Clemetson V. Sweetser, Inc.
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STATE OF MAINE
CUMBERLAND, ss.
SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
Docket No. CV-11-26(
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CHARLES D. CLEMETSON,
Plaintiff
ORDER
v.
SWEETSER, INC.,
STATE OF MAINE
Cumberland, ss, Clerk's Office
NOV 0 4 2011
Defendant.
RECEIVED
In this action plaintiff Charles Clemetson is suing defendant Sweetser Inc.
alleging defamation, placement in a false public light, breach of fiduciary duty, and
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The complaint seeks
compensatory and punitive damages.
Before the court is a motion by Sweetser to dismiss the complaint on two
grounds: (1) that Sweetser's alleged actions constituted protected activity under Maine's
anti-SLAPP statute, 14 M.R.S. § 556; and (2) that in any event Dr. Clemetson's complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The gist of Dr. Clemetson's complaint is that Dr. Clemetson, who is a licensed
psychiatrist, was unfairly terminated from employment at Sweetser after approximately
three weeks of work and that Sweetser subsequently filed a complaint with the Board of
Licensure in Medicine falsely stating that Dr. Clemetson had failed to attend certain
training and had repeatedly missed scheduled appointments with patients. Complaint
<[<[ 3-15. Dr. Clemetson also alleges that in seeking future employment, he was
compelled to tell potential employers the unfounded and misleading reasons given by
Sweetser for his termination. Complaint <[ 23. Finally, he alleges in passing that
Sweetser employees made false and unprivileged statements to unspecified third
parties. Complaint 1116. 19.
1. Sweetser's anti-SLAPP and Immunity Defenses
Sweetser argues that its report to the Board of Licensure in Medicine was
mandated under the Health Security Act, see 24 M.R.S. § 2506, 1 and falls within the antiSLAPP statute's definition of a "written or oral statement . . . submitted to a legislative,
executive or judicial body." 14 M.R.S. § 556. Sweetser notes that the Law Court has held
that "the Legislature intended to define in very broad terms those statements that are
covered by the statute." Schelling v. Lindell, 2008 ME 59 112, 942 A.2d 1226, 1230. As a
result, Sweetser argues, the anti-SLAPP statute requires Dr. Clemetson to show that
Sweetser's report to the Board of Licensure was devoid of any reasonable factual
support or any arguable basis in law and caused "actual injury" within the meaning of
the anti-SLAPP statute to Dr. Clemetson. See 14 M.R.S. § 556; Morse Bros. Inc. v.
Webster, 2001 ME 70 1 20, 772 A.2d 842, 849 (discussing plaintiff's burden under antiSLAPP statute); Schelling v. Lindell, 2008 ME 59 11 17-19, 27, 942 A.2d at 1231-34
(discussing actual injury requirement)
Sweetser also argues that the Health Security Act provides that any health care
provider or health care entity shall be "immune from civil liability . . . for making any
report or other information available to any board, appropriate authority, professional
competence committee or professional review committee pursuant to law." 24 M.R.S. §
1
Section 2506 provides that a health care provider or entity "shall, within 60 days, report in
writing to the disciplined practitioner's board or authority" the name of any licensed employee
whose employment has been terminated for reasons related to clinical competence or
unprofessional conduct, together with pertinent information relating to that action.
2
2511(1). 2 As a result, Sweetser argues that even if the anti-SLAPP statute were
inapplicable, it cannot be held liable for its report to the Board of Licensure in Medicine.
2. Dr. Clemetson's Response
In response to Sweetser's motion, Dr. Clemetson has not contested Sweetser's
arguments that the anti-SLAPP statute is applicable. Nor has he attempted to
demonstrate through pleadings and affidavits that Sweetser's report to the Board of
Licensure was devoid of any factual support or any arguable basis in law and that he
suffered actual injury within the meaning of§ 556. See Morse Bros. v. Webster, 2001 ME
70
CJ[
20, 772 A.2d at 849. Similarly, Dr. Clemetson does not argue that the immunity
contained in § 2511 is inapplicable in his case or that his claims relating to Sweetser's
report to the Board of Licensure are not subject to that immunity.
See Plaintiff's
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated August 12, 2011 at 1-2.
Instead, Dr. Clemetson focuses on his allegation that in seeking employment
after his termination from Sweetser, he was "compelled to explain to potential future
employers and third parties the unfounded and misleading reasons given by Sweetser
for his termination." Complaint
CJ[
23. Because he is proceeding under a theory of
"compelled self-publication," Dr. Clemetson argues, the Maine anti-SLAPP statute and
the Health Security Act "do not apply." Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
2
The immunity set forth in§ 2511 applies to "any person acting without malice, any physician,
podiatrist, health care provider, health care entity or professional society, any member of a
professional competence committee or professional review committee, any board or
appropriate authority and any entity required to report under this chapter." The Law Court has
reserved decision on whether the immunity conferred by§ 2511 is absolute or conditioned on
the absence of malice. McCullough v. Visiting Nurse Service, 1997 ME 55 CJI 14, 691 A.2d 1201,
1205. However, because the words "acting without malice" appear only in connection with
"any person," Magistrate Judge Kravchuk has opined that§ 2511 is intended to provide
absolute immunity to physicians, health care providers, and the other specifically identified
professionals or entities. Landsberg v. Maine Coast Regional Health Facilities, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 37390, *27-28 (Recommended Decision), adopted in part, rejected in part on other
grounds, 640 F. Supp. 2d 108 (D.Me. 2009).
3
Dismiss dated August 12, 2011 at 1. See id. at 2 (court should evaluate his allegation of
compelled self-publication under the normal standard applicable to motions to dismiss,
"not under the burden-shifting procedure set forth in the anti-SLAPP statute").
The court agrees that to the extent that Dr. Clemetson' s allegations do not
depend on reports that Sweetser has challenged under the anti-SLAPP statute and
under the immunity contained in 24 M.R.S. § 2511, his claims must be evaluated under
the usual standard applicable to a motion to dismiss. Under that standard, the material
allegations of the complaint must be taken as admitted and must be read in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff to determine if they sets forth elements of a cause of
action or facts that would entitle plaintiff to relief. In re Wage Payment Litigation, 2000
ME 162 <Jl 3, 759 A.2d 217, 220.
Because Dr. Clemetson has waived any argument that his claims based on
reports to the Board of Licensure in Medicine are barred by the anti-SLAPP statute and
the immunity contained in § 2511, the court will grant Sweetser's motion as to those
claims.
3. Compelled Self-Publication
The Law Court has expressly reserved the question of whether Maine law
permits a defamation claim to be based on compelled self-publication. Cole v. Chandler,
2000 ME 104 <Jl5, 752 A.2d 1189, 1193. Previously in 1995 the federal district court had
predicted that Maine would recognize defamation claims based on compelled selfpublication, but only where it was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff would be
placed under strong compulsion to repeat the defamatory statement. See Carey v. Mt.
Desert Island Hospital, 910 F.Supp. 7, 11-13 (D.Me. 1995) (Brody, J.).
4
Since Judge Brody's decision, vanous other courts have weighed in on the
validity of compelled-self publication, and the court is aware that the theory of
compelled self-publication now appears to be a minority view, that it has been
described by the Seventh Circuit as a "largely discredited" doctrine, that Massachusetts
and Connecticut have declined to adopt that doctrine, and that the federal court in New
Hampshire has predicted that New Hampshire would not adopt such a theory. See
Olivieri v. Rodriguez, 122 F.3d 406, 408 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, C.J.); White v. Blue Cross
and Blue Shield of Massachusetts, 809 N.E.2d 1034, 1037-39 (Mass. 2004); Cweklinsky v.
Mobil Chemical Co., 837 A.2d 759 (Conn. 2004); Slater v. Verizon Communications, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3270, *26-28 (D.N.H. 2005)(McAuliffe, J.).
Whether this court or the Law Court will ultimately recognize compelled selfpublication is, therefore, far from a foregone conclusion. Under the circumstances,
however, the court will not make a final determination at the pleading stage. Additional
factual development, either as part of a summary judgment record or at trial, will help
to illuminate whether and to what extent compelled self-publication should provide a
basis for liability. This is particularly true because Dr. Clemetson has also alleged, as
noted above, that employees of Sweetser made unprivileged and defamatory
statements to unspecified third parties. If true, this might provide a basis for liability
apart from Dr. Clemetson's compelled self-publication theory and apart from any
report made to the Board of Licensure in Medicine or any other appropriate authority.
The Law Court has held, however, that a defendant in a defamation case is
entitled to sufficient notice of the content and circumstances of an allegedly defamatory
statement to be able to determine whether defenses such as truth and privilege should
be raised. See Picard v. Brennan, 307 A.2d 833, 834-35 (Me. 1973). In the court's view
allegations that Sweetser employees made unspecified defamatory and unprivileged
5
statements to unspecified third parties are insufficient under this standard. Dr.
Clemetson shall have 20 days from the date of this order to amend count I of his
complaint in order to remedy these defects.
4. Dr. Clemetson's Other Causes of Action
Count II of Dr. Clemetson's complaint alleges that Sweetser's allegedly
unfounded reasons for termination placed him in a false light. The essential elements of
a false light claim are set forth in Restatement Second Torts§ 652E (1977):
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that
places the other before the public in a false light is subject to
liability ...
(emphasis added). See Cole v. Chandler, 2000 ME 104 C)I17, 752 A.2d at 1197. Publicity
requires communication to the public at large or to a sufficient number of persons so
that it must be regarded as substantially certain to become a matter of public
knowledge. Id.; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D, comment a.
Dr. Clemetson' s complaint alleges that Sweetser's statements to third parties and
to the Board of Licensure have given publicity to assertions that have placed Dr.
Clemetson in a false light, Complaint
CJI
27, but the complaint does not allege that
Sweetser made any communications to the public at large or to a sufficient number of
persons that those communications are substantially certain to become a matter of
public knowledge. 3 As a result, Sweetser's motion to dismiss Dr. Clemetson's false light
claim will be granted.
3
For the reasons noted above, Dr. Clemetson has not contested Sweetser's arguments that its
report to the Board of Licensure were protected by the anti-SLAPP statute and were privileged
under 24 M.R.S. § 2511, so his false light claims cannot be based on that report. In any event, a
communication to the Board of Licensure is not a communication to the general public or a
communication that is substantially certain to become a matter of public knowledge.
6
Count III of the complaint alleges that Sweetser breached a fiduciary duty to Dr.
Clemetson but does not allege any of the essential elements of a fiduciary relationship the actual placing of trust and confidence by the party claiming a fiduciary relationship
and a great disparity of position and influence between the parties. See Bryan R. v.
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, 1999 ME 144
<J[
19, 738 A.2d 839, 846. Moreover,
even if Dr. Clemetson had recited those elements, the Law Court has ruled that in order
to survive a motion to dismiss, "a plaintiff must set forth specific facts constituting the
alleged relationship with sufficient particularity to enable the court to determine
whether, if true, such facts could give rise to a fiduciary relationship." Id. <[ 21, 738 A.2d
at 846-47. Count III of Dr. Clemetson's complaint falls far short on this score, and
Sweetser's motion to dismiss that count will be granted.
Count IV of Dr. Clemetson's complaint alleges intentional infliction of emotional
distress. In part, this count of Dr. Clemetson's complaint consists of conclusory
allegations that simply track the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress
as set forth in such cases as Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158 <[ 10, 784 A.2d 18, 22-23. See
Complaint <[<[ 38-40. The only facts supporting such a claim are those previously set
forth - that Sweetser unfairly terminated Dr. Clemetson and made a false report to the
Board of Licensure as to the reasons for Dr. Clemetson' s termination, that Sweetser
employees made unprivileged and defamatory statements about Dr. Clemetson to third
parties, and that Sweetser's termination compelled Dr. Clemetson to repeat Sweetser's
defamatory statements in seeking new employment and cast him in a false light.
Dr. Clemetson's claims based on Sweetser's report to the Board of Licensure are
barred for the reasons stated above, and the court has some doubt that Dr. Clemetson' s
remaining allegations would, if proven, demonstrate that Sweetser's conduct was so
extreme and outrageous as to exceed all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as
7
atrocious and intolerable in a civilized community. See Staples v. Bangor Hydro-Electric
Co., 561 A.2d 499, 501 (Me. 1989). Nevertheless, that cannot be determined at the
pleading stage.
Count V of the complaint consists of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. In order to recover on a free-standing claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a special relationship existed
between plaintiff and defendant that created a duty to avoid the negligent infliction of
emotional harm. Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158 <[[<[[ 18-19, 784 A.2d 18, 25-26. The only
relationship between Dr. Clemetson and Sweetser that can be discerned from the
complaint is an employer-employee relationship. However, there is no authority for the
proposition that an employer-employee relationship constitutes the kind of special
relationship that could give to a negligent infliction claim. Accordingly, count V of the
complaint will be dismissed.
Count VI of the complaint seeks punitive damages. This is not a separate cause of
action but a form of relief that may be available if Sweetser is held liable on one or more
of Dr. Clemetson's other claims and if Dr. Clemetson also proves entitlement to
punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence. In light of the rulings on Dr.
Clemetson's other causes of action, his claim for punitive damages cannot be resolved
on the pleadings.
The entry shall be:
With respect to Count I of the complaint, defendant's motion to dismiss is
granted as to any defamation claims based on reports by defendant to the Board of
Licensure in Medicine but is denied as to plaintiff's allegations of compelled selfpublication. With respect to allegations in the complaint of unprivileged statements to
third parties, plaintiff shall have 20 days from the date of this order to amend count I of
the complaint as set forth in this order. If not such amendment is filed, plaintiff's claims
relating to unspecified statements to third parties shall be dismissed. Defendant's
8
motion to dismiss is granted as to counts II, III and V of the complaint and is denied as
to counts IV and VI of the complaint.
The Clerk is directed to incorporate this order in the docket by reference
pursuant to Rule 79(a).
Dated: November
tf , 2011
Thomas D. Warren
Justice, Superior Court
9
CHARLES CLEMETSON
VS SWEETSER
UTN:AOCSsr -2011-0056023
CASE #:PORSC-CV-2011-00269
01 0000003404
MOSS PHILIP
D/B/A MOSS SHAPIRO 400 CONGRESS ST PORTLAND ME 04112
F
SWEETSER INC
DEF
RTND
07/15/2011
UHL ERIC J
02 0000007244
D/B/A MOSS SHAPIRO 400 CONGRESS ST PORTLAND ME 04112
F
SWEETSER INC
DEF
RTND
07/15/2011
BANDA DARRICK X
03 0000009329
39 PORTLAND PIER PO BOX 4803 PORTLAND ME 04112
F
CHARLES CLEMETSON
PL
RTND
06/14/2011
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