FRED LEE COLVARD V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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FRED LEE COLVARD
V.
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JUDITH E. MCDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE
NO . 06-CR-000812
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE VENTERS
REVERSING AND REMANDING
Appellant, Fred Colvard, was convicted by a Jefferson Circuit Court jury
of one count of first-degree sodomy, two counts of first-degree rape, one count
of first-degree burglary, and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender
(PFO II) . For these crimes, Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment .
Appellant now appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110.
Among other things, Appellant argues on appeal that certain testimony
from medical personnel was improperly admitted through the hearsay
exception under KRE 803(4) . Because we find that our previous interpretation
of the hearsay exception for "statements for purposes of medical treatment or
diagnosis" was too broad, we find that the testimony was inappropriate . In
addition, several other hearsay statemdnts from other witnesses were
improperly admitted . Because, in combination, the errors were not harmless,
we reverse Appellant's conviction and remand this matter for a new trial. We
will address Appellant's other arguments which may arise in his new trial to
provide guidance to the trial court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 2, 2006, Appellant allegedly sexually assaulted two girls, D .J.
and D.Y., in their bedroom . D.J. and D .Y. were six and seven years old,
respectively, at the time of the events . Appellant knew the children because
not only did he live in the same apartment complex as them, but just a few
months before, he was engaged to marry their grandmother . The grandmother
ended the engagement when she learned that Appellant was convicted of
attempting to rape a ten-year-old girl in 1994.
When D.J. and D .Y. told their mother that they had just been sexually
assaulted by Appellant, she immediately reported it to the authorities. The
girls were then medically examined and interviewed by several medical
professionals . The medical examinations turned up no DNA or other physical
evidence connecting Appellant to the crime. However, the examinations were
not inconsistent with the girls' allegation of sexual assault.
A jury trial was conducted and the jury found Appellant guilty of two
counts of first-degree rape, one count of first-degree sodomy, and one count of
first-degree burglary. He was also convicted of PFO 11 and the jury
recommended sentences of twenty years for the burglary and life on each of the
sex offenses . Those sentences were all enhanced to life imprisonment as a
result of the PFO II conviction . Additional facts will be developed further below,
as needed .
I. HEARSAY TESIMONY WAS IMPROPERLY
ADMITTED UNDER KRE 803(41 ;
EDWARDS V. COMMONWEALTH IS OVERRULED
Jennifer Polk, Dr. Cole Condra, and Dr. Lisa Pfitzer are medical
personnel who testified at trial that the victims identified Colvard as the
perpetrator of the crimes committed against them . Because the testimony of
each of these medical personnel implicates KRE 803(4) 1 and the ongoing
viability of the extension of that rule created in Edwards v. Commonwealth, 833
S .W .2d 842 (Ky. 1992) (overruled on other grounds by B.B. v. Commonwealth,
226 S .W .3d 47 (Ky. 2007)), we consider Colvard's allegations of error as it
relates to these medical witnesses together .
A . Jennifer Polk
Polk, an EMT who responded to the emergency call, was called by the
Commonwealth to testify about the events of March 2, 2006 . Over Colvard's
objection, Polk was allowed to testify that the first child to whom she spoke
said that "Fred from number seven [Appellant] . . . stuck his `dick' in her." Polk
1 KRE 803 provides in pertinent part : "The following are not excluded by the hearsay
rules . . . (4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history,
or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general
character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to
diagnosis or treatment."
also testified that the second child to whom she spoke told her, in substance,
that Appellant had "hurt" her anus . Appellant timely objected to the testimony,
but the trial court overruled the objection upon the basis that it was admissible
under KRE 803(4) .
B . Dr. Condra
Appellant argues that Dr. Condra improperly gave testimony about
statements DJ made to the triage nurse at the hospital . Dr. Condra testified
from notes made by the nurse on March 2, 2006, When the children were
initially admitted into the hospital for evaluation . Among other things, Dr.
Condra testified that D .J . told the triage nurse that Appellant sexually abused
her. He also testified that D .J . told the nurse that "Fred has been f***ing her,
putting his weenie in her private parts ."
Dr. Condra also testified that D.J. and D .Y . informed him that they were
sexually assaulted that day "and over the past months . "2
C . Dr. Pfitzer
Appellant argues that Dr. Pfitzer, a treating pediatrician providing followup examination and treatment to D.Y. and D .J ., should not have been
permitted to testify as to the medical history provided by G.W., the girls'
mother. Appellant timely objected to the evidence, but his objection was
overruled.
2 Based upon this testimony Appellant moved for a mistrial for failure of the
Commonwealth to give notice of its intent to introduce prior acts pursuant to KRE
404(c) . The motion was denied .
Dr. Pfitzer testified that she saw the children as a result of sexual abuse
allegations made against "a neighbor" named "Fred" and that the allegations
involved vaginal and anal penetration. Dr . Pfitzer also testified that D.J.'s
mother reported that D .J. told her that "Fred was f***ing us."
D . KRE 803(4) and Edwards v . Commonwealth
As previously noted, the testimony of these medical personnel implicates
KRE 803(4), the medical diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule . KRE 803(4)
provides that "[s]tatements made for purposes of medical treatment or
diagnosis and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain,
or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external
source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis" are
not excluded by the hearsay rule even though the declarant is available as a
witness . However, the general rule is that the identity of the perpetrator is not
relevant to treatment or diagnosis . Souder v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W .2d 730,
735 (Ky. 1986) (overruled on other grounds by B.B., 226 S .W.3d at 47) .
However, in Edwards, this Court recognized an exception to the
identification rule in cases where a family or household member is the
perpetrator of sexual abuse against a minor of that household. See also J.M.R.
v. Commonwealth ofKentucky, Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 239
S.W.3d 116 (Ky. App. 2007) (applying exception). In Edwards, we relied on
United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985), as persuasive authority
for the family, or household member, exception to the general rule. Therein,
we acknowledged :
In Renville, the Court made this exception to the general rule that
physicians rarely have reason to rely on statements of identity
because of two important aspects involved in the case: (1) the
physician was not merely diagnosing and treating the child/patient
for physical injuries but psychological injuries as well, and (2) the
abuser was a family, household member.
The physician in that case testified that he was treating the child
for her emotional and physical trauma. He also said that the
identity of the abuser was extremely important to him in helping
the child work through her problems . The identity was also
particularly important if the abuser lived with the child, because
the abuse would likely continue as long as the child remained in
the household with the abuser .
Edwards, 833 S .W .2d at 844 (citing Renville, 779 F.2d at 438) .
The Commonwealth, citing the Court of Appeals' unpublished opinion
Plotnick v. Commonwealth, No . 2007-CA-000160-MR, 2008 WL 162881 (Ky.
App . Jan. 18, 2008), argues that this exception applies since the children may
have considered Appellant a member of the family or household, as Appellant
had only recently ended his relationship with their grandmother. Therefore, if
Appellant -is treated as a family or household member, and the perpetrator's
identity is necessary for purposes of medical treatment, then the Edwards
exception to the general rule would apply, allowing Polk's testimony about the
origin of the children's injuries to be properly admitted under KRE 803(4) as
statements reasonably pertinent to D.J.'s and D .Y.'s treatment or diagnosis.
Upon reconsideration of the plain language of KRE 803(4) and its
underlying purpose, we have come to the view that the identification exception
we adopted in Edwards and the Court of Appeals applied in J.M.R. were based
upon an ill-advised and unsound extension of a traditional exception to the
hearsay rule. We accordingly overrule Edwards and J
.
.R
.M
The hearsay rule developed over hundreds of years of Anglo-American
experience injury trials . That jurisprudential experience taught that
statements of witnesses repeating what they had heard from others out of court
was inherently unreliable and unworthy of belief. To protect the integrity of the
trial and its truth-finding mission, such out-of-court statements were
forbidden. We also learned, however, that certain kinds of out-of-court
statements, because of the circumstances in which they were uttered, were
highly reliable .
[Hearsay evidence] was later excluded for lack of oath and crossexamination, two devices for assuring trustworthiness, of which
the latter is primary and came finally to be controlling . Therefore,
the hearsay rule and its exceptions in outline, though not in detail,
form a logically coherent whole. Each exception is justified, for the
hearsay received thereunder was uttered with attendant conditions
which furnish a sufficient guaranty of its trustworthiness to enable
the jury to value it.
See Edmund M. Morgan and John MacArthur Maguire, Looking Backward and
Forward at Evidence, 50 Harv. L. Rev . 909, 920-921 (1937) .
Among the several exceptions to the hearsay rule that developed is the
one now codified as KRE 803(4), "statements for purposes of medical treatment
or diagnosis ."
We know that an ill or injured person seeking to be healed or cured is
ordinarily highly motivated to give truthful information to the physician or
medical provider treating that illness or injury. The essential element that
lends credence to the statement is that the patient, the "declarant" in hearsay
law parlance, believes that the doctor must have that information to render
effective treatment. The doctor's actual need, use, or reliance upon the
declarant's information is less meaningful than the declarant's belief that the
information is essential to effective treatment. The declarant's belief makes the
out-of-court statement inherently trustworthy.
As expressed in Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 561-562 (4th Cir.
2005) :
Rule 803(4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence [the federal
counterpart of KRE 803(4)] allows the admission of hearsay
statements "made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment
and describing . . . present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the
inception or general character of the cause or external source
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment."
This exception to the hearsay rule is premised on the notion that a
declarant seeking treatment "has a selfish motive to be truthful"
because "the effectiveness of medical treatment depends upon the
accuracy of the information provided ." 5 Jack B . Weinstein Ss
Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 803 .06[l]
(Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., 2d ed.2004) ; see Morgan v. Foretich,
846 F.2d 941, 949 (4th Cir .1988) . Admissibility of a statement
pursuant to Rule 803(4) is governed by a two-part test: "(1) the
declarant's motive in making the statement must be consistent
with the purposes of promoting treatment; and, (2) the content of
the statement must be such as is reasonably relied on by a
physician in treatment or diagnosis ." Morgan, 846 F .2d at 949 .
(internal quotation marks & footnote omitted) .
Hence, we except from the hearsay rule statements made by a patient to
medical personnel for the purpose of medical treatment or diagnosis. In the
Edwards case, we enlarged that exception to include statements of a patient
identifying the perpetrator of sexual abuse when that perpetrator is a member
of the family or household of the victim, not because the utterance of the
statement was motivated by the victim's desire for effective treatment, but
because the medical professional might use that information to protect the
victim from further abuse by a member of the victims family or household.
Edwards, 833 S.W.2d at 844. In so doing, we failed to recognize that it is the
patient's desire for treatment, not the doctor's duty to treat, that gives
credibility to the patient's out-of-court statement. There is no inherent
trustworthiness to be found in a hearsay statement identifying the perpetrator
when that statement did not arise from the patient's desire for effective medical
treatment. As Professor Lawson notes, in Section 8 .55(6) of the Kentucky
Evidence Law Handbook (4th ed.
Evidence, § 442 (2d ed .
1994)) :
2003)
(quoting Mueller 8, Kirkpatrick, Federal
"(T)his expansion [the Edwards/Renville
decisions] of the exception is troubling . . . admitting such statements because
doctors rely on them in diagnosis is highly questionable ."
The Renville rule has also received other scholarly criticism. State v,
Jones, 625 So.2d 821, 825 (Fla.
1993),
for example, sets forth learned
authorities which criticize the rule and the reasonings therefor:
However, the trend to adopt a Renville-type analysis also has been
harshly criticized . As the Maryland Court of Special Appeals noted
in a scholarly opinion :
In stretching outward their list of a physician's
responsibilities and in pushing forward with their
definition of "medical treatment and diagnosis," the
expansionists have left behind, abandoned and
forgotten, the state of mind of the declarant . . . .
Physical
self-survival
dictates
revealing
even
embarrassing truth to avoid the risk of the wrong
medicine or the needless operation . Presupposing a
declarant conscious of the probable consequences of
his assertions, the imperative to speak truthfully is not
nearly so strong when the anticipated result is a social
disposition. The temptation to influence the result
may, indeed, run in quite the opposite direction.
Truthful answers as to the identity of its abuser may
well wrench a child from the reassuring presence of its
mother or father or both . It is highly unlikely that
there operates in an infant declarant a compelling
desire to bring about such a result. Cassidy v. State,
74 Md .App . 1, 536 A.2d 666, 684 (1988), cert. denied,
312 Md. 602, 541 A .2d 965 (1988) .
Moreover, many commentators have expressed concern that in the
course of laudable efforts to combat child abuse, prosecutors,
courts, and others have occasionally overreached. See, e .g.,
Michael H. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule,
and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions : The State of the Relationship,
72 Minn.L.Rev. 523, 529 n. 26 (1988) ("The successful prosecution
of child sexual abuse cases should not be permitted to distort the
hearsay exception for statements for medical diagnosis, or
treatment. Almost anything is relevant to the diagnosis or
treatment of psychological well being, and far too many
untrustworthy statements are relevant to preventing repetition of
the abuse.") ; Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and
Statements for the Purpose of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, 67
N.C .L.Rev. 257, 258 (1989) (Applications of medical diagnosis or
treatment exception in child abuse cases "have tended to expose
the thinness of the justification for extending the exception to
statements made without any view toward treatment.")
As reflected by the foregoing discussion, we have carefully considered the
Renville rule, its merits and demerits, and now conclude that our adoption of
the rule was an unwise departure from the traditional hearsay rule that has
served our system of justice well for many generations. One cannot reasonably
conclude that the statements identifying the perpetrator, such as those at issue
in this case, were made by young children "for the purpose of medical
treatment or diagnosis." The Renville rule is inconsistent with the plain
language of KRE 803(4), and, as the above authorities explain, the reliability of
10
a child's identification of the perpetrator of the abuse to a medical professional
contains the same tangible risks of unreliability generally inherent in all
hearsay testimony. Accordingly, Edwards, J.M.R., and other cases applying the
exception to the hearsay rule are overruled. In so deciding, we do not hold that
statements of a child victim to medical personnel identifying an abuser are
always inadmissible . There may be circumstances in which such statements
will be found to comport with the requirements of KRE 803(4) or other
exceptions to the hearsay rule . This, however, is not such a case.
Based upon the above discussion, we conclude that it was error for the
trial court to have permitted Polk, Dr. Condra, and Dr. Pfitzer to testify under
the Renville construction of the medical treatment exception to the hearsay
rule.3 Moreover, because the testimony served to bolster the children's
testimony and the Commonwealth's theory of the case, the testimony was
highly prejudicial . As further discussed below, in combination with other
inadmissible hearsay statements let into trial, reversible error occurred.
This opinion does not alter or limit the traditional hearsay exception
allowing medical providers to testify to a patient's out-of-court statements as to
what was done to the patient and how he or she was injured . Nor, as the
dissent implies, does this opinion impede or limit the ability of medical
3 Even under the Renville rule it would have been error to have admitted Polk's
testimony. Polk, as an EMT, was treating D .J . and D .Y. for purely physical injuries,
without addressing the emotional/ psychological trauma. An emergency medical
responder, unlike a treating physician ordinarily does not have the medical training,
or the expertise, to engage in, or plan for, psychological evaluation and treatment.
Thus, the identity of the perpetrator is not something an EMT would reasonably rely
upon in composing a course of emergency treatment. Thus, the Edwards and Renville
exception was inapplicable in this instance.
personal to report suspected child abuse, including information regarding the
identity of a suspected abuser to the appropriate authorities . We simply state
that we no longer recognize a special exception to the hearsay rule which
allows medical providers to testify in court to the hearsay statements of a
victim of sexual offenses which identify the alleged perpetrator because that
identification is not pertinent to the medical treatment being provided.
II . OTHER HEARSAY TESTIMONY
In addition to the medical testimony hearsay discussed above, Appellant
also complains of hearsay statements introduced at trial through J .W., the
victims' uncle ; G.W., the victims' mother; and Valleri Mason, a children's
forensic interviewer. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that each of
these witnesses was permitted to repeat statements made by the children
identifying Appellant as the perpetrator, and that the statements were not
subject to any hearsay exception.
A. J .W . - (Victims' Uncle)
Appellant argues the trial court erred by permitting testimony from the
victims' uncle, J.W. The uncle, a prosecution witness, testified that he asked
D .Y. "what happened, who touched her," and D .Y. pointed to Appellant.
Appellant objected, claiming the testimony was hearsay, but the trial court
determined the uncle was being asked about what he said and saw, not what a
third-party said, and allowed him to testify to his recollection .
KRE 801 defines a statement as: "(1) An oral or written assertion; or (2)
Nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion."
12
(Emphasis added) . We have no difficulty in concluding that D .Y.'s nonverbal
conduct pointing at Appellant following J.W .'s question was the equivalent of a
verbal assertion by D.Y. that "Fred Colvard touched me." Thus, the nonverbal
assertion falls under the normal hearsay rules for the admission of evidence .
In support of the statement's admission, the Commonwealth cites us to
KRE 801A(a)(3), Preston v. Commonwealth, 406 S .W.2d 398, 403 (Ky. 1966),
and our previous ruling in Owens v. Commonwealth, 950 S .W .2d 837, 839 (Ky.
1997), to the effect that "once a witness is allowed to testify that he made an
identifying statement, further proof by other witnesses that he did in fact make
it is just as relevant and competent as would be defensive proof to the effect
that he did not make it." (internal citations omitted) .
KRE 801A(a)(3) provides as follows :
Prior statements of witnesses . A statement is not excluded by the
hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness, if
the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is examined
concerning the statement, with a foundation laid as required by KRE
613, and the statement is: . . . (3) One of identification of a person
made after perceiving the person.
(emphasis added) .
While D .Y. did testify at trial, the Commonwealth fails to cite us to D.Y.'s
testimony wherein she was "examined concerning the statement" she made to
her uncle, and our review of the testimony discloses no such examination of
the child . Nor do we find compliance with the foundation requirements
contained in KRE 613 . Further, the uncle testified prior to D.Y. . Accordingly,
the elements for admissibility under the rule are not met, and the uncle's
testimony relating the statement was admitted in error. r
13
B . G.W. - (Victims' Mother)
At trial, Appellant asked the children's mother on cross-examination
whether she had asked the children "Did he put his dick in you?" The
apparent purpose of the question was to impeach the mother by portraying her
as vulgar . Appellant then had the mother read a report prepared by Polk that
stated that the mother had, in fact, asked the children that question.
On redirect, the Commonwealth attempted to ask the mother about a
statement made by D .Y. to Polk to the effect that Appellant "took his weenie out
of his zipper and put it in her, but not all the way." The Commonwealth first
attempted to argue that the statement was admissible as a statement made for
medical diagnosis under KRE 804(a) as extended under Edwards . The trial
court ultimately ruled that the question and answer could come in for the
purpose of showing that the children used "children's" terminology as opposed
to the vulgar terminology allegedly used by the mother.
Appellant now claims that allowing the mother to so testify improperly
bolstered the victims' testimony. We agree .
While Appellant's inquiry of the mother about her question to the
children opened the door to further inquiry regarding that event, and perhaps
other conversations she had with the children, we fail to perceive how that
would have opened the door for the mother to repeat D .Y.'s statement to Polk.
Because D.Y. used children's terminology does not impeach the mother's denial
14
that she asked the children a question using vulgar terminology. Moreover, the
purported impeachment was impeachment on a collateral matter that
permitted a hearsay statement not subject to an exception implicating
Appellant as guilty of the charges to be heard by the jury.
The mother's questioning of the children is too attenuated from D .Y.'s
statement to Polk for questioning concerning the former to have opened the
door to the latter. We discern no other hearsay exception which would have
permitted the statement to be admitted, and accordingly conclude that it was
admitted in error.
C. Valleri Mason
Lastly, Appellant objects to various statements made by Valleri Mason, a
forensic interviewer for Family and Children First. 4 Mason, a self-described
child interview specialist, interviewed D.Y . and D .J . the day after the reported
assault and testified about that interview at trial. She testified that D.Y. and
D .J. made disclosures of sexual abuse and that they circled anatomically
correct drawings indicating where they had been violated . In addition, she
testified to the following discussion she had with D .J. :
You told me that Fred, that he put his peanuts [D .J.'s term for
penis] in you. She said, "Yeah." I said, well can you show me on
here . Does this boy, does he have peanuts? She said, "yes" . . . . I
4 Appellant also objects to Mason's testimony that DJ stayed on task better, followed
questioning, and was less easily distracted than D.Y., her older sister; her testimony
that she had not testified as a witness in court for each interview she has done,
because not all cases go to court ; and her testimony that she does not make
recommendations to the prosecutor, that some cases settle, and sometimes the
touching alleged is not illegal or improper touching.
asked her to circle where the peanuts are on that boy and she
circled the penis.
Though Mason's title is that of a "forensic interviewer," she is, in effect, a
social worker. "It is well-settled that 'ft]here is no recognized exception to the
hearsay rule for social workers or the results of their investigations ."' B.B., 226
S .W.3d at 51 . It follows that there is no hearsay exception which would allow
Mason to testify to the children's identification of Appellant as having sexually
assaulted them.
As with the medical testimony, the above hearsay was prejudicial
because the testimony served to bolster the children's testimony and the
Commonwealth's theory of the case. As further discussed below, in
combination with the medical hearsay statements admitted into evidence at
trial, reversible error occurred.
III . THE HEARSAY ERRORS WERE NOT HARMLESS
RCr 9 .24 requires us to disregard an error if it is harmless .
A non-constitutional evidentiary error may be deemed harmless if the reviewing
court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially
swayed by the error. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) . The
inquiry is not simply "whether there was enough [evidence] to support the
result, apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether
the error itself had substantial influence . If so, or if one is left in grave doubt,
This claim of error was not properly preserved by objection. We have factored this
into our harmless error review in considering whether reversible error occurred as a
result of the multiple recitations of impermissible hearsay identifying Appellant as
having perpetrated a sexual assault on the children .
S
16
the conviction cannot stand." Id. at 765 ; Winstead v. Commonwealth 283
S .W.3d 678, 688-89 (Ky. 2009) .
In light of the lack of DNA or other physical evidence linking Appellant to
the crimes, the multiple instances of hearsay testimony described above which
bolster the Commonwealth's theory was of sufficient consequence such that we
cannot say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed
by the error. The improper hearsay evidence vouching that the children had
previously identified Appellant as the perpetrator multiplied the bolstering
effect and resulted in a parade of witnesses vouching for the Commonwealth's
theory of the case.
In sum, we are persuaded that the multiple instances of hearsay
evidence bolstering the Commonwealth's case were not harmless error. We
accordingly are constrained to vacate the trial court's judgment of conviction,
and remand for a new trial.
IV. EVIDENCE REGARDING APPELLANT'S PRIOR CONVICTION IS
ADMISSIBLE
Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously permitted the
Commonwealth to introduce evidence that he was convicted of attempting to
rape a ten-year old child in 1994 . Because the issue is likely to arise again
upon retrial, we address the argument on the merits .
At trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence that Appellant was
convicted of attempting to rape a ten-year old girl in 1994 . The victim, who is
now twenty-three years old, testified at trial . Appellant argues that this
testimony was error per KRE 404(b) because the circumstances surrounding
17
the 1994 conviction were too dissimilar to the instant case . Generally, a
defendant's prior bad acts are inadmissible . However, KRE 404(b)(1) provides
that evidence of prior crimes or wrongs is admissible if offered for "proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake or accident." As recognized in Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973
S .W .2d 13, 29 (Ky. 1998), this list of exceptions is illustrative, not exclusive .
"Among the non-enumerated exceptions we have recognized to KRE 404(b)'s
general prohibition on the introduction of prior bad acts evidence is . . . modus
operandi." Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S .W.3d 90, 95 (Ky. 2007) . The modus
operandi exception requires that:
[t]he facts surrounding the prior misconduct must be so strikingly
similar to the charged offense as to create a reasonable probability
that (1) the acts were committed by the same person, and/or (2)
the acts were accompanied by the same mens rea . If not, then the
evidence of prior misconduct proves only a criminal disposition
and is inadmissible .
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)) .
It is not the commonality of the crimes but the commonality of the
facts constituting the crimes that demonstrates modus operandi.
So, as a prerequisite to the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence,
we now require that the proponent of the evidence to `demonstrate
that there is a factual commonality between the prior bad act and
the charged conduct that is simultaneously similar and so peculiar
or distinct that there is a reasonable probability that the two
crimes were committed by the same individual .' Thus, `[a]lthough
it is not required that the facts be identical in all respects,
`evidence of other acts of sexual deviance . . . must be so similar to
the crime on trial as to constitute a so-called signature crime.'
Id. at 97.
The circumstances of the present offenses are sufficiently similar to the
1994 crime to satisfy the standard we have established for admission under
KRE 404(b) . The prior offense indicated a sexual interest in prepubescent girls,
such as the victims here . In both the prior crime and the current offenses,
Appellant knew the victims and gained access to their homes by his
involvement in a romantic relationship with an adult female in the household .
All of the victims had second floor bedrooms and were quietly assaulted while
others were in the home. The nature of the sexual act itself was similar in that
each incident was of brief duration, the perpetrator said nothing to the victim
during the assault, the perpetrator did not ejaculate, and avoided vaginal or
anal tearing of the victims by penetrating only partially.
Faced with those striking similarities between Appellant's prior
conviction and the current alleged crimes, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting under KRE 404(b) the evidence of Appellants prior
conviction for attempted rape. At retrial, should the same facts be developed,
the trial court will be well within its discretion to admit evidence regarding
Appellant's prior conviction .
V. THE BURGLARY INSTRUCTION GIVEN TO THE JURY WAS ERRONEOUS
Finally Appellant argues that the jury instruction given on the burglary
charge was improper because it allowed the jury to convict him of that crime if
they believed he either caused physical injury to the girls, a violation of KRS
511 .020(1)(b), or threatened the girls with harm to their mother if they told
anyone about what he did. KRS 511 We address the issue because
.
.020(1)(c)
it may arise upon retrial.
Appellant argues that the instruction as written presented alternate
theories of guilt, violating his right to a unanimous verdict. A jury instruction
which presents an alternative theory of guilt is proper and does not violate the
requirement of unanimity found in Section 7 of the Kentucky Constitution, if
every alternate theory contained in the instruction was reasonably supported
by evidence presented at trial . Hayes v. Commonwealth, 625 S.W .2d 583, 584
(Ky. 1981) .
While alternative theories of criminal liability may properly be combined
in a single instruction, the instruction must accurately present the elements of
each alternative theory . Guilt under KRS 511 .020(1)(c) requires that one "uses
or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument against any person who is not
a participant in the crime ." The corresponding instruction given by the trial
court stated that Appellant could be found guilty of first degree burglary if,
among the other elements, he "threatened to kill the victim's mother, [G.W.] ."
It is clear that the instruction does not accurately reflect the requirement of the
statute . If upon retrial, the Commonwealth pursues a conviction on the
alternate theories of liability under KRS 511 .020(1) (b) and (1) (c), and,
appropriate evidence is offered to support same, the instruction must
correspond to the statutory element by requiring the jury to find, not simply a
threat to kill another, but a threat to use a deadly weapon against another
person .
20
VI . OTHER ISSUES
Appellant also argues that prejudicial error occurred by the trial court's
failure to strike two jurors for cause. Because the case is reversed on other
grounds and the issue is unlikely to recur upon retrial, we decline to address
it.
Appellant also argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient
to support the convictions. We disagree . The testimony of D.J. and D .Y.
describing the events of March 2, 2006, and, identifying Appellant as the
perpetrator was sufficient to defeat his motion for a directed verdict .
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S .W .2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) .
The trial court did not err in overruling Appellant's motions for directed
verdicts.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit
Court is reversed,, and the cause is remanded for additional proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
All sitting. Cunningham, Noble, and Schroder, JJ ., concur. Minton,
C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part and would not allow introduction of
1994 attempted rape conviction because the facts of the current case are not
sufficiently similar to satisfy KRE 404(b) . He concurs in all other respects .
Scott, J ., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion in which
Abramson, J., joins .
SCOTT, JUSTICE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
OPINION : Although I concur with the majority on the other issues, I must
respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion that this Court's decision in
Edwards v. Commonwealth, 833 S .W.2d 842 (Ky. 1992) (overruled on other
grounds by B.B. v. Commonwealth, 226 S .W.3d 47 (Ky. 2007)) was "based upon
an ill-advised and unsound extension of a traditional exception to the hearsay
rule." Slip op. at 7 .
1 . Edwards and Renville
Edwards, id. at 844, was premised on United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d
430 (8th Cir. 1985), wherein the logic of the rule as applied to young children
was explained, to wit:
Statements by a child abuse victim to a physician during an
examination that the abuser is a member of the victim's immediate
household are reasonably pertinent to treatment.
Statements of this kind differ from the statements of fault . . . and
properly excluded under our past decisions in a crucial way: they
are reasonably relied on by a physician in treatment or diagnosis .
First, child abuse involves more than physical injury; the physician
must be attentive to treating the emotional and psychological
injuries which accompany this crime. The exact nature and extent
of the psychological problems which ensue from child abuse often
depend on the identity of the abuser. The general rule banning
statements of fault is premised on the assumption that the injury
is purely somatic . This is evident from the examples put forth by
the courts and commentators discussing the rule.
In each
example, the medical treatment contemplated was restricted to the
physical injuries of the victim; there is no psychological component
of treatment which could relate to the identity of the individual at
fault. Furthermore, in each example the statement of fault is not
relevant to prevention of recurrence of the injury. Sexual abuse of
children at home presents a wholly different situation.
Second, physicians have an obligation, imposed by state law, to
prevent an abused child from being returned to an environment in
which he or she cannot be adequately protected from recurrent
abuse. This obligation is most immediate where the abuser is a
member of the victim's household, as in the present case .
Information that the abuser is a member of the household is
therefore "reasonably pertinent" to a course of treatment which
includes
removing
the
child
from
the
home .
Id. at 436-438 (internal citations and footnotes omitted) ; see also J.M.R. v.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 239
S .W.3d 116 (Ky. App . 2007) .
As our predecessor Court noted in Edwards:
In Renville, the Court made this exception to the general rule that
physicians rarely have reason to rely on statements of identity
because of two important aspects involved in the case : (1) the
physician was not merely diagnosing and treating the child/patient
for physical injuries but psychological injuries as well, and (2) the
abuser was a family, household member.
The physician in that case testified that he was treating the child
for her emotional and physical trauma. He also said that the
identity of the abuser was extremely important to him in helping
the child work through her problems . The identity was also
particularly important if the abuser lived with the child, because
the abuse would likely continue as long as the child remained in
the household with the abuser.
833 S.W.2d at 844 . And, as was noted by the Court in J.M.R. :
The therapists testified that the boys feared their stepfather would
harm them in the future and that they did not want to reunify with
their mother because of her inability or unwillingness to leave their
stepfather . While the mother contends that these statements were
inadmissible hearsay, we conclude that these statements qualified
as hearsay exceptions pursuant to KRE 803(4) because the
statements were made to therapists who were determining what
happened to the children and what treatment they needed to
receive and the statements were made for the purpose of receiving
medical
treatment.
239 S.W .3d at 119 -120; see also Gadd v. Commonwealth, 2005-SC-000880MR, 2007 WL 858811 (Ky. 2007) . Gadd, in turn, led to an expansion in
Plotnick v. Commonwealth, 2007-CA-000160-MR, 2008 WL 162881 at *3 (Ky.
App. 2008), wherein the Court recognized :
While not a "family member" in the traditional sense, D.R. called
Plotnick "daddy," D .R. had a half-sibling fathered by Plotnick, D .R.
had resided with Plotnick at times, and the victim's mother had an
ongoing relationship with Plotnick from which it may . be inferred
that there would be ongoing contact between the victim and the
alleged perpetrator. Therefore, we believe the Edwards exception
applies, and that the physician's assistant properly repeated D .R.'s
identification of Plotnick as the perpetrator.
Each of these opinions are based on common ground - that it is
medically relevant to the health and safety of young children that their injuries
not only be recognized and treated, but also that further injury prevented - i .e .,
their perpetrators, if connected with the children's home life, could be identified
and reported so that the child would be made safe .
Moreover, even State v. Jones, 625 So.2d 821, 824-25 (Fla. 1993), upon
which the majority bases its logic, admits that "[t]he majority of state courts
confronted with this issue have followed Renville and permitted medical
personnel to testify regarding statements of identity made by child victims of
abuse." Id. at 824-25 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) .
11. The Occurrence
The relevant events precipitating this analysis occurred on March 2,
2006, in Louisville, Kentucky, when the victims, D.J. and D.Y., were six and
seven years old, respectively . That day, their mother, G.W ., met them as they
got off the school bus and was told by the bus driver that the girls had
misbehaved on the trip home . She then took them home, ordering them to
their room and bed as punishment for their behavior on the bus. G.W., who
was seven months pregnant at the time, then went to the kitchen to fix her
daughters a snack, but became ill and went to the bathroom .
During this time, Appellant entered the home and went to D .Y . and D .J.'s
bedroom. D .J. testified that Appellant climbed onto the top bunk where she
was lying and used belts to tie her arms and legs to the bed . He then hit her in
the face and raped her. Though D .J . could not remember what he said,
Appellant threatened her. In addition, Appellant raped D .Y . . He told D .Y. that
he would kill her mother and the baby her mother was carrying if she told
anyone what he was doing. Appellant then climbed out the window .
While in the bathroom, G.W. heard a door close and shouted to her
daughters, asking who was in the house. D .Y., the older of the two victims,
then asked to come into the bathroom to wash herself. D.Y. initially refused to
tell her mother why, but she was holding herself. On undressing her, G.W.
noticed that D.Y .'s vagina was red, and had a strong odor . G.W . then went to
her daughter's room and noticed an odor of feces. After briefly questioning the
children, G.W. realized that both her daughters had been raped. At her
insistence, both girls identified Appellant as their attacker.
G.W. then looked out the window and saw Appellant leaving. She
grabbed a butcher knife from the kitchen, left the apartment, and confronted
Appellant . Initially, he denied the allegations, but became silent when G.W.'s
25
mother, W.D ., Appellant's former fiancée, confronted and physically attacked
him.
The police and EMS were then called to G.W.'s apartment . No injuries or
blood was seen on the girls and EMS left the scene . G .W. and W.D . then took
the girls to the hospital. Dr. Condra, who saw the children at the hospital,
testified that D.J.'s examination showed some mild redness between the vulva
and vagina, but there was no evidence of tears or bruising to the vagina . An
abnormality of the hymen was also noted. Dr. Condra concluded that D .J .'s
examination was consistent with her complaint of sexual assault and was
consistent with some type of penetration, although he could not specify the
nature of the penetration .
D .Y.'s examination showed some mild redness or inflammation at the
opening of the vagina, but there were no tears or bruising. The history D.Y .
gave Dr. Condra, along with his examination, was consistent with a sexual
assault. D.Y. also had anal dilatation of about 1 .5 centimeters. Such a
dilatation was consistent with a penetrating trauma.
Vaginal swabs, anal swabs, and a vaginal smear of the panties did not
disclose the presence of any seminal fluid or sperm cells on D .J. or D .Y. .
However, an unidentified 11-inch, light brown, Caucasian head hair was found
in D.Y.'s anal region that did not belong to Appellant, an African-American . No
semen, pubic hair or body hair was found on any of the bed clothing or the
towel removed from the girl's bedroom . Rape kits taken from the children did
not contain any semen that could be examined or analyzed as Appellant had
not ejaculated.
III . The Medical Testimony
A . Dr. Condra
Prior to seeing Dr. Condra at the hospital, D.J. and D.Y . were interviewed
by the triage nurse . Dr. Condra relied upon these notes in treating the victims.
The notes reflected that D .J . told the triage nurse that Appellant sexually
abused her. Dr. Condra also testified that D .J . told him and the nurse what
Appellant had been doing to her. He also testified that both D.J . and D.Y .
informed him that they were sexually assaulted that day "and over the past
months ."
B . Dr. Pfitzer
Dr. Pfitzer was a treating pediatrician who provided follow-up
examination and treatment to D .J. and D .Y . . She testified that she saw the
children as a result of sexual abuse allegations made against "a neighbor"
named "Fred" and that the allegations involved vaginal and anal penetration .
IV. The Majority's Departure From Edwards
In discarding Edwards' precedent of eighteen years, the majority asserts
that it "cannot reasonably conclude that the statements identifying the
perpetrator, such as those at issue in this case, were made by young children
`for the purpose of medical treatment or diagnosis ."' Slip op . at 11 . The
majority further asserts "the reliability of a child's identification of the
perpetrator of the abuse to a medical professional contains the same tangible
27
risk of unreliability generally inherent in all hearsay testimony." Id. at 12 .
Outside the medical field, one could assert this conclusion to be valid as long
as it rested "on the obvious assumption that the declarant is responding under
the impression that [he or she] is being asked to make an accusation that is
not relevant to the physician's diagnosis or treatment." Renville, 779 F .2d at
438. However,
[t]his assumption does not hold where the physician makes clear
to the victim that the inquiry into the identity of the abuser is
important to diagnosis and treatment, and the victim manifests
such an understanding. In such circumstances, the victim's
motivation to speak truthfully is the same as that which insures
reliability when he recounts the chronology of events or details
symptoms of somatic distress .
Id. Here, there is nothing in the record to indicate "that the child's motive in
making these statements to medical personnel was other than as a patient
responding to a physician questioning for prospective treatment." Id. at 439
(citing United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir. 1980)) ; see also U.S.
v. Kappell, 418 F.3d 550, 557 (6th Cir . 2005) ("The record supports the district
court's finding that `there is sufficient indicia that these statements were made
for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment . . . to be admissible under
803(4) . -) .
The reasoning for retaining the Edwards/ Renville exception was also
aptly noted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Hawkins v. State, 72 S.W.3d
493, 498 (Ark. 2002) :
R.T.'s identification of appellant as her abuser allowed Dr.
Hawawini to take steps to prevent further abuse by her stepfather,
who was a member of her household.
Additionally, R .T.'s
28
identification of appellant as her abuser allowed Dr. Hawawini to
take steps to treat the emotional and psychological injuries which
accompanied the rape. Moreover, we note that based on R.T .'s
statements, Dr. Hawawini referred her to a physician at Children's
Hospital who specialized in treating children who are sexually
abused . Finally, R.T.'s identification of appellant as her abuser
permitted Dr. Hawawini to fulfill her legislatively imposed duty of
calling the child-abuse hotline and reporting the crime .
And, the Court in Morgan v. Foretich, also noted that "[w]e agree with the
judgment of the Eighth Circuit [in Renville] that `[s]exual abuse of children at
home presents a wholly different situation' from that normally encountered in
Rule 803(4) cases and that situation requires great caution in excluding highly
pertinent evidence." 846 F.2d 941, 949 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing Renville, 779 F.2d
at 437) . In State v. Tracy, 482 N .W.2d 675 (Iowa 1992), the Iowa Supreme
Court agreed, noting that "[b]ecause of the nature of child sexual abuse, the
only direct witnesses to the crime will often be the perpetrator and the victim .
Consequently, much of the State's proof will necessarily have to be admissible
hearsay statements made by the victim to relatives and medical personnel." Id.
at 682 . Thus, "'[i]nformation that the abuser is a member of the household is
therefore `reasonably pertinent' to a course of treatment which includes
removing the child from the home .' Id. at 681-82 (quoting Renville 779 F .2d at
438) ; see also State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801, 810 (Ariz. 1987) ("[I]n child
sexual abuse cases, we therefore join the growing number of jurisdictions
which recognize that statements regarding the abuser's identity fall within Rule
803(4) whenever, as here, identity is relevant to proper diagnosis and
treatment.") ; State v. Aguallo, 350 S.E .2d 76, 80 (N.C . 1986) ("[I]n the context of
a child sexual abuse or child rape, a victim's statements to a physician as to an
assailant's identity are pertinent to diagnosis and treatment .") ; Goldade v.
State, 674 P.2d 721, 725 (Wyo. 1983) ("[T]he function of the court must be to
pursue the transcendent goal of addressing the most pernicious social ailment
which afflicts our society, family abuse, and more specifically, child abuse.") ;
U.S. v. George, 291 Fed . Appx. 803, 805 (9th Cir. 2008) ("The district court also
did not abuse its discretion by admitting D .B .'s statement to a nurse
practitioner that George touched her inappropriately because the statement
was made for the purposes of a medical diagnosis."); People of Territory of Guam
v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608, 613 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Thus, a child victim's statements
about the identity of the perpetrator are admissible under the medical
treatment exception when they are made for the purposes of medical diagnosis
and treatment .") (emphasis added) .
V. Conclusion
For these reasons, I cannot so easily cast away an exception wisely
adopted by our predecessor Court for the protection of the children of Kentucky
and thus I must dissent.
Abramson, J., joins.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Cicely Jaracz Lambert
Assistant Appellate Defender
Office of the Louisville Metro Public Defender
717-719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Julie Scott Jernigan
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
'~Uprrmr (~Ourf
of ~firnfurhv
2007-SC-000477-MR
FRED LEE COLVARD
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JUDITI-I E. MCDONALD-BURK :MAN, JUD(TE
NO. 06-CR-000812
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
ORDER OF CORRECTION
On the Court's own motion, the Opinion of the Court rendered March 18,
2010, is hereby corrected by substituting page 13 of the opinion as attached
hereto, in lieu of page 13 of the opinion as originally rendered. Said correction
does not affect the holding .
ENTERED : April 9, 2010 .
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