DOCK B. HILLMAN V. HON. MITCH PERRY (JUDGE JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT), ET AL.
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76 .28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED AMONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
RENDERED : JANUARY 21, 2010
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2009-SC-000276-MR
DOCK B . HILLMAN
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS CIRCUIT COURT
CASE NO . 2009-CA-000157
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 06-CR-003457
HON . MITCH PERRY (JUDGE
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT), ET AL .
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING IN PART AND VACATING IN PART
Appellant, Dock B . Hillman, appeals as a matter of right' from an order
of the Court of Appeals denying his petition for a writ of prohibition seeking to
prohibit Judge Mitch Perry of the Jefferson Circuit Court from imposing
sentence on him pursuant to a guilty plea on the grounds that such would
violate double jeopardy principles under the United States and Kentucky
Constitutions . The Court of Appeals denied his petition upon the rationale that
by pleading guilty Hillman waived double jeopardy as a defense .
Because Hillman has already been sentenced and the circuit court no
longer retains jurisdiction over the cause, Hillman's petition for a writ to
1 Kentucky Const. ยง 110(2)(b).
prohibit sentencing is moot. We accordingly, affirm the Court of Appeals, albeit
on different grounds. We further vacate the portion of the Court of Appeals'
order addressing the issue of waiver on the merits, lest it unduly influence
Hillman's potential post-conviction remedies .
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The basic facts are not in dispute. Hillman was indicted for the offenses
of attempted murder, first-degree assault, second-degree assault, and firstdegree persistent felony offender. The case proceeded to trial .
During the trial it was discovered that two photographs were
inadvertently omitted from the discovery materials disclosed by the
Commonwealth . Hillman aggressively challenged the discovery violation,
arguing that one of the photos was exculpatory. Counsel moved for dismissal
or other appropriate sanctions and, in the presence of the jury, so vehemently
expressed disapproval at the violation that the trial court cautioned him to
calm down .
Outside of the jury's presence, Hillman's counsel stated that because of
the present discovery violation, he could not be certain that other exculpatory
evidence had not been withheld. He renewed his request for sanctions and
again requested a dismissal. The trial court stated that it intended to declare a
mistrial and to require the Commonwealth to review all materials in its
possession in order to ensure that no other items had been omitted from
discovery. Defense counsel did not object to the court's stated intention, but
did offer the court an alternative to the mistrial by asking whether the court
would consider admonishing the jury.
However, the trial court accepted defense counsel's representation that
the materials were exculpatory-and that this necessitated a mistrial. Defense
counsel then stated, "I was just trying to offer an alternative, but that's fine."
After this discussion ended, the jury was brought back into the courtroom, a
mistrial was declared, and the jury was released.
On September 3, 2008, Hillman filed a motion to dismiss the indictment
based upon double jeopardy grounds. The court heard the motion on
September 26, 2008, and then denied the motion from the bench .2
On October 7, 2008, the date scheduled for a new trial, Hillman entered
a guilty plea to the charges of second-degree assault and fourth-degree assault.
Under the agreement Hillman was to serve a total of ten years. In so pleading
Hillman expressly acknowledged, among other things, that he understood that
by entering his plea he was waiving his right to appeal the convictions .
After entry of the guilty plea, but before final sentencing, Hillman filed in
the Court of Appeals a petition for writ of prohibition pursuant to CR 76.36
seeking to prohibit the trial court from sentencing him under the plea
agreement on double jeopardy grounds. The petition also sought intermediate
relief pursuant to CR 76 .36(4) staying the pending sentencing, which the Court
2 We note that a petition for a writ is a proper device for a defendant to exercise his
constitutional right against retrial on double jeopardy grounds . Macklin v. Ryan , 672
S.W .2d 60 (Ky. 1984) . If the writ had been sought at this point, the procedural
problem which eventually developed would not have occurred .
of Appeals denied on February 3, 2009 . On February 9, 2009, the trial court
sentenced Hillman in accordance with the plea agreement. The judgment was
entered on February 10, 2009 .
On April--9, 2009, the Court of-Appeals entered an order denying-:the
petition for a writ on the grounds that Hillman's unconditional plea of guilty
constituted a waiver of his double jeopardy claim . This appeal followed .
DISCUSSION
A writ of prohibition may be granted by a higher court upon a showing
that :
(1) "the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside of
its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to
an intermediate court; or (2) that the lower court is acting or is
about to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and
there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great
injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not
granted."
Hoskins v. Maricle , 150 S .W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004) . Hillman asserted in the
Court of Appeals that by proceeding to sentencing the trial court would be
acting erroneously and in violation of double jeopardy principles. However,
before the Court could address the petition, the trial court imposed sentence
and entered a final judgment.3 At that point, it was too late to grant the relief
requested by Hillman . From a purely technical standpoint, at the time the
Court of Appeals made its findings, neither of the two writ categories identified
CR 76 .36 contains no provision providing that the pendency of the original action in
the Court of Appeals would abate or forestall the finality of his case in the trial court,
and as previously noted, the Court of Appeals had denied the motion to stay the
sentencing .
3
in Hoskins could be met . First, the trial court clearly had jurisdiction of the
criminal case when it imposed the sentence and entered the final judgment .
And second, the trial court was neither acting nor about to act erroneously for
the simple reason that it had already acted. At that point, the matter was
moot.
Even if the Court of Appeals believed Hillman had not waived his double
jeopardy claim, it had no means in the original action before it by which to
remand the matter to the trial court to set aside the final judgment, as might
be done on a direct appeal from a final judgment . When the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction over Hillman's
case because the final judgment was entered on February 10, 2009, and the
trial court lost jurisdiction ten days later. See, e.g. , Silverburg v.
Commonwealth , 587 S.W.2d 241, 244 (Ky. 1979) (noting that a trial court loses
jurisdiction over the defendant's case ten days after the entry of final
judgment). Once a court loses jurisdiction after the entry of final judgment,
such jurisdiction can only be renewed or extended by statute or rule. Rollins v .
Commonwealth , 294 S.W.3d 463, 466 (Ky. App. 2009) .
The petition for a writ of prohibition commenced an original action in the
Court of Appeals . The action then pending in the trial court was not abated by
operation of law or by order of the Court of Appeals. Thus, once the judgment
entered in the trial court became final, the only available recourse was by
collateral attack upon the judgment,4 because Hillman waived his right to a
direct appeal by pleading guilty. Thompson v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 22,
39 (Ky. 2004) ("[T]he entry of a valid guilty plea effectively waives all defenses
other than- the indictment charged no offense :"),; Sanders v . Commonwealth,.
801 S .W.2d 665, 668 fn 1 (Ky. 1990) (Once judgment becomes final remedy is
by collateral attack) .
It follows for the same reason that we are unable to grant the relief
requested by Hillman's petition for a writ to prohibit sentencing . If Hillman
continues to believe that his conviction and sentence was in violation of double
jeopardy, he may pursue relief under other procedural devices.
The Court of Appeals' order, however, decided on the merits that Hillman
had, through his guilty plea, waived his right to challenge his conviction on
double jeopardy grounds. Because the matter was moot, the decision of the
Court of Appeals on the merits of the issue was merely an advisory opinion,
which we conclude should not have been issued. See Lewis LP Gas, Inc v.
Lambert, 113 S .W .3d 171,177 (Ky. 2003) (overruled on other grounds by
Hoskins, 150 S .W.3d 1) . Accordingly, we vacate the portion of its order finding
waiver.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Court of Appeals denying a
writ of prohibition is affirmed; however, its order is vacated insofar as it decides
4 Although we express no opinion on the merits of this pro se litigant's arguments,
such devices may include RC 11 .42 or CR 60 .02, or a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus under KRS 419.020.
that by pleading guilty, Hillman waived the right to assert his double jeopardy
claim.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Dock B . Hillman
#106707
Green River Correctional Complex
1200 River Road
P O Box 9300
Central City, Kentucky 42330
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Hon . Mitch Perry
Judge, Jefferson Circuit Court
Jefferson County Judicial Center
700 W. Jefferson Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-4733
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST:
Teresa Ann Young
Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney
514 West Liberty Street
Louisville, KY 40202
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