Shafran V. Cook d/b/a Bath Family Dental

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SUPJ.;J~IOR 5TATFOFMi\INE CLr,ffiERL,\ND, ss COlTJU CIV!I ACTION Docket :\fo. CV-11--? DORO 1"1-!Y SH1\FRA.N, Plaintiff OEDFR ON DEFF:!\"DAS J"'S MOTION TO DIS~llSS A."\JD MOTION ro STRIKJ::; v. TA.IdldY COOK d/b/a BATH 1-".1\~fTL Y DENTAL, .·. ·. Before th~ cuurt are dl'fendant's motiun to disnuss plaintJif's complaint in 1ts entirety and defendant'; mohon to ~trike exh.ib1l~ included W1th plaintiffs rcsponse to defendant's motion to d1,miss. 1\I.R C1v. 1'. 12(b)(6) & 12(f). In her complaml, plainTiff dlkges that duri11g her employment at defendant's dental off1cc, she complained to OSIIA concerning certain health practices m defendant's office. (Compl. '![ 7.) Shi, <~liege~ that ~fter the complaint, Dr. Cook issued unfounded a11d retahcltory disciplmary w,trnmgs against plaintiJf and dtscharged her from employm"nt. (Compl. '1['1[12, 13.) allcgc~ iurtlwr that Dr. U!lernployment Cook inkrfered m plaintiffs dfort to compen~cltion PlaintJ.ff obt~in and fikd a complaint agarnsl plaintiif v..'ith the M<li,-w Board of Dental F.xaminers. (Com pl. ~ ~J 6, 18.) rlamliff filed ,, complamt W1lh :he Mcline Human Rights Commission ,md was issued a right to sue ktter on Febrmrry 4, 2CH4. (Compl. 'If\. 21, 23, 25.) On May 1, 2014, plaintiff flied t.h'" l~w~uit. She allegb thl' follm\·ing: COW1t I· Violatton of thl' Maine 'Whistkblower's Proteci:Jon Act; colffit II. l-'dlsc L1ght; coLmt fjj, Intentional Infhclion of Emotwnal [)islrl'tis; count IV: ?\'egl1gcnt Infliction of Fmotional D1slrcss; rount V: Deiamal1Dn; count VI: Slander Pl-r Se. In lieu ol ~n 2014 and ~ttached answer, defeJlda11t filed the pending motion to d1srniss on July 25, two ex hi bib to the mol!on. [Jlaintiff attached five "xhibits to her n:sponse to the motion. Wtth ci-te reply to pla.inttffs oppoS!lWn, defendant ftkd a motion to 1trike plambff's exh1b1ts. For the following reasons, the motion to dismtss !S granted in part and denied m part_ The motion to si:J-,ke is granted. FACTS The followmg Tammy Cook 1s a !\lain~ bet~ Jcnti~t are taken from plaintiffs l:'omplaint. Defc=ndant whose busmess, Bath family Dental, is located in Bath, (Compl. 'i. 2.) Plaintiff Dorothy Shafran worhd as a hyg1enist for defendant from July 2DDS to October 18, 2Dll. (Compl. 'li 3.) In late 2010, plaintiff became conc..,med ~bout infection control lap~es in ddvndant's otficc. (Compl. <;:'![ 4-5.) /\fkr discussmg her com-ems with defendant to no dVclil. pl~inbff f1led d complaint with OSHA alleging a number of hcillth and safety h,uard~ nt the Bath Farmly Dental ,,ffice. (Compl. respon.'lc to pla.mti!Ys complBint, OSKA_ in~peclors ql~l b-7_) ln nmducted an mspedion of dcf"ndant's off1ce on October 4, 2011. (Compl. '::: 8.) Dunng llw OSHA iru;pection, defendant told the OS! !A inbpectors that slw knew who hied the complamt and would flre those mdi,·iduals. (Campi. 'IJ '1.) 'llw OSHA mspec:ms advised defendant that fmng an employ(·~ for making an OSHA complaint would violJlr OSHA's wh.istleblm\·Cr protections. (Cornpl. 2 'I D.) Dcfendont rebpondc>J d-wt ~he \\·oukl lire l'.'!e ,-cspon,.ible mdiv1dua!h for another re,lson and no one> would be able to pro\'c it was connectc·d to the OSIJA compia<nt (Compl. 'Jl: 1-:J.) .A fle~ the msp~ctor" left, dekndant unmcd1aldy n1Mle statements that ohe su1peckd plamtiff wao involved m hlmg the OSH:\ complaint. (C:ompl 'ff JL) During the next two weeh, defendant b~gan 1Ssuing to plaintiff w1founded and retali~lory disGplinary warning~- (Compl. 9[ 12.) These wamings culmmatc·d in pl<untiff's termination on October 18, 2011. (C:ompl. '![ '13.) A~ a resull of defendant's rctaliiltory acllon~. tlw US Department of Labor hied a complamt at;ainst defendant. (CompJ_ 'f H_) Ddendant e"teno>d a consent agreement with the Department of Ldbor on Ft•bruaTy 4, 2Ul3. (Compl. '![ 15.) Aller plaintiff wilq fin,d, bhe sougl1t Ull~mploymenl compensahon. (CornpL '~ 16.} Ddenddnt challenged plain1lff'., right to wwmploymenl compensation and stated plawtitf had bel'n dischart;ed for mJsconduct. (Com pl. ':: 16.) After a lengthy appc.U procesb, the Lnemployrnent Insurance CommiSSion found that plaintiff had nol engaged in JniSconduct that \\'arranted chscharge. (CompL '![ 17.) On 'v1av 23, 2012, dekndont filed a C(Jmplaint again~t pla'nb.ff vvith the l\1ame Board of Dental Ex<~mtnl'TS (the Board). (Cmnpl. ':: 1S.) In her complumt, defcndont alleged th~t plaintiff h,Id <'ngagcd m "theft and working out of the scope of one's hcensl' and "ndangering the dentist's license." (CumpL 91 18) Defendant concluded in lwr complaint, "'So l had ,he privilege of pciying [plamhff] a wage for cheating, lying, stealmg, and breaking the rulc1 of hl'r own licensure." (CompL 91 19) On June.\ 2012, the Boilrd voted to d1srniss the cmnpla<nt and found "no violab.on uf the Dental Practice ;\ct." (Compl. '![ 20.) 1 DJSCUSSIO!\ A_ \10TTO.'\TOS'mTK~: Defendant !!led a motion ;o ~ITikc \h,. exhibits at'cached to plmntiflb 1\!.R. Gv. P 12(1)_ rbponse to the motwn to dtsmiss. ,t\l,Kh<·d cxhibib to Llwir plcadmss. l11 fact, both parties "The general n1k '" Lhcll only the facts alleged in the complJi11t m~y b'-' wno;;dered on a motion to di~miss ." See Moodv "· State liquor & Lutt_,'ry_ Comm'n 2004 ME 20, 'II t\, 1-14] A.2d 43. _I!Jthough there are exceptionb tD t],,• t;<'nl'r.tl mle, the majority of the pdrlles' exhib1t.s Jo not come wtthin the exception~, ore incomplete, and inadmissible Td_ 'II HI. burlher, .such addittonal evidence is better cons1dered on a motion for summBr)' judgment, when the court has the bc·ndn of the organizing principles of Rule 56. The court holS not constdered these cxhbits m dectdmg this motion to d.Jsmtss. B. MOTION TO_DTSMl% 1. Standard of_Review On rev1ew of a motion to dimmss for failure to state ~ ddim, the court "cccpls the 2.006 ME i-acl~ ~4. <' mo~t f~vorabl~ alleged in plainbffb compl,inl ,\S adtnitted. ~aunder& v t\, '102_ A.ld 830. Tiw court thcn exammes those iad5 "in Tiohcr th~ light to plaintiff Lo determine whether it ode, forth clements of a cause of action or alleges facts th~t would '-'Illitle the plainl:!ff to wlid pursuanllo some legal theory." Doe v. GrahaJlt, 2009 \lE HH, 'JI 2, 977 A.2d 391 (quotint; Saunders 2006 \1~" Y4, 'll H, 9U2 A.2d 838). "Fo,- a omrt to ?roperly clismib& o d"1m for "aiiure to stale,, ca•..tse of acbon, it must clppear 'beyond doubt 1S enTitled to no relief tmder all}' ~d th~t [tlw[ plainllff of facts that might be proven m support of 4 the cLlim.' Dragornir v. Spnng ljarbor Ho~~. (quotino; l'!iJT,pltl!l-':.·. c~rrard 668 A.2d 882, 88~ 2.0\)9 ME 51, '[ 15, 97:) A.2d JJ(J (\1c. 1~95 !). 2. Whbtlebk1wvr !):~':"' tirm Act Clarm (Count I); DcfJmatwn !Count V), and Slander Per Sc (C<.mnt Vll a. Concjjl;ional Privilq;c or Absolute Privilq;.~ Defendant f1rst argues that tlw ha,i.s tor plaillttffs Jett<·r to the Board, is a privileged C"OJT'.muniG;t.wn and for her statem~nb compl~int, def~ndBnt detcndant's ("ilnnot be h,1ble in that letter. Plaintiff argues that w}u]e the communicdi:JOn may be conditionally privileged, the defenda11t has e1ther abused that privilege or .tcled outside the scope of lwr r~portmg ob!tgatiom. The first tssue is the ext<·nt of the Health Sc<:"Urity Act. The provitiiOn reportin~ privilege under the Mainv grar<ting il11mumty under certain ctrcumstances, 2.4 \1.R.S. § 2511 (2013), provides: Any per~on acting v...·1thout mol in·, .my phys1cian, podiatri,l, hmlth care pmv>dcr, health care entity or professional ~ocicly, any memh<·r of <1 professwnal compdence committee or profcs~ional review committee, any board or appropnate autl10rity and any entity required to report LUlder tbib chapter are immune from t.Wd liability: 1. Reporting. For making any report or other mfonnotion available to any h<1ard, appropriilte .tulhonty, profession~! competence comm,ttecc or profeti~ion.tl rev1ew committer· pursuant tD law; lnterpretalton of this section requires a detenni'latwn of whether the phnHC '"dclmg wltf\Oul malice" a?plic~ lo physicians ancl heallh care providers. lkr,i~mm v..Aroostook Medico! Ccnler the federol appeared to ,lpply the "acting wit~out malice"" di~tnct standard to all} of who made it. 937 F. Supp. %7, ':!75 (D. Me. 1996). The La1N th.i& section, but found it unnccc'ssary '·to expreso 5 il.ll In court of Maine r"port, regardless C:our~ has applied opm10n whether the immumty pmv1ded by section 2[;11 io absolute or conditioned on tht• reporter acting with01't mulicc .... " ldcCullougl1 v. V!Sit1:1a Nurol' Serv. of S. l\1e~ 1497 ::vrr; s:;, 91 1-1, 691 .-\ 20 121!1. apply only to """Y person" and not to phy~1c1ans and the Dther entitieo vxphcitly hsted m this section. This interpretation of the statute i~ PxphGtly set forth in the legislab.ve lustory of ,m cl!Tlcndment to tl1ih section, which explains the old law ~nd hov.,. the section was ~nwnded. Lnder exisb.ng law, immumty from civil and criminol liability is aC"mrded in certain circum~tances to a.ny person, physici~n. health c~re pru\"lder, physici~m· profession~! ~ociety, phy.oic·i:~ns' prok~c;ion.tl competence committee member or member of the medic~] or osteopathic bo~rd or related h<·alth care authority. l'he itruntmity apphes if an individual or orgoni,-.ation m the litit above acts without mahce in reporting inform~tion to an appropriate health care board or authority, in ass1sting in pH,panng informclt!On to be so reported, or m assisting the board or authonty to carry out its duties with Tegard to the hecllth care proh·%i(Jn. Secb.on 5 makl'o 3 substantive changes in the existmg law. l'h,rd, section 5 accords physiLi.ms and the listed health c~re organizations immumty for reporting to and assisting ,, pertinent lwalth c,rre board, authonty or committee without regard to wlwther the acb.ons we're w1th malicP. Thi" blanket immunity is not ~ccorded to other perslms reporting tom assisting the health care boards, authonties or conumttees; the 'mahce' stand3rd remams for these persons. [B]lanket civil immuruty, as opposed to unnwnity applyi:-~g a 'I!lalice' standord, is accorded pl1y.sicians a.:1d the li~ted health care organizations bec~tJSe :.hey, as opposed to other rwrsons, have cerh,;n dub.es to report unposed by the Vlame Health Semnty Act. l. D 252(), Statement of Fact,§ 5, at 11-12 (113tll Lq;. 19881. lf ddcndant's letter to the Blktrd is a report by a physiciar. or one oi the listed health care orgamzatwns that has a duty· to report, defendant is absululel)- nnmune from civ1lliability for .tny statement~ in that report. 6 Detendant, a denllst, is not a "phys1cia.n" ab dl'!int,J by the MHSA. 'JlHc Act defines medic;ne, phy~i<1dl' d~ "any natuwl reroon authorized by law to p.:"iKtice ostE"op~thk nwd'clil~ or \'eterinary medicine within this 'ii_dc." 1c; M.RS § 2502(3). The Act definco )walt~ olh,·r.s cerhhed, registered or licenol'd limited to, nurses, pod1Jlrists, cc.re proctihoncr as "phys1cians and lil ~11 the heilling drts, including_. but not denlisls ... " (d. § 2502(1-A). If the term "physician" int·luded J,·nl,sts, the mcluoion ,,f dentLsis as a tiqmrale group in the definition of health care pr acti l:!mwr would not be requin'dl Defendont'c lctkr could be a report by "hea:th care provider as defined under the ll,.lliSA. Health care· prov1der is dl'fmcd as "any hospital, clulic, nurbing horne or other fanlity i11 wh1ch skilled mw;ing care or medic~ I ~''rv1ces are prescribed by ur performed uncl<'r the general dire<tion of persons lic'en~ed to practJce mr•dicinc, dentistry, podiatry or surgery in thio Slate and that is licensed or othervc-·bl' ~uthonzcd by the lawo of this State." 24 M.R.S. § 2502(2). L:nder tllis definition, dd<'ndant'~ dental office i~ cl health care provider. There mav be a factual issue a& to whdher the letl€r wa.; wntten on beholf of lhe dentaloffic·" a,; an cnuty or whether it wa~ a personal letter hom :he defendant. Assuming that the letter is from a health CclH' pro<i!der, the next question JS whetlwr the rcporl was made "pursuant to law."" Dd"ndclnt argues that the report was either requ:red OT ,P.1thorized pursuclnl to two sections of the \TIISA. l !he dcfm:tio:-t vf lcec.lth rare ;}ro,~dcr 1r. th~ . .'.cl aho wppur.s the cont'iu-<:on tha:" 2 Argu"bly, section 2511 could be r~od to prov1dc blanke, HnTTnmity to health ~"re p,.ovidcr reports, regardleso of whe:hc:- they were made ;'ursuant to a ~tatutory du:y to rep,,rt t-;iven the plum lansn~,,ge of the statute, rc>w~ver, whJch scales "en; ~n:1:y rtquired to report" and th~ iegJSialurc'; ratwe1oi~ 'o" granting thc;e ~r.t'tie., blanket i:nmu:1ily, the better interprdotion J.S to a?ply blanht c:nmumly only to tPo>e r~pn,.ts that ar~ rcqmred !:>y io1v 24M R S. ~ 2511; ?,~ olso Me( '-lilough, 1997 ME 53, 91 l4. t91 A.2d 1201 (health care pronder "iulfililcd] 1ts oblipt1on :o ,.cport [plalllt'.:'f's] termmallon to tCte bnard' ). 7 I'1rst, deiendant argue~ thut 24 l\I.RS. § 2.5illi reqwred th<· r'-'port. That O<'cbon /\ health care providn or h~,1!th care cnhty shall, witbin 61l day,, n'Pnrt in writing to the dibciphned practi\llmds board or aulhoritv the na1nc <'f a11y hcensed, ccrllhcd or regiblercd employee Or person privileged by the providl'r or en:1ty v,-ho~'-' employl!l~nt, mclucling employment through a 3rrl party, or pnvlieges have been revoked, suspend>'d, [muted or tem1inated or wllO remgned while under investigation or to avoid in,·ebtigallon for rc~s<mS related to dimcal competence m- U:",professional conduct, together wtth perlment miormation rdutmg to that actio,). Under thio oeclmn, the report termmation or ~nothcr "hh~ll be mild" w1tlun 60 days" c,f e1ther event adverc;<, to the heaJtl1 (~rc practitioner. The statute reqmres a report only when the actions described in the report led to the krmincllion or other adver~c A.2d J 20'1 (tindmg two letter~ actwn. See :\1crullough, ;997 ME 55,'!:'[ 12-14,691 pn\'deged where the letter~ con tamed infom1ation about tlw basis for the tenn;nallon and tlw opcaftc details about the incidents leading to lenmnatwn). In this case, according to the complamt, the report was not made within 60 da:s·' and the n'port d1d not <~mcern actions that led to plaintiff's termination. (Com pl. '['[ 18-19) Deiendont was, therefore, not obligated to file a report under this section. Defendant al,o rehes on 24 M.R.S. § 25UC', which 1tates: Any pmfessional comp<Oknce corrumttee withm tlus State ~nd ,my physician or physician o~~i~lant licensed to practice or oth<'rwise lawfully pracllang wtthin thi~ Slate shall and any other person may, report the relevant facts to th'-' ,lppropriilk board relating to the acts of ~ny ph1-S1Uan or phyoic:ian asststant in this St,\te 1£, m the opmwn of tlw committee, physici~n, physJC!an aooiolant or other person, the committee or individual has reasonilbl" b1owledge o[ acts of the physician or physiciiln a~sistant amounting to gross or repeated medical Tlldlpractice, profesaonal incompetetce, 3 Defendant relies on fods tl,at do nor day rcqmremem. (D~f_'o 1\,!em. 4-5.) ~?pear 8 ir the corn phd w;1e~. addrcssmg the 60- unpmfl'S,SH-JIMl conduct or oexu.1l misconduct identi'icd by board rule 'l'lus sectwn cannot apply to defendant's :etter b<'cuuse the section applic~ only :o reporls rdatmg !0 the acts "c'f !'IllY phvsu:1an or physicia11 u~.sislant." Plaintiff ih neither a physician nor a phy<;ieian ~h~btant. 4 BecaUOl' dl'fcnd~nt was not obligated lo make a report under the 1\IHS.-\, Jcefendant does not recl~VV ub'I(J]ute immunity for her letter. It i.s not dear that scclion 2511 applies to dei<'ndanl's report if that r0port was not onthonzed "pur~uunllo" the lvfHSA. 2,1 M R.S. § 2511(1). Nc'V<'rL~do:,"", the communication could be' condillon,Uly privileged under the common law. See }lor_g;an v. Kamstra. 2008 'v1E 21\ '::: 32, 941 A.2d 447 ("A COJlditional pnv1lege pmlc'cts against liability for dcfamatwn wht'n ~ociety has ~n h1tcresl m promoting free, but not absolutely 1mfctlered, speech." (mlernal quotation marks ormtted)}. As cxplamed below, bC'('au~e the motion to dismiss should he denied even if the communication is conditionally pn,·ileged, lhc court does not J,·cidc= at this point wht'Lher a pnvilege applies. b. Applving the lvlailce Standard A~~uming lhdt ha~ a the malice ~tand~rd applies tr' ddo:,ndant's report, plaintiff alkged bets that could support a findmg of malice_ "'vlalice mcludes rnaking ~lalemcnl knowmg 1l IS false, with a reckless out of Ypite or 11l wUl." Id. 'j[ 34 disrl"g~rd tor Its truth, or acting l'lami:Jf['s complaint allc=ges that defendant filing a11 OSHA wmplai:-ct. (CompL '!: 10.) Plamtiff furth"r ~llcgcs that she was defe~<iant ".crsd; IS not,, phys,cian or phys1c:an assistam, defendant coc:ld make rhe repnn only ·.mder the cla·~se rdating to "any per&C>n" Au:horized reports lrmr "any person" would not receive blJnkel 1mmunity. See 24 :\f.RS. § 2511 ("Any per,on actmg wif.>out mal tee .... "). ·1 As expla:ned abm·c, became 9 \S~lwd 1mfounJed dtsciplinary wunnngs that led to ln•r tern:ination wi(h;n two weeks of the OSHA lnspcc:Jon. (CowpL 'll'R !2.-:J.) de!endcmt'b u(·nrnony towards pl~intitf. (CompL 'I'~ Dt+~,dnnt then opposed IH-19.) These allc·gcd facts are sufhcient to support a findmg thot ddcnJant acted w1th mahce m making the T~purllo the Board. B<ecause defendant i<; not immune from civd hability, counh; 1, V, a.:cd \•1 of the compl<nnl W>llnot be di~mihsed. 3. Fab~ ).ight (Count II) Defendant argues plamtill'b complaint failo to state a cause of adion lor fuls<e light because th,rc 1S no allegation of publicity, an element of the tort. 'v!ilinc tol!ows the Restakmcnt's formul~ticm of the tort of false hght mvasion of privilcy, wluch states: One who giveo public1ly to a matter concernint; <mother that pl~c~s the other before the public m a fals<' light is subkctlo hab!lity to the other for invasion of h1s privacy, if (a) Lhe false light in wluch the other was placed would be lughly offell.YlVe to a re~sOnclble person, and (b) Lhe actor had knowledge oi or ~ded m reckless di~rcgurd <lS to the fals1ty of the publi,~J.ed matter and the false light in wbich th" other would be p\3ced. Col~_v Chandler 2000 IdE lll4, 'lf 17, 752 A.2.d ll89 (quoting Restateme11t (Second) of l'orts § 632E (l977)). 'Tubhcrty" i~ defined by th<· R\'statemcnt as: "Public1ty," as Jt is uoed m llus Section, ciders [rom "publication," a~ t'-lal term ts used in !; 577 in comwcl1on w1th ltability for ddamcll10n. "'Publication,"-in Lhac sense, is a word of art, •~·hich indudes any commuric~ti<m bv the deknd~nl to a third person "Publicity,"' on the other hill•d, means t:lol lhe :natter JS :nade public, by communic-at'ng 1lto the public at large, or to so m~ny persons that the mattn mml be ~egarded dS s-abstanb:a!ly certain to become one of public knowledge. 10 ld. (quotmg Restatement (Second) of Tort"§ G"i2lJ cmt. a ]l977JJln il light doun n·n·nt fl'dt>rdl case, the court applied \bi,-w law and disnussed o fa],;,. wlwr~ thl' onl; dlicgalwns in the compbi,t \A·nc Lhat the defendant "miorm[ed] the Plaintiffo prmpccll\"e employero agencies ~nd/or that the Plaintiff hod hren diSmissed frm11 rned1cal stc-filJcg the llosp,tal for unsatiofadory P''rfonnance." :'vfurti!gh v_ St. 'vlclrv"s Re.-.'1 Health Ctr., 2_[)13 VVL 5348607, at '9 (D. J\k 20-13). '!he court concluded that these allegations \\'lW insufi1C1ent to sal!sfy the publicily rcquirement.ld. l'laml!fi's complaint alkg"s only that defe11dant'" stdlements and writt~n complaint to the Board form the baSiS of her !abe iight cla1m. 5 The colllpl~int faib to allege publicity. Accordingly, count II of plaintiff's complamt is clis!lcissed 4_ ln_t~ntionallnfliction_of Emotiondl Distress (Counllll) DdcnJ,mt argues that she is ,,-,tilled to judgrrent on cuunt Ill because the alleg<'d conduct uf hlmg the report is not cxtreme and law. A plamtiff mu~t outng~ous as a matter of J<'monstrate the followmg clements to prevail on an mlentwnalmfliction of emotional distress dailll: (I) the defendant mtentionolly or recklessly mt1rcted oev<>re cmolional cl"tress or was certaw or ,.;ubslanl!ally certain that such distress would result from [defendant's] conduct; (2i !he conduct was so exh•me and outrageous JO to exceed all possible bounds of decen(y clnd must be regarded i!O a:-,-mjous, utterly mtolerable in a civili~l'd mmmunity; (3) the dcllons of the defenda11t 'a".lsed tLe plcjJ:tiff's emotional d1slress; clnd ,'i !'he Board 1s generally required to keep conplamt; confider.tiaL 2_4 MRS 5 2510. (4) thr vm0L1m1al discre% ''" n'~oonal1lc [)wr~on[ omitted)_ "rllt is for ~uffe~ed cmJ[J by the t'l"inllfl was so severe that b.: expected to en<:hm· •l. th~ court to dd~nnine 1:1 the fJr&t instance whetlwr Chc· defendant's conduct may reasonably be regilrdcd as so extreme and outrageous to permit rl'mvcry." Lougee ConservancY v. CitiMm:tt:'!l;:!'~"-' 21112 ME lllJ, 'If 26, 48 A.3d 77•) (inkrnol CjUOldtlOn marks omitted). D~k11<hnt rdic' on Lases in wluch the courts held tl1~t ~ the alleged conduct did plainllff <ould not reco\'er ao a rn<Jlh·r of law because 110! nwd lhc "extreme and outTdf,('Du.," Botka v. S.C. No,-es & Co.c.lrrc-, 2003 MC 128, 'f 19, 831 A.2d ~t.mdard. See 9~7; St~pJ<·s v. Bam,or llvdro-Electnc Co. 561 A.2d 499, 501 ('vle. 1SJS9), Osgood v. CU. York lm_ c_:,,, 2006 \II,'L 19i!D3%, at '7 (Me. Super. June-~, 2DU6). As plaintiff points out, however, ~11 of these cases were decided on ~umrn~ry judgment. Plamb.ff has alleged th~t ddend.mt engaged m a carnp~ign to deotroy her professional reputatwn, which mcluded baseless disciplinary warnings and a ddam~toTy letter to the Board. (Co:-npl ':'][12, 13, 1fl, 1~. 27, 32, 36.) Because the specific bcb; m<1y be important regording wlwther the defendant's conduct wos extreme ~nd outrageous, t!w cou:t denie& th<' rnoli<m to dismiss th<' intcntion<Jl infhdion oJ eJ!totional McDunough, 2014 defendant 15 ~ 64, c~ di~h-e~' clilim. Bratton v. 23, 91 A.3d 1050 (expl,ining Llhlt 1£ reasonable not entitled to judgment as a matter of ]awl. complamt will not be dismissed. 12 Cotmt V of the 5 N egl_ig':'~1t ]1_1f1i ction ot bN!llonal Disb:<'So (( ount IV) Defendant arg,tes that plai,-,litr'o neghgent inflirtum of emotional diotr"-"'" cla1m fa!ls as a matter of law. ,:,. situalJOn~ ~"'JdTtlle negltgent illth< tw:: cLum mvolnng bystander liability. " speCial relationoh:p tort kd~UT and th<' p lam btl, or a sep;uate, emotional distress. J~cobi ind<·p<~nde:ct IS limited to bd1vc~n t_~e tort t!1a t ic the· cause of t_~e v _~-1'v1C fns. Co., 2011 l\11::' .~6. <JT 17, 17 A. 3d 1229. rhcrc ;ue no allegatwns in the complaint reg;uding by-'h"lder liability or a ~p~c,al relationship between the partieo Thus, 1! plaintiff C'an recover for negligc·nt inflictiOn of emotional dtsb:ess, the claim must be based on a ~l'parate underlying tort Plaintiff has alleged ddamatwn and could constJtute the und~rlying ol~nder per se. A defamation claim tort for the pm1'oses of inflichon of emotional dibtrcss claim. See P~ck,ilrd ::>laintJff~ ncghgent v. Cent. :\Je_ PowcT Co. 477 A.2d 264, 269 (Me. 19R4) (affirming trial court's dec1sion granting defenda11t JUdgment notwithsta11ding the verdtct on plamtiffs negligent inflidwn of emobonal dtsb:ess claim whc-r,· lhc jury fotrnd for dd"ndant on the underlying dd.m1alion clann). Although as aJieg<·d. negligent infliction of '"'wtional distress is nol an independent claim in this Cil.>e, plainbff could 1f she pre\'illls on her d~f~rnati<m !<'CllVCC under tl-us theory da1m. Count TV of the complamt wEI not be dtsmtssed. I! The entry i~ Defendant's :\lotion!(' Slnke 15 CRANTFD Defendant's :\·Iobo:c ID lJ1snuss io GRA.l\fED as iollows: Count 11 of l'ic~inltifs Co'llplau:l 1.S DISMISSED. Defend~nt'~ Motion to Diomios ,, UE:\1100 on Counts L IlL IV, V, and VI. v,,,_}Lirlj fA~~::':::'-::::___ ::--·ancv Y:ri:b juStiCe, Superior Court CUY1RERI.AND-C:V-14"213 14 0!< CO URn d.illcl Count\' Y Street, Grnund floor ·d. ME 04101 ROBFRT Kl 11\n::; FSQ PO BOX 75R9 PUKILA.~D_'v!L U-11!7 .c couRTs .\ml CmullY Strc•et, Ground Floor C.,ME04101 EKlC ME!-D'-iERl ESQ C'{}!THlA Ml·.HK'ERT ESQ PO BOX 45~ ORONO MF 04473

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