State of Maine v. Cannady
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STATE OF MAINE SUPERlOR COURT DOCKET NO. CUMCD-CR~l5~7186 CUMBERLAND, SS. STATE OF MAINE Cumberland, n, Clerk's Oftlco STATE OF MAINE MAR O 201~ 8 RECEIV~D V. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) DMITRI CANNADY ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL Before the court is Defendant Dmitri Cannady's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. For the reasons stated herein, the court denies the motion and finds Defendant guilty of Failure to Give Correct Name and Operating After Revocation. I. FACTS The parties presented evidence at a bc11ch tdal. which generated the following, mainly undisputed facts. Officer Gowen of the Portland Police Department parked his patrol crniser'in the parking lot of"Global Gas" station on December 4, 2015 at 7 p.rn. He observed who he later lenrned to be the Defendant parked in front of the store, looking back at Gowen, immediately putting the car in gear and backing up out of his parking space to enter trnffic on Forest Avem1e. Gowen testified that Defendant was not wearing his seatbelt, which precipitated a traffic stop. Gowen was unable to dete1mine whether Defendant fastened his seatbelt while he was following Defendnat. At the time of the stop, Gowen observed Defendant wearing his seatbelt, and requested his name and identifying infom1ation. Defendant identified himself as "Jonas Washington" and had difficulty providing Gowen with his addresss and social security number. Gowen observed that Defondnnt appeared nervous, would not make eye contact and gave information in a halting maimer to suggest a lack ofcredibility or an astounding lack of memory. Gowen unsuccessfolly attempted to verify Defendant's identity by comparing a dliver's license photo of «Jonas Washingtona to the Defendant. Renewed requests to provide information to verify the Defendant's identity, which went unrequited. Eventually, Defendant was detained for fingerprinting at the Cumberland County Jail. Dul'ing the transport to the jail, Defendant explained to Gowen that he was not who he said he was, eventually identifying himself as Dimtri Cannady. Trial exhibits included certified records that support the conclusion that Defendant's right to operate a motor vehicle in Maine was revoked on August 5, 2004. Exhibits also supported the conclusion that Defendant's Maine license expired on July 11, 2003. The letter of revocation sent to Defendanfs addt·ess on file with the Secreta1y of State's Office was also introduced into evidence along with a r.eturn envelope that stated "Return to Sender Cannady, Dimitri, Moved 1.eft No Address Unnble to Forward, Return to Sender." The issue which lead the court to invite further briefing relates lo the Stale's burden of proof on the churge of Operating After Revocation, and whether under the circumstances the State proved "notice" to Defendant pursuant to the statute and consistent with the principles of due process. H. DISCUSSION The comt accepts that by a mechanical application of the statute 1 that notice wns . achieved upon Derendunl. The more subtle and signilicunl question arises when the Secretnry of State has actual knowledge that the presumption of notice created by the statute has been 1 29-A MRS §2557-A(4), 2482( I) . 2 rebutted, in lhis case by a return ncldress envelope and postal stamp indicating that Defendant had moved and the notice had not in fact been delivered to him. Attorney Nadeau points out thnt notwithstanding the guidance from the Lmv Court which concludes that notice by proof of mailing to the last address on file satisfies due process, that the more serious penalties the legislature fashioned after these cases were decided should require the court to revisit the issue. This court is more than a little sympathetic to that al'gument. A basic tenet of due process jurisprudence is that the analysis occurs on a sliding scale, informed by a variety of factors not the least of which is the penalties at issue. However, upon a close reading of the T,aw Court's analysis, the court is not persuaded lhat the process due Defendant under these circumstances creates an interpretation of the statute which amounts to little more than a ..ebuUable presumption of notice simply upon proof of mailing which may lhen be overcome by evidence that the Defendant did not actually receive notice. There are two categorical tributaries of this conclusion. First, the Legislature clearly mad~ a policy determination that the onus is on the licensed driver to notify the Sccretal'y of State of an address change. /\s a' corollary matter, notice is pel'mitted simply by u mailing to the last address provided under section 1407. r1 would be an unusual interpretation to conclude that while the I.egislature and the f .aw Court have determined that such notice mechanisms only satisfy due process contingently based upon whether notice mailings are bounced back to the Secretary of State. Second, as a related matter. such an inlerpretation would lead to administl'ative rigol' mortis. ' lf lhe more substantial potential ' penalties that were passed by the Legislature since the Law Com1 last visited due process challenges to this method of notice alters its analysis, lhcn it should sny so. l lowever, this com1 declines an invitation 10 do so and also declines the invitation to exceed its limited role and offer 3 policy solutions to the formidable problem created by such an interpretation of the notice provision. Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal is denied. The court finds the Defendant guilty of Failure to Provide Correct Name and Operating After Revocation. The Clerk is directed to enter this Order on the unified criminal docket by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Unified Criminal Procedure 53(a). Dnte: March 8. 2017 Lane ·. Walker Justice, Superior Court 4
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