC 1.4 since B ar Coun sel failed to ch arge respo ndent w ith -11- violating that Rule. We overrule Bar Counsel s exceptions to Rule 1.5 and 1.16. F. Complaint of James Owens Mr. Owens s complaint stems from the purchase of property in Baltimore City at a tax sale for $3,346.88. In December, 2002, Mr. Ow ens met w ith and retaine d respond ent to represent him in securing a deed to the property. Mr. Owens paid respondent a total of $2,000, which included an agreed upon fe e of $1,100 plus ad ditional expenses. It was M r. Owens s understanding from respondent that the deed would be completed within six months to a year. Shortly after their initial meeting, respondent filed in the Circuit Court for B altimore City a Complaint and Affidavit to foreclose the right of redemption on the property. Between May, 2003 an d Marc h, 2004, res ponden t filed an orig inal Affid avit of Compliance and three amended affida vits. In O ctober, 2 004, after Mr. Owens had not received the deed from responde nt, and the owner of record, against whom respondent was suppo sed to foreclose the rights of redemption, received a delinquent tax notice, M r. Owens w ent to the Baltimore City Circuit Court Clerk s office and discovered that an ejectment action had been filed by a thir d party. After Mr. Owens attempted to contact responde nt on seve ral occasion s, to no avail, he filed a complaint with the AGC. Upon a second request, respondent answered the compla int, in which he claimed that the delay was not his fault because he had filed the -12- proper paperwork with the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. He contended that the delay was due to the Clerk s Office and the Chambers of Master Susan Marzetta. Upon investigation, Bar Counsel determined that respondent had failed to provide a forty year chain of title, including a list of creditors, p roof of se rvice and a certificate un der affida vit. Bar Counsel charged respondent with violating MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 8.1(a) and 8.4(c) and (d). The hea ring judge c oncluded that respond ent violated o nly MLR PC 1.3, by fa iling to pursue a foreclosure of the owner s right of redemption in that an insufficient affidavit o f compliance was filed. We will sustain Bar Counsel s exceptions to the hearing judge s failure to find r espon dent in v iolation of M LRP C 8.1(a ), 8.4(c) and 8.4 (d). Indeed, her conclusions of law support Bar Counsel s exceptions: On May 28, 2003, Respondent filed a Complaint and Af fidavit to fore close the right of redem ption on the p rope rty located at 116 N. Glover St. This Complaint was forwarded to Master Susan Marzetta. Master Marzetta notified Respondent of the deficiencies in his A ffidav it of Co mplian ce. Respondent resubmitted an Affidavit of Compliance on August 10, 2003. Master Marzetta advised tha t this Affidavit was also deficien t. On February 1, 2004, a third Affidavit of Compliance was filed which was also deficient. On March 1, 2004, the fourth Affidav it of Compliance was submitted . . . . On November 29, 2004, Petitioner sent to Respondent a second request for response within seven days. . . . Respondent alleged that the delay in processing was c aused by the Baltimore C ity Clerk s Office and the Chambers of Master Susan Marzetta. Respondent stated he had filed the nec essary paperw ork with the Court and he was awaiting the Court s Order. An investigation conducted by Sterling Fletcher, investigator for Petitioner, determined that Respondent failed to provide a certificate under affida vit, a forty year chain of title including a list of creditors, and the origina l green c ards of service . -13- It is clear from the findings of fact that Master Marzetta informed respondent of the required information needed in order for the court to approve the submitted affidavits. Respondent represented that he had complied with the court s instructions, but upon further investigation, it seems clear that he failed to do so. Accordingly, we find that the hearing judge erred in not concluding that respondent had v iolated MLR PC 8.1(a), 8.4(c) and 8.4(d). Misc. Docket AG No. 24 Bar Counsel filed a second complaint against respondent two days after the first one was filed. This second complaint stems from respondent s representation of Andrea Catrice Dorsey in a bankru ptcy proc eeding and Jo an Alic e Brow n in a tax sale ma tter. The hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence the following facts and conclusions of law: A. Complaint of Andrea Catrice Dorsey Respondent was retai ned by M s. Do rsey o n Jan uary 1 3, 2004, to represent her in a Chapter 13 bank ruptcy in order to address and suspend a pending foreclosure of her home. More than two months later, respondent filed a Voluntary Petition for Chapter 13 Bankruptcy in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland on behalf of Ms. Dorsey, but failed to file a Chapter 13 Plan. In April, 2004, the court dismissed the petition, w ith prejudice. A month later, respondent filed an Emergency Request for Hearing and Motion for Recons ideration of Order D ismissing Case, representing to the court that he had filed both a bankruptcy petition and a bankruptcy plan. Respondent claimed that he attached a -14- Chapter 13 Plan to his eme rgency motio n, howe ver, neither the docket no r the case file reflect the filing of a Chapter 13 Plan. Two days later, respondent received notice from the Clerk s office that his motion failed to contain a certificate of service or a proposed order with his motion and that he had 10 d ays to cure thos e defects. H e apparen tly attempted to cure the defect but failed to follow the requisite format required under the Federal Rules. The Bankruptcy Court allowed responden t ten additiona l calendar d ays to cure the d efect. When he failed to cure the defects within the allotted time, the Bankruptcy Court issued an Order dismissing the case for failing to comply with required filing procedures. Shortly thereafter, within 180 d ays of the dismissal of Ms. Dorsey s original petition, respondent filed a second Voluntary Petition for Chapter 13 which was dismissed by the Court on the ground that Ms. D orsey was n ot entitled to relief within 180 days of the dismissal of her petition. A few months later, Ms. Dorsey filed a complaint with Bar Co unsel. Within a few days, Bar Counsel mailed a req uest for info rmation to re sponden t seeking a re sponse w ithin fifteen days. Respondent failed to respond. Two months later, Bar Counsel sent a second notice to respondent. On the same day, however, Bar Counsel received respondent s response to his first inquiry in which responde nt stated that h e could no t in good f aith file a Chapter 13 because we would be explicitedly agreeing to repay the much higher and incorrect debt amount, and that he believed that there was a disputed arrearage between the mortgage holder and the debtor. Bar Counsel then requested that respondent provide -15- the original client f ile of Ms . Dorsey s ma tter within ten days. Respondent failed to respond. Thereafter, respondent was served with a copy of Statement of Charges from the Peer Review Committee. Respondent failed to cooperate with the Committee s investigation which resulted in the pro cess being terminated p ursuant to Md. R ule 16-743(b)(2). Bar Counsel charged respondent with violating MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 8.1 and 8.4. The hearing judge concluded that respon dent violated (1) ML RPC 1 .1 by failing to represent [Ms. Dorsey] with the required and necessary thoroughness and preparation when he failed to file a Chapter 13 Plan on her behalf after having filed the petition in the bankruptcy court, (2) MLR PC 1.3 by failing to represent Ms. Dorsey in a diligent manner that resulted in reasonable and prompt representation, including a lack of diligence and knowledge of the rudim entary rules gov erning the f iling of a ba nkruptcy petition when he filed a second petition for Chapter 13 within 180 days of the first dismissal, (3) MLRPC 1.4(a) and (b) by failin g to keep Ms. Dorsey informed of the status of her case, (4) MLRPC 1.5(a) by charging and collecting from Ms. Dorsey an excessive fee that did not c omport to the services performed by respondent on Ms. Dorsey s behalf, (5) MLRPC 8.1(b) by refusing to provide petitioner with the en tire client file upon request in order for petitioner to conclude the investigation , and (6) M LRPC 8.4(d) by eng aging in conduct that was prejudicial to the admin istration o f justice . B. Complaint of Joan Alice Brown Ms. Brown s complaint stems from respondent s representation of her in a tax sale of -16- property matter. On June 4, 2002, Ms. Brown purchased tax sale certificates on two different properties loca ted in Ann e Ar undel Co unty, Maryland. A little less than a year from th e date of purchase, Ms. Brown retained respondent to represent her in rights of redemp tion proceedings regarding the two properties. She paid respondent a $2,000 fee and entrusted the original tax certificates to him. Notice was clearly given on the face of each tax certificate that the certificate would be void unless a p roceeding to foreclose the owner s right of redemption was initiated no later than two years after the date Ms. Brown purchased them; that is, no later than June 4, 2002. It appears tha t responde nt failed to file a complaint to foreclose the right of redemption on one of the properties, which resulted in the tax certificate becoming void. Verification of respondent s lack of filing a complaint was evidenced by a August 6, 2004 letter from the Off ice of Finance for Anne Arundel County, noting that one of the tax certificates was void since no foreclosure proceeding had ever been file d. Furthermore, respondent failed to obtain a deed and to file a certificate of compliance with respect to the seco nd p rope rty. Ms. Brown filed a formal complaint with petitioner on January 11, 2005. Bar Counsel unsucce ssfully requested a response to Ms. Brown s allegations from respondent two times prior to filing a Statement of Charges with the Chairman of the Peer Review Committee pursuant to Md. Rule 16-7 41. Resp ondent fa iled to participa te in the Peer Review process which prompted Bar Counsel to terminate that process pursuant to Md. Rule 16-743(b)(2) -17- and file a P etition for D isciplinary Actio n with this C ourt. The hearing judge concluded that respondent violated (1) M LRPC 1.1 by failing to be thoroughly prepared in his representation of Ms. Brown, (2) MLRPC 1.3 by his lack of diligence in failing to file any proceeding to foreclose the rights of redemption upon the tax certificates entrusted to him by his clie nt, (3) ML RPC 1 .4 by failing to communicate to Ms. Brown the status of her case and failing to provide Ms. Brown with the requisite information to make an informed decision as to whether to continue his representation of the matter, (4) MLRPC 1.5(a) by charging an excessive fee of $2,000 even though he failed to render services, (5) MLRPC 1.16(d) by effectively abandoning Ms. Brown and failing to return the unearned fee upon termina tion of his representation, and ( 6) ML RPC 8 .1(b) by failing to respond to Bar Counsel s inquiries. Neither respondent nor Bar Counsel filed exceptions to the hearing judge s findings of fact an d conc lusions of law . Instead, Bar Counsel reiterated that respondent was already a subject of a pendin g complaint before this Court and that he is a subject of a preliminary injunction issued by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City enjoining him from practicing law. Bar Counsel recommends that the proper sanction arising from Ms. Dorsey and M s. Brown s complain ts should be disbarment. Since we do not find any error with the hearing judge s findings of facts and conclusions of law, we agree with Bar Co unsel that the appropriate sanction in th is case is disba rment. As this Court has stated many times, [i]t is well-settled that the purpose of -18- disciplinary procee dings is to prote ct the pu blic rath er than to punish the errin g attorn ey. Attorney Grievance v. Wallace, 368 M d. 277, 2 89, 793 A.2d 5 35, 542 (2002); Attorney Griev. v. Franz & L ipowitz, 355 M d. 752, 760 -61, 736 A .2d 339, 34 3-44 (199 9); Attorney Griev. Com n v. Myers, 333 Md. 44 0, 446-47, 635 A .2d 1315, 1318 (1 994); Attorney Griev. Com n v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 364, 624 A.2d 50 3, 513 (19 93); Attorney Griev. Com n v. Protokowicz, 329 Md. 252, 262-63, 619 A.2d 100, 105 (1993). Determining the appropriate sanction is in a particular case is dependent upon the particular misconduct and facts and circumstances in the case. Attorney Grievance v. Wallace, supra, 368 Md. at 289, 793 A.2d a t 543. See als o Attor ney G riev. Com n v. Ba bbitt, 300 Md. 637, 642, 479 A.2d 1372, 1375 (1984) ( [t]he severity of the sanction to be impo sed for m isconduc t generally depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. ); Attorney Griev. Com n v. Montgomery, 296 Md. 113, 120, 460 A.2d 597, 600 (1983) ( [t]he severity of the sanction to be im posed is depe ndent o n the fa cts and circum stances of eac h case. ). In all eight cases, respondent accepted fees and th en failed to re present his c lients diligently or competently. It is worth repeating he re what we stated in Attorney Grievance v. Wallace, supra, 368 Md. at 291, 793 A.2d at 544: In determining the proper course to follow when confronted with an attorney who has neglected the needs of his clients and failed to comm unicate w ith them, w e have co nsistently regarded neglect and inattentiveness to a client s interests to be a violation of the Canons of Ethics warranting the imposition of some disciplinary sanc tion . . . . It is clear then that willful and flagrant neglect of a client s affairs is, in and of itself, the kind of misconduct by an attorney w hich ca n lead to disbarm ent. . . -19- . [W]e have noticed too many instances when lawyers have agreed to represent clients and accepted fees, in part or in whole, only to completely neglect these same legal problems, causing the same clients emotional distress, financial loss, or other varying kinds of inconve nience. [Internal citations omitted]. Responden t s misconduct is parallel to the misconduct found in Attorney Grievance v. Wallac e, supra. Therefo re, we agre e with Ba r Counse l that the appro priate sanctio n is disbarme nt. IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING THE COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761(b), FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND AGAINST DAVID D. SUTTON. -20-

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