Dale A. Gremillion VS Greene Tweed & Co. I., L.P. and Greene, Tweed, & Co., Inc.
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION STATE OF LOIIISIANA COtiRT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCIIIT J NUMBER 2013 CA 0684 DALE A. GREMILLION VERSUS GREENE TWEED & CO. I., L.P. & GREENE, TWEED, & CO., INC. Judgment Rendered: December 27, 2013 Appealed from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana Docket Number 617, 529 Honorable R. Michael Caldwell, Judge Presiding xaFkx: F** x** F* Y Paul F. Bell Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Baton Rouge, LA Dale A. Gremillion Amelia W. Koch Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Kathlyn G. Perez Greene, Tweed & Co., I., L.P. & Greene, Tweed & Co., Inc. New Orleans, LA kX'iCkkxa4k%kdC X: F ° BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., WELCH, AND CRAIN, JJ. WHIPPLE, C.J. This appeal involves an. action by an employee against his former employer for unpaid vacation pay. The employer filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that all wages owed to the employee, including unused vacation pay, were promptly motion paid at the time for summary judgment of and his resignation. dismissed the The trial court granted the employee' s claim. For the following reasons, we affirm. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Dale Gremillion began his employment as a salesman with Greene Tweed & Co. I., L.P. & 2006. Greene, Tweed, & He voluntarily resigned Co., Ina ("Greene Tweed") on September 16, almost six years later on June 26, 2012. After receiving his final paycheck, Gremillion emailed Greene Tweed' s human resources department, requesting additional pay far unused vacation pay purportedly due. Greene Tweed denied his request, prompting Gremillion to file suit for lost wages, penalties, interest, attorney' s fees, and costs under the Louisiana Wage Payment Act. In response, Greene Tweed filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that Gremillion was promptly paid for all vacation time that he was owed upon his resignation and that he has no claim for additional unpaid vacation. The trial court granted Greene Tweed' s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Gremillion' s suit. Gremillion now appeals. DISCUSSION Vacation leave, once promised, immediately becomes vested property of the empioyee to whom it was promised. Williams v. Dutchtown Pharmacv, L.L.C., 08- 2559 ( La. App. lst Cir. 9/ 11/ 09), 24 So3d 221, 226. Upon the resignation of an employee, vacation pay is considered an amount due under the terms of 2 employment, if, in accordance with the stated vacation policy of the person employing such laborer or other employee, both of the following apply: a) The laborer or other employee is deemed eligible for and has accrued the right to take vacation tizne with pay. b) The laborer or other employee has not taken or been compe sated far the vacation time as of the date of the discharge or resignation LSA-R.S. 23: 631( D)( 1). In his petitions, Gremillion contended that he was entitled to compensation for unused and unpaid vacation, which he claims should have been awarded to him on April 1, 2011 for his additional prior year of service. compensation under the Gremillion' s alleged entitlement to policies presents a question of contractual obligation and interpretation of Greene Tweed' s leave policy(ies). Z Interpretation of a contract is usually a legal question which can be properly resolved in the framework of a motion for summary judgmerlt. Sanders v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 96- 1751 ( La. App. lst Cir. 6/ 20/ 97), 696 So. 2d 1031, 1036, wri.t denied, 97- 1911 ( La. 10/ 31/ 97), 703 So. 2d 29. Interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the parties. LSA-C, C. art. 2045. When the words of a contract are clear, explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties' intent. LSA-C.C. art. 2046; Green v. New Orleans Saints, 00- 0795 ( La. 11/ 13/ 00), 781 So. 2d 1199, 1203. Thus, the threshold lIn his original petiYion, Gremillion contended he was entitled to compensation for 200 hours of unused vacation. However, in brief to this court, he contends that he as entitled to " 20 days of unused vacation for his 2010/ 2011 year of service to Greene Tweed," together with statutory penalties and attorney' s fees. For purposes of this appeal, we analyze his claim as a demand far" 20 days of unused vacation." Z In Knecht v. Boaxd of Trustees for State Colleges and Universities and Northwestern State Universitv, 591 So. 2d 690, 692 ( La. 1991), a compensatoxy time policy was implemented by the Board in an executive order, and was later suspended. A group of thirty-rivo unclassified state employees filed suit seeking compensation for overtime worked pursuant to the Board' s policy. The Supxeme Court found that the plaintiffs were " contractually entitled" to use the compensatory Time and the employer failed to perform its " contractual obligation." 3 issue we must decide is wheth Greer. e r ' I° eed' s policy( ies) clearly and unambiguously establzsh how and when v tcatian is earr ed and allocated. On appeal, the parties do not ' rspute that Gremillion was entitled to be paid for any unused -aacation ti ne; ner do he} dis ute thar Gre:.ne Tweed had the power and also do made not rigl,t to maka dispute that during prosp ctive charage various chan Gremilliods es to i to ( Yreen;. employznent, s leave policy i.es). ' vveed' s The parties acation policies were However, the parties disagree as to whether changes to Greene Tweed' s leave policy(iesj resulted in the company' s failure to provide Gremillion with eacation that h claims was previously earned and owed, namely, the twenty d of' vacation that remillion alfleges he should have received on April 1, 201 L Gremillion contends that wnd r Greene Tweed' policy( ies), vacation was retroactive" anci earned in the y= before 3 avas ivdn. AcGOrd'zngly, he argues ear that on April 1, 2011, he was du, but never x ec iveci, pay fex vacation time earned for work done from April i. 20 0 thrs gh ar h 1, 2011. In contrast, Greene Tweed contends that under its policy(ies), vac tion was awarded prospectively, and then earned in the year it vas given. Therefore, C reene Tweed contends, no lump sum of vacation was owed to Crremi lion en April 1, 2011; rather, Greene Tweed contends that under th policies at issue, Ciremillic n was fully compensated. After de novo review of each of the polieies offered an su port f th motion for summary judgment, we agree: On the date Gremillian began working at Gxeene Tweed in September 2 06, Greene Tweed' s vacation policy pxovided in pertia ent part that newly hired employees would be entitled to " paid time off' in Yhe year of hire and " vacation days" in the following calendar year undex a specific scheduie. Under this policy, employees hired from July through the end of the calendar year of hire were entitled to no " paid time off' in the calendar year of hire and a specified number of 4 vacation days" for the fallowin cal ndar .y ear. Thus, in accordance with this policy, when Gremillion began workin at Green Tweed ir. September 2006, he did not receive any vacation beneft on the date of his hire or throughout 2006. Moreover, on January 1, 2007, in accordance with the applicable policy, he received the full the specified amount of allowed amount under lve days of vaiati. n. Thereafter; he received t., tihe chedr. le, i_ e., fi£ een. ` vacation days," on January 1, 2008 and on January i, 2( 9. However, Greene T eed ame ided. zts stated Ieav, policy in Octobe.r 2009, with the changes effective A pril 1, 20"1Q, Tk ese c? nanges included it ip ementing a paid time off policy, thereby e itziznating . ny distinction between personal/ sick days and vacation days, the I T and changin olicy to run in accordance with the fiscal year of April 1 st through Marc. 3 i st, u-ith em loyees expressly " grant[ ed]" h their " annual entitlement" policy stated: " of PTO on April lst of each year. Specifically, the Effective April Ist, 2010, the company grants annual PTO to employees under the following ian. It is the policy c f the company not to provide pay in lieu of granted was PTO, unless based required by law." on " years of continuou Although the number c f PTO hours ervice," there is nothing im the policy to support GremAllzon' s argument that xhis arznuai award oi PTO was earned as compensation for prior wark. Aeuordingly; r+A ril 1, 2(310, f: iremillion was granted twenty days of PTO. As reflected in the record, Crreerae TYveed again amended its leave policy with changes effective April 1, 2011. Pursuant to tfies changes, employees were no longer awarded an annual entitlerrxent of PTO at the beginning of the fiscal year. Rather, for the first time, the adopted policy provided that employees would earn PTO, to be accrue on a montkly basis, ( i.e,, 1! 12 per rnonth) in accordance with years of continuous service, as iollows: 5 The PTO plan year extends from April lst through March 31S`. PTO will be eamed on a monthly basis ( i.e., 1/ 12 per month) in the current PTO plan year. PTO is earned at the beginning of each calendar month worked. Emphasis added). Thus, under the above policy, Gremillion could accrue PTO of twenty days ( 160 hours) thrroughout the year, to be earned and accrued on a monthly basis in the amount of 1. 66 days ( 13. 33 hours). As reflected in the record, between April 1, 2011 and March 31, 2012, Gremillion earned his PTO on a monthly basis under the policy and used his eniire twenty days of PTO. Further, in accordance with this policy, from March 31, 2012 through his resignation date of June 26, 2012, Gremillion earned fifty hours of PTO, of which he used twenty- four hours. Accordingly, upon Gremilliods resignation, Greene Tweed owed and paid Gremillion for his remaining twenty- six hours of earned, but unused PTO. In addition to the policies noted above, Greene Tweed also offered in support of its motion for summary judgmznt the affidavit of Beth Manville, an employee in Green Tweed' s human resource department, which set forth the specific vacation policies applicable during Gremillion' s employment; the amount of PTO or vacation earned, allocated and used by Gremillion throughout his employment; and the amount and mathematical basis for the final amount paid to Gremillion far his unused PTO. In opposition to the motion for suininary judgment, Gremillion did not offer any affidavits or other supporting evidence to contradict the policies as set forth by Greene Tweed. Instead, he relied only on a strained and unsupported interpretation of the applicable policies, which argument we specifically reject. While the policy effective April l, 2010 tied the specific amount of PTO to be granted an employee at the beginning of the fiscal year to the employee' s years of service, there is nothing on the record before us to indicate that this schedule represented PTO earned for prior service. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 6 supported, an adverse party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided above, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for triala If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if apprQpriate, shall be rendered against him. LSAC. C.P. art. 967( B). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Greene Tweed showed that under the applicable policies, no genuine issue of material fact remained as to when vacation was granted or earned by employees, and that under said policies, Gremillion received or was paid far all vacation time or PTO due upon cessation of his employment with Therefore, we find that the trial court Greene Tweed. correctly granted Greene Tweed' s motion for swnmary judgment. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the February 21, 2013 judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. Costs of this appeal are to be paid by plaintiff, Dale A. Gremillion. AFFIRMED. 7
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