Tripping Gnome Farm, LLC V. Ferrara

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STATE OF MAL"\1£ CUMBF.RLAI\TI, s~ SCPl-'RlOR COURr CJVJL ACTION rJOCKET NO RE-14-157 ../ NM--C({IY]-I:Z-V;J,-I't TRJPFlJ\"G G\10.\iE FARM, I J .C RYEN MU.'\ROE, and URSULA MU::-.JROE Plaintiffs v. LOU I'ElUZ/\RA, MELISSA FERRA.RA, and NFIV ENGLAND ALPACAS, D<dendants Beton.~ " '2ll14 the court 1S defendanl< motion to stay. There is pending litigation m the Connecticut Superior Cuurt involving the same parties and !S~ue~- Dekndants mow the court \u stay the pruceedings in Maine m favor of the Connecticut litigation. Ddendants argul' they cannot obtain complete relief m Mame. Plaintiffs oppose the motion and argue that because the Maine sutt was filed first. the litigation should take plalc in Maine. For the followmg reasons, the motion to stay is granted. BACKGROUND This suit arises out of an agreement between plaintiffs and the defendants rrgarding the sale of Tripping Gnome Farm, LLC's ( rGF) alpacas lo ~third-party buyer_ Plamttffs do not illsputc that TGF agyced to pay and did pay dcfe11dants a comm1ssi<ln for alpaca sales m 2011 for brokering a deal belwr·en plaintiff and an alpaca buyer_ The par11e"' dispute comwns whelh\,r plainhffs alsu agreed to pay "tail commissions" to the defendants, which are fees for future sJieb of alpacJS between reF and the third-party buypr_ According to defendants, plamtiffs agn·ed to contract th~ 1S terms of a wnttr_n contract S\>nt to plaintiffs, even though that unsigned. commisston~," The contract includes provisions regarding "tail selects Connecticut as the forum fur Iitigatwn, and prov1des for attorney's fees to the preva!l'mg party. Plainhff 'J Gf filed its complaint for declaratory JUdgm~nt on April 2, 2014, and an amended complaint was filed on june 12, 2014, which mduded Ryen 1\funroe and Ursula Munroe as plaintiffs. In the amended complaint, plaintiffs seek the following: in count T, a declaratory JUdgnwnt that plaintiffs never agreed to pay defendants the tali commissions; in count IT, a declaratory judgment that plamtiffs did not agree to pay defendants' attorney's fee"; in count IlL a declaratory judgment that the parties d1d not agree to litigate ,n Connecl:!cut; and m colll1t IV, a declaratm-y judgment that plamtiffs Ryen Munroe and Ursula 'vlunroe cannot be held pcrbonally liable in connection with the dispute between TGF and ddendants. allege the followmg: in count 1: In thetr counterclrum, defendants breach of contract; and in count II: unjust <:nriclunent. Defendants hied a motion to disrruss on June 9, 2014 and argued improper venue because of the contract's forum seleditm clause. Th<' court denied the motion to dismiss on July 3, 2014. Defendants filed the motion to stay on October 17, 2014. The court held a telephone conference wtth counsel on :'\ovember 19, 2014 to d1scuss the motion to stay. A second telephone confcn'nce ·was held on November 26, 2014 after the Connecticut court granted the Munroes' mol:!on to dismisb them as parties !TIthe Connecl:!cut suit. 2 DlSCL"SSION A trial court has bruud discretiOn m considering whether to stay a procf'f'ding when there 1S litigation pendmg in another JUnsdictwn. Fijs_h v, WhaplPs. 220 A.2d 170, 172 (Me. 1966). Although the first-fihcd actwn gen,mlly has priority over a subsequent suit filed m another jurisdiction, "{t]he circumst~nces of the litigation may be sw:·h as to m~ke it desirable to stay t},, fi"t actwn, and to permit the subsequent action to proceed to conclusion." !4,; sec -'!)_so Jones v. York, 444A.2d 382, 384 (.'.1e. 19il2) In F1tch the Law Court listed several factors to gmde the trial court m deciding whether to grant a stay: Multiple considerations may serve the trial court Ill a JUdicial exercise of its discretion in granting or denying a st,ly, such as whether the subsequent action was designed solely to harass the adverse party; the nature of the respective actions, cs1wcially with a view as to which appears to provide complete ]U~tice; also, where did the ca.uS<' of action arise and which law will be applicable; W1ll there be great and unneccs~ary expense and inconvenience; the avat!abdity of witnesses; the stage at which the proceedings m li-te other court have already progressed; the delay in obtaming trial. Each case must perforce present its own v~riety of C1rcmnstances which may nece&s!tate different results. Fitch 222A.2d ~t 172-73. In Jones v. York, defendants filed a declaratory judgment action in the Superior Court ~hortly before plaintiffs filed a fordble entry and detainer action in the District Court. 444 A.2d ~t 384. :\Teverthekss, the law Comt decided that although the Supenor Court action was flied first, the J.)jstrid Court had properly taken juri~diction of the matter. I d. at JS5. The court balanced the rights of the parties and concluded th.-,l the summary na.ture of the District Court proceedmg~ would g1ve the parl:!es "the just, speedy and mexpensive determination of their d1spute ...."!d. J Other junbdictions "give pnority to 'coen·ive' actions over declaratory judgment action~ or anticipatory smts, regard].:% of the order of filing." Fin. Inc v. :'vfcltrix Con~t. lli_u~t'!!l'. Co. Inc. CUJ\..!SC-CV-2012-100, Bt 5 (:rvfe. Super. Ct., Cum. Cnty., Sept. 13, 21)12). As one federal murt explamcd, an exception to the first-filed swt rule '"ex1sl" where the first-f1led ,uit constitutes an 'improper anticipatory filing,' or one made under the apparent threat of a presumed adversary fding the mirror 1m age of that ~uit in a ddfcn·nt rcourt]." On tel Prods. Inc y. Project Stratc,Pes (QrQ,_, ll99 F. Supp 1144. 1150 anticipatory filing 1S 1mproper if "'it attempt~ (S.D.~.Y. !995). A.n to exploit the first-filed rule by securing a venue that d1fkrs from the one that the filer's adwrsary would b£• expected to choose." ld, "When· a party is prepared to pur;ue a lawsmL but first desires to attempt settlement discussions, that party ,],ould not be deprived of the fir~t-fi!ed rule's beneflt oimply becduse its adversary used the resulting delay in filing to proceed w1th the mirror 1m age of the anticipated suit." Id_, Based on the corre~pondence of counsel att,Khl-'d to defendants' reply memorandum m support of the motion to stay, it app,;~rs that defendants wa1ted to f!le suit becau~l' the parties were enguging in settl<'ment discussions. (Def~_' ]{eply Mem Exhs. A & B.) l:lefore these diYcussions concluded, plaintiff filed this "uit m Maine. Ddmdant~ 24, 2014, before they were represent that the Cmmecticut suit was filed on Apnl ~l-rved on M~y 2 with the burrunons ~nd complamt for the \faine suit 1 Based on this limeline, plaintiffs' suit is an anl:!cipntory fllingthat should not reap the bencfi t of the "hr."t-filed" rule. 1 Dunng the telephone conference, plaintiff;' mun'd d1d not dispute defendants' h1story m the Tirs< paragraph of page four of defencl.anls' reply memorandum but offered further explanat:lon and context. 4 Other factors w~igh m support of grantmg- a ;tav. First, 1f ddcnd~nts are correct and the written contrad is bindmg on the parties, the forum selectwn cbu~e would dpply to theca~<' ~nd :he partic0 would be required to hhgate in Coru1eclicut 2 As defendants argue, the only way the Maine court can resolve ctll issues ib to find again~\ defendants. Plaintiffs do not face similar prejudice in ( :onnechcut. Second, defendanls could be prejud1ced by litigatmg m .'vlaine if they are unable to assert an unfair t:radc practices dam1 that may be availabk in Connecticut. Cumparf 42 C.G.S.A. § 42-l!Og(d} (West 2014) (providing cause of action lo "[a]ny pe"'m who suffers any . .'") w~lh a~certainable loss of money or property . 5 MRS.§ 213(1} (2013) (limiting pnvate cawN of action to '"[,l]ny p<'rson who purchasvs or leases good~, ;ervices or prop<,-ty .."}. ln the objection to the motion to stay, plaintiffs d.Jd not 1dcnlify ~ny specific benef1t to plaintiffs from litigating in Ma.me as oppoo<.'d to Connectlcut and relied primartly on conferenc~, th~ "first-filed'" the Connectic-ut court ru.l~. dismi~sed nefore the second telephone the Munroe' ~5 parties m the Connecticut suit. Defendanb represent they will file a motion to dismiss Ursula \tluruoe as a counterclaim defendant in tlw \lame suit and will file a motion for recon~ideration 1n the Conneclimt ~uit of the m-der dismissing Ryen M1Jruoe based, apparently, on additlonal information. The court does not have sufflctenl information to considerations. It appears, how~ver, that both smL~ addres~ all of the Fitch are similar m nature because 2 If the court deterrmnes the parties entered a c-ontract, as def~ndants argue, the ~ourt will view the contract as a whole ~nd avmd rendering any provision n>eaningless. lik~ly Se~ McCarthy v. U.S.!. Corp., 678 A.ld 4B. ,02 (Me. 1996). 5 m the Maine 'lUI, pla.tnl1ffs seck a declaratory jltdgmenl that no contract existed between the parties ~nd m the Connecticut suit, plaintiffs Bl!ege breach oi that alleged contract, unjuRt enriduncnt, and, notably <~hsent violation of Connecticut's Unfair Trade Practices Ad. defendants allege in their Both ~uits count~rclam1 are in the early st<~ges in the Mame sUlt, a In the l\famc su1t, breach of umtra< t and unjust l'nrichment. of the proceeding~ The expmse and inconverucnce to the parhcs if requ1rcd to litigate in the forum thev did not In dddition tp the abow considerations, because of the apparent heightened adver,arial nature of these lawSU!t,, including various discover:;: disputes the parties cannot resolve themselves, the potential for conflicting rulings from the Maine and Connechcut courts on d1scovery and evidenttarr issues JS real. 5!,e Fitch, 220 A.2d at 173 {"Each case must perforce present it~ own variety of ClTCumstances which may necess1tate d1fferent n,suJts.")_ The entry is Defendants' mohon to slav is CRAN rFD. !"his cas" is "tayed pending T<'SO]ulicln of the p~rtJes' suit in Connecticut. If the Conne<-ticut Supenor Court granLo the p·ndmg motion to d"mi5s or grants thl' pending motion to stay, counsel will r~quest ~conference with the court. 6 DAJ\IEL ROSI-'NTI:IAL ESQ YfARCCS CLEGG & MlSTRETrA 01\E C.A._'IAL PLAZA SUJTE 600 PORTLAND MF 04101--4035 ILSE TEETERS-TRUMPY F.SQ TAYLOR MCCORMACK & FRAI\.1F 30 MILK ST 5'HI'L00R PORTLAND ME 041()1

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