L'Hommedieu V. Ram Aircraft

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

STATE OF MAINE CUMBERLAND, ss BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT Location: Portland Docket No.: .B· CD-CV-13:31 .. / .,/ LtJv- {'u/}J - cr;~o l_.,()' :s ) E. CHRIS L'HOMMEDffiU and HEATHER ) PERREAULT, Personal Representatives of ) the ESTATE OF BDWARD ) L'HOMMEDIEU, STEPHEN M. MYERS, ) and KIM C. MYERS, ) ) Plaintiffs, v. RAM AIRCRAFT, L.P. CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY d/b/a MCCAULEY PROPELLER SYSTEMS, MAINE AVIATION SALES, INC., AIRCRAFT MAlNTENANCE OF MAINE, INC., YANKEE AVIATION SERVICES, INC., NEW ENGLAND PROPBLLOR SERVIC, INC., ENGINE COMPONENTS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and CHAMPION AEROSPACE, LLC, Defendants ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) DECISION AND ORDER (Motion to Set Aside Defa\llt!Motlon for Leave to File Late Answer) Tllis 11111ttet' is before the Coutt on Defendant Champion Aerospace LLC's (Defendant Champion) Motion to Set Aside Default and Motion for Leave to File Late Answet·. The record reflects that Plaintiffs set·ved the complaint and summons on Defendant Champion's agent, CT Cot·poratlon Systems, on May 3, 2013. When Defendant Champion did not file an answer to the complaint, on June 10,2013, Plaintiffs requested and obtained a default against Defendant Champion. The clerk nlso entered default judgment against Defendant Champion. The fimll default was entet·ed on June I7, 2013. On Juue 24, 2013, Defendant Champion flied a late answet', a motion for leave to file late answer, and a motion to set aside the default and default judgment. DisC\lssion M.R. Civ. P. 55(c) provides that n[f]ot· good cause shown the cout1 may set aside an entry of default and, If a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b)." "To meet the 'good cause' standard of R\lle 55(c) a patiy must show 'both a good excuse for his untimeliness in pleading ... and the existence of a meritorio\IS defense"'. Hammondv. Thomas RealtyAssocfales, 617 A.2d 562,563-64 (Me. 1992) (clflng, Design Build ofMaine v. Paul, 601 A.2d 1089, 1091 (Me. 1992)). In addition, the Court should be mindful of the law's preference for t·esolvlng c!'lses on the merits, mther than ou a procedural basis. See, Thomas v. Thompson, 653 A.2d 417, 420 (Me. 1995); 3 Harvey, Maine Civil Pmct/ce § 55.7 at 207 (2012-2013). Preliminarily, given that the clerk is only authorized to enter a default judgment "for a sum certain ot ¢ fot· a S\ltn which can by computation be made certain," and given that Plaintiffs' claim cannot is not one fot ¢ a sum certain, the clerk was not authorized to enter a default judgment. M.R. Civ. P. 55(b)(l). Accordingly, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b), the Court will grant Defendant Champion's ¢·equest for relief fi'Om the default judgment and will vacate the judgment. As mentioned above, in its assessment of Defendant Champion's request to set aside the default, the Court must determine whether Defendant Champion has demonsiJ·ated a good excuse fm· its failure to file an answe1· to the complaint within 20 days of the service of the complaint and smmnons, and a meritol'ious defense to Plaintiffs' claim. Based upon a review ofPIHintiffs' complaint, and the affidavit of James Liddle, Defendant Champion's president, the Com1 2 concludes that the cause of the airplane crash that is the subject of this case, including Defendant Champion's potential responslbiUty for the crash, is very much in dispute. The Court is convinced, therefore, tbat Defendant Champion has a meritorious defense to Plaintiff's claim, The issue thus becomes whethet· Defendant Champion has demonstrated a good excuse fol' its failure to file timely its response to Plaintiffs' complaint, First, the Cout·t notes that after leaming of the entry of default through a mailing from the Cumberland County Court, Defendant Champion, through Its counsel, promptly filed an answer and the pleadings by which Defendant Champion seeks to remove the default. Defendant Champion's prompt actions suggest that Defendant Champion's failure to file timely an answet· was not the product of its disregard for the judicial process. In addition, the Court is convinced that Defendant Champion's failure to file the answer resulted fi·om a brenkdown in the process established by TransDigm, Defendant Champion's parent company, to assUI'e that complaints are managed properly. The breakdown flpparently resulted from a combination of factot·s in TransDigm 's office during the tin1e that the complaint was received, which factors include the recent relocation of the office of one of the individuals responsible for handling the complaint, and several othet ¢ pressing business matters. The fact that Defendant Champion, through its parent compnny, has an established proced\lre for handling complaints is ftwther evidence that Defendant Champion did not intend to disreg1ml or disrespect the process. In short, the Co\lli is perslladed that Defendnnt Champion's faihll'e to tile was likely caused by inadvertence rather than an intentional disregard for the cou1t process. Under these circ\lmstanccs, which include Defendant Champion's prompt efforts upon learning of the defa\llt to answer the complaint and to seek removal of the defnult, the Court conchtdes that Defendant Champion has demonstrated a good exc\ISe fo ¢· the faih1re to file an answer to the complaint. The 3 Cout·t believes that this conclusion is consistent with "the policy of the Jaw to favor, wherever possible, a hearing on the merUs ... " Westcott v. Allstate, 397 A.2d !56, 163 (Me. 1979). 1 Conclusion Based on the foregoing annlysis, the Court grants Defendant Champion's Motion to Set Aside Defa\dt, and grants Defendant Champion's Motion for Leave to File Late Answe1·. Accordingly, the Court vacates the judgment against Defendant Champion, sets aside the default entered ngnlnst Defendant Champion, and Rllows the flUng of the lftte answer. Pursuant to M.R. Clv. P. 79(a), the Clerk shall incorporate this Decision and Ordet· into the docket by reference. Date: r/46I{:1 J hu C. Nivison J tstice, Maine Business & Consumer Court 1 Allhough perhAps not onlfroly rolovant to the Court's "good cnuse" Analysis, tho fact that the cnso is In Its lnflmt stages and involves mul!iplo DofendRnts finther convinces tho Court that removal of tho default Is AppropriAte. 4 E. Chris L'Hommedieu et al v. RAM Aircraft, LP et al BCD-RE-13-33 PLAINTIFFS COUNSEL (NAME AND ADDRESS) Kim C. Myers Norman Hanson & DeTroy P.O. Box 4600 E. Chris L'Hommedieu Portland, Maine 04112-4600 Lance E. Walker, Esq. Heather Perreault E. Chris L'Hommedleu and Heather Perrault as CoPersonal Representatives of the Estate of Edward L'Hommedleu Philip M. Coffin, Ill, Esq. Lambert Coffin 477 Congress Street P.O. Box 15215 Portland, Maine 04112-5215 DEFENDANTS COUNSEL (NAME AND ADDRESS\ RAM Aircraft, L.P. Christopher C. Dinan, Esq. Monaghan Leahy, LLP 95 Exchange Street P.O. Box 7046 Portland, Maine 04112-3906 Cessna Aircraft Company d/b/a McCauley Propeller Services Martha C. Gaythwaite, Esq. Friedman Gaythwalte Wolf, LLP 25 Pearl Street P.O. Box4726 Portland, Maine 04112-4726 Maine Aviation Safes, Inc. and Aircraft Maintenance of Maine Noreen A. Patient, Esq. Eaton Peabody 167 Park Row, P.O. Box 9 Brunswick, Maine 04011 Yankee Aviation Services James B. Haddow, Esq. Petruccelli Martin & Haddow, LLP Two Monument Sq., Ste. 900 P. 0. Box 17555 Portland, Maine 04112-8555 New England Propeller Service, Inc. Engine Components International, Inc. Champion Aerospace, LLC Phillip E. Johnson, Esq. Johnson & Webbert, L.L.P. 160 Capitol St., Ste. 3 : P.O. Box 79 Augusta, Maine 04332-0079 Daniel R. Mawhinney, Esq. Thompson & Bowie, LLP Three Canal Plaza P.O. Box 4630 Portland, Maine 04112 JohnS. Whitman, Esq. Richardson Whitman Large & Badger 465 Congress Street P.0. Box 9545 ftJfOl!Wj) .N/1/?}Jl;- tJ'f;!;l.- 95':1~- STATE OF MAINE CUMBERLAND, ss BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT Location: Portland · Docke~No.: BCDMCVM13-3J / ( " j vI -· ,,_ 1 · . · ! : '~\ -· ' ¢ r. ' i I ' .,_ '<--1 ; ,: I ; I I ). ..-0 I ) B. CHRIS L'HOMMBDIEU and HEATHER ) PERREAULT, Personal Representatives of ) the ESTATE OF EDWARD ) L'HOMMEDIBU, STEPHEN M. MYERS, ) and KIM C. MYERS, ) Plaintiffs, v. RAM AIRCRAFT, L.P. CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY d/b/a MCCAULEY PROPELLER SYSTEMS, MAINE AVJATION SALES, INC., AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE OF MAINE, INC., YANKEBAVIATIONSBRVICES, INC., NEW ENGLAND PROPBLLOR SBRVIC, INC., ENGINE COMPONENTS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and CHAMPION AEROSPACE, LLC, Defendants ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) DECISION AND ORDER (Motion to Dismiss) Defendant Yankee Aviation Services, Inc. (Yankee) moves to dismiss the complaint of Plaintiffs Stephen M. Myers, Kim C. Myers, and B, Cluis L'Hommedieu and Heather Perreault, Personal Rep~·eseutatlves of the Estate of Edward L'Hommedieu, for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Through its motion, Yankee asserts that its contacts with the State of Maine are insufficient to justifY the exercise of either general or specific pet'Sonal jurisdiction by Maine courts. } FACTUAL BACKGROUND The following facts are based on the Plaintiffs' complaint and the affidavit submitted by Yankee. See Doifv. Complastlk Corp. ¢ 1999MB 133, ,,. 13"14, 735 A.2d 984. This case arises out of a plane crash that occurred on Apl'il 10, 2011, when the right engine of a Cessna aircraft (the Aircraft) piloted by Edward L'Hommedieu suffered a loss in powet· Municipal Airport. (Compl. "22, 26~27.) ne~r the Biddeford The Aircraft rapidly lost velocity and altitude and crashed Into the home of Stephen and Kim Myers. (Compl. ,-[,-[ 28-30.) The crnsb resulted In the death of Edward UHommedieu. (Compl. 1 34.) Plaintiffs aUege that the right engine of the Aircraft failed becnuse of improperly installed or defective o"rlngs In that engine. (Compl. ~,-[ 41"42.) In their complaint, Plaintiffs make no allegations that are specific to Yankee; rather, the complaint consists of general allegations against all of the named Defendants. Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that between 2002 and 2011, the Defendants repaired, maintained, inspected, or replaced parts in the Aircraft's right engine, and at the conclusion of these tasks, certified that the Aircraft was airwot·thy. (Compl. ~1 45, 47.) Plaintiffs allege that the defect in the o~rlngs, rendered the Aircraft not airworthy, and that the tasks performed by the Defendants were thus perfonned improperly, ultimately leading to the engine failure and death of Edward L'Hontmedleu. (Compl. 1l'd 46, 48~49.) The only specific reference to Yankee in the complaint is as follows: uoefendant Yankee Aviation Services, Inc. is a Massachusetts corporatlon with a pl'imary place of business in Plymouth, Massachusetts. Yankee Aviation Services, Inc. is in the business, Intel' alia, of providing aircraft maintenance, Inspection and repah· sel'vices.11 (Compl., 17.) 2 In support of its motion to dismiss, Yankee submitted the affidavit of Peter G. Conner; the president ofYankee. 1 (Conner Aff. W 1, 3.) Yankee is a fixed-base operator, providing, am~ng other services, aircraft inspection, repair, and maintenance at the Plymouth Municipal Airport in Plymouth, Massachusetts. (Conner Aff. , 5.) The location in Plymouth is the only location at which Yankee does business. (Conner Aff., 4.) Between February 10 and June 30, 2004, Yankee performed work on the Aircraft at its Plymouth facility, pursuant to an agreement with the Ah'Craft's then owner, a Massachusetts limited liability company located In Nantucket, Massachusetts. (Conner Aff. 'jfl 1.) . Yankee has never conducted any business in Maine. (Conner Aff. , 9.) Yankee has never owned any property or had any place of business In Maine, has never had any employee or agent in Maine, not ¢ has Yankee advet1ised In any publication bused in or circulated exclusively or primarily in Maine. (Conner Aff. 1 6.) Prior to 2004, Yankee advet1ised intermittently in two print trade publications that circulate4 throughout the United States, including Maine, but Yankee has not advertised subsequently in any print or online publication. (Cotmer Aff. , 7.) Beginning around 2004, Yankee has maintained a passiv6, informational website (www.yankeeavlation.com), which provides information about Yankee and its services. (Conner Aff. 1 8,) From at least the beginning of 2004, Yankee has had no clients with Maine addresses and, to the best of Ml'. Conner's knowledge, no clients who were Maine residents. (Conne1· Aff. 'J 10.) None of the Plaintiffs or the Decedent, Edward L'Hommedieu, was a customer of Yankee. (Conner Aff. 'J 10.) DISCUSSION 1 Sfnco 1985, ·Connor and his wlfo Gall A. Conner have been tho only two directors, officers, or shareholders of Yankee. (Conner Aff. ~ 1.) 3 A. Standard of Review nMaine's jurisdiction over nonresident defendants is controlled by its ·long-arm statute/' 14 M.R.S. § 704-A (2012), which "is co-extensive with the due process clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. XIV,§ 1." Murphy v. Keenan, 661 A.2d 591, 593 (Me. 1995). Thus, the CoUl't need only nconsidet· whether due process requirements have been satisfied" in addressing the question of personal jurisdiction. Suttle v. Sloan Sales, Inc., 1998 ME 121,14,711 A.2d 1285. Personal jurisdiction over a no!U'esident defendant may be either general or specific; satisfaction of one fot·m of jurisdiction is sufficient to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by Maine Comts. See H(lr/ow v. Chfldren's Hosp,, 432 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2005), noeneral jurisdiction broadly subjects the defendant to suit in the forum state's com1s in respect to aU matters, even those that at·e unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the forum!' Cossaboon v. Me. Med. Ctr., 600 F.3d 25, 3 I (1st Cir. 2010), Specific jurisdiction exists when "the cause of action arises directly out of, or relates to, the defendant's forumAbased contacts,, ld (quotation marks omitted). See also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Opera/Ions, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853"54 (2011) (distinguishing between general and specifiojurisdiction), Regardless of whether general or personal jurisdiction is asserted, the requirements of the due process clause must still be satisfied. Due process Is satisfied when: (l) Maine has a legitimate interest in the subject matter oftbe litigation; (2) the defendant, by his or her conduct, reasonably could have anticipated litigation in Maine; and (3) the exercise of jurJsdfctlou by Maine's courts comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Connelly v. Doucette, 2006 ME 124, 17, 909 A.2d 221 (quotation marks omitted).· Plaintiffs must satisfy the first two prongs of this test, and then the burden shifts to Yankee to 4 "demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction does not comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'' Blckfordv. Onslow Mem'l Hosp. Found, Inc., 2004 ME 111,1 10, 855 A.2d 11 SO. Because the Court is proceeding on the motion based upon the pleadings and affidavits, Plaintiffs need only make a prime facie showing that jurJsdiction exists over Yankee, and the Court construes the facts in Plaintiffs' favor. See Dmf, 1999 ME 133, , 14, 735 A.2d 984. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs' showing must be made on speoiflo facts in the record, going "beyond the pleadings and mak[ing] affirmative proof ... by affidavit or otherwise." Id V13; see also Cossaboon, 600 F.3d at 31 (discussing plaintlfrs burden of proof). B. Analysis Yankee concedes that Maine has a legitimate interest in the subject matter of the litigation, but challenges the second and third prongs of the due process test: reasonable anticipation of litigation and fair play and substantial j\tstlce. Plaintiffs have the burden of showing that by Yankee's conduct, Yankee could reasonably have anticipated litigation in Maine. See Blcliford, 2004 ME 111, ~ 10, 855 A.2d 11SO. 11 A defendant may reasonably anticipate litigation in a particular forum when there is 'some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.'" Connelly, 2006 MB 124, 'i 9, 909 A.2d 221 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewlcz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). The Court must thus consider Yankee's contacts with Maine and detennine whethet· Yankee "purposefully direct[ed its] activities at Maine residents or creat[cd] continuing obligations between [it] and Maine residents!' Murphy, 661 A.2d at 594. The Court begins with Plaintiffs' assertion of general jurisdiction, and then addresses specific jurisdiction, 5 1. General Jurisdiction In support of their claim of general jurisdiction over Yankee, Plaintiffs largely attack the affidavit of Mr. Comter as "self~servlngn and generating mo ¢·e questions than it answers. Plaintiffs did not, however, explain how Yankee's contacts with Maine constitute purposeful availment of this forum, nor did they submit any affidavit to counter the facts of Mr. Conner's affldavit.l General jurisdiction requires a showing of purposeful, continuous, and systematic contacts between a non~resldent defendant and a forum state. See Goodyear Dunlop, 131 S. Ct. at 2856. The facts before the Court are that Yankee adve11ised in national publications circulated In Maine anq that Yankee maintained a website that was presumably viewable by Maine residents. (Conner Aff. ,~ 7"8.) Since 2004, the year Yankee serviced the Airc ¢·aft, Yankee has not had any clients who were Maine residents. (Conner Aff. ~ 10.) Even construing these facts in Plaintiff.'l' favor, Plaintiffs have failed to show how Yankee has continuing general contacts with Maine sufficient to justify general jurisdiction over Yankee unrelated to the events of the accident. See ld.; Dorf, 1999 ME 133, ~ 11, 735 A.2d 984 (stating that the plaintiff must establish that the defendant> thro\tgh its conduct, could reasonably anticipate litigation in Maine). 2. Specific Jurfsdicfion In support of theh· claim of specific jurisdiction, Plaintiffs assert that the work that Yankee performed on the Aircraft over a four-month period in Massachusetts (Cmuter Aff. , 11), the inherent mobllity of airplanes, and the relatlve close proximity of Massachusetts and Maine show that Yankee could reasonably have anticipated Utigation itt Maine regarding the work it performed. Plaintiffs compare the present case to Mahon v. East Moline Metal Products, 579 2 Plalntlffil assort, In tholr memorandum, that since this litigation began, Yankeo has deactivated Its website. (Opp'n M, Dismiss S.) Plalnllft's have not, however, submitted an affidavit setting forth tho contents oftho website or how tho website affects tho COurt's mlnlrmmt contacts analysis. See Dotf. 1999MB 133,1,1 13, 73S A.2d 984 (requiring a plaintiff opposing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction to "go beyond tho pleadings nnd mako affirmative proof' based "on speolllc fncts set forth In tho record" (quotation marka omitted)). 6 A.2d 255 (Me. I 990), where the Law Court concluded that East Moline, an Illinois company with no office or agent in Maine, was nonetheless subject to personal jurisdiction in Maine after a Maine resident was killed in an accident in Maine by a countet·weight on a hoist manufactured by the defendant. Plaintiffs assert Mahon is instructive because, as in the p1·esent case, the Mahon defendant only advertised in national publications, had limited contact with Maine, and the accident occurred in Maine. The Cmtrt, howevet', concludes that Mahon is not controlling in the present case. In Mahon, the Law Colltt reasoned that ¢ ¢[b]ecause of the intended purpose for which the hoist was manufactured, East Moline must have anticipated its removal from site to site. In fact, East Moline was aware of its use In Maine." Id. (emphasis added). The knowledge of the defendant that its product would be used in Maine comports with the concept of purposeful availment. As explained in World· Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, u[t]he forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its pt·oducts Into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State." 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980). The Law Cm1rt fmmd personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant in Mahon beca\tse it was aware its hoist was being used in Mahle. 579 A.2d at 256. In contrast, Plaintiffs have not shown that Yankee had knowledge that the Aircraft would be used in Maine or even travel to MHine. Massachusetts LLC owned the Aircraft. At the time the service was performed, a (Conner Aff. ~ 11.) Services performed in Massach\tsetts on a plane owned by a Massachusetts LLC could not provide Yankee with any notice of future suit in Maine t·egardlng those services. 7 Furthermore, the mobility of the Aircraft does not suppo11 the exercise of jurisdiction of Maine courts over Yankee. The Supreme Court addressed this same argument in World-Wide Volkswagen and rejected the notlon that because a motor vehicle is mobile, it is foreseeable that it will cause injury in another forum. See 444 U.S, at 295-98. The foreseeabillty or 11 likelihood that a product wUl find its way into (a] forum" is not the focus of the inquiry: the inquiry is on 11 the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State ... such that he could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." 444 U.S. at 297. Plaintiffs have not shown how Yankee should have known or anticipated the Aircraft would travel into Maine at the time Yankee performed the sel'Vices in Massachusetts. Finally, the Court does not find the reasoning of cases involving products in the stream of commerce particuiarly helpful when the conduct at issue is the performance of sel'Vices in a single forum, The First Circuit has distinguished between the rendering of services and the sale of goods in interstate commerce, concluding that the alleged tortious rendition of services in one state does not create a "portable tort which can be deemed to have been committed wherever the consequences foreseeably were felt." Harlow, 432 F.3d at 63 (quoting Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d 287, 289-90 (9th Cir. 1972)). Although the First Circuit was addressing the pl'Ovlslon of medical care, which is a personal service, the reasoning applies equally to other sel'Vices rendered within a forum when the effects of those seL·vlces are felt outside the fomm. The appropriate inquiry is to the defendant's conduct and connection to the forum. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at297. CONCLUSION In sum, the Plaintiffs have failed to satisfY their burden on the second prong of the due process test. Based on the current record, Yankee could not have anticipated litigation Jn Maine 8 when performing services in Massachusetts. Yankee has insufficient contacts with the state of Maiue to juslifY the exercise of either geneml or specific jurisdiction. Accordingly, and based on the foregoing analysis, the Court GRANTS Yankee Aviation Services, Inc.'s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion is granted without prejudice. Pursuant to M.R. Clv. P. 79(a), the Clerk shall incorporat6 this Decision and Order into the docket by reference. Date: .. <tj;:~jtJ \1--ol n C. Nivison Ju lice, Maine Business & Consumer Court on DocJ<et.&_i/a Entered the Copies sent via Mall_ Elect onlcally;,(' 9 E. Chris L'Hommedieu et al v. RAM Aircraft, LP et al BCD-RE-13-33 PLAINTIFFS COUNSEl (NAME AND ADDRESS) Kim C. Myers Norman Hanson & DeTroy P.O. Box 4600 E. Chris L'Hommedieu Portland, Maine 04112-4600 Lance E. Walker, Esq. Heather Perreault of the Estate of Edward L'Hommedleu Philip M. Coffin, Ill, Esq. lambert Coffin 477 Congress Street P.O. Box 15215 Portland, Maine 04112-5215 DEFENDANTS COUNSEL (NAME AND ADDRESS) E. Chris L'Hommedleu and Heather Perrault as CoPersonal Representatives RAM Alrcraf~, L.P. Cessna Aircraft Company d/b/a McCauley Propeller Services Maine Aviation Sales, Inc. and Aircraft · Maintenance of Maine Yankee Aviation Services New England Propeller Service, Inc. Engine Components International, Inc. Champion Aerospace, LLC Christopher C. Dinan, Esq. Monaghan Leahy, LLP 95 Exchange Street P.O. Box 7046 Portland, Maine 04112-3906 Martha C. Gaythwaite, Esq. Friedman Gaythwalte Wolf, LLP 25 Pearl Street P.O. Box4726 Portland, Maine 04112-4726 Noreen A. Patient, Esq. Eaton Peabody 167 Park Row, P.O. Box 9 Brunswick, Maine 04011 James B. Haddow, Esq. Petruccelli Martin & Haddow, LLP Two Monument Sq., Ste. 900 P. 0. Box 17555 Portland, Maine 04112-8555 Phillip E. Johnson, Esq. Johnson & Webbert, L.L.P. 160 Capitol St., Ste. 3 : P.O. Box 79 Augusta, Maine 04332-0079 Daniel R. Mawhinney, Esq. Thompson & Bowie, LLP Three Canal Plaza P.O. Box 4630 Portland, Maine 04112 JohnS. Whitman, Esq. Richardson Whitman Large & Badger 465 Congress Street P.O. Box 9545 ty(),'fJ:/?PtJ 11'!111rePI!~~ _ _q.5'Is

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.