Galouch V. State of Maine

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. CV-12-)11~) STATE OF MAINE KENNEBEC, ss fV)('{){Y) -J<.£N _,a11 7j.J.tD 13 PATRICIA GALOUCH, Petitioner, v. ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT STATE OF MAINE, DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, Respondent. Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Patricia Galouch's ("Galouch") Complaint alleging violations ofthe Maine Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4551-4633 and the Maine Whistleblowers' Protection Act, 26 M.R.S.A. § 831 et seq. The Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by Defendant, the State of Maine Department of Professional & Financial Regulation (the "DPFR" or the "Employer"), pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56. Defendant argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law through the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the issue of whether the State terminated Galouch's employment for retaliatory or discriminatory reasons was resolved in prior arbitration between the parties. STATEMENT OF FACTS Between May 6, 2006 and October 22, 2010, Gal ouch was employed as an Office Associate II by the Maine Bureau of Insurance, a State of Maine Agency within the DPFR. (S.M.F. ~ 1.) Galouch is a member ofthe Maine State Employees Association, Local 1989 1 ("MSEA"). (S. Add'l M.F. ~ 2.) Beginning in 2007, MSEA filed a series of grievances on Plaintiff's behalf relating to alleged harassment and retaliation by managers at the DPFR. (S. Add'l M.F. ~ 2.) On March 10,2009, Galouch and MSEA representatives reached an agreement with the State wherein Galouch agreed to dismiss or withdraw all past grievances and complaints in order to retain her position; the State agreed to improve her working conditions, wipe clean her record with regard to discipline, and pay Galouch's attorney's fees. (Am. Campi.~ 8.) On two occasions in January 2010, Galouch reported that she believed certain State subcontractors had breached the terms of a court reporting service agreement. (S. Add'l M.F. ~ 3.) The first report was made to her supervisor and the second report was made to DPFR's Contract administrator. (S. Add'l M.F. administrative leave. (S. Add'l M.F. October 22, 2010. (S. Add'l M.F. ~ ~ ~ 3.) On January 28, 2010, Plaintiff was placed on 4.) The State terminated Galouch's employment on 4.) On October 29, 2010, Galouch filed a charge with the Maine Human Rights Commission and on June 3, 2011, she obtained a right to sue letter. (S. Add'l M.F. ~ 5.) On November 19, 2010, on Galouch's behalf, MSEA filed a grievance to challenge Plaintiff's termination. (S. Add' I M.F. ~ 2012. (S.M.F. 6.) An arbitration was held over eight days between March 22, 2012 and July 17, ~ 25.) The arbitrator was presented with an issue of whether, under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between the State and MSEA, the State had "just cause" to terminate Galouch's employment. (S.M.F. ~ 25.) During the arbitration, multiple witnesses testified with respect to Galouch's work performance at D PFR and Gal ouch, who was represented by MSEA and its attorneys, had an opportunity cross-examine the witnesses. (S.M.F. ~ 26-27.) Following the arbitration, the arbitrator issued an arbitration decision (the "Arbitration Decision") dated November 13, 2012, 2 which made certain findings of fact and conclusions. (S.M.F. ~ 29.) With respect to Galouch's job performance, the arbitrator's findings of fact included the following: "Galouch's performance problems included not getting along with co-workers and making errors that jeopardized the mission of the Bureau;" "Galouch was unable to maintain accurate docket filings for rate cases, which could have resulted in reversal of the Superintendent's decisions on appeal;" "Galouch also made errors in data entry, which could have led other states to take action against agents based on inaccurate information, creating potential liability issues for the Bureau;" "the job of legal secretary for the Bureau was beyond Gal ouch's abilities;" "Gal ouch was disorganized;" "Galouch was messy;" "Galouch was inattentive to details;" "Galouch argued with vendors about their contracts;" "Galouch argued with the Superintendent of the Bureau in public;" "Galouch was careless about how documents were sent out;" etc. (S.M.F. ~~ 8-23.) Because the State had not followed the principles of progressive discipline, the Arbitrator concluded that Galouch's termination was without just cause, but she upheld the termination on the ground that Galouch had failed to perform her duties as an employee of the Bureau of Insurance even adequately. (Armstrong Aff. Ex. A.) On May 29, 2012, Galouch filed a complaint in the instant matter alleging violations of the Maine Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4551-4633 and the Maine Whistleblowers' Protection Act, 26 M.R.S.A. § 831 et seq. Defendant moved to dismiss the action, but their motion was denied on February 15, 2013 by this Court's order holding that Galouch's complaint set forth sufficient facts to establish that she engaged in a protected activity under the Maine Whistle blowers' Protection Act. 3 STANDARD OF REVIEW Summary Judgment Summary judgment is appropriate when the Court's review of the parties' statements of material fact and cited record evidence indicates that there are no genuine issues of disputed material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Dyer v. Dep 't ofTransp., 2008 ME 106, ~ 14, 951 A.2d 821 (citation omitted). Courts consider such evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Beal v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010 ME 20, ~ 11, 989 A.2d 733. A fact is material if it has the potential to impact the outcome ofthe case. See Parrish v. Wright, 2003 ME 90, ~ 8, 828 A.2d 778 (citation omitted). An issue of fact is genuine when "sufficient evidence requires a fact-finder to choose between competing versions of the truth at trial." I d. At the summary judgment stage, evaluation of employment discrimination claims made pursuant to the Maine Human Right Act 1 involves a three-step, burden-shifting analysis. Daniels v. Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility, 2012 ME 80, v. Brewer School Dep 't, 2009 ME 2006 ME 37, ~ 57,~ ~~ 14-15, 45 A.3d 722 (citing Cookson 14, 974 A.2d 276); Whitney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 9, 895 A.2d 309). First, an employee must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id The burden then shifts to the employer to produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for its action. Id (citing Doyle v. Dep 't of Human Servs., 2003 ME 61, ~ 15, 824 A.2d 48). "If the employer does so, the employee can survive a motion for summary judgment by presenting sufficient evidence from which a fact-finder could determine 'that either 1 In Levitt v. Sonardyne, Inc., Judge Woodcock of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine clarified that a claim for whistleblower discrimination technically "arises under the [MHRA][,]" see 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4572(1)(A), 4621, which "'provides a right of action to ... whistleblowers who have suffered retaliatory discharge."' No. 2:12-cv-000320JAW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5658, at *25 n.1 (D. Me. Jan. 15, 2013) (quoting Costain v. Sunbury Primary Care, P.A., 2008 ME 142, ~ 6, 954 A.2d 1051). 4 (1) the circumstances underlying the employer's articulated reason are untrue, or (2) even if true, those circumstances were not the actual cause of the employment decision,"' but merely a pretext.Jd. (quoting Cookson, 2009 ME 57,~ 16, 974 A.2d 276). Collateral Estoppel "Collateral estoppel prevents a party from relitigating factual issues already decided 'if the identical issue necessarily was determined by a prior final judgment, and the party estopped had a fair opportunity' and incentive to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding." Kurtz & Perry, P.A. v. Emerson, 2010 ME 107, ~ 16, 8 A.3d 677 (quoting Efstathiou v. Efstathiou, 2009 ME 107, ~ 7, 982 A.2d 339; Macomber v. MacQuinn-Tweedie, 2003 ME 121, ~ 22, 834 A.2d 131). The findings made by an arbitration panel, to the extent necessary to its determination, may have preclusive effect for purposes of collateral estoppel. !d. ~ 18. A "valid and final award by arbitration has the same effects under the rules of res judicata ... as a judgment of a court" as long as the process leading to the award contains the essential elements of adjudication. Beal v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010 ME 20, ~ 14, 989 A.2d 733 (holding that an arbitration award had preclusive effect under the doctrine of collateral estoppel even though the award was not judicially confirmed). The essential elements of adjudication include: (1) adequate notice; (2) the right to present evidence and legal argument and to rebut opposing evidence and argument; (3) a formulation of issues of law or fact to apply rules to specified parties concerning a specified transaction; (4) the rendition of a final decision; and (5) any other procedural elements as may be necessary to constitute the proceeding a sufficient means of conclusively determining the matter in question. Kurtz & Perry, P.A., 2010 ME 107, ~ 19, 8 A.3d 677. 5 However, when an arbitration decision is issued with respect to a collective bargaining agreement, claim preclusion does not operate to bar the later filing of a statutory discrimination action brought before a court or specialized agency. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 54 (1974); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 744-745 (1981); McDonaldv. West Branch, 466 U.S. 284,292 & n. 13 (1984). In Gardner-Denver, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that when the State Legislature accords a statutory right (like a right accorded by the Maine Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4551-4633 and the Maine Whistleblowers' Protection Act, 26 M.R.S.A. § 831 et seq.), that public right is independent from and paramount to the ones guaranteed by a collective bargaining agreement. Gardner- Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 49-54. DISCUSSION The issue as presented requires the Court to first decide if Plaintiff is precluded from relitigating the issue of whether the DPFR had a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for Galouch's termination. The Court agrees with Galouch that when an arbitration decision is issued with respect to a collective bargaining agreement, a union member, like Galouch, is not precluded from filing an independent discrimination action with a court or specialized agency simply because the union pursued an employment-related claim as a grievance under that collective bargaining agreement. 2 2 Unless the collective bargaining agreement at issue "explicitly state(s]" that the parties agree to arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims, in that case, the right to pursue such claims in a judicial forum would be deemed waived. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 129 S.Ct. 1456, 173 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009). See also Pulkkinen v. Fairpoint Commc 'ns, Inc., No. 09-CV-99-P-H, 2010 WL 716109, at *4-5 (D. Me. Feb. 23, 2010). No such waiver exists in the case before this Court; Article 45 of the CBA, in relevant part provides as follows: The State and MSEA-SEIU agree that any disputes out of the provisions of this Article may be processed through the grievance procedure contained in the Grievance Procedure Article subject to the State's right to have any such grievance considered at the 6 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 54 (1974); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 744-745 (1981 ); McDonald v. West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 & n. 13 (1984). However, this does not mean that the arbitrator's findings must be completely disregarded by the Court in subsequent discrimination litigation. On the contrary, there is a body of law suggesting that factual findings made by an arbitrator after a proper arbitration proceeding may be conclusive in a later-filed civil suit between the same parties (or their privies), including a situation in which the earlier arbitration involved a contractually based wrongful discharge claim and the later lawsuit involved a claim that the employee's discharge violated one or more state civil rights statutes. Cole v. W Side Auto Employees Fed. Credit Union, 229 Mich. App. 639, 647, 583 N.W.2d 226,230 (1998). See also Gimas v. Bialy, 20020099, 2008 WL 650488, at *5 (Mass. Super. Feb. 22, 2008) (holding that the arbitrator's findings were sufficient evidence of the plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination in a later-filed civil suit); City of Boston v. MCAD, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 234,239 (Mass. 1995) ("forum adjudicating a statutory claim of discrimination may receive an arbitration decision in evidence and accord it the weight that seems appropriate"), overruled on other grounds by Tr. of Health and Hasp. of the City of Boston, Inc. v. MCAD, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 329 (Mass. 2005). If the arbitration has been conducted fairly and thoroughly by a competent arbitrator, the court or agency hearing the statutory claim may wish to give the arbitration decision rather more weight than if the arbitration has been loose, cursory, and conclusory. See Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 60 n. appropriate level or steps by the State's Affirmative Action Officer. This provision shall not preclude other legal remedies provided by law. (Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. 4 (emphasis added).) 7 21; City of Boston v. Massachusetts Comm 'n Against Discrimination, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 234, 239 (Mass. 1995). In the latter case, an arbitrator found that the employer had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons to terminate the plaintiff, an African-American corrections officer who violated multiple regulations and rules. But in a subsequent action filed with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, the plaintiff was able to show that the reasons were pretextual because white corrections officers who had engaged in similar conduct were not terminated. ld at 23 7. Here, because the findings of the arbitrator noted above were made as a result of what appears to be a fair and thorough proceeding (an eight-day judicial-type proceeding) conducted by a competent arbitrator, the Court could be justified in deciding at this stage of the proceedings that the findings should be given considerable weight and preclusive effect on the issue of whether DPFR had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons to justify her termination. However, the Court will not do so at this time. The Court cannot, as a matter of law, ignore the third-step of the Daniels burden-shifting analysis. DPFR is asking the Court to grant full summary judgment in its favor. The third step of the Daniels analysis- the issue of pretextwas not even addressed in arbitration, and no discovery has yet been conducted. The Court concludes that Galouch is entitled to an opportunity to generate evidence through discovery on the issue of pretext. Daniels, 2012 ME 80, ~ 15,45 A.3d 722. As noted at the time of oral argument, the Court would expect that evidence developed in discovery on the second and third steps of the Daniels analysis would tend to overlap significantly. Whether the evidence generated in discovery creates an issue or issues of material fact on the issue of whether D PFR had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for termination can be decided at a later stage of these 8 proceedings. The Court also specifically reserves ruling on whether and to what extent the arbitrator's findings of fact will be given preclusive effect on that issue. Discrimination claims in general are often quite difficult to assess at the summary judgment stage and particularly, "the issue ofwhether an employee has generated an issue of fact regarding an employer's motivation or intent is one heavily dependent on the individual facts before the court." !d. (quoting Cookson, 2009 ME 57,~ 12, 974 A.2d 276). CONCLUSION The Court concludes that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is premature. The entry will be: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED without prejudice. After discovery is complete, both parties may file dispositive motions under the Rules. \?-\\'1-\l) DATE ~ ~-SUPERIOR COURT :mS1>fcE 9 PATRICIA GALOUCH SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. Docket No AUGSC-CV-2012-00175 - PLAINTIFF Attorney for: PATRICIA GALOUCH JAMES A CLIFFORD - RETAINED CLIFFORD & CLIFFORD LLC 62 PORTLAND RD SUITE 37 KENNEBUNK ME 04043 DOCKET RECORD VS STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL - DEFENDANT 35 STATE HOUSE STATION AUGUSTA ME 04333-0035 Attorney for: STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL KELLY L TURNER - RETAINED OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 6 STATE HOUSE STATION AUGUSTA ME 04333-0006 MILA KOFMAN (DISMISSED) - DEFENDANT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, 2233 WISCONSIN AVE NW, STE 525 WASHINGTON DC 20007 Attorney for: MILA KOFMAN (DISMISSED) KELLY L TURNER - RETAINED OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 6 STATE HOUSE STATION AUGUSTA ME 04333-0006 ANNE HEAD (DISMISSED) - DEFENDANT DPFR, 35 STATE HOUSE STATION AUGUSTA ME 04333-0035 Attorney for: ANNE HEAD (DISMISSED) KELLY L TURNER - RETAINED OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 6 STATE HOUSE STATION AUGUSTA ME 04333-0006 Filing Document: COMPLAINT Filing Date: 05/29/2012 Minor Case Type: CONSTITUTIONAL/CIVIL RIGHTS Docket Events: 05/30/2012 FILING DOCUMENT - COMPLAINT FILED ON 05/29/2012 Plaintiff's Attorney: JAMES A CLIFFORD 05/30/2012 Party(s): PATRICIA GALOUCH ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 05/29/2012 Plaintiff's Attorney: JAMES A CLIFFORD 05/30/2012 Party(s): PATRICIA GALOUCH OTHER FILING - ENTRY OF APPEARANCE FILED ON 05/29/2012 Plaintiff's Attorney: JAMES A CLIFFORD 06/28/2012 Party(s): PATRICIA GALOUCH SUPPLEMENTAL FILING - AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED ON 06/21/2012 Plaintiff's Attorney: JAMES A CLIFFORD Page 1 of 6 Printed on: 12/17/2013 AUGSC-CV-2012-00175 DOCKET RECORD 07/11/2012 Party(s): STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL MOTION - MOTION TO DISMISS FILED ON 07/06/2012 Defendant's Attorney: KELLY L TURNER WITH MEMORANDUM OF LAW, ATTACHED EXHIBITS AND PROPOSED ORDER 7/6/2012-AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS FILED 08/02/2012 Party(s): PATRICIA GALOUCH MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FILED ON 07/27/2012 Plaintiff's Attorney: JAMES A CLIFFORD TO FILE RESPONSE TO STATE'S AMENDED MOTION TO DISISS. 08/02/2012 Party(s) : PATRICIA GALOUCH MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME GRANTED ON 08/02/2012 M MICHAELA MURPHY 1 JUSTICE COPIES TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 08/02/2012 Party(s): STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 07/06/2012 Defendant's Attorney: KELLY L TURNER 08/02/2012 Party(s): MILA KOFMAN (DISMISSED) ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 07/06/2012 Defendant's Attorney: KELLY L TURNER 08/02/2012 Party(s): ANNE HEAD (DISMISSED) ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 07/06/2012 Defendant's Attorney: KELLY L TURNER 08/10/2012 Party(s): STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FILED ON 08/07/2012 Defendant's Attorney: KELLY L TURNER FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND PROPOSED ORDER 08/15/2012 Party(s): PATRICIA GALOUCH OTHER FILING - OPPOSING MEMORANDUM FILED ON 08/15/2012 Plaintiff's Attorney: JAMES A CLIFFORD TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 08/17/2012 Party(s): STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME GRANTED ON 08/17/2012 M MICHAELA MURPHY JUSTICE COPIES TO PARTIES/COUNSEL DEFENDANT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS IS DUE ON OR BEFORE AUGUST 27 2012 I 1 08/31/2012 Party(s) : STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL,MILA KOFMAN (DISMISSED) ,ANNE HEAD (DISMISSED) OTHER FILING - REPLY MEMORANDUM FILED ON 08/27/2012 Defendant's Attorney: KELLY L TURNER IN SUPPORT OF ITS AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS Page 2 of 6 Printed on: 12/17/2013 AUGSC-CV-2012-00175 DOCKET RECORD 11/14/2012 HEARING- MOTION TO DISMISS SCHEDULED FOR 11/28/2012 at 10:45 a.m. M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE in Room No. 2 11/14/2012 HEARING - MOTION TO DISMISS NOTICE SENT ON 11/14/2012 11/14/2012 ASSIGNMENT - SINGLE JUDGE/JUSTICE ASSIGNED TO JUSTICE ON 11/14/2012 M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE 11/21/2012 Party(s): PATRICIA GALOUCH MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE FILED ON 11/21/2012 Plaintiff's Attorney: JAMES A CLIFFORD MOTION HEARING 11/21/2012 Party(s): PATRICIA GALOUCH MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE GRANTED ON 11/21/2012 M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE RE-SCHEDULED FOR LATER IN DECEMBER. UNDERSIGNED NOT IN KENNEBEC ON 12/11/12. COPY TO ATTY CLIFFORD AND AAG TURNER 11/21/2012 HEARING - MOTION TO DISMISS NOT HELD ON 11/21/2012 MOTION TO CONTINUE GRANTED 12/21/2012 HEARING - MOTION TO DISMISS SCHEDULED FOR 01/09/2013 at 09:30 a.m. M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE in Room No. 2 12/21/2012 HEARING - MOTION TO DISMISS NOTICE SENT ON 12/21/2012 LIST SENT TO ATTY CLIFFORD AND AAG TURNER 01/09/2013 HEARING - MOTION TO DISMISS HELD ON 01/09/2013 M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE Defendant's Attorney: KELLY L TURNER Plaintiff's Attorney: JAMES A CLIFFORD TAPE 1644, INDEX 5753-7162 AND TAPE 1645, INDEX 72-155 UNDER ADVISEMENT 02/20/2013 Party(s): STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL MOTION - MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED ON 02/15/2013 M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE COPY TO ATTY CLIFFORD, AAG TURNER 03/05/2013 Party(s): STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIVE PLEADING - ANSWER TO AMENDED PLEADING FILED ON 03/04/2013 Defendant's Attorney: KELLY L TURNER DEFT'S ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT 04/18/2013 Party(s): PATRICIA GALOUCH LETTER - FROM PARTY FILED ON 04/17/2013 Plaintiff's Attorney: JAMES A CLIFFORD REGARDING SCHEDULING ORDER AND AMENDED COMPLAINT 04/23/2013 ORDER - SCHEDULING ORDER ENTERED ON 04/23/2013 M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE Page 3 of 6 Printed on: 12/17/2013 AUGSC-CV-2012-00175 DOCKET RECORD ORDERED INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE AT THE SPECIFIC DIRECTION OF THE COURT. PARTIES/COUNSEL COPIES TO 04/23/2013 DISCOVERY FILING - DISCOVERY DEADLINE ENTERED ON 12/23/2013 05/15/2013 Party(s): STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL MOTION - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED WITH AFFIDAVIT ON 05/15/2013 Defendant's Attorney: KELLY L TURNER WITH MEMORANDUM OF LAW STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AFFIDAVIT OF JULIE PROPOSED ORDER ARMSTRONG AND 06/06/2013 Party(s): PATRICIA GALOUCH OTHER FILING - AFFIDAVIT FILED ON 06/05/2013 Plaintiff's Attorney: JAMES A CLIFFORD OF PATRICIA GALOUCH 06/06/2013 Party(s): PATRICIA GALOUCH OTHER FILING - OPPOSING MEMORANDUM FILED ON 06/06/2013 Plaintiff's Attorney: JAMES A CLIFFORD PLTF'S OPPOSING STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS ANB STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS, PLTF'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFT'S MOTION SJ 06/13/2013 Party(s): STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL OTHER FILING - REPLY MEMORANDUM FILED ON 06/12/2013 Defendant's Attorney: KELLY L TURNER DEFT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SJ, REPLY STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 06/18/2013 HEARING - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT SCHEDULED FOR 07/15/2013 at 11:30 a.m. M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE in Room No. 2 06/18/2013 HEARING - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOTICE SENT ON 06/18/2013 06/25/2013 Party(s) : STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE FILED ON 06/24/2013 Defendant's Attorney: KELLY L TURNER DEFT'S UNOPPOSED MOTION TO CONTINUE (HEARING 7/15/13) 07/03/2013 Party(s): PATRICIA GALOUCH ADR - NOTICE OF ADR PROCESS/NEUTRAL FILED ON 07/03/2013 Plaintiff's Attorney: JAMES A CLIFFORD MEDIATION WITH JERROL CROUTER, 7/30/13 07/03/2013 Party(s): STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE GRANTED ON 07/02/2013 M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE COPIES TO PARTIES/COUNSEL NEXT CIVIL MOTION DAY RESCHEDULED TO 07/03/2013 HEARING - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOT HELD ON 07/02/2013 MOTION TO CONTINUE GRANTED 08/29/2013 Party(s): STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FILED ON 08/23/2013 Page 4 of 6 Printed on: 12/17/2013 AUGSC-CV-2012-00175 DOCKET RECORD Defendant's Attorney: KELLY L TURNER DEFT'S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT TO COMPLETE ADR 08/30/2013 Party(s) : STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME GRANTED ON 08/29/2013 M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE COPIES TO PARTIES/COUNSEL ADR BY 1/23/14. ALL DEADLINES SET BY SCHEDULING ORDER FOLLOWING THE DISCOVERY DEADLINE ARE EXTENDED BY 30 DAYS. 09/21/2013 HEARING - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT SCHEDULED FOR 10/09/2013 at 09:00 a.m. M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE in Room No. 2 09/21/2013 HEARING - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOTICE SENT ON 09/21/2013 10/09/2013 HEARING - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT HELD ON 10/09/2013 M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE Defendant's Attorney: KELLY L TURNER Plaintiff's Attorney: JAMES A CLIFFORD TAPE 1767, INDEX 3600-4965 ADVISEMENT UNDER 10/09/2013 CASE STATUS - DECISION UNDER ADVISEMENT ON 10/09/2013 M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE MOTION SJ 10/17/2013 Party(s): STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL DISCOVERY FILING- RULE 26(G) LETTER FILED ON 10/16/2013 Defendant's Attorney: KELLY L TURNER REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, ETC, SERVED 10/9. 10/29/2013 HEARING- 26(G) CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR 10/31/2013 at 09:00 a.m. M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL 10/30/2013 Party(s) : STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL LETTER - FROM PARTY FILED ON 10/25/2013 Plaintiff's Attorney: JAMES A CLIFFORD RESPONSE RE: REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY CONFERENCE 11/03/2013 HEARING- 26(G) CONFERENCE HELD ON 10/31/2013 M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE Defendant's Attorney: KELLY L TURNER Plaintiff's Attorney: JAMES A CLIFFORD 11/03/2013 ORDER- 26(G) ORDER ENTERED ON 10/31/2013 M MICHAELA MURPHY , JUSTICE ALL DISCOVERY DEADLINES STAYED UNTIL 11/15/13 PARTIES/COUNSEL 12/03/2013 Party(s): PATRICIA GALOUCH JURY FILING - DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL FILED ON 11/27/2013 Plaintiff's Attorney: JAMES A CLIFFORD Page 5 of 6 COPIES TO Printed on: 12/17/2013 AUGSC-CV-2012-00175 DOCKET RECORD 12/17/2013 Party(s): STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL MOTION - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT DENIED ON 12/17/2013 M MICHAELA MURPHY I JUSTICE COPIES TO PARTIES/COUNSEL AND REPOSITORIES. DEFT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. AFTER DISCOVERY IS COMPLETE, BOTH PARTIES MAY FILE DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS UNDER THE RULES. A TRUE COPY ATTEST: Clerk Page 6 of 6 Printed on: 12/17/2013

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.