Emile J. Gros, John Farrell Chustz, Kernie J. Gros, Sharon Adams Jarreau, Arthur J. Delapasse, Brenda Delapasse Leteff, Carl J. Anderson, Gertrude Maze Anderson, Oliver J. Jack, Sr., Hilda Sanchez Delapasse, Emile David, Jr., and Marilyn Adams David VS Boisvert Farms, LLC

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7AYE OF L UI Y NA COURT O APPEAL FIRST CIRCUET 2013 CA Q016 EMILE J. CaROS, ] UHN FARRELL CWUSTZ, KERNIE J. GRUS, SHARON ADAMS JARREAU, ARTHUR]. DELAPASSE, BRENDA DELAPASSE LETEFF, CARL J. ANDERSON, GERTRUDE MAZE ANDERSON, OLTVER 7. JACK, SR., HILDA SANCHE DELAPASSE, EMEL DAVID, 7R., AND MARILYN ADAMS DAVID 1/ ERSUS BOISVERT FARMS, LC 7udgrnent Rendered: FE 7 2l 1 F Qn Appeal from the Eighteenth Judicial District Court n and far the F'arish of We. t Baton P.ouge State of Lou;siana No. 39; 279 Honorabie Alvin 6atist, 3r., Judge Presiding x James P. Dcre Cotm; el fbr ? IaintifFs/ Appellees R. Benn Vincent, Jr. F.mile J. Gros, .)ohn Farrel! Chustz, ros, Sharon Adams Jarreau, Kernie J. and Marilyn Adams C avid Lyn S. Savoie Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/ Appellant S. Jess Sperry Juston M. 0' Brien B isvPrt Farms, ! LC Brook L. Thibodeaux Baton Rouge, Louisiana BEFORE: PETTIGREW, McDONALD, AND McCLENDON, 7J. McCLENDON, J. The deferdant appeals the trial court's judgments that granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, declaring the plaintiffs to be the rightful possessors and owners of their respective immovable properties, including the 100- foot-wide strip of properly at issue herein. For the reasans that follow, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On April 8, 201i, Emile ]. Gras, Johri Farrell Chustz, Kernie J. Gros, Sharon Adams Jarreau, Arthur J. Delapasse, F3renda Delapasse Leteff, Carl J. Anderson, Gertrude Maze An erson, Otiver J. Jack, Sr., Hilda Sanchez Delapasse, Emile David, Jr., and Marilyn Adams David filed a petition for declaratory judgment and other relief against B isvert Farms, LLC. In their petition, plaintiffs asserted that, on 5eptember 2, 201Q, Boisvert Farms disturbed the pear. able e possession of their adjacent properties by filing a quitclaim deed in the public records of West Batpn Rouge Parish that purp rted to evidenc.e Boisvert Farms' ownership of a 100-foot-wide strip of pro erty across the properties of plaintiffs. l The quitclaim deed, dated August 31, 2010, between Union Pacific Railroad Company and Boisvert Farms, incl: ded the property at issue.' Plaintiffs asserted that they had openly enjoyed peacefui, quiet, and uninterrupted possession of their properties for more than one year prior to the act of disturbance and that they were entitled to a declaratory ; udgment maintaining their possession, enjoyment, and ownership of the property, inc!uding the 100-foot-wide strip of property at issue. i he imm vable property at issue, located in West Saton Reuge Parish, contains approximateiy 9. 13 cres, with Jimansions of apprnximately 100 feet wide hy _i,479 feet long, and it intersecL the properties of each ofi the plair,ti.ffs. ouisiana Civil Code AKide 250J provides, in pertir ent part, That "{ a] per, en may transfer to another whatever rights to a khir. ha may then have, Nrithout warranting the existence of any g sucH rights." Comment ( b) of tl e Revision CommenL Rrovides that "[ tltiis Article describes the an act of the ki d called a quitclai! n deed at common law." " At common law, the e' fects of f distinguishing factor nf a quitclaim deed is that it is an instrument tha*. purports to convey nothing more fhan the interest or estate of the grantor, if any he has, at the time oP- the conveyance, rather than the property It, elf.' Comment (:). 2 Boisvert Farms filed an answer, denying the allegations of the petition and asserting that plaintiffs were not possessors af the property. Thereafter, on January 4, 2012, plaintiffs filed their motion for summary judgment, xequesting the trial court to grant their request for a declaration of possession and ownership of their respective properties, inciuding the 100- foot-wide strip of property. The hearing on the motion was set for May 30, 201Z, and on May 23, 2012, Boisvert Farms filed its opposition to the summary judgment motion. In the meantime, Oliver J. ] ack, Sr., Arthur J. Delapasse, Brenda Delapasse Leteff, Hilda Sanchez Delapasse, Carl J. Anderson, Gertrude Maze Anderson, and Kernie J. Gros ( only as ta Lot B- 1) entered into settlement agreements with Boisvert Farms, and on May 30, 2012, after filing a motion to dismiss, they were dismissed from the suit with prejudice. 3 Additionally, the hearing was continued as to Emile David, Jr. and Marilyn Adams David, due to Mr. David' s health issues 4 Further, on May 29, 2012, the remaining plaintiffs, Emile J. Gros, John F. Chustr, Sharon Adams Jarreau, and Kernie J. Gros, filed their reply memorandum for summary judgment, which included arguments regarding acquisitive prescription. At the conclusion of the hearing on May 30, 2012, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. On August 1, 2012, a judgment was signed by the trial court, granting the motion for summary judgment as to Emile J. Gros, John F. Chustz, Sharon Adams Jarreau, and Kernie J. Gros. Also on August 1, 2012, the trial court signed a judgment, granting summary judgment as to Marilyn David. Jarreau, In the judgments, Emile J. Gros, John F. Chustr, Sharon Adams Kernie J. Gros ( only insofar as to Lot 4), and Marilyn David were declared to be the rightful possessors and owners of their respective properties, including the 100-foot-wide strip of property at issue. 3 Kemie J. Gros expressly reserved all claims as to Boisvert Farms in connection with his remaining property, identified as Lot 4. Subsequently, Mr, David passed away, and on June 21, 2012, Boisvert Farms filed its opposition to the motion for summary judgment with regard to Marilyn David. The parties agreed to submit the matter on briefs. 3 point is that the documenC exists where e asked for an extension of himself through the only process that he thought he needed to do, and there's nothing in the JOA that says he did something wrong. The trial court subsequently signed a written judgment granting Pa on' s motion and dismissed the forfeiture claim and awarded Paxton $ 5, 000. 00 in attorney's fees4 Osage has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the forfeiture claim and awarding Pa on attorney's fees because genuine issues of material fact remain as to when the March 20, 2008, memorandum was actually prepared. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used to avoid a full- scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact. Granda v. State Farm Mutual Insurance So. 2d 698, 701. 935 Company, 04- 2012 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 10/ 06), Summary judgment is properly granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with a davits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter af law. LSA C.C. P. art. 966( B). Summary judgment is favored and " is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." LSA C.C. P. art. 966( A)( 2). The burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment remains with the movant. However, if the movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the movanYs burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements 4 In its motion for summary judgment, Paxton had also sought disbursement of the funds deposited into the registry of the court attributable to Paxton' s ownership interest in the well and removal of Rapiere as the well operator, but the trial c4urt denied the motion in these regards. The trial court, however, certified the partial grant as a final judgment in accordance with LSA- C. C. P. art. 1915B( 1) expressly determining " that there is no just reason for delay." Considering the criteria set forth by the Louisiana Supreme Court in R.7. Messinger, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 04- 1664 ( La. 3/ 2/ OS), 894 So. 2d 1113, 1122, we have conducted a de novo review of the propriety of the trial crourt's designation of finality and find that the trial court's designation of its December 12, 2012 judgment as final was proper. 4 determining whether mer,t ju. summac priate: whether there is any is: genuine issue of materiai fact, arid rvhether the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lewis, 93 So. 3d a± 744. The mover bears the burden of provin judgment. ! SA- C. G. P. that he is entitled to summary vJhen the rnnver will bear the burden of ark. 9b6C( 2}. proof at trial, that party must su apart his motion with credihle evidence that wauld entitle him to a direct?d verdi!t if not contrnverted at trial. Hines; 876 So. 2d at Such an affirmative shoYn ing will then shift the burden of 766. production to the parry oppasir g the mntion, reqi iring the opposing party either to produce evider,tiary materials that demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for triai or to submit an aff`davit requesting ad itiona! time for discovery. Id. at 766- 67. IT the mover has F ut fiortn suppc,-ti g proaf: tfiraugh affidavits or othenvise, the adverse party may n t rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadin s, but ?? respons, by affidavits or otherwise, must set forth specific is facts shawing that there is a Mitcheil r. Southern is genuine ue Scrap Recycling, for. trial. L. L. C., LSA- C. C. F. art. 967B; 1. 1- 220]. ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 8/ 12), 93 So. 3 754, 757, v! rii deiiieci, 12- 1<; C2 ( La. 10/ 12/]. 2), 99 Sc. 3d 47. In summary, when the mever tivill oear the burJen of proof at trial, the initial burden of mover to show pr of on that no c a rioti enu ne n for issue summ2 ¢ of material judgment remains with the faci: exists. i;ewis v. Four Corners Volunteer Fire Dept., 08- 0354 { La, App. 1 Cir. 9/ 26/ 08), 994 5o. 2d 696, 699. Gnce the mover makes a prima facie sho ving that ihe motion should be granted, the burden shifts te the r7on- moving party ta present evidence demonstrating that a material factuai issue remains. Ed. In ruling on a motion for summary judgrnent, tl- e trial court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to ci termine the truth of the matter, but iiistead to determine 876 SoZd at 755. whether there is Because the genuire appiicabie issue of triable fact. substantive !aw Hines, determines materiality, uahether a particular fact in dispute is material can be seen only in 5 light of the substantive law apoiica le to th2 r. se. a Lemann v. Essen Lane Daiquiris, Inc., OS- 1095 ( La. 3/ 10/ J6), 923 So. 2d 527, 632. DISCUSSION Chapter I of Title II of khe Code of Civil Procedure, is entitled " Actions to Determine Ownership or Possession", and provides for three different actions through which ne can assert ownership or possession of real property. Lnuisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3651 provides for petitory actions, which are actions brought by a person who claims thp ownership, but who is not in possession, of immovabie property or of a real right therein, against another who is in possession or who claims the awnership thereof adversely, to obtain judgment recognizing the plaintifF's ownership. Secondly, LSA-C.C. P. art. 3654 provides that " the issue of ownership of immovable property or of a real right therein is presented in an action for a declaratory judgmenk...." A plaintifF who is in possession of the property at issue can bring an action far dectaratory judgment, thereby raising issuss of possession and ownership in the same action. Lafourche Realty Co. v. Duard Eymard Co., Inc., 93- 1278 ( La. App, 1 Cir. 6/ 24/ 94), 638 So. 2d 1138, 1139. Finally, LSA- C. C. P. art. 3655 provides for possessory actions. In this matter, Boisvert Farms initially contends that summary judgment cannot be granted on an issue that was not presented in the motion for summary judgment. It asserts that acquisitive prescription was not pled in either the petition or the mc tion for summary judgment, and it was not until plaintiffs 6 Louisiana Code pf Civil Procedure Article 3654 provides: When the issue uf ownership of immovable property or of a real right therein is presented in an action for a declaratory judgment, or in a concursus, expropriation, or similar proceeding, or the issue of the ownership of funds deposited in the registry of the caurt and which belong to the owner of the immovable property or of the real right therein is so presented, the court shall render judgment in favor of the party: 1) Who wou!d be entitled to the possession of the immovable property or real right therein in a possessory action, unless the adverse party proves that he has acquired ownership from a previous owner or by acquisitive prescription; or 2) Who proves better title to the immovable property or real right therein, when neither party would be entitled to the possession of the immovable property or real right therein in a possessory act:on. 6 filed their reply memorandum that the issue of acquisitive prescription was raised. However, in their petition, plaintiffs requested that they be declared the rightFul possessors and owners of the 100- foot-wide strip at issue. Further, in their motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs again sought a declaration of possession and ownership of the disputed praperry. Plaintiffs clearly put at issue the ownership of the 100- foot-wide strip by filing the declaratory judgment action pursuant to LSA-C.C. P. art. 3654, and we find Boisvert Farms' argument to be without merit.' Boisvert Farms also argues that the trial court erred in its application of the law of possession. It asserts that the trial court erred in not beginning its analysis in 1910, when Boisvert Farms' predecessor, the New Orleans, Texas & Mexico Railroad acquired the praperty at issue.$ Boisvert Farms claims that the railroad maintained possession of the property until it was transferred to Boisvert Farms. Thus, Boisvert Farms contends that the railroad was in possession of the disputed strip prior to the plaintifFs and that the railroad was never evicted and never lost civil possession. Conversely, plaintiffs maintain that each plaintiff individually evicted the railroad of its possession and they began possessing as owners in their own right and, in fact, became owrers of the disputed properly long before the railroad ever transferred any purported interest it may have had in the property to Boisvert Farirs. As previously noted, Article 3654 provides that person who is in possession of immovable property may institute an action for declaratory judgment for the recognition of his ownership against a person who claims ownership of the same property. Mt. Everett African Methodist Episcopal Church v. Carter, 96- 2591 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 29/ 97), 705 So. 2d 1179, 1181. Boisvert Farms' reliance on Hoover v. Hoover, O1- 2200 ( La. 4/ 3/ 02), 813 So. 2d 329, is misplaced, as the ownership of the lU0- foot-wlde strip of property is clearly at issue herein. Further, unlike the lack of notice in Hoover, Boisvert Farms unquestionably knew that plaintiffs moved for summary judgrnent on the issue of possession and ownership. 8 The New Orleans, Teacas & Mexico P.ailroad Company ivas merged into the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company and then became part of the Union Pacific Railroad Company. 7 Thus, under the provision determined is the SR- i,. C:.. art. 3, 5, the frst issue that must be questian of currenY. possession. Possession determines who cf- has the burden of r roof. W. en one party daim= possession of one year to the h exclusion of Che other party and the .^ourt finds as a matter of fact that one party had possession fior one year, the second party pleads his title. Then, the burden shifts to the one pieading title to make out his title good against the world. Id. Possession is the detention or enjoyment of a corporeal thing, movabie or immovable, that one holds or er. rcises by himself or by another who keeps or e exercises it in his name. LSA- GC. art. 3421. Possession is a matter of fact; nevertheless, one who has possessed a thing for over a year acquires the right to possess it. LSA-C. C. art. 3422. To cquire passession, one must intend to possess as owner and must take corporea! possession of the thing. LSA- C. C. art. 3424. The possessor must prove that: 1) he had possession during the disturbance; 2) he and his predecessors in title had possession without interruption and quietly for more th n a year im rediately prior to the disturbance, unless evicted by force ur fraud; 3) the disturbance could be one in fact or in law; and 4) the possessory action was instituted within a year of the disturbance. LSA- C. C. P. art. 36581°; Mai v. Floyd, 05- 2301 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 6/ 06), 951 So. 2d 244, 246, writ_ denied, 07- 0581 ( La. 5/ 4/ 07), 956 So. 2d 619. 9 Possession is a preliminary matter whi h must first be resolved before the issue of ownership can be determined because, otherwise, the possessor' s rights are infringed by forcing him to prove ownership. Chevron U. S.A., Ync. v. Landry, 546 So. 2d 858, 861 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 1989), aff'd, 558 So. 2d 242 ( La. 1990). o Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3658 provides: To maintain the possessory action the possessor must allege and prove that: 1) He had possession of the immovable property or real right therein at the time± he disturbance occurred; 2) He and his ancestors in title had such possession quietly and without interruption for more than a year immediately prior to the disturbance, unless evicted by force orfraud; 3) The disturbance was one in fatt or in iaw, as defined in Article 3659; and 4) The possessory action was disturbance. 8 ir. tituted s within a year of the Possession is lost wherr; the possessar ma irssts his intention to abandon it or when he is evicted by another by force or usurpatinn. LSA- C.C. art. 3433.' 1 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3659 provides: Disturbances of possessifln which give rise to the possessory action are of two kinds: disturbance in fact and disturbance in law. A disturbance in fact is an eviction, or any other physical act which prevents the possessor of immovable property or uf a real right therein from enjoying his possession quietly, or which throws any obstacle in the way of that enjoyment. A disturbance in law is the execution, recardation, registry, or continuing existence of recnrd of anv instrument which asserts or implies a right of nwnership or to the possession of immovable property or of a real right therein, or any claim or pretension of ownership or right to the possession thereof except in an action or proceeding, adversely to the possessor of such property or right. Plaintiffs maintain that any alieged possession by the railroad was disturbed in fact and disturbed in law by pl intiffs, and the railroad neuer took any steps to quiet their disturbances. Plaintiffs allege that the execution and recordation of each of their titles, none of which contain any reservation or mention that the railroad company owned any portion of the 100- foot-wide disputed strip of properly, evidences a disturbance in law. 1z PlaintifFs further allege disturbances in fact on th ir praperties, including the growing of sugar cane; the grazing of cattle; canstructing and maintaining roadways; building structures on the properties; mowing, grading, and maintaining the properties; leasing the properties for farming ard rnineral pur oses; using the properties for recreational purpases; and paying taxes on the properties. Plaintiffs contend that once they recorded titie to their properties and began possessing the 11 What cpnstitutes eviction is a question of fact t. be determined tiy the frier of facts. See o Comment ( d) to Article 3433. 1z John Chustz re: orded title to Lot 7 on Ma ch 31, 1972. Sharon Jarreau recorded title to Lot 6S on February 4, 1991. Emile Gros recorded title to an undivided interest in Lot 5 on June 1. 1, 1980; L. ot 5- F on January ? 7, 1494; Lo! - C- 1 on Odober 13, 1999; ! ot 5- E- 1 on August 2, 2000; and Lot 5- D- 1 on P4 y ] 8, 2001. Kernie Gros recorded title to Lot: 4 an July ?_ 1994. Marilyn 9, David recorded litle to Lot 5- A en February 4, 1991. a J prnperties as owners, the a lro f` fiad c°' y: ar to fle a claim to reclaim passessic n; but the railroa J failed to do o. i' One who possesses a , arC of an ir,mavable by virtue of a title is deemed tp have constructive possession witliin the limits of his title. LSA- C. C. art. 342.6. Plaintiffs assert that once khey eatablished possession, they constructively possessed thPir entire properties, which incluued ti e 100-foot-wide strip at issue. Plaintiffs further conterid that based on their just title, pnssession, and good faith, they each became o vners of the 100- foot-wide strip long before the railroad purpr rted to sel! ary interest it might F ave in the disputed property to BoisuPrt Farms, either thro gh ten- year or thirty-year acquisitive prescription. f3oisvert Farms; however, aryues th t it has valid title to the 1Q0- foot-wide strip. Therefore, according to Boisvert Farri s, it was entitled to establish passession by tacking antr the railroad' s possession. Boisvert Farms maintains that piaintiffs have pres?nted no evidence of evi tion and that they are not possessors of the disputed roperty. In suppert of their motion for summary judgmeni:, each plaintiff presented evidence regarding his or her possession and wnership. As to Jnhn F. Chustz, Mr. Chustz submitted his affidavit, with attachments, in which he attesteci that he purchased Lot 7, consisting of 28. 62 acres, on March 20, 1972. He further attest d tliat since acquiring the properry, he had eng ged in various acts o possession, including the building f a fence around the property and farming cattle across the property, includin the disputed strip. Mr. Chustz further stated in his affidavit that from 1975 through 1982, he built barns and livestock p ns on the property, including uver the disputed property. He stated he has entered into various ii, gas, and mineral leases covering the entirety of the property, and that he has paid taxes on the property since he purchased it in 1912. 13 Louisiana Civii Code article 3434 provides, irt relevanE part., that "( i] n the case of eviction, the right to possess is lost if the possessor does not recover possession within a year of the eviction.° 10 i Sharon Adams Jarreau aiso fled an affidavit, with attachments, in which she stated that on February 1, 1991, her parents donated Lot 6- B, containing 11. 53 acres, to her. She further attested that the property has had sugar cane on it since her father purchased it in 1947, and that the 100- foot-wide strip has been specifically farmed since April 1958, when her " father and brothers cleared it of the abandoned line." railroad Ms. Jarreau stated that there are active sugar cane leases on the property and that, in addition to farming, she uses the property with her family for recreational purposes. She also attested that she has been paying the taxes on the lots since she became owner of the properties in 1991. Emile J. Gros submitted his a davit, with attachments, and attested that he and his wife are the owners of Lot 5- F, Lot 5- C- 1, Lot 5- E- 1, Lot 5- D- 2, and Lot 5- D. He stated that they acquired an undivided one-quarter interest in Lot 5, containing 67. 38 partition, acres, on June 7, 1980. On January 26, 1994, by an act of Mr. and Mrs. Gros acquired 16. 24 acres, designated as Lot 5- F. On October 5, 1999, they acquired Lot 5- C- 1, containing 5. 08 acres, in an exchange of property. Mr. and Mrs. Gros also acquired Lot 5- E- 1, containing 6. 73 acres, on July 27, 2000; Lot 5- D- 2, containing 5. 23 acres, on May 16, 2001; and Lot 5- D on September 11, 2002 Mr. Gros further attested that since acquiring the properly, he has engaged in various acts of possession and ownership, including the planting, growing, and harvesting of sugar cane on the properry; grazing of cattle across the property; constructing and maintaining roadways across the property; using the property with his family for recreational purposes, including the use of four-wheelers and horseback riding; entering into oil, gas, and mineral leases; mowing, grading, and maintaining the entirety of the property; and paying taxes on the property. Kernie Joseph Gros filed his affidavit, with attachments. He attested that he acquired Lot 4 on July 29, 1994, and that since acquiring the property, he has engaged in various acts of possession and ownership, including the planting, growing, and harvesting of sugar cane on the property; constructing and 11 maintaining fi roadways across *_ e' Yaper? y; ;:Sf q c e property with his family for recreational purposes, including tne use of recreationa! o ¢ehicles; entering into oil, gas, and minera! le ses; mowing, grading, and maintaining the entirety of the property; and paying taxes en the roperty. Marilyn Adams David afsa submitted her a davit, with attachments, in which she stated that on February 1., 199i., her parehts donated Lot 5- R, containing 15. 8G acres, to her. She furtY er att sted that the properky has had sugar cane on it slnce her father ,purchased it in 1947, and that the 100- foot- wide strip has been specificaify farmed since April 1958, whPn her " father ar d brothers deared it ofi Yhe a andor ed railr ad liri." Ms. David stated that there are active sugar cane leases n the pr pPrty and that, in addition to farming, she uses the property with her Pamily for recreationai purp ses. She aiso attested that she has been paying the taxss on the property since she became owner in 1 91. Each of the plaintiffs further attested that wh n they purchased their praperties, at no poin.*.was it ver brought te ±he;r attPntion, nor depicted in any sun ey, that a railroau' company might have arr interest in any of the properties. Additionaliy, plaintiffs stated that khey considered themselves to be the sole and exclusive + wners ar d possessors c their properties, that their possession has bePn constant and withou interrupcion since at least tF e time plaintiffs acquired their propert, and that there had been no adverse claims of ownership against any plaintiff's pr perty untii 5eptemt er 2., 2010, when the quitclaim deed of Boisvert Farms ;vas filed. In opposition to the motion or sumn ary judgment, Boisvert Farms submitted the affidavik of George Pi rson, an attorney and title examiner, as well as excerpts from the deposikions of Mr. Chustz, Kernie Grns, Ms. Jarreau, and Emile and Earline rns. Boisvert Farms argues that Mr. Pierson, after examining the abstrar, of title and other io uments, corcluded that Boisvert Farms had t title to the 100-foot-wide strip. 12 In his affidavit, Mr: Pierson examiner irr Louisiana since 1 7C. ated tha'?` Fas been an attorney and title His title examination and opinion of title was based on an abstract of title certified frorri August 2, 1910 until April 25, 2012, various maps, and a review of the history of the ilnian Facific Railroad Company. Mr. Pierson concluded that from August 2, 191G, when the New Orleans Texas & Mexico Railroad Compariy acquired the 100- foot-wide strip that traversed through Lots 1 through 12 of Tonawanda Plantation, through the merger of the railroads into the Union Pacific Railroad Company on October 20, 1997, and continuing up to the time of the quitclaim deed, the disputed trip of property was and c ntinued at all times to be owned in full ownership by the railroad. 14 Mr. Pierson therefore concluded hat Boisvert Farms was the full owner in fee simple title of the 10Q- foot-wide strip f property conveyed in the quitclaim deed. The triaf court concluded that plaintiffs possessed the property with intent to own and, in fact, did so from the time the railroad left in the 1950s until Boisvert Farms filed its quitclaim deed. The court also found that each of the plaintiffs acquired the ownership of the 100-foot-wide strip by either ten- year or thirty-year acquisitive prescription. Finding no yenuine issue of material fact, the trial court granted summary judgment, declaring the plaintiffs to be the owners of the 100-foot-wide disputed strip ef properly. Upon our own thorough de novo review of the record, we agree with the trial court that plaintiffs were in possession of the disputed strip. Therefore, Boisvert Farms had the burden of proving that its title was good against the world. See Mt. Everett African Methodist Episcopal Church, 705 So. 2d at 1182. Boisvert Farms, however, did not, anrJ could not, meet this burden of proof. At the time Boisvert Farms filed '+ quitclaim deed, its predecessor, the ts Union Pacific Railroad Company was not the owner of the 100- foot-wide strip of property. The railroad's possession was interrupted by the possession of the disputed property by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs established corporeai and constructive This is less and except . 664 acre5 that urere transfe! red by the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company that were located only on lats 1, 2, and 3 and tfre northern portion of Lot 4 of Tonawanda Plantation. 13 possession of the disp tFd st. p D theii titi2 artd acts of possession and the railroad' s lack of + ntent to own. Therer'ore, the burden shifted to Boisvert Farms to show the existence af a g nuine issue far trial. f3oisvert Farms failed to present evidence sufficient to prove that it " acquired ownership from a previous owner" in 201Q, as the railroad as no lonyer the po sessor or owner of the property. Accordingfy, because : ve find no genuine issue oY material fact, the trial court correctly determined that the pl intiffs are the possessors and owners of the 100-foot-wide strip af property, artd t eir rnotion for summary judgment was properl/ yranted. CONCLU IQN For the above arrd forego r, reasons, we affirm the August 1, 2012 g judgments of the triai court, granting summary judgment and declaring Emile J. Gros, ] ohn F. Chustz, Sh run Jarre u, K rnie Gros ( only insofar as to Lot 4), and M rilyn David to be the righiful posessors and owners of their respective raperties, inciuding the 100-foct-wide strip of property at issue. Costs of this appe l are assesseci aqainst Cic isvert Farms, LLC. AFFERMED. 14

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