Brenda Weatherspoon and Peggy Landry VS Charter Home Health, L.L.C. and BlueCross BlueShield of Louisiana and Colonial Insurance Company
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT NO 2012 CA 1916 BRENDA WEATHERSPOON AND PEGGY LANDRY VERSUS CHARTER HOME HEALTH L BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD G OF LOUISIANA AND COLONIAL INSURANCE COMPANY Judgment Rendered UN 0 7 20 3 On Appeal from the 19 Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana Trial Court No 567 921 The Honorable Wilson Fields Judge Presiding Gail N McKay Baton Rouge Louisiana Barbara L Irwin Timothy E Pujol Gonzales Louisiana Attorney for Plaintiffs Appellants Brenda Weatherspoon Peggy Landry Attorneys for Defendant Appellee Charter Home Health L C BEFORE GUIDRY CRAIN AND THERIOT JJ r 9 CRAIN J The plaintiffs appeal a judgment based upon a jury verdict and the denial of their post motions We affirm in part reverse in part and render trial FACTS AND PROCEDLJRAL HISTORY This appeal arises out of claims by two former employees that their health life and disability insurance polices were canceled because their employer neglected to pay the premiums despite deducting the premium payments from their payroll checks The relevant events occurred in 2007 and early 2008 while plaintiffs Brenda Weatherspoon and Peggy Landry were employed by defendant Charter Home Health L As employees of Charter Weatherspoon and Landry C were covered by a group health insurance policy issued by Louisiana Health Service Indemnity Company d BlueCross B1ueShield of Louisiana For a a b period of time during their employment they were also covered by life and disability insurance policies issued by Colonial Life Accident Insurance Company The evidence at trial established that Charter paid fifty percent of the premium for the health insurance but paid no portion of the premium for the life and disability insurance Employees paid the full premium for life and disability coverage The same method of payment was used for all premiums Charter deducted the employees share of the premiums from their payroll checks and remitted the payments to the insurers There was limited evidence introduced at trial relative to the life and disability coverage provided by Colonial Wandell Rogers a co of Charter owner testified that representatives of Colonial marketed the policies to the employees during the summer of 2007 and any interested employee could obtain the coverage Charter deducted one percent of the premium from the hundred employees payroll checks and paid the premiums to Colonial 2 The record does not establish that the Colonial policies were ever canceled due to non of premiums The appellants presented invoices indicating payment that certain payments were late but no documentation of cancellations was offered Rogers on the other hand testified that the coverage was never canceled for nonpayment of premiums Instead Charter decided to move the coverage to another carrier due to employee dissatisfaction with Colonial and the payroll deductions for the Colonial premiums stopped in October or November of 2007 Landry testified that she purchased a disability policy through the alternative insurer in March of 2008 after Charter moved the coverage from Colonial Weatherspoon apparently did not purchase a policy from the new insurer but acknowledged that she had the option to keep her Colonial coverage if she wanted it Charter refunded the unused Colonial premiums to both Weatherspoon and Landry Considerable evidence was introduced at trial relative to the health insurance Problems with the payment of the Blue Cross premiums began in 2007 although the precise reason for the problems was disputed at trial Charter blamed Blue Cross for billing errors associated with a new billing system that Blue Cross implemented in 2007 Blue Cross countered that Charter failed to timely pay the premiums although Blue Cross did acknowledge that it forwarded some statements to Charter that contained inaccurate information After numerous communications between Charter and Blue Cross Charter forwarded three checks on November 30 2007 that it believed paid the full health insurance premiums for October November and December According to Blue Cross recards the three s payments actually covered October a portion of November and a premium that had never been paid far the month of April Blue Cross continued to forward monthly premium invoices in January and February although no additional payments were forthcoming In the wake ofthis confusion Rogers and the other 3 owner of Charter decided in early 2008 that Charter could no longer afford the health insurance so no additional premium payments were made after the November 30 2007 payments On March 28 2008 Blue Cross forwarded a notice to the group plan participants including Weatherspoon and Landry advising that their coverage had ended on November 30 2007 the last month Charter remitted any premium payment Consequently although the health insurance for all Charter employees was canceled effective November 30 2007 the employees did not learn of that cancellation until March 28 2008 The lack of knowledge of the cancellation was compounded by the fact that Charter continued to withhold health insurance premiums from the employees payroll checks after November 30 2007 After the cancellation Charter issued premium refund checks to the employees in April of 2008 Two other important events occurred in the spring of 2008 Weatherspoon who was employed as Charter billing manager resigned from her employment s pursuant to a letter dated March 17 2008 The letter did not provide a reason for her resignation but Rogers testified that the departure was associated with the results of an audit of the company sbilling practices Not long after Weatherspoon resigned Landry ended her employment with Charter in early April of 2008 A lung condition prevented her from continuing her employment and she was ultimately declared disabled Landry testified that dissatisfaction with how Charter handled her benefits was also a reason far her leaving the company however she admitted that she accepted another job in April of2008 and was only able to work one day job because ofher poor health The termination of the employment of Weatherspoon and Landry in March and April 2008 respectively marks the end of the period during which the plaintiffs mistakenly believed they had health insurance After terminating their a employment with Charter Weatherspoon and Landry knew that Charter would no longer be remitting payments for their insurance premiums because they were no longer on s Charter payroll At that point they became responsible for maintaining their own health insurance including the full premium payment Accarding to her testimony Landry did not apply for health insurance after she left Charter because she could not afford it Weatherspoon offered no evidence that the cancellation of the Blue Cross policy prevented her from obtaining health insurance after she resigned from Charter Thus the time period during which Weatherspoon and Landry mistakenly believed they were covered by health insurance was December 1 2007 through the date of the termination of their employment or a period of approximately four months During those four months Weatherspoon and Landry reasonably believed they had health insurance and premiums were routinely deducted from their paychecks Blue Cross communicated with the designated group leader who was Roger wife about the premium payments issues but the employees s remained unaware Before learning of the cancellation both plaintiffs received medical care under the belief that the cost would be covered at least in part by the Blue Cross health insurance Weatherspoon and Landry instituted this proceeding against several defendants including Charter and Blue Cross By the time of the trial only the claims against Charter remained A three day jury trial ended with a jury verdict finding negligence in withholding the health insurance premiums and allocated sixty percent fault to Charter and forty percent fault to Blue Cross The jury found no negligence for witl the Colonial premiums The jury determined that holding Weatherspoon suffered damages caused by Charter and awarded her 10 15 829 for past medical expenses No amount was awarded far Detriment to Credit Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress or Mental Anguish s The jury found that Landry did not suffer any damages caused by Charter and did not award any sum to her The trial court signed two judgments The first judgment was submitted by counsel for the plaintiffs and was signed on April 5 2012 That judgment incorporated the completed jury verdict form and awarded jud in favor of anent Weatherspoon and against Charter in accardance with the jury verdict hereid s together with interest and a share of the costs of the proceeding proportionate The judgment dismissed Landry claims with prejudice s The second judgment was submitted by counsel for Charter and was signed on April 24 2012 That judgment was entered in accordance with the verdict of the jury in favor of Weatherspoon and against Charter in the amount of 6 49 497 together with interest and 60 of her portion of the cost of the proceeding The second judgment also dismissed Landry claims with prejudice No reason was s given for the entry of two judgments Between the execution of the two judgments Weatherspoon and Landry filed a motion on April 18 2012 requesting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict JNOV or in the alternative a new trial or additur The trial court denied that motion by a judgment signed on July 24 2012 Weatherspoon and Landry then filed a motion for appeal which was granted on August 15 2012 Weatherspoon and Landry assert the following assignments of error The jury verdicts are ambiguous and contradictory on their s faces and so contrary to the evidence that no rational jury could have L reasonably reached such verdicts 2 The district court erred in denying plaintiffs motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or alternatively for new trial ar for additur on damages We consider both of these assignments of error hereinafter however we first address the entry of two judgments on the jury verdict and what procedural effect if any multiple judgments have on this appeal 6 JUDGMENTS ON JURY VERDICT Charter argues that the second judgment is an absolute nullity citing jurisprudence holding that courts have no autharity to make a substantive amendment to a judgment except through a motion for new trial or on appeal According to Charter the present appeal is only from the second judgment which is purportedly null so the first judgment is now final and this appeal should fail s Charter argument is without merit The second judgment did not make substantive modifications to the first judgment and the order granting the present appeal was not limited to a particular judgment Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1951 provides that a final judgment may be amended by the trial court at any time with or without notice on its own motion or on motion of any party to alter the phraseology of the judgment but not the substance or to conect errors of calculation See Yillaume v Villaume 363 So 2d 448 450 La 1978 Thus a judgment may be amended by the trial court where the amendment takes nothing from or adds nothing to the original judgment Tunstall v Stierwald 01 La 1765 02 26 2 809 So 2d 916 920 Villaume 363 So 2d at 450 The second judgment altered only the phraseology of the first judgment and did not make any substantive amendments The first judgment incorporated the verdict form as completed by the jury including the award of damages to Weatherspoon in the amount of 10 and the allocation of fault to Charter of 15 829 sixty percent The second judgment also entered in accordance with the verdict of the jury simply specified the amount of damages recoverable from Charter based upon its percentage of fault 6 the product of 10 multiplied 49 497 15 829 by 60 sixty percent Both judgments awarded interest from tbe date ofjudicial demand until paid and both judgments awarded Weatherspoon her proportionate amount of costs from Charter Finally both judgments dismissed Landry claims s with prejudice Because the second judgment altered only the phraseology of the first judgment and was therefore a valid amendment we distinguish the cases relied upon by Charter as involving substantive amendments See Adam v State ex rel t Dep of Transp Dev 08 La App 1 Cir 2 5 So 3d 941 writ 1134 09 13 denied 09 La 5 8 So 3d 584 Mack v Wiley 07 La App 1 0558 09 15 2344 Cir 5991 So 2d 479 writ denied 08 81 La 9992 So 2d 932 08 2 ll 08 19 Under these circumstances we hold that the second judgment amending the first judgment is valid and is properly before this court on appeal JURY VERDICTS Weatherspoon and Landry argue that the jury verdicts are ambiguous and s contradictory on their faces and so contrary to the evidence that no rational jury could have reasonably reached such verdicts We review the jury findings of fact under the manifest error standard of s review Under that standard a court of appeal may not set aside a jury finding of s fact in the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong Rosell v ESCO 549 So 840 844 La Landry v Leonard J Chabert Med Ctr 02 2d 1989 1559 La App i Cir 5 858 So 2d 454 463 writs denied 03 03 03 14 1748 1752 La 10 855 So 2d 761 When there is conflict in the testimony reasonable 03 17 evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable Touchard v Slemco Elec Foundation 99 La 3577 00 17 10 769 So 2d 1200 1204 Landry 858 So 2d at 463 Therefore the issue for the reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was wrong but whether the s finder fact conclusions were reasonabie under the evidence presented Touchard 769 Sa 2d at 1204 Landry 858 So 2d at 463 The appellants contend that the jury verdict is ambiguous on its face and that the jury erred when it found that Charter did not negligently withhold premiums s for the Colonial policies failed to award 30 in medical expenses to 20 269 Weatherspoon failed to award 69 in medical expenses to Landry failed to 08 515 award mental anguish to both plaintiffs and failed to award a sum for detriment to credit for both plaintiffs Addressing these arguments in order we first find that the jury verdict is not ambiguous Appellants argue that it is impossible to tell whether the sum awarded to Weatherspoon represents her total award or the amount recoverable from Charter The verdict form asked the jury what percentage of fault it attributed to various parties including Charter and Blue Cross The jury entered 60 for Charter and 40 for Blue Cross The next question directs the jury to state the amount of money if any that will reasonably compensate Brenda Weatherspoon far her damages and the jury entered the sum of 10 for past medical 15 829 expenses The jury inserted zeros in the blanks for detriment to credit intentional infliction of emotional distress and mental anguish The completed interrogatory setting forth the sum awarded to Weatherspoon for her damages does not indicate that it was intended to be the amount owed only by Charter Furthermare Weatherspoon and Landry did not object to the fortn of the jury interrogataries and therefare waived any appeal right related thereto La Code of Civ Pro art 1812B Marroy v Hertzak llLa App 0403 1 Cir 9 77 So 3d 307 311 This argument is without merit 11 14 12 The appellants next contend that the jury erred when it found that Charter did not negligently withhold the Colonial premiums This jury conclusion is amply supported by the evidence presented at trial Although the appellants presented evidence of late payments Charter co Rogers testified that the Colonial s owner polices were never canceled far nonpayment of premium and that the coverage was moved to another insurer at the request of the employees This testimony was not contradicted by any documentary evidence or testimony from any representative of 9 Colonial Landry corrobarated some of Rogers testimony when she confirmed that she secured coverage with the new insurer Rogers also confirmed that the unused portion of the Colonial premium was refunded to Weatherspoon and Landry Based upon the faregoing we see no manifest enor in the jury s conclusion that Charter was not negligent in withholding the Colonial premiums This argument is without merit The appellants remaining arguments concern the damages awarded or not awarded by the jury A jury is given great discretion in its assessment of quantum for both general and special damages La Civ Code art 2324 Guillory v Lee 1 0075 09 La 6 16 So 3d 1104 09 26 1116 Furthermore the assessment of quantum by a jury is a determination of fact that is entitled to great deference on review Wainwright v Fontenot 00 La 774 So 2d 70 74 0492 10 00 17 Because the discretion vested in the trier of fact is so great and even vast an appellate court should rarely disturb an award on review Youn v Maritime Overseas Corp 623 So 2d 1257 1261 La 1993 cert denied 510 U 111 S 1994 Before a court of appeal can disturb an award made by a fact the finder record must clearly reveal Yhat the trier of fact abused its discretion in making its award Only after making that finding can the appellate court disturb the award and then only to the eartent of lowering it or raising it to the highest or lowest point which is reasonably within the discretion afforded that court Wainwright 774 So 2d at 74 Coco v Winston Indus lnc 341 So 2d 332 334 La 1977 Weatherspoon argues that the jury committed manifest enor in awarding her only 10 for medical expenses instead of the full amount requested of 15 829 20 269 30 Weatherspoon introduced in evidence a substantial amount of inedical invoices and a Blue Cross benefits statement along with an itemized summary totaling 20 269 30 However as Weatherspoon conceded during cross examination the documentation confirmed that many of the medical expenses 10 were incurred well before the cancellation of the health insurance on November 30 2007 A Blue Cross representative testified that expenses incurred before November 30 2007 should have been covered The exhibits also confirm that several of Weatherspoon charges were s included in the summary more than once appearing in one section for a physicians services group and again under the names of the individual physicians later in the summary Weatherspoon also acknowledged that the policy was an 80 20 policy meaning she would have been responsible far paying a deductible oftwenty percent of the medical expenses that would have been covered under the policy She also had a annual co under the policy Finally she was 00 000 1 payment unsure if certain charges related to contact lenses that were included in the suminary would have been covered under the policy These adjustments resulted in a significant reduction of the recoverable medical expenses Based upon our review of the evidence we find that the jury did not abuse its discretion in awarding Weatherspoon the sum of 10 for medical expenses 15 829 Landry asserts that the jury committed manifest error when if failed to award her 69 in medical expenses Landry also presented a substantial amount 08 515 of inedical documentation and an itemized summary indicating this total amount However she admitted that the documents show that the overwhelming majority of these expenses were incurred after she terminated her employment at Charter in April of 2008 The total medical expenses in the summary incurred between December 1 2007 through April 1 2008 are only 763 09 In light of the 00 000 pay 1 co and the twenty percent deductible applicable under the Blue Cross policy we find that the jury did not abuse its discretion in awarding Landry zero for medical expenses Weatherspoon and Landry next assert that the jury erred by failing to award damages for mental anguish Neither plaintiff suffered any physical injury as a ii result of Charter negligence in withholding the Blue Cross premium payments s Ifthe defendant conduct is merely negligent and causes only mental disturbance s without accompanying physical injury illness or other physical consequences the defendant is generally not liable for such emotional disturbance Prest v Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation 12 La 12 0513 12 4 So 3d Moresi v State Through Dept of Wildlife and Fisheries 567 So 2d 1081 1095 La 1990 However our courts have created an exception to this general rule where there is the especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress arising from special circumstances which serves as a guarantee that the claim is not spurious Prest slip op at 13 Moresi 567 So 2d at 1095 14 Over the objection of Charter the trial court instructed the jury as follows about mental anguish damages The law recognizes that a plaintiff may suffer mental distress and anguish as a result of an incident as well as physical pain and suffering You are permitted to consider such consequences as a part of the general damages which you may award By mental distress and anguish I mean substantial worry or concem grief and the like Though the law recognizes a possible recovery far mental distress it requires that you carefully scrutinize the evidence presented on this point to assure yourselves that such injury has been proven by plaintiff This instruction incorrectly omits the burden of proof required by Moresi and its progeny for an award of inental anguish in the absence of physical injury Accordingly we give no special deference to the jury determination far this item s of damages because the jury did not have the correct legal guidance for the adjudication of this claim Without a correct instruction on the law we cannot assume that the jury applied the pertinent legal principles to the case Through Dep of Transp t See State Dev v Chambers Inv Co Inc 595 So 2d 598 605 La 1992 Weatherspoon presented evidence at the trial of the emotional impact of discovering that she was responsible far medical expenses that should have been iz covered by the Blue Cross policy and the stress of dealing with collection agencies seeking to recover the bills Weatherspoon underwent a heart catheterization procedure in January of 2008 that she thought was covered by her health insurance only to later learn that her insurance was canceled priar to the procedure She began receiving bills for the full amount of the charges without any deduction for insurance payments Although she tried to repay the charges by making partial payments for several months she was contacted by multiple collection agencies by telephone and mail One bill collector testified that his company called Weatherspoon a minimum of 50 times concerning ahospital bill incurred 00 590 in January of 2008 Through partial payments Weatherspoon eventually paid that bill in full Weatherspoon described her feelings as frustrated upset and mad at the same time When asked to describe what she went tl Weatherspoon rough replied Trying to at the time a single mother raising a son Overwhelmed with bills trying to get everything in order I was A lot working faithfuYly going to school also And trying to provide a future for my son And unaware of the consequences of the things that has happened this has really been very much overwhelming And today this is still this is 2012 and I still facing the results of m the negligence of someone else Given the evidence we find that the facts present an especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress arising out of special circumstances which serve as a guarantee that Weatherspoon claim for mental anguish is not spurious s Moresi 567 So 2d at 1095 She presented evidence of the anxiety she suffered while dealing with the sudden and significant debt of inedical expenses imposed upon her because of the cancellation of her insurance unbeknownst to her before she underwent the medical treatment Under these facts we find an award of 00 000 15 to Weatherspoon is appropriate for her mental anguish 13 Unlike Weatherspoon Landry offered no testimony addressing her mental anguish associated with uninsured medical expenses from the relevant four month period Instead most of her testimony concerned the inconvenience of receiving medical care at a charity hospital which according to the exhibits occurred months and even years after she terminated her employment with Charter Even if Charter had timely paid the premiums the Blue Cross coverage would not have been available to Landry after her departure from Charter unless she paid the premiums Landry testified that she did not apply for health insurance after leaving Charter because she could not afford it Consequently neither her uninsured status after leaving Charter nor her treatment in the charity health care system was caused by any negligence of Charter Landry also testified about her inability to purchase a breathing machine on Aprii 4 2008 but the record does not establish that she was still employed by Charter at that time Finally she testified about getting free samples of inedication from providers due to her not having prescription coverage but again the record does not establish whether those events occurred before or after she left Charter Under these circumstances we find that Landry failed to meet the burden of proof necessary to recover mental anguish as a result of Charter snegligence The final item of damages that the appellants contend should have been awarded was for detriment to their credit Representatives of two collection agencies testified that they reported Weatherspoon to credit bureaus for late or no payments for medical expenses incurred during the relevant period of time However no evidence was presented on behalf of either plaintiff to establish the extent of detriment if any to their respective credit ratings No credit reports were introduced to demonstrate the plaintiffs credit ratings before and after these events and no other evidence was offered that otherwise quantified the impact of ia the uninsured medical expenses on their credit ratings We find no abuse of discretion in the jury awarding zero damages for detriment to credit MOTION FOR JNOV NEW TRIAL OR ADDITUR Weatherspoon and Landry also assigned as error the trial court failure to s grant their motions for JNOV or alternatively a new trial or additur A JNOV is warranted when the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict The motion should be granted only when the evidence points so strongly in favor of the moving party that reasonable men could not reach different conclusions not merely when there is a preponderance of evidence for the mover If there is evidence opposed to the motion which is of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair men in the exercise of impartial judgnent might reach minded different conclusions the motion should be denied Anderson v New Orleans Pub Serv Inc 583 So 2d 829 832 La 1991 When a JNOV is denied the appellate court reviews the record to determine whether there is legal error or whether the trier of fact committed manifest error McCrea v Petroleum Inc 96 La 1962 App 1 Cir 12 705 So 2d 787 793 Autin Cajun Joint Venture v Kroger 97 29 s Co 93 La App 1 Cir 2 637 So 2d 538 544 writ denied 94 0320 94 16 0674 La 4638 So 2d 224 94 29 For the reasons already provided we believe the jury erred in awarding Weatherspoon zero damages for mental anguish For the same reasons we find the trial court erred in not granting a JNOV as to that item of recovery In all other respects the trial court properly denied the plaintiffs post motions trial CONCLUSION We affirm the judgment signed on April 24 2012 which amended the April 5 2012 judgment insofar as it found in favor of Brenda Weatherspoon and against Charter Home Health L but we reverse the amount of the damages set forth C is therein and hereby render judgment in favor of Weatherspoon and against Charter in the total amount of 15 consisting of 6 for medical expenses 49 497 49 497 and 9 for mental anguish and representing Charter 00 000 ssixty percent share of the total award We affirm all other aspects of the judgment including the award of interest and costs to Weatherspoon as set forth therein and the dismissal with prejudice of Peggy Landry claims at her sole cost We assign all costs of this s appeal to Charter AFFIRMED IN PART REVERSED IN PART AND RENDERED 16 NOT DESIGNATED FOR PLBI ICATION STATE OF LOUISIANA LOURT OF APPEAI FIRST CIRC JIT Mf3ER NL2G 12 CA 16 BRENDA WEATHERSPOON AI PEGGY LANDRY 1D VERSUS CHARTER HOME HEALTH L BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD OF C LOUISIANA AND COLONIAL INSURANCE COMPANY 7 GUIDRY J dissents in part and assigns reasons 7 GUIDRY J dissenting in part I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion to the extent that it finds s no abuse of the jury discretion in failing to award damages to Weatherspoon for s detriment to her credit At trial Weatherspoon introduced evidence that her unpaid medical expenses were assigned to collection agencies who repeatedly attempted to collect on the debt This evidence in my opinion is sufficient to support an award of damages far detriment to Weatherspoon credit and the jury abused its s discretion in failing to award Weatherspoon any damages for this claim
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
