KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION V. SANDRA CAMILLE BROOKS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
TO BE PUBLISHED
,'VUyrrMr
Courf of '1~rufurkv
2010-SC-00000139-KB
KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION
V.
IN SUPREME COURT
SANDRA CAMILLE BROOKS
RESPONDENT
OPINION AND ORDER
Upon motion of the Kentucky Bar Association (KBA), this Court entered
an order directing Sandra Camille Brooks to show cause why this Court should
not hold her in contempt for her continued unauthorized practice of law in
violation of an August 25, 2005 Order of this Court. The 2005 order held
Respondent in contempt for her failure to abide by a 1997 KBA directive to
cease and desist engaging in the unauthorized practice of law and, again,
ordered her to refrain from the unauthorized practice of law. Respondent failed
to timely respond to this Court's April 22, 2010 Show Cause Order.
Nevertheless, a response was filed upon this Court's granting of Respondent's
motion for an extension of time .
At the outset, we must address a challenge to this Court's jurisdiction .
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss this case, asserting that the KBA has
failed to state a claim upon which relief cars be granted and further asserting
that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction . Although there is no
accompanying explanation or argument, we surmise that Respondent is
questioning this Court's authority to discipline her, a non-lawyer, for the
violation of a Supreme Court Rule governing the practice of law. First,
Respondent's assertion would have been better directed to the previous 2005
proceedings wherein this Court sanctioned her and enjoined her from the
unauthorized practice of law. At this juncture, the proceedings are merely
contempt proceedings for Respondent's violation of our previous order. Clearly,
there can be no legitimate challenge to this Court's jurisdiction to enforce its
own order and to impose contempt sanctions for violations of such order.
Nevertheless, because of the significance of a jurisdictional challenge, we will
address the underlying issue of this Court's jurisdiction to enjoin and sanction
non-lawyers for the unauthorized practice of law.
This Court has long exercised its jurisdiction to sanction and enjoin nonattorneys from practicing law without a license . See, e.g., Hargett v. Lake, 305
S.W .2d 523 (Ky. 1957) ; Carter v. Brien, 309 S .W.2d 748 (Ky. 1956) ; Hobson v.
Kentucky Trust Co. of Louisville, 303 Ky. 493, 197 S .W.2d 454 (Ky. 1946) ;
Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Covington, 342
S .W.2d 397 (Ky. 1961) ; Frazee v. Citizens Fid. Bank & Trust Co., 393 S .W.2d
778 (Ky. 1964); Kentucky State Bar Assn v. Kelly, 421 S .W.2d 829 (Ky . 1967);
Kentucky Bar Assn v. Fox, 536 S .W. 2d 469 (Ky. 1976) ; Kentucky State Bar
Ass'n v. Bailey, 409 S .W.2d 530 (Ky . 1966) . Furthermore, the contention that
this Court does not have jurisdiction to proceed against a nonmember of the
legal profession for the unauthorized practice of law was expressly rejected in
Kentucky State Bar Assn v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn of Covington, 342
S .W.2d 397 (Ky. 1960), a holding that was reaffirmed in Kentucky State Bar
Ass'n v. Tussey, 476 S .W.2d 177 (Ky. 1972).
Along with prior instances of sanctions and injunctions imposed by
Kentucky's highest Court against non-lawyers for the unauthorized practice of
law, First Federal relied on In re Baker, 85 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1951) for its exercise
of jurisdiction over non-lawyers . Baker, a decision of New Jersey's highest
court, explained that jurisdiction was expressly granted by its Constitution, but
even absent such express authority, inherent power existed in the Court to
exercise jurisdiction over laymen who were practicing law without a license .
Significantly, New Jersey's constitutional provision, N .J . Const. Art. VI, § 2, is
very similar to Ky. Const. § 116. 1 Both provisions provide for the state's
supreme court to govern admission to the bar and to discipline members of the
bar. Baker explained that this express authorization to regulate licensed
attorneys necessarily carried with it an implied corollary power to sanction
those who invade the province of the profession without obtaining admission to
the bar. Baker eloquently stated the rationale as follows :
It is generally conceded throughout the country that
the power to control admissions to the bar and to
discipline members of the bar is inherent in the
judiciary. Here these powers have been expressly
Section 116 provides, in relevant part, that the Supreme Court "shall, by rule,
govern admission to the bar and the discipline of members of the bar."
conferred on the Supreme Court by art. VI, sec . II, par.
3 of the Constitution : "The Supreme Court shall have
jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law
and the discipline of persons admitted ." But whether
inherent or express, these powers over the admission
and discipline of members of the bar would be
meaningless and futile if laymen might practice law
with impunity. . . . The reason for prohibiting the
unauthorized practice of law by laymen is not to aid
the legal profession but to safeguard the public from
the disastrous results that are bound to flow from the
activities of untrained and incompetent individuals,
assuming to practice a learned profession which
entails years of preparation and without being bound
by the high standards of professional conduct and
integrity which are imposed on members of the bar by
the Canons of Professional Ethics, which are zealously
enforced by the courts for the public good.
Baker, 85 A.2d at 511-12 .
Baker gleaned insight from the highest courts of Illinois and Vermont,
which had already addressed the issue . In In re Morse, 126 A. 550, 553 (Vt.
1924), the Supreme Court of Vermont said :
That the express legislative grant to this court of
exclusive and full authority to determine who shall
practice as attorneys before the courts of this state
carries with it the implied power to do whatever may
be reasonably necessary to make such grant effective,
even to punishing for contempt those pretending to
such office, cannot be doubted .
Similarly, in People ex rel. Ill. State Bar Assn v. Peoples Stock Yard Bank, 176
N .E. 901, 906 (Ill. 1931), the Supreme Court of Illinois stated :
Having inherent and plenary power and original
jurisdiction to decide who shall be admitted to practice
as attorneys in this state, this court also has all the
power and jurisdiction necessary to protect and
enforce its rules and decisions in that respect. Having
power to determine who shall and who shall not
practice law in this state, and to license those who
may act as attorneys and forbid others who do not
measure up to the standards or come within the
provisions of its rules, it necessarily follows that this
court has the power to enforce its rules and decisions
against offenders, even though they have never been
licensed by this court. Of what avail is the power to
license in the absence of power to prevent one not
licensed from practicing as an attorney? In the
absence of power to control or punish unauthorized
persons who presume to practice as attorneys and
officers of this court the power to control admissions to
the bar would be nugatory. And so it has been held
that the court, which alone has authority to license
attorneys, has a necessary corollary ample implied
power to protect this function by punishing
unauthorized persons for usurping the privilege of
acting as attorneys.
A related concept was addressed in Hobson v. Kentucky Trust Co. of
Louisville, supra, which explained that unauthorized practice of law
proceedings could be initiated not only by the bar association but by any
practicing attorney because "an acquired right to practice law vests the holder
with a `property right' which he or she may protect against an intruder into the
profession who has not likewise acquired such a similar right." 197 S.W .2d at
458 .
We need not add to the explanations so amply set out in the foregoing
authorities to justify our exercise of jurisdiction over Respondent in the first
instance, wherein we sanctioned and enjoined her from the unauthorized
practice of law. Moreover, as stated earlier, the current proceedings are not
unauthorized practice proceedings, although that is the underlying infraction ;
rather, because this Court has previously entered an order enjoining
Respondent from further engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, these
proceedings are focused on whether Respondent should be held in contempt
for violation of this Court's August 25, 2005 order. The nature of these
proceedings being contempt as opposed to unauthorized practice of law
removes them from the purview of SCR 3 .460, which provides for the
appointment of a special commissioner . In these contempt proceedings,
Respondent has been offered an adequate opportunity to show cause why she
should not be held in contempt of this Court's order. See Commonwealth v.
Pace, 15 S .W .3d 393 (Ky . App., 2000) . She has responded with a detailed
explanation of the issues raised by her conduct and has submitted nine
exhibits for the Court's consideration. We now turn to whether Respondent
has indeed shown sufficient cause that she should not be held in contempt of
this Court's 2005 Order.
Although Respondent is not admitted to practice law in this
Commonwealth, Respondent has continuously operated a business, which she
advertises as "Legal Self 'Help." In 1994, the KBA received information
indicating that Movant was selling legal forms, assisting customers in
completion of the forms, and giving legal advice to customers, particularly
concerning bankruptcy matters. This prompted an inquiry, followed by
correspondence between the KBA and Respondent . The KBA obtained
affidavits from two of Respondent's customers, stating that Respondent had
given them legal advice and had provided them with extensive assistance in
completing bankruptcy forms . The end result of the KBA's inquiry was a
January 8, 1997 letter to Respondent . The letter noted, "You have also chosen
to advertise in the Lexington Telephone Book under the `attorneys' section,
although you are not an attorney." The letter directed Respondent to cease and
desist the unauthorized practice of law .
Despite this directive, in 2004, the United States Bankruptcy Court in
the Eastern District of Kentucky found Respondent and her "Legal Self Help"
business guilty of engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, a decision
affirmed on appeal. Consequently, upon the KBA's motion, this Court ordered
Respondent to show cause why she should not be held in contempt for
violating the 1997 directive issued by the KBA. Respondent admitted that she
had violated the 1997 directive. In an August 25, 2005 Order, this Court held
Respondent in contempt and imposed a sanction of $1,500.00 . Further, the
Court, again, ordered Respondent to cease the unauthorized practice of law.
The current disciplinary proceeding arises from Respondent's continued
advertisement of her Legal Self Help business under the "Attorneys" section of
the 2009-2010 edition of the Windstream Yellow Pages (Yellow Pages) for the
Greater Lexington Metro Area . The ad proclaims "Low Cost Legal Self Help . . .
Over 22 years Helping Our Customers Save Costly Legal Fees . . . Hundreds of
Legal Forms ." Further, Respondent's business was advertised under
"Attorneys" on a refrigerator magnet attached to the front of the book. In
August 2009, the Office of Bar Counsel (OBC) notified Respondent that this
advertising contravened this Court's 2005 Order. In her reply, Respondent
attempted to shift the responsibility for the advertisement to Yellow Pages by
attaching their advertising terms and conditions, which explain that they
determine the listing headings and are authorized to refuse to publish an
advertiser under a particular heading. Respondent asserted that her request
for them to add other headings had not been approved.
The OBC requested documentation showing that Respondent had indeed
asked that her business not be listed under the "Attorneys" heading and also
requested that Respondent obtain an affidavit from a Yellow Pages employee,
verifying that Respondent had no control over the placement of her
advertisement in the phone book or on the cover magnet and further verifying
that it was the Yellow Pages' decision to list Respondent's business under the
"Attorneys" heading. Subsequently, Respondent stated that Yellow Pages was
in the process of assigning a new representative to her area, who was supposed
to contact her in mid-November 2009 . She attached the same documentation
as previously provided. In January 2010, OBC followed up with a phone call to
Respondent, inquiring about the status of the requested affidavit. Her written
response averred that Yellow Pages had advised her that the company was in
the process of changing its name, that it was extending its publishing cycle for
three months, and that a representative would contact her at that time.
Respondent did not mention any efforts undertaken to obtain the previously
requested affidavit.
Accordingly, on April 22, 2010 this Court ordered Respondent to show
cause why she should not be held in contempt for violating this Court's 2005
Order. In her response, Respondent seems to reason that a 2008 consent
order and injunction issued by the United States Bankruptcy Court in the
Eastern District of Kentucky proves that she is no longer engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law. However, the 2008 Order appears to have been
prompted by allegations of Respondent's continued violation of the Order
issued by the Bankruptcy Court in 2004 . The 2004 Order found that
Respondent had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and, in addition
to imposing fines, required Respondent to submit weekly reports of customers
purchasing "bankruptcy kits," essentially enabling the Bankruptcy Court to
continually monitor her activities . This arrangement lasted until 2008 when
yet another adversary proceeding was commenced, alleging further violations
by Respondent; namely, that she was preparing bankruptcy petitions . The
proceeding resulted in the aforementioned 2008 consent order and injunction
wherein Respondent, without admitting any wrongdoing, agreed to cease
selling bankruptcy forms and performing any acts constituting the practice of
law in the area of bankruptcy. We fail to see how the 2008 Order provides a
defense to Respondent's violation of this Court's 2005 Order.
Furthermore, the particular violation at issue here involves Respondent's
holding herself out as an attorney through Yellow Pages' advertisements . On
this issue, Respondent continues her attempt to shift responsibility for the
advertisement to Yellow Pages . She attaches to her response an affidavit of a
Yellow Pages employee representative . However, the affidavit does not comply
with the information requested by the OBC . Rather, the affidavit, dated April
12, 2010, simply states that Respondent has requested that Yellow Pages add
new headings but that Respondent understands that "Yellow Pages has full
control over the Headings and Placement of the Advertisement and in no way
promises that these new headings will be added." Respondent avers that she
was contacted by Yellow Pages about a month after the execution of this
affidavit and she was informed that Yellow Pages would be adding the headings
of "Attorney - Pro se, Attorney - Self Representation, Attorney - Self Help," and
that Respondent's business would be listed under the new headings in the next
publication in July 2010. Consequently, Respondent asks this Court to abate
this matter until July 2010 when she can demonstrate compliance with this
Court's 2005 Order.
As already noted, however, the submitted affidavit does not indicate that
Respondent had ever asked not to be listed under the "Attorneys" heading, the
proof requested by the OBC. Moreover, other than Respondent's vague
statement that she had asked Yellow Pages in the past to add new headings,
Respondent does not offer evidence of any past communication she had with
Yellow Pages to prevent her ads from appearing under this inappropriate
heading. In fact, there is no indication that Respondent even informed Yellow
Pages that she was not an attorney . Instead, Respondent explains that her
business has been listed under this heading for the past twenty-six (26) years
and without complaint prior to the 2005 Order . However, Respondent was on
notice as early as 1997 that advertising under this section was impermissible.
In its 1997 directive, the KBA detailed the information that it had obtained of
Respondent's activities that constituted the unauthorized practice of law and
explicitly noted "You have also chosen to advertise in the Lexington Telephone
Book under the `attorneys' section, although you are not an attorney ."
SCR 3 .020 defines the practice of law as "any service rendered involving
legal knowledge or legal advice, whether of representation, counsel or advocacy,
in or out of court, rendered in respect to the rights, duties, obligations,
liabilities, or business relations of one requiring the services ." This Court has
recognized that "it is incumbent upon this Court to maintain the integrity of
the profession by ensuring that those who hold themselves out to the public as
attorneys are authorized to do so ." Hipwell v. Kentucky Bar Assn, 267 S .W. 3d
682, 683 (Ky. 2008) .
In Kentucky Bar Assn v. Legal Alternatives, Inc., 792 S.W .2d 368 (Ky.
1990), this Court found an Oregon corporation, which advertised and offered
services in Kentucky, to be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law where
no attorneys were employed by the corporation. Although it provided
disclaimers in its literature, the corporation was assisting clients in filling out
legal forms, particularly in bankruptcy filings, in exchange for a fee. The
corporation ignored a cease and desist letter from the KBA and this Court held
it in contempt for doing so and imposed a $5,000.00 sanction . Other
jurisdictions have also concluded that holding oneself out as an attorney
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. In State ex rel. Indiana State Bar
Ass'n v. Diaz, 838 N .E.2d 433 (Ind. 2005), a non-lawyer who provided
immigration services to clients promoted her services by identifying herself as a
Notary Public . Significantly, the titles "Notario publico" or "Notario" refer to an
elite class of lawyers in many Latin American countries. The Supreme Court of
Indiana concluded that utilizing these titles on advertisements and business
cards, absent a conspicuous disclaimer that she was not an attorney, was
inherently misleading and constituted the unauthorized practice of law. See
also In re Mittower, 693 N .E.2d 555 (Ind. 1998) (holding that designations of
"esquire," "general counsel," and "attorney-in-fact," on business cards and
letterhead by one who no longer held a license to practice law constituted the
unauthorized practice of law) .
In the instant matter, Respondent's advertising of her Legal Self Help
business under the "Attorneys" heading in the Yellow Pages and on the cover
magnet, as well as the description of her services within the advertisements,
create the misleading impression that she is providing legal services in the
capacity of an attorney. Such actions directly contravene this Court's August
25, 2005 Order. Further, Respondent's purported defense is unpersuasive .
Merely tendering a document that contains the Yellow Pages' terms and
conditions of advertising offers little support to Respondent's defense .
Although the tendered document confirms that Yellow Pages determines
headings and has the right to refuse to publish an advertisement under a
particular heading, Respondent failed to show that she made Yellow Pages
aware of her true status or requested that her business not be listed under the
"Attorneys" heading, or that the listing was, in any way, contrary to her own
request. Furthermore, the affidavit of the Yellow Pages employee supports only
that Respondent has attempted to rectify the violation after these proceedings
12
were initiated;2 it offers no support that Respondent made any such efforts
pursuant to the 1997 directive or the 2005 Order of this Court.
As such, we agree with the KBA that Respondent's advertisements violate
this Court's 2005 Order to refrain from the unauthorized practice of law.
Respondent was cautioned, as early as 1997, to refrain from advertising her
business under the "Attorneys" section of the phone book. In light of
Respondent's extensive disciplinary history concerning the very matters at
issue here, a sanction of $5,000.00 is imposed for Respondent's continued
contemptuous actions. Respondent is once again ordered to refrain from
engaging in the unauthorized practice of law and we must also caution
Respondent that each violation and sanction imposed for her unauthorized
practice of law augments the disciplinary history that this Court will consider
in imposing sanctions for future violations, if any, of the 2005 Order and this
Order.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1 . Respondent is found to be in contempt of this Court for the
unauthorized practice of law in violation of the August 25, 2005 Order of this
Court.
2 . Respondent is ordered not to engage in the unauthorized practice of
law in the future.
-
2 The new heading proposed by Respondent, we note, still contains the word
"attorney."
13
3 . Respondent is sanctioned for her contempt in the amount of Five
Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), to be paid to the Clerk of the Supreme Court for
remittance to the General Fund of the Commonwealth within thirty (30) days of
the date of the entry of this Order.
4. Respondent is responsible for costs or fees due or owing in connection
with this action, if any, upon appropriate motion by the Kentucky Bar
Association.
All sitting. All concur .
ENTERED: September 23, 2010 .
&&F
*1 ffic
JUSTICE
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.