RANDY MULLINS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
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BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 21, 2010
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Of
2009-SC-000566-MR
RANDY MULLINS
DQ`~CAPPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM BREATHITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE FRANK A . FLETCHER, JUDGE
NO. 09-CR-00042
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
On August 28, 2009, Appellant, Randy Mullins, was convicted by a
Breathitt Circuit jury on two counts of Trafficking in a Controlled Substance,
First Degree, Second or Subsequent Offense . KRS 218A .1412 . For these
crimes, Appellant was sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment . He now
appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b) . We now
affirm.
I. Background
In September 2008, and October 2008, Shane Humphrey, acting with
Operation UNITE, participated in a "controlled drug buy" wherein Humphrey
proceeded to Appellant's home and purchased controlled substances . As part
of the operation, UNITE provided Humphrey with "buy money" and concealed
on his person certain video and audio surveillance equipment so as to record
the transaction. The equipment, howeve
produced poor quality recordings of
the transactions .
On the strength of the controlled buys, the Commonwealth indicted
Appellant. Thereafter, at trial, just before voir dire, the trial court read the
indictment to the perspective jurors, stating:
The grand jury charges : that as of the 13th day of
September 2008, in Breathitt County, Kentucky, the above[-]
named Defendant, Randy Mullins:
Count I: Committed the offense of trafficking in a
controlled substance in the first degree by knowing[ly] and
unlawfully selling methadone, a controlled substance
classified in schedule II, having previously been convicted of
a trafficking offense under Chapter 218A of the Kentucky
Revised Statutes.
And the grand jury charges : [t]hat as of the 31 st day of
October 2008, in Breathitt County, Kentucky, the abovenamed defendant,. Randy Mullins :
Count II : Committed the offense of trafficking in a
controlled substance in the first degree by knowing[ly] and
unlawfully selling [O]xycontin, a controlled substance
classified in schedule II, having previously been convicted of
a trafficking offense under chapter 218A of the Kentucky
Revised Statutes.
(emphasis added) . This was the only instance in which Appellant's previous
convictions were mentioned and Appellant made no contemporaneous
objection.
In the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, Humphrey testified that during the
first "buy" he purchased contraband from Appellant. Humphrey also testified
that during the second buy, he gave money to and received contraband from
Appellant.
After the Commonwealth rested, the trial court was made aware that the
reading of the indictment should not have included Appellant's previous
convictions .
Following the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Appellant guilty as
charged and sentenced him to twenty-five years' imprisonment . He now
appeals his conviction, averring that: (1) the trial court committed palpable
error by reading the indictments and including references to his prior
convictions ; (2) the trial court erred by admitting the video recordings and
other evidence of the drug sales as evidence because the Commonwealth did
not prove sufficient control of the "buy"; and (3) this case is replete with ,
reasonable doubt and therefore should be reversed.
To the extent that our appellate authority permits us, we address each
argument in turn .
II. Analysis
A. Reading of the Indictment
Appellant, recognizing that he did not properly preserve this issue for
appellate review, argues that the trial court committed palpable error when it
referenced his prior convictions when it read the indictment. He further argues
that thereafter the prejudice could not have been repaired or remedied by an
admonition, and thus the error violated his right to a fair and impartial trial as
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United Sates Constitution .
The Commonwealth, while admitting that the trial court erred in this
regard, argues that the error was not palpable as Appellant did not suffer a
manifest injustice . We agree.
All parties recognize that where a subsequent offense is charged, "[n]o,
reference shall be made to the prior offense until the sentencing phase of the
trial, and this specifically includes reading of the indictment prior to or during
the guilt phase ." Clay v. Commonwealth, 818 S.W .2d 264, 265 (Ky . 1991) .
Indeed, where such an error occurs and the defendant properly objects, a
mistrial is warranted. Commonwealth v. Pace, 82 S.W .3d 894, 895 (Ky. 2002) .
But, where the defendant fails to contemporaneously object to the error, the
issue is deemed waived and will only be reversed upon a finding of palpable
error. Id. (citing Bell v. Commonwealth, 473 S .W.2d 820 (1971)) .
To reverse a conviction under palpable error, an appellate court must
find the error "easily perceptible, plain, obvious, and readily noticeable ."
Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S .W.3d 343, 348-49 (Ky. 2006) (citations and
quotations omitted) ; RCr 10 .26 . Furthermore, the error "must involve
prejudice more egregious than that occurring in reversible error, and must be
so grave in nature that if it were uncorrected, it would seriously affect the
fairness of the proceedings ." Brewer, 206 S .W.3d at 349. The ultimate
question is whether Appellant has suffered a manifest injustice that is
shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable. Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W .3d
1, 4 (Ky. 2006) . Where a court cannot answer this question in the affirmative,
the error cannot be palpable. Id.
In Pace, we granted discretionary review to decide whether a trial court
committed palpable error when it admitted the defendant's prior DUI
convictions during the Commonwealth's cross examination of the defendant in
a fourth-offense DUI trial. 82 S .W.3d 894. There,, the Court of Appeals found
palpable error because it was "well-established that prior DUI convictions are
inadmissible in the guilt phase of a DUI trial." Id. at 895 . The Court of Appeals
reasoned the error palpable because of the "lack of objective evidence against
Appellee since he had refused to submit to a breathalyzer," and because "the
verdict hinged on the credibility of Appellee's denial versus the arresting
officer's testimony." Id . We reversed that decision, noting the other evidence
that implicated the defendant in the crime . Id. There, the defendant admitted
drinking, denied intoxication, and did not deny that his license were suspended
for a prior DUI. Id. Ultimately, we could not conclude, in light of other
evidence in that case, that palpable error occurred. Id.
Similarly, here, Appellant claims that he was prejudiced because the jury
received information about his prior convictions when the court read the
indictment. However, the jury in this case also received direct testimony from
a cooperating witness specifically implicating Appellant in these crimes.
Moreover, as in Pace, Appellant's case boiled down to a credibility issue-the
jury could believe Appellant's version of events or the cooperating witness's.
Obviously, they chose to believe the cooperating witness. Thus, we cannot say
that Appellant suffered a manifest injustice when the trial court made the
single mention of Appellant's prior convictions during an,opening reading of the
indictment. See Martin, 207 S .W.3d at 4 .
B. Commonwealth's Control of an Orchestrated Drug Buy
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred by admitting the video
recordings of the drug transactions as evidence because the Commonwealth
did not prove to the jury that the officers searched the cooperating witness
before and after the "buy" ; the officers searched the cooperating witness's
vehicle before and after the "buy"; and, finally, that the officers kept the
cooperating witness under observation, and monitored the entrances and exits
of the location of the "buy." In support of his position, Appellant relies on
Iddings v. State, 772 N .E.2d 1006 (Ind. Ct. App . 2002) .
The Commonwealth responds by noting that these search criteria and
observations are not requisite elements of the crimes charged and that the
Commonwealth bears no such burden . I And with regard to the Appellant's
reliance on Iddings, the Commonwealth avers it is legally distinguishable from
the case at bar.
KRS 218A.1412 provides:
1 Notwithstanding the fact that these issues are irrelevant to proving Trafficking in a
Controlled Substance, the Commonwealth also notes that there indeed was
evidence these searches were conducted. Both UNITE Detective Easter and the
cooperating witness testified to this effect.
(1) A person is guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance
in the first degree when he knowingly and unlawfully traffics
in: a controlled substance, that is classified in Schedules I or
II which is a narcotic drug; a controlled substance analogue ;
lysergic acid diethylamide; phencyclidine; a controlled
substance that contains any quantity of methamphetamine,
including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers ; gamma
hydroxybutyric acid (GHB), including its salts, isomers, salts
of isomers, and analogues ; or flunitrazepam, including its
salts, isomers, and salts of isomers.
As is evident from a plain reading of this provision, nothing in this statute
requires the Commonwealth to prove that the cooperating witness, his vehicle,
or other effects were properly searched before or after the "buy"---and neither
does the statute require the Commonwealth to monitor the event . While such
proof may create an issue of credibility for the cooperating witness, rebutting
such is not a mandatory responsibility of the Commonwealth . Indeed,
Appellant cites no pertinent authority supporting this proposition and this
Court can find no case imposing such a burden upon the Commonwealth.. And
although Appellant relies on Iddings in support of his position, we find his
argument meritless .
In Iddings, an Indiana intermediate court of appeals addressed whether a
magistrate should have issued a search warrant . 772 N.E .2d 1006 . There, the
appellant argued that because the police did not have sufficient control of the
"buy" (outlining the search criteria Appellant now argues), the warrant should
not have been issued and thus the fruits of the search were unconstitutional.
Id. at 1011-12 . We simply do not have that here; nor do we express an opinion
relative to the Iddings holding under similar circumstances.
The issue here is simply whether
trial court can properly admit videos
and other physical evidence where, allegedly, the Commonwealth has not
proven that the buy was sufficiently controlled . We hold that the
Commonwealth bears no such burden.
C. Reasonable Doubt
Next, we address Appellant's argument that reversal is required because
this case is "replete with reasonable doubt." We pause to note that it is not
within the purview or authority of this Court to make a determination of
reasonable doubt absent a showing of insufficiency of the evidence presented at
trial . Thus, although Appellant frames this issue as one questioning the
existence of reasonable doubt, we frame the question as whether sufficient
evidence existed to convict Appellant of the crimes charged.
The crux of Appellant's argument surrounds the notion that because the
Commonwealth's only eyewitness was not credible, and because the audio and
video were of such poor quality, the jury could not have found him guilty of the
crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. An appellate court in
this Commonwealth cannot reevaluate the evidence or substitute its judgment
as to the credibility of a witness for that of the trial court and the jury.
Commonwealth v. Bivins, 740 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Ky. 1987) .
On appellate review, the relevant question with respect to a sufficiency of
the evidence argument is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational Crier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Potts v.
Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 345, 349 (Ky. 2005) . In this case, the
Commonwealth presented a cooperating witness who testified that he bought
contraband from Appellant on two occasions. It was in the province of the jury
to weigh the complaining witness's credibility. And assuming, arguendo, that
the jury may not have been able to convict Appellant solely on the strength of
the video tapes due to their poor quality, that does not negate the fact that the
Commonwealth offered the jury a participating eyewitness .
Viewing these facts in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we
conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could have found Appellant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt based on the eyewitness testimony in this case .
Baker v. Commonwealth, 234 S.W.3d 389 (Ky . App . 2007) ; People v. Calabria,
816 N .E.2d 1257 (N.Y. 2004); State v. Davis, 848 So.2d 557 (La . 2003) .
III. Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm Appellant's conviction in all
respects .
All sitting. Minton, C .J. ; Cunningham, Noble, Schroder, Scott, and
Venters, JJ., concur. Abramson, J., concurs in result only.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Michael A. Stidham
Stidham Law Office
500 Brown Street
P.O . Box 732
Jackson, KY 41339
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Jeanne Deborah Anderson
Executive Director
Office of the Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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