JEFFREY CURTIS COTTON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY l, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED
DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE
ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE
DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE
ACTION.
/At
RENDERED : MAY 20, 2010
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
6;*)Uyr-rM:V %Lxurt ot 1.
C
Mi
2008-SC-000516-MR
2009-SC-000338-MR
JEFFREY CURTIS COTTON
V.
ATIF Ur'i a-ra
.
.LI
&1 f I+r"im?
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN L . ATKINS, JUDGE
NOS . 07-CR-00632 ; 08-CR-00192
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING, IN PART,
AND REVERSING AND REMANDING, IN PART
Appellant, Jeffrey Curtis Cotton, was found guilty by a Christian Circuit
Court jury of rape in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, robbery
in the first degree, burglary in the first degree, tampering with physical
evidence in the first degree, fleeing or evading police in the first degree, and
escape in the second degree . He was sentenced to fifty years' imprisonment .
He now appeals his convictions for first-degree sexual abuse and second-degree
escape as a matter of right. Ky . Const. ยง 110(2) (b) .
I. Facts
On July 11, 2007, a man carrying a knife and wearing a ski mask
entered F. D .'s rural home while she sat watching television, wrapped his arm
around her neck, and told her to give him her money and jewelry or he would
cut her throat. When she informed the intruder that she did not have any
money or jewelry, he jerked her arm behind her back and forced her from her
chair before tying her arms behind her back and placing a bag over her head.
The man then removed F. D .'s clothing and pushed her across the room and
onto her back. He penetrated F. D .'s vagina both digitally and with a foreign
object for several minutes .
F. D. told the intruder that her granddaughter would be arriving soon,
but he informed her that he did not care . However, when a car passed, he got
to his feet and washed his hands in her kitchen sink. The man then untied
F.D ., telling her that if she looked at him he would kill her. F .D . sat where the
intruder left her for five minutes, after which time she looked around her home
and he was gone . She called 911 and reported that she ,had been raped.
Officer Mark Reid of the Christian County Sheriff's Department was
transporting two civilians involved in an unrelated matter on the day in
question . Since he was only a mile away from F.D .'s home, he responded to
the call . As Officer Reid approached F.D .'s residence, he saw Appellant driving
his vehicle with two tires on the road and two off. When Officer Reid got
behind Appellant's car, Appellant hit the accelerator and began weaving. When
Officer Reid activated his lights and siren, Appellant threw a shirt and several
other items out of his window. Officer Reid pursued Appellant, driving at
speeds around eighty miles per hour, and Appellant ran through an
intersection, locked up his brakes, and slid into a cornfield. Due to the
civilians in his car, Officer Reid chose not to pursue Appellant, but instead,
continued to follow him once he was back on the road until Appellant flipped
his car into a ditch. Reid then parked his cruiser, ran to Appellant's car, and
told him not to move when he tried to exit the vehicle through the window . He
was taken to the hospital, where he was placed under arrest.
When other officers arrived, they recovered a shirt, a ski mask, gloves, a
wallet, binoculars, and a large knife from the scene . Appellant testified that he
had found these items as he was "scavenging" for copper and other items of
value and picked them up and put on the shirt . He also said that the reason
he fled from Officer Reid was that he had only recently been released from
prison and that the sight of the police officer frightened him, causing him to
panic . He claimed that he had never been to F.D .'s home or had any contact
with her.
After his arrest, Appellant escaped from a van used to transport inmates
from jail to court. He ran across the parking lot before he was stopped and
taken back into custody.
Appellant was found guilty of first-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse,
first-degree robbery, first-degree burglary, tampering with physical evidence,
first-degree fleeing or evading the police, and second-degree escape . The jury
recommended a sentence totaling eighty years for these crimes (all sentences to
be served consecutively), however, pursuant to KRS 532 .110(1) (c), his sentence
was limited to fifty years .
II. Analysis
A. Jury Instructions
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred when it allowed the jury
to convict him of both first-degree rape and first-degree sexual abuse because
the sexual abuse instruction was couched in general terms of "sexual contact"
and did not differentiate that act from that on which the rape charge was
based. 1 Based on this instruction, if the jury convicted Appellant of rape, he
clearly subjected F.D . to sexual contact for purposes of first-degree sexual
abuse . Thus, if the jury found (as it did) that Appellant raped F.D ., they also
had to find that he was guilty of first-degree sexual abuse-i .e., he must have
also subjected her to sexual contact .
The jury instruction for sexual abuse read :
You will find the Defendant guilty of First-Degree
Sexual Abuse under this Instruction if, and only if, you
believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
all of the following:
Contrary to the Commonwealth's assertions, Appellant's allegation of error is
preserved. In the case at bar, Appellant objected not to the form of the jury
instructions for rape and sexual abuse, but on the grounds that sexual abuse is a
lesser-included offense of rape and that the two should not have been separate
charges . Appellant's objection, "although technically insufficient, was nevertheless
sufficiently related to the proper ground as to preserve the issue for review,"
Claycomb v. Howard, 493 S.W.2d 714, 717 (Ky. 1973), and it "fairly and adequately
presented to the trial judge . . . the party's position ." RCr 9 .54(2) .
A. That in this county on or about July 11, 2007, and
before the finding of the Indictment herein, he
subjected [F.D.] to sexual contact; and
B. That he did so by forcible compulsion .
(emphasis added) . The jury instruction for rape read likewise, with the sole
exception that the words "subjected [F.D .] to sexual contact" were replaced with
"engaged in sexual intercourse with [F .D .] ."
In Johnson v. Commonwealth, 864 S .W.2d 266, 277 (Ky. 1993), the
defendant was charged with both sexual abuse and rape. There, the jury
instructions, as in the case at bar, differentiated between the two crimes only
by substituting the terms "sexual contact" and "sexual intercourse" for one
another . See id. But as we explained in Johnson:
[S]exual abuse in the first degree is a lesser-included
offense of . . . rape in the first degree . . . while at the
same time it was in this case a primary charge of the
indictment, relating to a separate instance of sexual
contact [digital penetration in the case at bar] . . . .
The instruction, couched in general terms of "sexual
contact" without differentiating the act from those acts
constituting rape . . . permitted the jury to find
Johnson guilty twice for the same act, e.g., intercourse
constituting rape and intercourse constituting sexual
contact and, therefore, sexual abuse.
Id. at 277 . The jury instructions in the present case, like those in Johnson,
allowed Appellant to be convicted twice for the same act .
In Harp v. Commonwealth, 266 S .W.3d 813 (Ky. 2008), Appellant was
charged with seven counts of sexual abuse (among other charges) . We reversed
Appellant's sexual abuse convictions because the jury instructions on the
seven counts were "identical, containing no identifying characteristics that
required the jury to differentiate among each of the counts." Id. at 816 . "We
have previously held that `when multiple offenses are charged in a single
indictment, the Commonwealth must introduce evidence sufficient to prove
each offense and to differentiate each count from the others, and the jury must
be separately instructed on each charged offense .'" Id. at 817 (quoting Miller v.
Commonwealth, 77 S.W.3d 566, 576 (Ky. 2002)) . Furthermore, we have held
that "a trial court errs in a case involving multiple charges if its instructions to
the jury fail `factually [to] differentiate between the separate offenses ."' Id. at
817 (quoting Combs. v. Commonwealth, 198 S .W .3d 574, 580 (Ky. 2006)) .
While Harp dealt only with the issue of differentiating between different
multiple counts of the same offense, when read together with Johnson, it is
clear that the result must be the same here : we must find that the jury
instructions were erroneous.
As we held in Harp, "failure to include proper identifying characteristics
in jury instructions is reversible error, provided that a timely objection to the
error has been made ." 266 S .W .3d at 818 . Furthermore, while the error may,
in some cases, be harmless,
a party claiming that an erroneous jury instruction, or
an erroneous failure to give a necessary jury
instruction [is harmless], bears a steep burden
because we have held that "[i]n this jurisdiction it is a
rule of longstanding and frequent repetition that
erroneous instructions to the jury are presumed to be
prejudicial; that an appellee claiming harmless error
bears the burden of showing affirmatively that no
prejudice resulted from the error ."
Id. (quoting McKinney v. Heisel, 947 S .W.2d 32, 35 (Ky . 1997)) . In the present
case, the Commonwealth has not overcome this "steep burden ." 2
Appellant claims no error, nor do we find any, with the rape instruction .
By convicting Appellant of rape, it is clear that the jury found that he had
penetrated F.D . with a foreign object.3 However, since the sexual abuse
instruction was couched in general terms of "sexual contact," it could have
allowed Appellant to be convicted twice for the same act (penetration by a
foreign object constituting both "sexual intercourse" as required by the rape
instruction and "sexual contact" as required by the sexual abuse instruction,
rather than finding him guilty of sexual abuse due to the separate and distinct
2 The Commonwealth claims to have cured any error in the jury instructions . In its
closing argument, the Commonwealth stated that the sexual abuse charge was
based upon digital penetration while the rape charge was based upon penetration
by a foreign object . However, the jury instructions did not make this differentiation .
Our precedent speaks clearly on this matter: "the arguments of counsel are not
sufficient to rehabilitate otherwise erroneous or imprecise jury instructions ." Dixon
v. Commonwealth, 263 S.W.3d 583, 593 (Ky. 2008) .
KRS 510 .010 defines sexual intercourse to include penetration by a foreign
object, and then defines a foreign object to include "anything . . . other than the
person of the actor." To wit:
(8) "Sexual intercourse" means sexual intercourse in its ordinary sense
and includes penetration of the sex organs of one person by a foreign
object manipulated by another person . Sexual intercourse occurs
upon any penetration, however slight ; emission is not required .
"Sexual intercourse" does not include penetration of the sex organ by
a foreign object in the course of the performance of generally
recognized health-care practices ; and
(9) "Foreign object" means anything used in commission of a sexual
act other than the person of the actor.
act of digital penetration), we reverse Appellant's first-degree sexual abuse
conviction and remand this matter to the trial court-where retrial of the
sexual abuse charge will not be barred by double jeopardy. See generally
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S . 299 (1932) ; Commonwealth v. Burge, 947
S .W.2d 805, 811 (Ky. 1996), modified on denial of reh'g, 947 S .W.2d 805
(Ky.1997) (returning to Blockburger for double jeopardy analysis) . In the
present case, the sexual abuse charge and the rape charge each "requires proof
of a fact which the other does not" : penetration by a foreign object in the case
of rape, and digital penetration in the case of sexual abuse . Blockburger, 284
U.S . at 304 .
B . Severance
Appellant next argues that his escape charge should have been severed
from his other charges, as the two did not arise from a common plan or scheme
or arise closely in time to one another. Even if Appellant had preserved this
issue, "[w]e will not reverse on appeal for failure to sever `unless we are clearly
convinced that prejudice occurred and that the likelihood of prejudice was so
clearly demonstrated to the trial judge as to make his failure to grant severance
an abuse of discretion ."' Bratcher v. Commonwealth, 151 S .W .3d 332, 340 (Ky.
2004) (quoting Rachel v. Commonwealth, 523 S .W.2d 395, 400 (Ky . 1975)) .
However, Appellant not only failed to preserve this issue by making a motion to
sever, but he also conceded the escape charge during closing arguments. Now,
Appellant contends that this perceived error merits palpable error review under
RCr 10 .26, which reads:
A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of
a party may be considered by the court on motion for a
new trial or by an appellate court on appeal, even
though insufficiently raised or preserved for review,
and appropriate relief may be granted upon a
determination that manifest injustice has resulted
from the error.
As we noted in Brewer v. Commonwealth, "what a palpable error analysis
`boils down to' is whether the reviewing court believes there is a `substantial
possibility' that the result in the case would have been different without the
error." 206 S.W .3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006) (citing Sehoenbachler v.
Commonwealth, 95 S .W .3d 830, 836 (Ky. 2003)) . Appellant contends that
evidence of his escape allowed the jury to speculate about his sense of guilt as
it related to his other charges . However, Appellant was also charged with
fleeing or evading the police-another charge which he conceded in closing
arguments. If the jury did, indeed, draw such an inference, it could have done
so from the similar conduct involved in the fleeing and evading charge. Thus,
finding no palpable error, we affirm Appellant's conviction for first-degree
escape.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we hereby reverse Appellant's first-degree
sexual abuse conviction and remand the matter to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. All remaining convictions are
affirmed .
All sitting . Minton, C.J. ; Abramson, Noble, Schroder, Scott, and Venters,
JJ., concur . Cunningham, J., concurs, in part, and dissents, in part, by
separate opinion .
CUNNINGHAM, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART:
I concur in the Court's opinion affirming the rape conviction in this case . I
respectfully part ways, however, with the Court's reversal of the
first-degree sexual abuse conviction .
I agree with the Commonwealth that this error was not properly
preserved and, I add, neither was it palpable error. Appellant's specific
objection to the instructions is that the first-degree sexual abuse is a lesser
included offense to the rape, and the two should have been one charge. The
answer to this objection is simple . Just because one offense in an indictment
or conviction may be a lesser-included offense of another offense charged does
not mean there cannot be two separate crimes. Here, there was evidence of
first-degree sexual abuse with the digital penetration and evidence of the
separate offense of rape with the penetration of the foreign object .
Had the Appellant properly objected specifically to the instruction on the
ground for which our Court now reverses, the trial court may well have made
the correction in the instruction . It would have been a simple step by simply
adding "by digital penetration" on the sexual abuse instruction and "by
penetration with a foreign object" on the rape instruction. This specific relief
was never requested and, therefore, I do not believe it is fair to the trial judge to
say it was properly preserved. Since there was sufficient evidence to support
conviction on both crimes, under the instructions given, there was no palpable
error. I would affirm the conviction in full.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Steven Jared Buck
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentuc
Todd Dryden Ferguson
Gregory C . Fuchs
Michael Louis Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.