State Of Louisiana VS Maximino Cruz Sanchez
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STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT 2010 KA 0016 STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS MAXIMINO CRUZ SANCHEZ Judgment Rendered JUN 1 1 2010 On Appeal from the Twenty Second Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of St Tammany State of Louisiana Docket No 466319 Honorable William J Crain Judge Presiding Walter P Reed Counsel for Appellee District Attorney State of Louisiana Covington Louisiana Kathryn W Landry Attorney for the State Baton Rouge Louisiana Ivan A Orihuela Counsel for DefendantAppellant Riguer Silva Kenner Louisiana Maximino Cruz Sanchez BEFORE DOWNING GAIDRY AND McCLENDON JJ McCLENDON J Defendant Maximino Cruz Sanchez was charged by bill of information with operating a vehicle without lawful presence in the United States a violation of LSAR 14 Defendant filed a motion to quash the bill of information S 100 13 attacking LSAR 14 S 100 13 The trial court denied the motion to quash Defendant withdrew his former plea and entered a plea of guilty as charged reserving the right to appeal the trial court ruling on the motion to quash bill of s information pursuant to State v Crosby 338 So 584 La 1976 The trial 2d court sentenced defendant to thirty days imprisonment in parish jail The trial court further ordered that defendant Naturalization Service INS detainer be held under Immigration and Defendant now appeals presenting five assignments of error as to the trial court denial of the motion to quash bill of s information For the forthcoming reasons we affirm the conviction and sentence STATEMENT OF FACTS As defendant entered a guilty plea to the offense as charged in the instant case the facts were not developed In accordance with the bill of information the instant offense took place on March 16 2009 The factual basis presented by the defense counsel during the Boykin hearing is as follows A police officer approached defendant as he was changing one of the tires on his vehicle The passenger of defendant vehicle indicated that defendant had been driving while s intoxicated The officer further determined that defendant did not have a valid s driver license and that he was not legally present in the United States ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR In an outlined argument in support of his assignments of error defendant denotes the following major challenges to LSAR 14 S 100 13 federal preemption equal protection vagueness valid police power cruel and unusual punishment and the lack of probable cause Defendant also pleaded guilty to DWI as charged in a separate bill of information 2 First defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash because LSAR 14 is preempted by federal immigration law S 100 13 Defendant specifically contends that the definitions for the state statute outlined in LSAR 14 create a non federal alien classification scheme S 100 12 Noting that federal law precludes states from creating their own categories of aliens defendant argues that LSAR 14 creates categories of aliens that are S 100 13 wholly divorced from the categories created by the federal government Defendant specifically notes that the definitions for alien students and nonresident aliens are new and do not employ or extend federal categories Defendant argues that LSAR 14 does not use federal categories to S 100 13 mirror federal goals and does not rely on federal immigration standards Defendant also contends that LSAR 14 provides definitions that are S 100 12 confusing and irreconcilable with federal definitions Defendant contends that the categories of aliens that apply to LSAR 14 are incompatible with S 100 13 federal definitions Further defendant argues that the statute requires state agents to make determinations of whether an alien may be admitted or removed from the United States and to report suspects to INS Defendant argues the statute constitutes an impermissible regulation of immigration contending that reporting frequently results in the initiation of removal proceedings against undocumented suspects Defendant further argues that the statute is preempted because the federal government occupies the field of deciding which aliens are required to carry proof of documentation Defendant contends that the statute imposes much stiffer penalties for the same violation and that the state more severe penalties s conflict with the federal scheme spenalties Second defendant argues that LSAR S 13 100 14 violates equal protection in that the requirement that alien students and nonresident aliens carry documentation showing lawful presence in the United States disproportionately affects those aliens covered by the statute and subjects them to severe penalties 3 Third defendant argues that the statute is poorly drafted and impermissibly vague and unconstitutional in that on its face it offers no discrete definition of the documentation a nonresident alien is required to carry to avoid a violation of the law Defendant contends that the statute provides insufficient notice to the public of the behavior that is criminalized Correspondingly defendant argues there is no standard set forth in the statute or any of its cited references by which a trier of fact can determine guilt or innocence Defendant further contends that in drafting the statute the legislature did not offer guidelines to govern its application by law enforcement Fourth defendant argues that LSAR 14 is not a valid exercise S 100 13 of state police powers He contends that the statute conflicts with the federal plenary immigration power In arguing that the statute is an invalid exercise of state police powers defendant concludes that the statute is repugnant to the S U Constitution Fifth defendant argues that the statute constitutes a disproportionate punishment in that it raises a routine traffic violation to a felony that can trigger deportation with a bar from returning to the United States for up to ten years even if defendant has a United States citizen parent spouse or child Defendant argues that this is cruel and unusual punishment that is clearly arbitrary and without rational relationship to the crime As to his final argument defendant contends that through enforcement of LSAR 14 local law enforcement authorities are delving into federal S 100 13 immigration matters under the guise of traffic enforcement without training on the applicable standards Defendant argues that the statute failure to offer s guidance as to what constitutes documentation demonstrating lawful presence in the United States renders it impossible for the police to apply any standard or make a probable cause determination Defendant specifies that in his case the arresting officer did not attempt to verify his status in the United States under immigration laws even though he did not confess to being an illegal alien Defendant further contends that the only indication to justify the arrest and El charge was his inability to produce a driver license Defendant concludes that s the arresting officer did not have probable cause to arrest him for a violation of LSA R 14 S 100 13 In denying the motion to quash the bill of information the trial court cited this court holding in jurisprudence noted below in finding that the federal s preemption challenge does not have merit Finding no violation of the Equal Protection Clause in this case the trial court noted that the legislative purposes as set forth in the statute at issue show a rational basis under state law for distinguishing between the classes of individuals affected The trial court further concluded that the maximum penalty for the offense does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment Preemption Valid Police Power Louisiana Revised Statutes 14 provides 13 100 A No alien student or nonresident alien shall operate a motor vehicle in the state without documentation demonstrating that the person is lawfully present in the United States B Upon arrest of a person for operating a vehicle without lawful presence in the United States law enforcement officials shall seize the driver license and immediately surrender such license to s the office of motor vehicles for cancellation and shall immediately notify the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the name and location of the person C Whoever commits the crime of driving without lawful presence in the United States shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars imprisoned for not more than one year with or without hard labor or both Defendant cites State v Lopez 05 0685 La 4 Cir 12 948 So App 06 20 2d 1121 writ denied 07 0110 La 12 969 So 619 in support of his 07 7 2d preemption argument However ruling that LSAR 14 is not S 100 13 invalidated on the basis of federal preemption this court has previously declined to follow State v Lopez in the following published cases State v Gonzalez Perez 071813 La 1 Cir 2 997 So 1 writ denied 090292 La App 08 27 2d 09 18 12 23 So 930 State v Reyes 07 1811 La 1 Cir 2 3d App 08 27 989 So 770 writ denied 082013 La 12 23 So 929 Subsequent 2d 09 18 3d to those cases in State v Ramos 07 1448 La 1 Cir 7 993 So App 08 28 2d E 281 en banc writ denied 082103 La 12 23 So 929 this court 09 18 3d reaffirmed the holdings in the above cited cases The State of Louisiana is vested with the authority to regulate public roads and highways within the state under its police power provided that the legislation does not prove repugnant to the provisions of the state or national constitutions Kaltenbach v Breaux 690 F Supp 1551 1553 W La D 1988 We do not find a clear and manifest purpose of Congress to effect a complete ouster of state power to regulate requirements for legal operation of a vehicle on public roads and highways within a state In accordance with our prior holdings on this issue and as set forth above LSAR 14 is not S 100 13 preempted by federal law and the enforcement of the statute constitutes a valid exercise of this state police power s Racial Profiling Equal Protection Probable Cause According to the uncontested factual basis presented by the defense at the Boykin hearing in this matter defendant was changing a tire on his vehicle when the police officer approached him The Equal Protection Clause prohibits race based selective enforcement of the law only when such enforcement has a discriminatory effect and is motivated by a discriminatory purpose To show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause a claimant must prove that the actions involved had a discriminatory effect and were motivated by a discriminatory purpose Chavez v Illinois State Police 251 F 612 635 36 7th Cir 3d 2001 To prove discriminatory effect the claimants are required to show that they are members of a protected class that they are otherwise similarly situated to members of the unprotected class and that they were treated differently from members of the unprotected class Chavez 251 F at 636 3d A party may show that he was similarly situated yet treated differently by identifying individuals who received disparate treatment or by using statistics to demonstrate a significant disparity Chavez 251 F at 636 When statistics 3d are introduced they must address the issue of whether one class is being treated differently than others similarly situated 1 t Chavez 251 F at 638 3d Supreme Court precedent also suggests that minority motorists alleging that a pretextual traffic stop constituted a denial of equal protection must show that similarly situated Caucasian motorists could have been stopped but were not See Chavez 251 F at 63741 3d There is nothing in the record to indicate that the officer blatantly acted with a discriminatory purpose There was no hearing or evidence in the record that defendant is a member of a protected class who is otherwise similarly situated to members of the unprotected class and that he was treated differently from members of the unprotected class Defendant has failed to raise an inference of purposeful discrimination or a prima facie showing of discrimination Thus the record does not support a finding of a violation of the Equal Protection Clause or the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable seizures As noted defendant also argues on appeal that there was no probable cause for his arrest Defendant also raised this issue in his motion to quash However the question of probable cause for defendant pretrial imprisonment is s now moot since the defendant has been convicted State v Sweeney 443 2d So 522 531 La 1983 State v Dorsey 484 So 865 866 La 1 Cir 2d App 1986 A defendant adversely affected may move to suppress any evidence from use at trial on the ground that it was unconstitutionally obtained art 703A LSAC P Cr The record reveals that defendant filed such a motion but did not raise the lack of probable cause for his arrest as a basis for suppression A new basis for a motion to suppress cannot be raised for the first time on appeal A defendant seeking review of a motion to suppress on appeal is limited to the grounds articulated at trial State v Peters 546 So 829 831 La 1 2d App Cir writ denied 552 So 378 La 1989 State v Wright 441 So 1301 2d 2d 1303 La 1 Cir 1983 App Moreover defendant did not seek a hearing or ruling on his motion to suppress or reserve the issue for appellate review prior to pleading guilty See Crosby 338 So at 586 State v Ealy 451 So 1351 2d 2d 1352 La 1 Cir 1984 App Hence probable cause for arrest is not properly before us VA Vagueness Attacks on the constitutionality of a statute may be made by two methods The statute itself can be challenged or the state application to a s particular defendant can be the basis of the attack Constitutional challenges may be based upon vagueness State v Gamberella 633 So 595 601 02 2d App La 1 Cir 1993 writ denied 940200 La 6 640 So 1341 94 24 2d In this case defendant does not attack the statute application to his particular s conduct but argues that the statute is unconstitutional on its face The constitutional guarantee that an accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him requires that penal statutes describe unlawful conduct with sufficient particularity and clarity that ordinary persons of reasonable intelligence are capable of discerning the statute meaning and s conforming their conduct thereto Gamberella 633 So at 602 2d Const amend XIV 1 LSAConst art I 2 13 See U S In addition a penal statute must provide adequate standards by which the guilt or innocence of the accused can be determined In determining the meaning of a statute and hence its constitutionality penal statutes must be given a genuine construction according to the fair import of their words taken in their usual sense in connection with the context and with reference to the purpose of the provision LSAR 14 Gamberella 633 So at 602 S 3 2d Louisiana Revised Statutes 14 clearly satisfies these requirements 13 100 under the applicable rules of construction Under the terms of the statute the conduct proscribed is unambiguous The statute requires alien drivers to carry proof of legal status and the penalty provision imposes punishment based on the failure to do so These elements are plainly stated in Subsection A of the statute and Subsection C provides the penalty for a violation of the statute The statute describes the prohibited conduct with sufficient particularity and clarity that ordinary persons of reasonable intelligence are capable of discerning the s statute meaning and conforming their conduct thereto Thus the statute is not impermissibly vague M Cruel and Unusual Punishment A defendant who has been charged with violating a criminal statute and who is therefore subject to criminal prosecution is adversely affected by that statute and may contest the constitutionality of the sentence authorized therein as facially excessive in violation of LSAConst art Constitution explicitly prohibits excessive sentences I 20 s Louisiana The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated t he deliberate inclusion by the redactors of the Constitution of a prohibition against excessive as well as cruel and unusual punishment broadened the duty of this court to review the sentencing aspects of criminal statutes State v Goode 380 So 1361 1363 La 1980 Not only does 2d our Constitution explicit protection against excessive punishment permit us to s determine both whether the sentence of the particular offender is excessive but also whether the range of sentences authorized by a criminal statute is excessive See State v Guajardo 428 So 468 472 La 1983 citations 2d omitted A punishment is constitutionally excessive if it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and is nothing more than the purposeless imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime State v Dorthey 623 So 1276 1280 La 1993 2d A sentence is grossly disproportionate if when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society it shocks the sense of justice State v Lobato 603 So 739 751 La 1992 2d It is a well established principle that the legislature has the unique responsibility to define criminal conduct and to provide for the penalties to be imposed against persons engaged in such conduct Dorthey 623 So at 1278 The penalties provided by the 2d legislature reflect the degree to which the criminal conduct affronts society State v Davis 94 2332 p 11 La 1 Cir 12 666 So 400 407 App 95 15 2d writ denied 960127 La 4 671 So 925 96 19 2d penalties unless they are found to be unconstitutional 1278 0 Courts must apply these Dorthey 623 So at 2d We note that LSAR 14 imposes no mandatory minimum S 100 13C prison sentence or fine The statute requires only that the sentence not exceed one year and the fine not exceed 1 00 000 While defendant notes that the reporting requirement of the statute may trigger deportation considering the nature of the offense and the punishment and purpose thereof as set forth in LSAR 14 we find that the sentencing provision applicable to LSAR S 100 11 S 13 100 14 is not unconstitutionally excessive CONCLUSION In State v Griffin 495 So 1306 1308 La 1986 the Louisiana 2d Supreme Court stated Statutes are presumed to be valid and the constitutionality of a statute should be upheld whenever possible Because a state statute is presumed constitutional the party challenging the statute bears the burden of proving its unconstitutionality The attack will fail if there exists a reasonable relationship between the law and the promotion or protection of a public good such as health safety or welfare Citations omitted Based on the foregoing analyses defendant has failed to meet the burden of proving the unconstitutionality of LSAR 14 The trial court did not err S 100 13 in denying the motion to quash the bill of information We find no merit in the assignments of error CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED 10
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