JAMES E. TIPTON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : MARCH 18, 2010
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
2009-SC-000119-MR
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JAMES E. TIPTON
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM MEADE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BRUCE T. BUTLER, JUDGE
NO . 08-CR-00004
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, James Tipton, was found guilty by a Meade Circuit Court jury
of manufacturing methamphetamine . Appellant was sentenced to twenty (20)
years imprisonment . He now appeals his conviction as a matter of right. Ky.
Const. § 110(2)(b) .
I. Background
After receiving a tip that Appellant had purchased pseudoephedrine and
was preparing to manufacture methamphetamine, Detective Seelye of the
Meade County Sheriff's Office located Appellant in a truck driven by Ricky
Bennett. After pulling over the two for expired registration tags, Detective
Seelye noticed a large duffle bag inside the vehicle. When Seelye inquired
about the duffle bag, Appellant admitted that it contained items necessary for
manufacturing methamphetamine. Both men were arrested at the truck and
Appellant surrendered other raw chemicals associated with methamphetamine
production.
Police later executed a search warrant on Appellant's residence where
they found additional incriminating items, including evidence of past
methamphetamine production . A search was also conducted of Appellant's
truck-bed camper located behind his mobile home where police discovered
numerous methamphetamine-related items and chemicals, some of which
tested positive for methamphetamine. Police also noticed that the ceiling of the
camper was stained with red phosphorous. Appellant admitted that he had
cooked the drug approximately twenty times in the camper .
Appellant was indicted for manufacturing methamphetamine and was
later jointly tried with Ricky Bennett and his wife, Ester Bennett. At the
conclusion of trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of manufacturing
methamphetamine . He was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment . On
appeal, Appellant raises two principal allegations of error in his underlying
trial : 1) that the Commonwealth improperly commented on his right to remain
silent during closing argument; and 2) that the trial court erroneously admitted
prior acts evidence . For the reasons that follow, we affirm Appellant's
conviction .
II. Analysis
A. Comment on Right to Remain Silent
Appellant first argues that his conviction must be reversed because the
Commonwealth improperly commented upon his failure to testify at trial.
Having reviewed the comments in context, we find no error and thus cannot
agree.
During Ricky Bennett's closing argument, his defense counsel
emphasized Appellant's guilt and also read from portions of the trial court's
jury instructions, arguing that the Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient
to support a conviction. In particular, his defense counsel contended that the
Commonwealth had failed to prove that Bennett knowingly possessed items
used to manufacture methamphetamine .
Approximately twenty minutes later, the Commonwealth, in closing,
stated the following:
A defendant is presumed to know the natural and logical
consequences of their actions. The defendants got up here and
say, well, they were talking about the knowledge requirement. As
you read in the instructions, a defendant has a right to remain
silent. They are not compelled to testify and the fact they didn't
testify cannot be used as an inference of guilt or prejudice them in
any way. Defendants are never required to testify, so how does the
Commonwealth meet its burden on those mental states?
Defense counsel for Bennett immediately objected and argued that the
Commonwealth had committed reversible error by commenting on their silence.
Appellant joined the objection, requested an admonition and, alternatively,
moved for a mistrial . In response, the Commonwealth argued that it had
simply quoted the jury instructions and that she was going to inform the jury
that the knowledge and intent requirements could be inferred from the
circumstances because it is impossible to "get inside a defendant's head and
know."' The trial court overruled Appellant's objection, denied his request for
an admonition and the Commonwealth continued, concluding: "The
Commonwealth can never get inside the defendant's head with respect to the
mental state that we're talking about here, knowledge, intent, those sorts of
things . You infer knowledge and intent from the evidence, the objective
evidence."
It is, of course, true that the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides that "no person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend. V. In Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S . 609 (1965), the United States Supreme Court held that
"(a)n important corollary to that right is that neither a prosecutor nor a trial
judge may comment upon a criminal defendant's failure to testify."2 Spalla v.
Foltz, 788 F.2d 400, 403 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Griffin, 380 U.S . at 609) ; see
also Griffin, 380 U.S . at 614 ("We . . . hold that the Fifth Amendment, in its
The trial court's jury instructions reflected RCr 9 .54(3), ordering the jury that a "[a]
Defendant is not compelled to testify and the fact that the Defendant did not testify
in this case cannot be used as an inference of guilt and should not prejudice him in
any way."
2 In Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S . 308 (1976), the Court further explained the holding
in Griffin, stating that it "prohibits the judge and prosecutor from suggesting to the
jury that it may treat the defendant's silence as substantive guilt." Accord
Porrtuuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S . 61, 69 (2000) ("Griffin prohibited comments that
suggest a defendant's silence is `evidence of guilt.') .
1
direct application to the Federal Government and in its bearing on the States
by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the
prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such
silence is evidence of guilt.") ; see also KRE 511 (a) . If a reviewing court
determines that a reference did improperly comment on the defendant's
decision to remain silent, its effect, being constitutional error, must be
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt to avoid reversal. Chapman v. California,
386 U .S. 18, 26 (1967) .
Moreover, it should be noted that "the rule set forth in Griffin applies to
indirect as well as direct comments on the failure to testify." Spalla, 788 F.2d
at 403 ; see also Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S .W.3d 569, 589 (Ky. 2006) .
As we explained in Ragland, "[h]istorically, courts drew distinctions between
`direct' comments upon a defendant's failure to testify, which were usually held
to be improper and prejudicial, and `indirect' comments, which were usually
found not to warrant reversal." 191 S .W.3d at 590 (citing Moore v. State, 669
N .E .2d 733, 740 (Ind. 1996) ; State v. Neff, 978 S.W .2d 341, 344 (Mo. 1998)) .
Yet, we continued,
[n]ow, . . . "a less formalistic rule" . . . governs such inquiries, and
it is generally accepted that a comment violates a defendant's
constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination only
when it was manifestly intended to be, or was of such character
that the jury would necessarily take it to be, a comment upon the
defendant's failure to testify . . . ,
or invited the jury to draw an adverse inference of guilt from that
failure .
Id. at 590-91 (internal citations omitted) ; see also Robinson, 485 U .S. at 31-32
(1988) ("The Court of Appeals and respondent apparently take the view that
any `direct' reference by the prosecutor to the failure of the defendant to testify
violates the Fifth Amendment as construed in Griffin. . We decline to give Griffin
such a broad reading.") .
Turning to Appellant's case, in context, see Ragland, 191 S .W.3d at 590
("[T]he context of the statement at issue here - and specifically, the fact that it
was in response to defense argument - is critical to its interpretation."),
Robinson, 485 U .S . at 33 ("[A] reference to the defendant's failure to take the
witness stand may, in context, be perfectly proper."), United States v. Young,
470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) ("[A] criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on
the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the statements or
conduct must be viewed in context."), the Commonwealth's comments did not
invite the jury to draw an adverse inference of Appellant's guilt and were not
manifestly intended to be, or were of such a character that the jury would
necessarily take them to be, a comment upon his failure to testify because they
were fairly responsive to defense argument and simply explained the jury
instructions and applicable law. See Hall v. Vasbinder, 563 F.3d 222, 233 (6th
Cir. 2009) ("When the prosecutor goes no further than to take defense counsel
up on an invitation, that conduct will not be regarded as impermissibly
calculated to incite the passions of the jury.") ; Ragland, 191 S.W .3d at 590
(citing State v. Ball, 675 N.W .2d 192, 200 (S.D . 2004)) . Indeed, it appears that
the primary purpose in referencing the defendants' silence here was to explain
how the Commonwealth could, nevertheless, prove the requisite mens rea in
the absence of any direct proof as Bennett's defense counsel had just argued .
See Robinson, 485 U .S. at 33-34 ("The central purpose of a criminal trial is to
decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence,' . . . it is
important that both the defendant and the prosecutor have the opportunity to
meet fairly the evidence and arguments of one another.") (citations omitted) .
Accordingly, we find no error.
B. Prior Acts Evidence
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting certain prior
acts evidence pursuant to KRE 404(b), contending that it was not relevant or
probative but highly prejudicial. Prior to trial, Appellant moved to exclude all
prior acts evidence and now asserts that it was error for the trial court to
admit: his admission that he had previously manufactured methamphetamine
twenty times; evidence of red phosphorous stains on the ceiling of his camper;
and, evidence of prior methamphetamine labs found in and around his
residence . We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in this
regard . See Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S .W.3d 11, 19 (Ky. 2005) (abuse
of discretion standard) (citing Partin v. Commonwealth, 918 S.W.2d 219, 222
(Ky. 1996)) ; see also Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)
("The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.")
(citation omitted) .
Pursuant to KRE 404(b)(1), "[evvddence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
[is] not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on
a particular occasion, except . . . [i]f offered for some other purpose, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident." Yet, even if offered for some other permissible
purpose, this Court has held that three inquiries must be separately addressed
before the prior acts evidence may be admitted : (1) it must be relevant to a
purpose other than to prove his criminal disposition; (2) it must be sufficiently
probative; and (3) its potential for undue prejudice cannot substantially
outweigh its probative value. Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882, 888-91
(Ky. 1994) (citing Robert G . Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, §
2 .25 (II) (3d ed. 1993)) ; Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11, 19 (Ky.
2005) .
In Young v. Commonwealth, this Court held that testimony indicating
that the defendant had taught the witness how to manufacture
methamphetamine was admissible for a purpose other than to show criminal
propensity - namely, to show the defendant's knowledge and intent.3 25
S.W .3d 66, 70-71 (Ky. 2000) . As was the case in Young, we believe that the
evidence here was highly relevant to whether Appellant knew how to
manufacture methamphetamine and that the nature of the evidence, when
taken with his own admission, was extremely probative of his intent to
manufacture methamphetamine . Given its clear probative value, we do not
believe the trial court erred in concluding that its probative value was not
substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice.
III. Conclusion
Therefore, for the above stated reasons, we hereby affirm Appellant's
conviction and sentence.
All sitting. All concur.
3
We note that the defendant in Young was similarly charged with violating KRS
218A. 1432, which, in pertinent part, reads:
(1) A person is guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine when he
knowingly and unlawfully:
(a) Manufactures methamphetamine; or
(b) With intent to manufacture methamphetamine
possesses two (2) or more chemicals or two (2) or more
items of equipment for the manufacture of
methamphetamine .
(2) Manufacture of methamphetamine is a Class B felony for the first
offense and a Class A felony for a second or subsequent offense.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Samuel N . Potter
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentuc
Michael John Marsch
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Attorney General's Office
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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