ANTONIO L. BRADLEY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : DECEMBER 16, 2010
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APPELLANT
ANTONIO L. BRADLEY
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE AUDRA JEAN ECKERLE, JUDGE
NO. 04-CR-003162
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE MINTON
VACATING AND REMANDING
Antonio Bradley entered a conditional plea of guilty but mentally ill to
one count of murder and one count of tampering with physical evidence .
Bradley unsuccessfully sought to withdraw his conditional guilty plea, and the
trial court sentenced him to twenty years' imprisonment for murder and five
years' imprisonment for tampering with physical evidence, to run concurrently
with each other but consecutively with a cumulative ten-year sentence Bradley
received on two counts of attempted arson in another case . Bradley then filed
this appeal as a matter of right.'
Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b). The murder and tampering with physical evidence
convictions are the subject of this appeal ; since we denied Bradley's motion to
transfer, the attempted arson convictions are the subject of a matter of right appeal
currently pending before the Court of Appeals . See Case No. 2009-CA-001642 .
The main issue before us is whether custodial interrogation by the police
violated Bradley's constitutional right to remain silent or his right to counselor both rights . After carefully examining the record, we conclude that the
police improperly continued to interrogate Bradley after he had invoked his
right to counsel. So we hold that the trial court erred by denying Bradley's
motion to suppress his confession . Accordingly, Bradley's convictions must be
vacated . Vacating those convictions renders moot Bradley's secondary
arguments that the police improperly continued to question him after he
invoked his right to remain silent and that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to withdraw his conditional guilty plea.
The facts that led to the charges against Bradley are not germane to the
limited issues presented on appeal. As we understand the underlying facts,
Bradley was accused of murdering
a person
outside an apartment complex
and, in a separate indictment, of pouring gasoline on the apartment complex's
steps, ostensibly as a precursor to setting them afire . Because those
underlying facts do not involve the limited issues before us, the parties
appropriately do not focus on them.
Instead, the parties focus on the facts pertaining to the overarching
question we must answer: whether the trial court erred by denying Bradley's
motion to suppress his confession. In answering that question, we must bear
in mind that "[w]hen reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, we
Because we do not know precisely what issues have been raised in that appeal, we
do not express any opinion as to its proper resolution .
utilize a clear error standard of review for factual findings and a de novo
standard of review for conclusions of law." 2
Neither Bradley nor the Commonwealth takes issue with the trial court's
findings of fact. So those findings of fact are conclusive . 3
According to the testimony at the suppression hearing of Detective
Williamson, Bradley was interviewed in the homicide unit office at police
headquarters about the murder for which Bradley was ultimately charged and
convicted. The police informed Bradley of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona,
including his right to the assistance of counsel and right to remain silent.
Bradley signed a waiver-of-rights form before the interrogation.
During the interrogation, Detective Williamson misrepresented to Bradley
the state of their investigation when he told him that there was a police officer
waiting in the hall who could identify Bradley as having run away from the
scene of the shooting . Williamson assured Bradley that he (Williamson) wanted
to help him (Bradley) .
As set forth by the trial court, the most crucial portion of the
interrogation is as follows:
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 187 S.W.3d 300, 305 (Ky. 2006) .
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9 .78.
The suppression hearing consisted solely of the testimony of Detective Williamson .
Although the interrogation of Bradley apparently was videotaped, that videotape is
not found in the record before us. The trial court reviewed that videotape and
transcribed it in relevant part. Because neither party takes issue with the trial
court's transcription, we must assume the accuracy of the transcription .
384 U.S. 436 (1966) .
Williamson: Well here's the deal. Well you know what, you're
right, but it can be a lot worse . You stand up and
you tell the truth . Be a man and take what's coming.
. . . You can either be a cold hearted son-of-a-bitch
or you can be a man about it with some remorse.
Tony [Bradley] only you can make that decision . I
cannot do that for you.
Bradley :
So I'm going to [be] sitting behind bars now?
Williamson : Well you know what, it's your choice . You're going to
do some time. I'm not going to sit here and lie to
you. Okay.
Bradley:
A lot of time .
Williamson : Well I don't know. I don't know the story. Why don't
you run it by me and we'll look at it.
Bradley:
Well, you know, I need a lawyer or something .
Williamson : Do what?
Bradley:
A lawyer .
Williamson : That's your right. We read you your rights when you
come [sic] in here. But I, I'm totally convinced you
do what is the right thing and you'll be better off.
You see where I'm at? You feel what I'm saying? Do
you want to tell us? Just tell us what happened . It's
nothing we can't get through, I mean there may be
circumstances here that change this whole thing.
Only you can tell us. It's a big step.
Bradley:
I did do it.
Williamson : You did what. You shot him? Why?
Bradley:
Cause he was trying to get me.
Williamson : What was he doing?
Bradley:
If I didn't get him he was going to get me 151
s The Commonwealth makes much in its brief of Detective Williamson's testimony at
the suppression hearing that he believed that Bradley had asked him (Williamson)
As the trial court noted, not every use of the word lawyer or attorney by a
suspect is an invocation of the right to counsel . 6 Instead, precedent clearly
holds that the police must cease interrogating a suspect only if the suspect
clearly and unambiguously asserts his or her right to counsel ;? conversely,
questioning may continue if the suspect only ambiguously or equivocally
invokes his or her right to counsel. 8 Our task therefore is to determine if
Bradley's invocation of the right to counsel was unequivocal, as Bradley
argues, or was equivocal, as the circuit court concluded and the
Commonwealth argues on appeal.9
if he (Bradley) should have an attorney . But it is undisputed, however, that
Bradley stated he wanted a "lawyer or something"-he did not ask if he should
have an attorney . So Williamson's testimony that Bradley asked if he should have
an attorney is directly contrary to the plain language used by Bradley.
6
See, e.g., State v .Gobert, 275 S.W.3d 888, 892 (Tex.Crim .App. 2009) .
See, e.g., Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569, 586 (Ky. 2006) ("If at any
time during a police interrogation the suspect has `clearly asserted' his right to
counsel, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present ."), citing
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981) ; Davis v. United States, 512 U.S .
452, 458 (1994) ("But if a suspect requests counsel at any time during the
interview, he is not subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made
available or the suspect himself reinitiates conversation .") .
Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 ("But if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is
ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances
would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to
counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning . . . . Rather,
the suspect must unambiguously request counsel .") (citations omitted) .
Of course, a "threshold issue . . . in any case involving a perceived violation of
Miranda rights . . . is whether the defendant was subject to a custodial
interrogation at the time he claims he was denied any of his Miranda rights . . .
because only statements made during custodial interrogations are subject to
suppression pursuant to Miranda." Jackson, 187 S.W.3d at 305. But that
threshold issue is not before us in the case at hand because it has not been raised
in the parties' briefs.
In making that determination, we must remember that a suspect "need
not speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don . . .
."1o
The suspect need
only "articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement
to be a request for an attorney."" Stated another way, "[i]f reasonable minds
could differ on whether a request for an attorney had been made, the language
is perforce ambiguous or equivocal." 12 Because the determination of whether a
purported invocation of the right to counsel involves an application of law to
facts, our review is de novo .13
Had Bradley said only, "[w]ell, you know, I need a lawyer" then it would
have been clear that he was invoking his right to counsel. The issue is
rendered less clear by Bradley's added "or something" to his statement.
Obviously, the generic phrase "or something" lends some superficial credence
to the Commonwealth's claim that Bradley's request was equivocal. But taken
in the relevant context of the questioning, we do not conclude that the phrase
"or something" defeats the otherwise clear request for counsel . 14
to Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (internal quotation marks omitted) .
11
12
13
14
Bumett v. Commonwealth, No . 2005-SC-000820-MR, 2008 WL 746615, at *6 (Ky.
March 20, 2008) (Noble, J ., concurring in result only) .
Jackson, 187 S.W .3d at 306 ("Determining whether a specific exchange is a `clear
and unequivocal' request for an attorney pursuant to . . . Davis v. United States . . .
requires an application of law to facts which must be reviewed de novo.") .
In an analogous, but unpublished, opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit concluded that a suspect's question that "[d]o I get to talk to a
lawyer or something?" was an, unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel .
Krysinski v. Rowland, 89 F.3d 845, at *2 (9th Cir. 1996) (Table case, text available
on Westlaw) ("We conclude that a reasonable interrogating officer would have
Our conclusion is supported by the fact that Detective Williamson asked
Bradley for clarification, to which Bradley responded simply "[a] lawyer." At
that point, any ambiguity with regard to Bradley's desire to invoke his right to
counsel was erased. And, crucially, Detective Williamson obviously believed
that Bradley had invoked his right to counsel because he responded "[t]hat's
your right ." 15 Taken in full context, Detective Williamson's recognition that
Bradley had a right to counsel is subject to no other reasonable interpretation
other than Detective Williamson subjectively recognizing that Bradley had
attempted to invoke his right to counsel. 16
Of course, the test for whether a suspect has clearly invoked the right to
counsel is objective, not subjective . 17 But, when the entirety of the relevant
exchange between Bradley and Detective Williamson is considered in context,
understood and that this interrogating officer did understand that Krysinski was
requesting an attorney when he said, `Do I get to talk to a lawyer or something?"') .
Since Bradley's statement was declarative, not interrogatory, Bradley's statement is
even more clearly an invocation of his right to counsel .
15
16
17
See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 684 S.E.2d 863, 865 (Ga. 2009) (relying on detective's
response, "You said you would like a lawyer" to suspect's request for attorney to
find no ambiguity in suspect's invocation of right to counsel) .
Williamson testified that he did not believe that Bradley had invoked his right to an
attorney and that he would have ceased questioning Bradley if he (Williamson)
believed that Bradley had invoked that right. But Williamson's testimony on that
point cannot easily be squared with his "[t]hat's your right" response to Bradley's
request for an attorney . In short, an objective analysis of this dialogue leads to the
conclusion that Williamson knew, or reasonably should have known, that Bradley
had invoked his right to an attorney .
Davis, 512 U.S. at 458-59 ("The applicability of the rigid prophylactic rule . . .
[preventing further questioning once a suspect invokes his or her right to counsel]
requires courts to determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to
counsel. To avoid difficulties of proof and to provide guidance to officers
conducting interrogations, this is an objective inquiry .") (citations and quotation
marks omitted) .
we conclude that Detective Williamson's subjective acknowledgement that
Bradley had invoked his right to counsel is also what an objective, reasonable
person would have derived from Bradley's statements . After all, other than the
odd phrase "or something," there is no tentativeness or doubt in the words
Bradley used, as is commonly the case when a court deems a purported
invocation of the right to counsel to be equivocal . For example, Bradley did not
declare that "maybe" he needed a lawyers$ or that he "might" need a lawyer, 19
nor did he ask Williamson if he believed that Bradley needed a lawyer.20 In
short, Bradley's comments bear none of the commonly encountered signs of
equivocation that would support a conclusion that the suspect has not
unequivocally invoked his right to counsel.
In addition to finding that Bradley had not unequivocally invoked his
right to counsel, the trial court concluded that Bradley had later waived his
right to counsel again when he responded to Williamson's continued effort to
induce Bradley to confess . But law enforcement authorities must cease
is See, e.g., id. at 462 (affirming lower courts' conclusion that suspect's statement
that "[maaybe I should talk to a lawyer" was not unequivocal invocation of right to
counsel) .
19
20
See, e.g., United States v. Zamora, 222 F.3d 756, 766 (10th Cir. 2000) (affirming
trial court's conclusion that suspect's statement that "I might want to talk to an
attorney" not an unequivocal invocation of right to counsel) ; Yenawine v.
Commonwealth, No . 2003-SC-0283-MR, 2005 WL 629007 at *3 (Ky. March 17,
2005) (suspect stating to police, "I might need to speak with my lawyer about
whether I should talk with you" and handing an attorney's business card to
authorities not an unequivocal invocation of right to counsel) .
See, e.g., Mueller v. Angelone, 181 F.3d 557, 573-74 (4th Cir. 1999) (suspect's
question to police, "Do you think I need an attorney here?" deemed not to be an
unequivocal invocation of right to counsel) . See also Dean v. Commonwealth,
844 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Ky. 1992) (suspect's question to police, "should I have
somebody here?" not unequivocal invocation of right to counsel) .
interrogating a suspect once that suspect has invoked the right to counsel .
Only the suspect may re-initiate dialogue with the authorities; the authorities
cannot continue to cajole or otherwise induce the suspect to continue to speak
without first affording the suspect an attorney. z 1
In the case at hand, once Bradley invoked his right to counsel,
Williamson was required to cease in his efforts to get Bradley to speak (i .e.,
confess), without first affording Bradley the services of an attorney.
Williamson, however, continued to beseech Bradley to speak-even though
Bradley had invoked his right to counsel- without honoring Bradley's request
for an attorney.
Obviously, Williamson's efforts were successful because Bradley soon
confessed . But that confession cannot be used against Bradley because the
confession was not made at Bradley's initiation . Instead, the confession was
the result of Williamson improperly continuing to question Bradley once
Bradley had invoked his right to counsel. So the fact that Bradley made
incriminating statements to Williamson after Bradley had invoked his right to
21
Edwards, 451 U.S . at 484-85 ("We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards,
having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not
subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication,
exchanges, or conversations with the police. . . . [I]t is inconsistent with Miranda
and its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an accused in
custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel.") (emphasis added) ; Smith v.
Illinois, 469 U .S. 91, 98 (1984) ("Edwards set forth a bright-line rule that all
questioning must cease after an accused requests counsel. In the absence of such
a bright-line prohibition, the authorities through badger[ing] or overreachingexplicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional-might otherwise wear down the
accused and persuade him to incriminate himself notwithstanding his earlier
request for counsel's assistance.") (citations and quotation marks omitted) .
counsel cannot defeat the initial, unequivocal request for counsel. When that
request occurred, Williamson erred by refusing to stop his interrogation of
Bradley.
The confession and other statements Bradley made after invoking his
right to counsel could only be considered to determine if Bradley had, after
invoking his right to counsel, waived that right by speaking further to the
police. without having been afforded the services of counsel. 22 But the only
factor that seems to support such a waiver is the existence of Bradley's
statements themselves . And, as previously discussed, those statements were
improperly obtained because they were in response to further statements and
questions by Williamson and, thus, were not independently voluntary
statements made of Bradley's volition . It is clear that a finding of a valid waiver
cannot be based solely on the fact that a suspect "responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation" after having validly invoked his or her right to
counsel. 23 Because Bradley's incriminating statements were made after he had
invoked his right to counsel, because those statements were made in response
to further prodding from Williamson, and because there appear to be no other
22
23
Smith, 469 U .S. at 98 ("Where nothing about the request for counsel or the
circumstances leading up to the request would render it ambiguous, all
questioning must cease. In these circumstances, an accused's subsequent
statements are relevant only to the question whether the accused waived the right
he had invoked. Invocation and waiver are entirely distinct inquiries, and the two
must not be blurred by merging them together .") .
Edwards, 451 U.S . at 484 ("we now hold that when an accused has invoked his
right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that
right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights .") .
10
factors to support a conclusion that Bradley had waived his right to counsel
shortly after invoking it, we cannot agree with the trial court that Bradley's
statements are a result of his having waived his right to counsel.
In short, we conclude that Bradley unequivocally invoked his right to
counsel when he stated that he needed to talk to a "lawyer or something" and
then repeated the phrase "a lawyer" when asked to clarify his request. So all
questioning of Bradley should have stopped until such time as Bradley was
provided an attorney. Because questioning did not stop, the trial court erred
by denying Bradley's motion to suppress . This means that Bradley's
convictions for murder and tampering with physical evidence must be vacated,
and this case remanded to the trial court with instructions to grant Bradley's
motion to suppress .
For the foregoing reasons, Antonio Bradley's convictions for murder and
tampering with physical evidence are vacated and this matter is remanded to
the circuit court with instructions to grant the motion to suppress and for any
further proceedings consistent with this opinion .24
All sitting. All concur.
24
Since Bradley's convictions are being reversed, his argument that the trial court
should have permitted him to withdraw his guilty plea is moot.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Daniel T. Goyette
Louisville Metro Public Defender
Elizabeth B . McMahon
Assistant Public Defender
Office of the Louisville Metro Public Defender
Public Defender Advocacy Plaza
717-719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentuc
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
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