State Of Louisiana VS Lee D. Blanchard
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT 2010 KA 0014 STATE OF LOUISIANA YV VERSUS LEE D BLANCHARD DATE OFJUDGMENT JUL 8 2010 UN AFFLAL PROM I HE T WEN 1Y I H1RD J UDICIAL DISTRICT COURT NUMBER 23 DIVISION B PARISH OF ASCENSION 795 STATE OF LOUISIANA HONORABLE THOMAS J KLIEBERT JR JUDGE Ricky L Babin District Attorney Donaldsonville Louisiana Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana Donald D Candell Assistant District Attorney Gonzales Louisiana M Michele Fournet Counsel for DefendantAppellant Baton Rouge Louisiana Lee D Blanchard BEFORE PARRO KUHN AND McDONALD JJ Disposition CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED KUHN J The defendant Lee D Blanchard was charged by grand jury indictment with four counts of molestation of a juvenile counts I 2 81 14 and he pled not guilty IV violations of La R S The State dismissed count I prior to the presentation of opening statements Following a jury trial on counts II III and IV the defendant was found guilty of the responsive verdicts of indecent behavior with a juvenile where the victim is under the age of thirteen violations of La R S 81 14 He was sentenced on each count to twelve years at hard labor with three years to be served without benefit of parole probation or suspension of sentence Five years of each sentence was suspended to be served on supervised probation The trial court ordered that the sentences would run concurrently The defendant now appeals designating the following assignments of error 1 The trial court erred in not requiring the State to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination in the defense exercise of peremptory challenges 2 The trial court erred in its ruling that the defense failed to meet its burden of coming forward with gender neutral reasons as to prospective jurors Trisha Skal Shanda Delmore Bonnie Hurley and Tammie Downing 3 The trial court erred in failing to hold the prosecution to its burden of establishing purposeful gender discrimination 4 The trial court erred in the reseating of challenged jurors and under the circumstances of the case violated the defendant right to a fair s trial to a fair and impartial jury and to peremptory challenges 5 The trial court erred in violating the defendant right to a fair trial s and to an impartial jury in refusing to dismiss juror Skal based on her exposure to a prejudicial incident outside the courtroom prior to trial 6 The trial court erred in accepting a verdict returned by a non unanimous jury violating the defendant right under the Sixth and s Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I 2 and 16 of the Louisiana Constitution 2 For the following reasons we affirm the convictions and sentences on counts II III and IV FACTS The victim K testified at trial Her date of birth was September 13 C 1994 She identified the defendant in court as her baby sitter husband s The victim stayed at her baby sitter home after school until her mother picked her up s after work She indicated that on August 25 2006 the defendant repeatedly put his hands in her pants and under her underwear and put his finger inside of her The first incident occurred when the victim was sitting between the defendant s legs at the computer looking for games for the defendant sdaughter to play The s defendant daughter was approximately four or five years old The victim indicated the defendant put his finger in her vagina which she called her too too The babysitter was outside during the incident The second incident occurred when the defendant sdaughter was sitting on the defendant sleg and the victim was sitting between the defendant slegs at the computer looking at games on Barbie The victim indicated that during that incident the defendant put com his finger in her tootoo The victim got up and left the room The victim indicated that when the defendant did it a third time that day she started crying and her baby sitter walked in and asked what had happened The victim indicated the defendant looked at her and whispered Please don tell The defendant told t the victim babysitter that the victim must have scratched her leg on the s computer and the victim agreed The victim indicated the only other time the defendant put his finger in her tootoo was approximately three weeks before the The victim is referenced herein only by her initials See La R 46 S 1844 W 3 incidents she had described The victim also indicated the defendant had taken her hand and made her rub his peepee on more than one occasion The victim stated she delayed telling anyone about the incidents because she was scared of what the defendant might do to her Dr John David Knapp also testified at trial The defense and the State stipulated that he was an expert in the field of internal medicine and pediatrics He examined the victim on August 30 2006 She had marked redness in her vaginal area and her hymen was not completely intact The 44yearold defendant testified he was at the computer with the victim and his daughter on August 25 2006 for fifteen to twenty minutes looking at com Barbie According to the defendant the victim was sitting between his legs and was sliding off the chair so he grabbed her around her legs and probably her butt maybe a little bit The defendant claimed he eventually got up because his computer kept crashing and the victim cried because she hurt herself on the desk He denied putting his hands under the victim clothing He claimed s if he touched the victim vaginal area it was unintentional He denied putting his s finger in the victim vagina He denied taking the victim hand and putting it on s s his penis DEFENSE COUNSEL USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES S In assignment of error number one the defendant argues the trial court erred in finding a prima facie showing of gender discrimination in the defense exercise s of peremptory challenges because the State failed to meet the threshold requirements for such a showing In assignment of error number two the defendant argues the trial court erred in finding the explanations provided by the defense for 4 its peremptory challenges were not gender neutral In assignment of error number three the defendant argues the trial court erred in failing to require the State to prove purposeful gender discrimination In Batson v Kentucky 476 U 79 106 S 1712 90 L69 1986 S Ct 2d Ed the United States Supreme Court held an equal protection violation occurs when a party exercises a peremptory challenge to exclude a prospective juror on the basis of The scope of a Batson claim has been extended to other suspect race classifications such as gender See J v Alabama ex rel T 511 U B E B S 127 141 42 114 S 1419 1428 128 L 89 1994 If the challenger Ct 2d Ed makes a prima facie showing of discriminatory strikes the burden shifts to the opposing party to offer racial gender neutral explanations for the challenged juror Ifa race gender neutral reason is given the trial court must then decide whether the challenger has proven purposeful discrimination Whether there has been intentional racial or gender discrimination is a question of fact The decisive question in the analysis is whether the racegender neutral reason should be believed A reviewing court owes the trial court evaluations of discriminatory s intent great deference and should not reverse unless the evaluations are clearly erroneous See State v Scott 2004 1312 pp 4445 La 1 921 So 904 06 19 2d 937 cert denied 549 U 858 127 S 137 166 L 100 2006 overruled S Ct 2d Ed on other grounds State v Dunn 2007 0878 La 1 974 So 658 per 08 25 2d curiam In order to make a prima facie showing the opposing party has exercised peremptory challenges on an impermissible basis the challenger may offer any facts relevant to the question of the opposing party discriminatory intent Such facts s 61 include but are not limited to a pattern of strikes by the opposing party against members of a suspect class statements or actions of the opposing party during voir dire which support an inference that the exercise of peremptory strikes was motivated by impermissible considerations the composition of the venire and of the jury finally empaneled and any other disparate impact upon the suspect class which is alleged to be the victim of purposeful discrimination See State v Duncan 99 2615 p 14 La 10 802 So 533 54445 cert denied 536 U 907 122 01 16 2d S Ct S 2362 153 L 183 2002 The challenger need only produce evidence 2d Ed sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that a prohibited discrimination has occurred Further Batson admonition to consider all relevant s circumstances in addressing the question of discriminatory intent requires close scrutiny of the challenged strikes when compared with the treatment of panel members who expressed similar views or shared similar circumstances in their backgrounds State v Elie 20051569 p 6 La 7 936 So 791 796 06 10 2d No formula exists for determining whether the challenger has established a prima facie case of a purposeful prohibited discrimination A trial judge may take into account not only whether a pattern of strikes against a suspect class of persons has emerged during voir dire but also whether the opposing party questions and s statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose See Duncan 99 2615 at p 14 802 So at 545 2d For a Batsontype challenge to succeed it is not enough that a discriminatory result be evidenced rather that result must ultimately be traced to a prohibited discriminatory purpose Thus the sole focus ofthe Batson type inquiry is upon the 2 intent of the opposing party at the time he exercised his peremptory strikes See State v Green 94 0887 pp 23 24 La 5 655 So 272 287 The same 95 22 2d three step burden shifting framework outlined in Batson is utilized regardless of whether the challenge is based on race or gender Duncan 99 2615 at p 11 802 2d So at 543 In the instant case panel one consisted of twentyone people and nine women twelve men Seven of the men had children who were the same age as or younger than the victim who was eleven years old at the time of the alleged offenses Defense counsel used five of his peremptory challenges to exclude four women Skal Dana Teepell Delmore and Donna Wescott and one man an employee of the Ascension Parish Sheriff Office on the first panel Panel two s consisted of twentyone people five men and sixteen women After defense counsel used his next three peremptory challenges to exclude women Hurley Downing and Melissa Gisclair the State objected under Batson on women The court sustained the objection noting that it had noticed a pattern of systematically excluding women Defense counsel argued he had legitimate reasons for the peremptory challenges he had exercised He claimed he had challenged Gisclair because she had a fiveyearold child similar in age to the victim and because she was a teacher The State pointed out that the only female juror Cynthia Case of the nine jurors selected at that time was also an educator Defense counsel replied that he had other reasons for choosing Case Defense counsel asserted that he had challenged Downing because she had two children four grandchildren was an accountant and 2 Case actually indicated she was a retired educator 7 was prosecution oriented Defense counsel claimed Downing would not be fair to the defendant because of how she had answered questions how she had looked at the defendant and how she had folded her arms The State countered that all eight of the male jurors chosen at that time had children Defense counsel replied he found mothers with small children to be a potential problem Defense counsel further claimed he had challenged Hurley because she had a twoyear old daughter was fairly reserved and was prosecution oriented Defense counsel asserted he had challenged Wescott because she worked for the Office of Community Services OCS which dealt with child abuse cases The State replied that Wescott had indicated she was only an administrative coordinator with OCS and Wescott did not deal directly with the cases Defense counsel claimed he had challenged Delmore because she seemed particularly friendly to the prosecution she had a seventeenyear old daughter and she was a claims adjuster for Blue Cross Blue Shield The prosecutor indicated she did not know Delmore and Delmore did not know her Defense counsel claimed he had challenged Teepell because she had testified that she had been physically attacked and she explained that she could not put that out of her mind and her husband was a retired Air Force colonel Lastly defense counsel claimed he had challenged Skal because she had three children ages 6 10 and 18 years worked for doctors and he did not like the way she had answered his questions The State responded noting that defense counsel main premise for exclusion s in each instance was that the prospective female juror had children The State further noted that many of the males who had been accepted by defense counsel also had children D The court accepted defense counsel explanations for the challenges against s Teepell Wescott and Gisclair but rejected the explanations for the challenges against Skal Delmore Hurley and Downing The court ordered Skal Delmore and Hurley to be seated as jurors and ordered Downing to be seated as an alternate juror Defense counsel objected to the court ruling and the next day he moved for a s mistrial on the basis ofthat ruling The court denied the motion for mistrial In the instant case the record establishes that the pattern of peremptory strikes by defense counsel against female jurors was evident and supported the tacit finding by the trial court that the prosecution had met its burden of going forward State v Green 94 0887 at p 24 655 So at 288 2d Once the defense offered genderneutral explanations for its peremptory challenges and the trial court ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination the preliminary issue of whether the State had made a prima facie showing became moot See Hernandez v New York 500 U 352 359 111 S 1859 1866 114 L 395 1991 S Ct 2d Ed State v Green 94 0887 at p 25 655 So at 288 2d Whether or not there was intentional gender discrimination was a question of fact The trial court considered the explanations for the peremptory challenges offered by the defense and found some of the explanations credible while finding some of them not credible The decisive question in the Batson type analysis is whether the gender neutral explanation should be believed See State v Tyler 97 0338 p 12 La 9 723 So 939 946 47 cert denied 526 U 1073 119 98 2d S Ct S 1472 143 L 556 1999 The trial court apparently did not believe 2d Ed defense counsel gender neutral explanations for its peremptory challenges against s Skal Delmore Hurley and Downing 9 It apparently rejected defendant s contentions that Delmore Hurley Downing and Skal appeared either prosecution oriented or adverse to the defense as pretextual reasons for peremptorily challenging these prospective jurors Further in explaining his use of peremptory challenges to exclude Skal Delmore Hurley and Downing defense counsel indicated he found mothers but not fathers with small children to be a potential problem The trial court correctly rejected this gender specific reason for the exercise of peremptory challenges by the defense and thus found the State had proven purposeful discrimination in regard to the peremptory challenges used by the defense to exclude these prospective jurors On the other hand the judge concluded that the defendant had legitimate gender neutral reasons for challenging Teepell Wescott and Gisclair and thus found the State had not proven purposeful discrimination in regard to the peremptory challenges used by the defense to exclude those prospective jurors See Purkett v Elem 514 U 765 769 115 S 1769 1771 131 L834 1995 S Ct 2d Ed per curiam The judge sustained the challenge against Teepell who said she was once attacked by a man and who also stated that it was hard to imagine that someone charged with child molestation was actually innocent The court also upheld a challenge against Wescott who worked for a state agency dealing with abused children Finally the challenge against Gisclair a teacher was apparently upheld on the grounds that defense counsel stated that he always struck teachers unless other factors militated toward including them The judge findings that these s peremptory strikes were made for purposes beyond any gender discriminatory intent shows that the trial judge determined that defense counsel had a legitimate reason for exercising the challenges Batson 476 U at 98 n 20 106 S at 1724 n 20 S Ct 10 A legitimate reason is not a reason that necessarily makes sense but a reason that does not deny equal protection Purkett 514 U at 769 115 S at 1771 S Ct After a thorough review of the record we find no clear error in the court s evaluations of gender discriminatory intent These assignments oferror are without merit SEATING OF PREVIOUSLY REJECTED JURORS In assignment of error number four the defendant argues the trial court mismanaged the jury venire by allowing challenged jurors to return to the audience while segregating selected jurors and then reseated previously rejected jurors who were aware they had been rejected and could have harbored hostility toward defense counsel He claims the record does not indicate whether or not the rejected jurors knew which side had excluded them but argues even if they were unaware of this information the inevitable speculation that would have arisen from the unexplained reseating was enough to deprive him ofan impartial jury Initially we note that the record indicates the State and the defense exercised their peremptory challenges in chambers La Code Crim P art 795 provides E The court shall allow to stand each peremptory challenge for which a satisfactory racially neutral or gender neutral reason is given Those jurors who have been peremptorily challenged and for whom no satisfactory racially neutral or gender neutral reason is apparent or given may be ordered returned to the panel or the court may take such other corrective action as it deems appropriate under the circumstances The court shall make specific findings regarding each such challenge There was no error The trial court followed the procedure set forth under La Code Crim P art 795 and the defendant claims ofprejudice are speculative E s This assignment of error is without merit MOTION TO DISMISS JUROR SKAL In assignment of error number five the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying the defense motion to dismiss juror Skal after she was approached by a man in the parking lot Due process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation Were that the rule few trials would be constitutionally acceptable The safeguards of juror impartiality such as voir dire and protective instructions from the trial judge are not infallible it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen Smith v Phillips 455 U 209 217 102 S 940 946 71 L 78 1982 S Ct 2d Ed The ultimate inquiry is Did the intrusion affect the jury deliberations and thereby s its verdict See United States v Olano 507 U 725 739 113 S 1770 1780 S Ct 123 L 508 1993 2d Ed Following the completion ofjury selection the trial court adjourned court for the day but questioned the jury in chambers The following colloquy occurred between the court and juror Skal Court And I understand yesterday leaving the courtroom something happened I don know the story so tell me what happened t Skal I left Everybody got dismissed around I think it was 1 00 clock oand I was walking to my car and I saw a guy a man talking to one of the other jurors asking him a question and I kind of noticed him cause he had on a red hoodie sweatshirt And I just passed him up and started walking to my car and there was a buck parked next to me and his door was open And I said excuse me cause I was trying to get in my car And he was like oh okay And he shut his door And I went 12 to unlock my door to get in and I saw out of the corner of my eye this guy like not running like at full speed but you know trotting real fast across the parking lot and he was looking at me So I knew he was like coming towards me And he came faster and faster and I jumped in my car and I shut the door and locked it real quick And he started hitting my window and I was you know scared and whatever and I cranked my car real quick And there was not a car parked in front of me there was a parking spot but not a car in front of me so I went forward and I went around I just started honking the horn and honking the horn And I was parked here and I went all the way around to this entrance and as I was going I looked in my rearview mirror and he was running Like I was going fast out of the parking lot and he was running after me so 1 just laid my hand on the horn and started honking the horn honking the horn And as I got to the exit a car a truck was in front of me and so I couldn go and I stopped and I saw him in my t window and he started hitting the window again screaming screaming and just screaming And he got like in front of my windshield and was hitting on my and I couldn go so I just kept honking the horn and t was crying and hysterical of course whatever And so the truck left and I pulled out and I was on this side road where the library on or s whatever I don know what the street is but I pulled out and then one t of the other guys was going he a juror He pulled beside me and he s said are you okay and he just mouthed to me and I said no and I was crying And I pulled in the civic center I think down there And he said we need to find an officer cause I saw everything that happened but I couldn do anything or whatever So at that time a police officer t passed and he flagged him down and I got in the Durango with him and we came back here and he said if you see him point him out We did so they got him and took him in and talked to him and he said his phone was in my car I like my car was locked the whole time cause my m phone was in there because I couldn bring it in the courthouse So t they went search the car and his phone wasn in there And he said his t phone was in my car which it wasn so I don know if he was trying t t to steal something out of my car or was trying to get in the car with me or I don know t Court as a juror My question is do you think that would affect you today Skal No I don think so I was upset yesterday of course t Court Well sure I can imagine Skal Yeah nothing like that ever happened you know I s m fine Court Okay 13 Skal m Ikind of nervous about coming here this morning and the family because their family was upset and you know I passed them and they saw me as the officers were talking to me The family saw me but I was kind of nervous coming but an officer came Court His family Skal His aunt I think was yeah But I think they were with a different trial or something I think it finished yesterday But I was fine I mean I m fine Court Okay The court then individually asked each of the other jurors and the alternate jurors if the incident in the parking lot would affect their service on the jury All jurors and alternates indicated the incident in the parking lot would not affect their service on the jury At the beginning of court the next day defense counsel moved that juror Skal be dismissed on the basis of the incident in the parking lot The court denied the motion and defense counsel objected to the ruling ofthe court There was no error in denying the motion to dismiss juror Skal The trial court carefully questioned her and every other juror including the alternate jurors and determined that the incident in the parking lot would not affect the service of any juror or alternate This assignment of error is without merit CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NON UNANIMOUS VERDICTS In assignment of error number six the defendant argues the convictions for counts II and III must be reversed because the verdict on those counts was not unanimous and the Louisiana scheme allowing non unanimous verdicts in felony cases La Code Crim P art 782 violates the federal and state constitutions A 14 It is well settled that a constitutional challenge may not be considered by an appellate court unless it was properly pleaded and raised in the trial court below First a party must raise the unconstitutionality in the trial court second the unconstitutionality of a statute must be specially pleaded and third the grounds outlining the basis of unconstitutionality must be particularized State v Hatton 2007 2377 pp 13 14 La 7 985 So 709 718 19 08 1 2d In the instant case the defendant failed to properly raise his constitutional challenge to La Code Crim P art 782 in the trial court Accordingly we A pretermit consideration ofthis assignment of error 3 DECREE For these reasons we affirm the defendant convictions and sentences s CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED 3 Nonetheless Article 782 withstands constitutional scrutiny State v Bertrand 20082215 p 8 La 3 6 So 738 743 State v Caples 20052517 pp 1516 La App 1st Cir 09 17 3d 06 9 6 938 So 147 157 writ denied 2006 2466 La 4955 So 684 2d 07 27 2d 15
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