DOMINIC RAIFSNIDER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2008-SC-000479-MR
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DOMINIC RAIFSNIDER
V.
ON APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE
NO . 06-CR-00579
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Dominic Raifsnider, was found guilty by a Kenton Circuit
Court jury of murder and robbery in the first degree . Appellant was sentenced
to life without parole . He now appeals his convictions as a matter of right. Ky.
Const . ยง 110(2)(b) .
I. Background
Evidence of Appellant's guilt was overwhelming, and he concedes as
much here . Appellant was convicted of robbing a gas station in Covington,
Kentucky at approximately 9 :00 a .m . on October 3, 2006, during which the
employee, David Joseph, was fatally stabbed twenty-five times to the chest and
arm . The robbery and attack was documented on a video surveillance tape and
in the presence of several witnesses . Appellant was arrested later that same
day and confessed to the crimes . Traces of the victim's blood were later found
in Appellant's recent residence. At trial, the Commonwealth pursued the death
penalty and Appellant's primary defense strategy was one of mitigation .
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of murder in
the course of robbery and of robbery in the first degree . For the count of
murder, the jury fixed his punishment at life without parole. For the count of
first-degree robbery, the jury fixed his punishment at twenty (30) years
imprisonment . The sentences were to run concurrently.
On appeal, Appellant raises four principal allegations of error in his
underlying trial: 1) that the trial court erroneously excluded his proposed
expert testimony; 2) that the trial court improperly admitted his confession; 3)
that the trial court erroneously failed to instruct the jury as to the defense of
intoxication and the verdict of guilty but mentally ill; and 4) that the prosecutor
engaged in misconduct in his closing argument . For the reasons that follow,
we affirm Appellant's convictions.
II. Analysis
A. Exclusion of Defense Expert Testimony
Appellant first argues that the trial court erroneously excluded proposed
expert testimony, which further denied him his right to present a defense and
his right to confrontation. We, however, cannot agree, as the trial court
correctly concluded that the proposed testimony did not satisfy the
requirements of KRE 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc . ,
509 U .S . 579 (1993) .
Prior to trial, the court granted Appellant funds to hire Dr. Eljorn Don
Nelson, a clinical pharmacologist, in assisting his defense - namely, by
explaining the effects of crack cocaine use . Thereafter, Appellant stated that he
might present Dr. Nelson's testimony in both the guilt and penalty phase of his
trial. The Commonwealth subsequently moved the trial court for a Daubert
hearing regarding Dr. Nelson's proposed testimony.
At the hearing, Dr. Nelson outlined his credentials, including his status
as a licensed pharmacist and professor of clinical pharmacology and cell
biophysics at the University of Cincinnati . He detailed his extensive experience
in conducting individual drug histories and stated that he had interviewed
Appellant for approximately one hour and reviewed his related reports .' Dr.
Nelson's findings indicated that Appellant suffered severe crack cocaine
addiction and his primary behavioral goal was to use the drug. Though
concluding that Appellant could still be criminally responsible, Dr. Nelson
opined that Appellant's drive to use crack cocaine led him to commit the
crimes : Dr . Nelson stated, "I am saying that crack motivated the behavior."
The trial court then inquired of defense counsel, "Is that the opinion you want
to offer?", to which defense counsel replied, "Yes."
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court issued its ruling. While
the court found that Dr. Nelson was an expert in the field of toxicology and
1 Dr. Nelson testified that drug histories were essentially one-on-one interviews in
which he asks an individual a series of question about his or her developmental and
medical history, including prescribed medications and history of drug abuse.
pharmacology, it concluded that the opinions he proposed could not be verified
through the methods he applied and, furthermore, were outside his realm of
expertise - i .e ., Dr. Nelson would be drawing psychological conclusions without
necessary science and training. The trial court, therefore, concluded that Dr.
Nelson could not testify during the guilt phase of Appellant's trial, though
adding that it would consider later whether he could testify in the penalty
phase .2
This Court has adopted the analysis set forth in Daubert, which
established the key considerations for admitting expert testimony under the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See Mitchell v. Commonwealth , 908 S .W.2d 100
v.
(Ky. 1995) (adopting Daubert) (overruled on other grounds by Fu ag to
Commonwealth, 993 S.W.2d 931 (Ky. 1999)) . This Court has also adopted
Daubert's notable extension in Kumho Tire Co . v. Carmichael, which held that
the Daubert may be properly applied "not only to testimony based on `scientific'
knowledge, but also to testimony based on `technical' and `other specialized'
knowledge ." 526 U.S . 137, 140-41 (1999) ; see Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v.
Thompson , 11 S.W.3d 575 (Ky. 2000) (adopting Kumho Tire) .
Pursuant
to KRE 702, "a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
2 Though Appellant also argues that the trial court erroneously excluded Dr.
Nelson's testimony during the penalty phase of trial, it does not appear from the
record that any attempt was made to renew introduction of the testimony, and thus no
ruling was made on the matter. We, therefore, do not consider his argument with
respect to the penalty phase . See Commonwealth v. Pace, 82 S.W.3d 894, 895 (Ky.
2002) ("The general rule is that a party must make a proper objection to the trial court
and request a ruling on that objection, or the issue is waived .") (citin Bell v.
Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 820 (Ky. 1971)) .
opinion or otherwise" so long as such "scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue." The proposed . testimony, however, must be "based
upon sufficient facts or data" and be "the product of reliable principles and
methods" that have been properly "applied" by the witness to the "facts of the
case ." Id .
In Stringer v . Commonwealth , this Court succinctly explained the several
distinct considerations involved in properly applying KRE 702 :
Expert opinion evidence is admissible so long as (1) the witness is
qualified to render an opinion on the subject matter, (2) the subject
matter satisfies the requirements of Daubert, (3) the subject matter
satisfies the test of relevancy set forth in KRE 401, subject to the
balancing of probativeness against prejudice required by KRE 403,
and (4) the opinion will assist the trier of fact per KRE 702 .
956 S .W.2d 883, 891 (Ky. 1997) ; see also Burton v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 269
S .W .3d 1, 6-7 (Ky. 2008) .
As to the underlying Daubert determination, it is one concerned with the
reliability of the theory or technique on which the proposed opinion relies and
involves a consideration of "nonexclusive, flexible factors," including
(1) whether the theory or technique can be or has been tested; (2)
whether it has been subjected to peer review or publication ; (3)
whether there is a known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether
the theory or technique has general acceptance within its
particular scientific, technical, or other specialized community .
Florence v. Commonwealth, 120 S .W.3d 699, 702 (Ky . 2003) (citin Daubert,
509 U.S. at 593-94) ; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 ("[T]he trial judge must
ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable .") (emphasis added) .3 We review a trial court's findings of
fact in this respect for clear error, though the trial court's ultimate decision in
admitting the evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion . See Miller v.
Eldridge, 146 S .W .3d 909, 915 (Ky. 2004) . "The test for abuse of discretion is
whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles ." Goodyear Tire, 11 S .W.3d at 581
(citing Commonwealth v . English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (1999)) .
We do not believe that the trial court erred in excluding Dr. Nelson's
opinions . Though Dr. Nelson was qualified in the areas of toxicology and
pharmacology, his proposed testimony that Appellant's severe addiction to
crack cocaine motivated the crime went plainly beyond the scope of his expert
qualifications . That is to say, though Dr. Nelson did, indeed, have extensive
academic and real world experience in the study of controlled substances, his
qualifications did not establish that he could also drift into psychology and
psychiatry, especially upon only a brief interview with Appellant without any
physical testing. See Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1351 (6th Cir.
1994) ("The issue with regard to expert testimony is not the qualifications of a
witness in the abstract, but whether those qualifications provide a foundation
for a witness to answer a specific question .") . In this respect, we note that
3 It is the burden of the party proffering the expert evidence to demonstrate its
reliability, "except when the party is offering expert testimony in a field of scientific
inquiry so well-established that it has been previously deemed reliable by an appellate
court," in which case "the trial court may take judicial notice of the evidence."
Commonwealth v. Martin , 290 S.W.3d 59, 66 (Ky. App. 2008) .
Appellant presented no evidence regarding the reliability of drug histories to
predict particular criminal behavior (such as whether it had been tested or
subjected to peer review) and this was, in fact, of particular concern to the trial
court.
Moreover, to the extent that Dr. Nelson sought to testify that Appellant
was addicted to crack cocaine and experienced the attendant compulsion to
use the drug, we do not think this opinion would have assisted the trier of fact
in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue. It is by now
common knowledge that crack cocaine is one of the most - if not the most notoriously addictive illegal substances available in the United States and,
indeed, has wrecked whole communities with its insidious effects . See
Stringer, 956 S .W.2d at 889 ("Generally, expert opinion testimony is admitted .
. . when the subject matter is outside the common knowledge ofjurors.")
(citations omitted) . Given that there was ample other evidence demonstrating
Appellant was addicted to and used crack cocaine, Dr. Nelson's opinion was
simply not useful.
Having concluded that the trial court properly excluded Dr. Nelson's
testimony pursuant to KRE 702, Appellant's generalized contentions that he
was, nevertheless, denied his right to present a defense and right to
confrontation are without merit.
B. Failure to Exclude Confession
Appellant next argues that his confession was involuntary. As such, he
claims that the trial court erroneously failed to suppress its admission at trial,
thus violating his protections under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, this claim of error is unpreserved. While Appellant
concedes that the record is without a ruling on his motion to suppress, he
urges this Court to assume that the motion was practically overruled because
his confession was, in fact, admitted at trial. Yet, we have long-held that it is
the burden of Appellant to request a ruling - in this case, when the confession
was offered - and we will not indulge in assumptions otherwise. See Pace , 82
S .W.3d at 895 ("The general rule is that a party must make a proper objection
to the trial court and request a ruling on that objection, or the issue is
waived.") ; Brown v. Commonwealth, 890 S .W.2d 2 86, 290 (Ky. 1994) .
Appellant does not request palpable error review and we do not address it
further.
C. Failure to Instruct Jury
Appellant's third claim of error is that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to instruct the jury as to the defense of intoxication and the
verdict of guilty but mentally ill. We find no error in either respect.
"A trial court is required to instruct the jury on every theory of the case
that is reasonably deducible from the evidence." Fredline v. Commonwealth,
241 S .W.3d 793, 797 (Ky. 2007) (citing Manning v. Commonwealth , 23 S .W.3d
610, 614 (Ky. 2000)) ; see also RCr 9 .54(1); Taylor v. Commonwealth , 955
S .W.2d 355, 360 (Ky. 1999) ("A defendant has a right to have every issue of fact
raised by the evidence and material to his defense submitted to the jury on
proper instructions.") (citing Hayes v. Commonwealth , 870 S.W .2d 786 (Ky.
1983)) . This requirement includes the right "to have the jury instructed on the
merits of any lawful defense which he or she has," Grimes v. McAnulty, 957
S .W.2d 223, 226 (Ky. 1997) (citing Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 754 S .W.2d 534
(Ky. 1988) ; Curtis v. Commonwealth, 169 Ky. 727, 184 S.W . 1105 (1916)),
though "the entitlement to an affirmative defense instruction is dependant
upon the introduction of some evidence justifying a reasonable inference of the
existence of a defense ." Id. (citing Brown v. Commonwealth , 555 S .W.2d 252,
257 (Ky. 1977) ; Jewell v. Commonwealth, 549 S .W.2d 807, 812 (Ky. 1977)) .
This Court reviews "a trial court's rulings regarding instructions for an abuse of
discretion ." Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W .3d 258, 274 (Ky. 2006) (citin
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 134 S .W .3d 563, 569-70 (Ky. 2004)) .
1 . Intoxication Defense
Pursuant to KRS 501 .080(1), voluntary intoxication may be a defense
where it negates "the existence of an element of an offense" - most often, the
mens rea, but, even then, only specific intent. See McGuire v. Commonwealth,
885 S .W.2d 931, 934 (Ky. 1994) ("Voluntary intoxication does not negate
culpability for a crime requiring a culpable mental state of wantonness or
recklessness, but it does negate specific intent.") . This Court has held that a
voluntary intoxication instruction is warranted where, "from the evidence
presented, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was so
intoxicated that he could not have formed the requisite mens rea for the
offense ." Fredline, 241 S.W.3d at 797 (citing Nichols v. Commonwealth, 142
S.W.3d 683, 689 (Ky. 2004)) . Yet, "there must be evidence not only that the
defendant was drunk, but that [he] was so drunk that [he] did not know what
[he] was doing." Springer v. Commonwealth , 998 S .W.2d 439, 451-52 (Ky.
1999)(citing Stanford v . Commonwealth, 793 S .W.2d 112, 117-18 (Ky. 1990) ;
Meadows v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W .2d 511 (Ky. 1977) ; Jewell , 549 S.W .2d at
807) . Thus, it is often said that "mere drunkenness will not raise the defense
of intoxication ." Ropers v. Commonwealth, 86 S.W .3d 29, 44 (Ky. 2004 ) (citin
Jewell, 549 S .W .2d at 812) .
Though the evidence may have established that Appellant was under the
effects of crack cocaine on the morning of the crime, no evidence indicated that
Appellant was so impaired or intoxicated that he was unable to form the mens
rea for murder (KRS 507 .040) or robbery in the first degree (KRS 515.020) .
Appellant identifies his own confession and the testimony of Bobby Villarreal
and Gloria Brown as providing sufficient evidence for a voluntary intoxication
instruction.
Villarreal was a friend and occasional employer of Appellant. Villarreal
testified that he spoke with Appellant on the morning of October 3, 2006, and
though he appeared under the influence of crack cocaine (as he had seen
Appellant before), he did not appear "drunk." Brown knew Appellant for
approximately ten years and had also seen him under the influence of crack
cocaine. At some time between 8:00 and 9 :00 a.m. on the same morning,
Brown saw Appellant sitting near a well-known drug-dealer's house and she
stated that he appeared edgy, irritable, and stressed, leading her to believe he
was under the influence of crack cocaine or perhaps coming down ("geeking")
from a drug-induced "high." In his videotaped confession, Appellant stated
that he had been smoking crack cocaine all through the previous night. None
of this evidence demonstrated that Appellant was under the influence of crack
cocaine later that morning - when the offenses were committed - nor does it
show that his impairment was at all significant. 4
2 . Guilty but Mentally Ill
A jury may return a verdict of guilty but mentally ill where the
prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of
an offense and the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that
4 Appellant relies on several cases dealing with intoxication instructions, but they
are all clearly distinguishable . See Lee v. Commonwealth , 329 S.W .2d 57, 58-59 (Ky.
1959) (jailer confiscated a partially filled half-pint bottle of whiskey from a confessing
defendant who appeared intoxicated ; and several empty half-pint bottles of whiskey
were found at the scene of the crime) ; Callison v. Commonwealth , 706 S.W.2d 434,
436 (Ky. App . 1986) (defendant testified to consuming a quart of whiskey along with
other drugs and had no memory of events; witness testified he temporarily lost
consciousness; and defendant was taken to hospital after arrest for drug and alcohol
overdose) ; Mishler v. Commonwealth , 556 S.W.2d 676 (Ky. 1977) (defendant stated
that he used "speed" and marijuana, could not remember the crime, and would not
have committed it had he not been under the influence of the drugs).
he was mentally ill at the time of the offense.5 KRS 504 .130(1) ; KRS
504 .120(4) . Kentucky's penal code defines mental illness as "substantially
impaired capacity to use self-control, judgment, or discretion in the conduct of
one's affairs and social relations, associated with maladaptive behavior or
recognized emotional symptoms where impaired capacity, maladaptive
behavior, or emotional symptoms can be related to physiological, psychological,
or social factors." KRS 504 .060(6) .
While the evidence may have established that Appellant suffered a
troubled life with some psychological affect, the trial court properly denied his
requested instruction of guilty but mentally ill because no evidence tended to
show that he was mentally ill when the offenses were committed . Appellant
bases much of his argument here upon the testimony of Dr . Edward Conner, a
licensed clinical psychologist . Dr. Conner examined Appellant during eight
different sessions, reviewed the reports of other doctors, and viewed the crime
surveillance tape . Though Dr. Conner concluded that Appellant had a
schizoaffective bipolar disorder, he also stated that there did not appear to be
substantial information indicating that Appellant suffered from a mental illness
which would compromise his ability to conform his behavior to the law when
the offenses occurred. Cf. Turner v. Commonwealth , 860 S .W.2d 772, 773 (Ky.
1993) (instruction warranted where expert testified that defendant was
suffering from paranoid schizophrenia at the time of offense and was not
5 Pursuant to KRS 504 .150, "[i]f the defendant is found guilty but mentally ill,
treatment shall be provided the defendant until the treating professional determines
that the treatment is no longer necessary or until expiration of his sentence, whichever
occurs first."
criminally responsible) ; Dean v . Commonwealth , 77.7 S.W .2d 900, 901 (Ky.
1989) (overruled on other grounds by Caudill v. Commonwealth , 120 S.W.3d
635 (Ky. 2003)) (instruction warranted where defendant was "diagnosed as
moderately mentally retarded, schizophrenic and in need of regular
medication") . Indeed, Dr. Conner ultimately believed that Appellant did have
the ability to control his behavior and make proper decisions .6 The only other
relevant evidence presented was insignificant : a reference to a report by a Dr.
Jones who, three days after Appellant's arrest, diagnosed him with a psychosis
disorder and the testimony of a deputy jailer who booked Appellant and
thought he appeared desperate and perhaps a suicide risk.
D . Improper Penalty Phase Closing Argument
Finally, Appellant asserts that the prosecutor, in his penalty phase
closing argument, made several improper statements that were substantially
prejudicial. Indeed, if this Court (first) determines that a prosecutor engaged in
misconduct in closing argument, reversal is required where "the misconduct is
`flagrant' or if each of the following three conditions is satisfied : (1) Proof of
defendant's guilt is not overwhelming ; (2) Defense counsel objected; and (3) The
trial court failed to cure the error with a sufficient admonishment to the jury."
Matheney v. Commonwealth , 191 S.W .3d 599, 606 (Ky. 2006) (emphasis in
original) (citing Barnes v. Commonwealth , 91 S .W .3d 564, 568 (Ky. 2002)) ; see
also Barnes, 91 S.W.3d at 568 (adopting Sixth Circuit test) ; United States v.
6 These views were corroborated by the report of Dr. Steven Simon, who interviewed
Appellant at the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center and found no mental illness
that would have impaired Appellant's ability to control his behavior at the time of the
offenses .
Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1382-90 (6th Cir. 1994) (articulating analysis) . The four
factors to be considered in determining whether the prosecutor's misconduct
was "flagrant" are: "(1) whether the remarks tended to mislead the jury or to
prejudice the accused; (2) whether they were isolated or extensive; (3) whether
they were deliberately or accidentally placed before the jury; and (4) the
strength of the evidence against the accused."7 Carroll , 26 F.3d at 1385 (citing
United States v. Leon , 534 F.2d 667, 679 (6th Cir. 1976)) . We, however, do not
find that the statements in question amounted to misconduct.
Appellant claims that the prosecutor made an impermissible appeal for
the jurors to place themselves in the victim's position, but this argument lacks
merit. The record shows that the prosecutor stated, "David [the victim] did not
get a second chance," while Appellant had "more than his fair share of second
chances." To be sure, this Court has held that it may be misconduct for a
prosecutor to engage in a "golden rule" argument in so much as it can "cajole
or coerce a jury to reach a verdict." Lycans v. Commonwealth , 562 S.W .2d
303, 306 (Ky. 1978) ; see also Caudill v. Commonwealth , 120 S.W.3d 635, 675
(Ky. 2003) ("A `golden rule' argument is one in which the prosecutor asks the
jurors to imagine themselves or someone they care about in the position of the
crime victim.") (internal citation omitted) . We do not, however, believe that, in
context, the prosecutor's comments here went so far. He did not explicitly ask
the jury to consider themselves in the position of the victim but made reference
to Appellant's significant criminal history and the opportunities afforded him to
7 The "flagrancy" analysis is usually the dispositive inquiry where the misconduct
was not objected to. See Matheney , 191 S.W.3d at 606 .
14
re-enter society so as to juxtapose the fate of the victim . This, taken alone, did
not exceed the bounds of proper closing argument . See Slaughter v.
Commonwealth , 744 S.W.2d 407, 412 (Ky. 1987) ("Great leeway is allowed to
both counsel in a closing argument . It is just that - an argument. A prosecutor
may comment on tactics, may comment on evidence, and may comment as to
the falsity of a defense position.") (emphasis in original) .
Appellant also takes issue with statements the prosecutor made
regarding the appropriateness of the death penalty. The relevant remarks were
as follows:
Considering the brutality of this attack, and the criminal history of
this defendant, the aggravating circumstance that we've already
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, Appellant should forfeit his
right to live on this planet . That aggravator brings in those five
penalties you have to choose from. There's only one penalty
though that brings justice for [the victim] . We've heard enough of
excuses and it's now time to hear justice. What I am asking you to
do isn't easy. But there's only one penalty that you should impose
because there's only one penalty that brings justice .
At this point, Appellant objected and argued that the prosecutor's implicit
suggestions that only the death penalty would bring justice was simply not
true .
Though perhaps bold, we do not believe these remarks constituted
misconduct . We cannot agree with Appellant that the prosecutor was stating
or implying a legal argument . Rather, it appears that the prosecutor was
merely advocating and arguing for imposition of the death penalty by
explaining why the evidence warranted it over other lesserpenalties for which
the jury was instructed : twenty (20) to fifty years (50) imprisonment; life
imprisonment ; life imprisonment without probation or parole for twenty-five
(25) years; and, life imprisonment without probation or parole .$ His
statements, therefore, did not go so far as to tend to negate the jury's free
"option of deciding whether the death penalty [was] appropriate for the
particular circumstances of the case ." Sanborn, 754 S .W .2d at 545; see also
Matthews , 709 S .W.2d at 422 ("[A] prosecutor must be extremely careful to
avoid any remarks which could mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing
process.") .
Appellant's final two claims of misconduct were not objected to and are,
in any event, unpersuasive . At one point in his closing, the prosecutor stated,
"In this sentencing phase, we've heard lots of excuses, lots of things to blame
other than the defendant: his parents, his bicycle, his grandmother's death,
growing up in the projects, his wife, his drugs, his mental health ." Contrary to
Appellant's contentions, we think that such remarks were fair comment on how
much weight should be accorded to the mitigating evidence presented . See
Soto v. Commonwealth , 139 S .W.3d 827, 875 (Ky. 2004) . As for the prosecutor
8 This is, after all, generally proper . See Workman v. Commonwealth , 309 Ky. 117,
216 S .W.2d 415, 416-17 (1948) ("The Commonwealth attorney in the performance of
his duty is not only justified in urging a conviction of the defendant on trial, but to
likewise insist on the degree of punishment which he concludes should be
administered, and in doing so he violates no rights of the accused.") ; see also
Matthews v. Commonwealth , 709 S.W .2d 414, 422 (Ky. 1985) ("[T]he prosecutor
referred to the jury's responsibility as `a very heavy burden,' and asked the jury for `a
verdict, a penalty of death by electrocution.' He stated that `the facts you heard . . .
warrant a death sentence .' The prosecutor's remarks charged the jury with its
responsibility, rather than diminishing it.") ; but see Sanborn v. Commonwealth , 754
S.W.2d 534, 545 (Ky. 1988) ("[Y]ou have a duty under your oath to return the penalty
of death against" the defendant .) (overruled on other grounds by Hudson v.
Commonwealth , 202 S.W.3d 17 (Ky. 2006)) .
16
referring to Appellant as a "career criminal" whose record was "offensive," we
also do not believe that there was anything improper in the Commonwealth
making reasonable comments and inferences, see Garrett v. Commonwealth ,
48 S .W.3d 6, 16 (Ky. 2001), based upon evidence that is clearly admissible
prior to sentencing . See KRS 532 .025(1) (b) (allowing Commonwealth to inform
jury of defendant's criminal record) .
III. Conclusion
Therefore, for the above stated reasons, we hereby affirm Appellant's
convictions and sentence.
Minton, C .J . ; Abramson, Cunning ham, Schroder, Scott, and Venters,
JJ ., concur. Noble, J., dissents in part by separate opinion.
NOBLE, J., DISSENTING IN PART: The majority holds that under the
evidence in this case, the Appellant was not entitled to an instruction on guilty
but mentally ill (GBMI) . I disagree .
The problem with the majority opinion is that it describes "mental
illness" only in the context of complete criminal responsibility, i.e ., the insanity
defense, which requires that the defendant lack "substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law." KRS 504 .020(1) . But mental illness, for purposes of
the guilty but mentally ill statute, KRS 504.130, requires only proof of a
"substantial impair[ment] [of the] capacity to use self-control, judgment, or
discretion in the conduct of one's affairs and social relations . . . ." KRS
504 .060(6) . These are different standards, with one requiring complete
incapacity to appreciate the criminality of conduct (insanity) and the other
requiring only substantial incapacity related to judgment and self-control
(GBMI) .
There are also different end results for the instruction on the insanity
defense and the instruction for GBMI . Insanity results in a complete defense
to the charge ; GBMI affects how a defendant is treated after conviction . The
GBMI statute provides for a guilty defendant to be given necessary treatment
for his mental illness until he is able to function in the general prison
population. This statute provides no defense whatsoever . Its effect on a
defendant is to help ensure humane treatment in incarceration, and it serves
to help the government in the administration and control of the prison
population . It might also afford judges with information and tools helpful in
making decisions about probation, or the parole board in making decisions
about parole .
The cases on which the majority relies address whether there was
sufficient evidence to justify an instruction on the insanity defense, which
obviously requires a much higher showing of impairment than a claim of guilty
but mentally ill. I agree that the Appellant did not make a sufficient showing to
pursue an insanity defense, but he did make a sufficient showing to receive an
instruction on GBMI .
By diagnosis, Appellant has a schizoaffective bipolar disorder. While this
may not have prevented him from appreciating the criminality of his actions at
the time of the crime, this is no doubt a disorder that affects behavior and
could be problematic in the general prison population . Three days after
Appellant's arrest, he was diagnosed by a Dr. Jones as having a psychotic
disorder, and the jail was concerned that he was a suicide risk. He had a long
history of psychological disorders and anti-social conduct. Clearly, a
reasonable jury could have found from this evidence that the Appellant was
guilty but was also a mentally ill person.
Consequently, I would reverse because the trial court failed to instruct
on GBMI, and remand for a new trial.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Julia Karol Pearson
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Jack Conway
Attorney General
William Bryan Jones
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Office of the Criminal Appeals
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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