SHAWNTELE CORTEZ JACKSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2007-SC-000392-MR
SHAWNTELE CORTEZ JACKSON
V.
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JUDITH E . MCDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE
NO . 06-CR-001673
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Shawntele Cortez Jackson, was found guilty by a
Jefferson Circuit Court jury of murder and tampering with physical
evidence . For these crimes, Appellant was sentenced to fifty years
imprisonment . He now appeals his convictions as a matter of right. Ky.
Const. § 110(2)(b) .
I. Background
In May of 2006, Richard Lee Washington was fatally shot in the
area of the Iroquois housing projects in Louisville . He was twenty-seven
years-old . Appellant, twenty years old at the time, was living in one of
the apartments with
his
girlfriend, Dominique Rudolph. At trial, it was
the Commonwealth's theory that Appellant intentionally shot and killed
Washington without excuse or justification . Appellant's defense was that
Washington first assaulted him and that Washington was unintentionally
shot in the course of defending and struggling over a handgun .
Between midnight and 12 :15 a.m. on May 16, 2006, Appellant
received a phone call from an Linidentified individual who owed him
money. Accompanied by a recent acquaintance, D'Angelo Scott,
Appellant sought a ride to a local convenience store in order to meet the
caller. Appellant then approached Dora Ditto and her boyfriend,
Washington, standing by a parked car . Though he knew Ditto, Appellant
had only seen Washington around the neighborhood . According to
Appellant, he approached Ditto and offered to pay her ten dollars to take
him to the convenience store. She agreed and Washington drove the
group .
When they arrived at the convenience store, Appellant met the
caller and received his payment . Before leaving, however, Appellant and
Washington began a verbal argument which continued until the group
returned to Iroquois. According to Appellant, Washington started the
argument because he wanted more "dope ." According to Ditto, Appellant
accused Washington of stealing his cell phone . Scott testified that he
remembered the two arguing over a missing cell phone.
1 Prior to and during the trip, all four individuals consumed various drugs .
Appellant allegedly received twenty to twenty-five Xanax pills from Washington
in exchange for two rocks of crack cocaine. After giving ten of the pills to Scott,
Appellant claimed he chewed up the rest. Ditto testified that she had drunk a
one-half pint of gin and smoked a marijuana joint laced with cocaine, adding
that Washington had smoked a similar "dirty blunt" while in the car.
2
Back at Iroquois, Washington pulled the car into a parking spot .
According to Appellant, who was still seated in the back seat,
Washington and Ditto exited the car and walked toward the trunk . He
slated that Ditto then removed a blank handgun from- the trunk and
handed it to Washington . At this point, Appellant claimed that he awoke
Scott and told him to get up. Appellant then exited the car and stepped
up onto the sidewalk before resuming his argument with Washington .
Washington allegedly approached Appellant and Appellant told
Washington that he saw Ditto hand him the gun. Appellant stated that
Washington threatened to kill him before the two began to yell and shove
one another, with Washington pushing Appellant first and Appellant
then pushing back. At some point thereafter, Appellant saw Washington
draw a handgun and Appellant immediately grabbed Washington's wrists
and the two men struggled for possession of the handgun. During this
struggle, Appellant explained that the gun was in Washington's right
hand when it fired, striking Washington in the back of the head.
The testimony of the other witnesses differed markedly from
Appellant's version of events. Ditto stated that Appellant was the first to
exit the car and that he went toward a group of apartments before
returning, saying that he had found his cell phone . He then asked
Washington for another ride, but Washington refused. Appellant insisted
that Washington would do so, and Washington again refused. According
to Ditto, Appellant then hit Washington with a handgun that she
assumed came from his pocket. Washington ordered Ditto to get on the
3
sidewalk, after which Appellant told Washington that he "ought to kill
him ." With the handgun in his right hand, Appellant then hit
Washington again with the gun and it fired, killing Washington .
Similarly, Scott stated that he remembered"-the two fighting, though he
recalled Washington yelling more than Appellant . He testified that
Appellant backed up and charged at Washington, swinging his right arm
and hitting Washington in the face . Scott then heard a gun fire, though
he did not recall seeing anyone in the group with a firearm that night.
Appellant stated that after the shooting he ran to Rudolph's
apartment because he was scared and high. Once there, he claimed that
he passed out on her bed, not waking or leaving for approximately thirty
six hours .2 According to Ditto, Appellant immediately ran from the scene
with a gun in his hand. Scott testified that he, too, went to Rudolph's
apartment and slept, but remembered Appellant arriving sometime later.
On this point, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Amber
Baker, a former girlfriend of Appellant. Baker stated that she was at her
apartment when Appellant arrived within ten to fifteen minutes of the
shooting looking scared. She claimed that he looked out of her screen
door for approximately twenty minutes before leaving.
It was determined that the shooting occurred at around 12 :42 a.m .
and the cause of Washington's death was a gunshot wound to the lower
back right part of his skull, with the bullet traveling toward the left eye
2 Later, while interviewing Rudolph and searching her apartment, police
stopped her son from removing two trash bags from the bedroom. Inside one of
the bags was the clothing that Appellant wore the night of the shooting.
4
and slightly downward without exiting. He died instantaneously .
Though police never recovered a weapon, the bullet was consistent with a
.45 caliber automatic handgun. The medical examiner noted that
Washingtor -did note have any defensive wounds but did have a contusion
over his left eyebrow and lacerations over his left cheekbone .
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of murder
and tampering with physical evidence. The jury fixed his punishment at
fifty years imprisonment for the count of murder and one year
imprisonment for the count of tampering with physical evidence,
recommending that the sentences run concurrent with one another. On
appeal, Appellant raises ten allegations of error in his underlying trial.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm Appellant's convictions.
II. Analysis
A. Failure to Strike Juror for Cause
Appellant's first argument on appeal is that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying his motion to strike a prospective juror for cause
and that such error is reversible because it forced Appellant to use all of
his peremptory challenges. We find no error in this regard .
Appellant identifies three isolated responses by Juror #24 to
defense counsel's hypothetical questions and contends that they
demonstrate that the juror could not presume innocence . While defense
counsel was explaining the presumption of innocence to the panel, she
asked whether anyone would agree that -a defendant "was a little guilty of
something" if his case progressed past an indictment and to trial. Juror
5
#24 nodded in agreement and answered that "once a person has gotten
this far along, there's bound to be some justification for it to start with ."
When defense counsel asked the juror whether he could still presume
the defendant innocent or treat the parties "on am evehplayirig field," he
first indicated that it would be significant if the evidence showed the
defendant carried a handgun, but his statement thereafter was largely
inaudible. The juror then agreed with defense counsel's summary of the
juror's statement that if the evidence showed that the defendant was
carrying a handgun, he would be more likely to commit a crime . Defense
counsel subsequently asked the juror whether he could put aside that
feeling and still consider the evidence. His response, however, was again
mostly inaudible, at one point stating that "it was hard to say." Counsel
followed, "because you don't know what the evidence is," to which the
juror agreed. Later in voir dire, Juror #24 nodded his head in agreement
with defense counsel's statement that someone carrying a concealed
handgun without a permit would be more likely to commit a crime. And
then, finally, Juror #24, when asked whether a defendant's illegal drug
possession would indicate that he would be more likely to commit other
crimes, the juror nodded in agreement (with many others on the panel)
and stated that drug possession often leads to other crimes.
"RCr 9 .36(1) provides that the trial judge shall excuse a juror [for
cause] when there is reasonable ground to believe that the prospective
juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict." Smith v.
Commonwealth , 734 S .W.2d 437, 444 (Ky. 1987) (quoting Peters v.
6
Commonwealth , 505 S .W.2d
764, 765 (Ky. 1974)) .
"[T]he party alleging
bias bears the burden of proving that bias and the resulting prejudice ."
Cook v. Commonwealth , 129 S.W .3d 351, 357 (Ky. 2004) (citin- Caldwell
v. Commonwealth;
634:.,5=:W .2d 405, 407 (Ky. 1982)) .
Where=-there i's
such a showing, "[t]he court must weigh the probability of bias or
prejudice based on the entirety of the juror's responses and demeanor."
Shane v. Commonwealth,
243 S . W.3d
336, 338 (Ky. 2007) .
The established "test for determining whether a juror should be
stricken for cause is `whether . . . the prospective juror can conform his
views to the requirements of the law and render a fair and impartial
verdict .' Thompson v. Commonwealth , 147 S.W .3d 22, 51 (Ky. 2004)
(quoting Mabe v. Commonwealth , 884 S.W .2d
668, 671 (Ky. 1994)) .
This
Court has
long recognized that `a determination as to whether to
exclude a juror for cause lies within the sound discretion of
the trial court, and unless the action of the trial court is an
abuse of discretion or is clearly erroneous, an appellate court
will not reverse the trial court's determination .'
Fugett v. Commonwealth, 250 S .W.3d
604, 613
(quoting Pendleton v.
Commonwealth , 83 S .W .3d 522, 527 (Ky. 2002)) .
Having reviewed the entire voir dire, we do not believe the trial
court abused its discretion in failing to strike Juror #24 . None of his
statements revealed an inability to conform his views to the requirements
of the law - here, an alleged inability to indulge the presumption of
innocence - and to render a fair and impartial verdict. Rather, the
statements that Appellant complains of were specific responses to
7
leading hypothetical questions posed by defense counsel, all of which
asked the juror to assume certain facts consistent with criminal
behavior . See Patton v. Young, 46'7 U .S . 1025, 1039 (1984) ("The trial
judge properly may choose to :--believe those s~tatemeh.ts that were -the
most fully articulated or that appeared to have been least influenced by
leading.") . When asked whether he could put aside -the significance of a
defendant possessing a firearm, the juror's audible response was
equivocal at best, agreeing that his decision would depend upon the
evidence presented . To the extent that Appellant argues that the juror's
statement that a felony trial was "bound to" have "some justification for
it," we think that is an accurate intuition (e.g., a finding of probable
cause) and it does not follow that the juror could not presume the
defendant's innocence for purposes of a trial. We, therefore, hold that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Appellant's
motion to strike Juror #24 for cause.
B. Inadmissible Opinion Testimony
Appellant next argues that the trial court erroneously permitted
two of the Commonwealth's witnesses to offer opinion testimony. We
review his claims here, but cannot agree.
Officer Robert King was the first to respond to the scene. At trial,
the Commonwealth questioned King regarding several photographs
displaying the positioning of Washington's body. During the questioning,
the Commonwealth asked King whether, in his opinion and experience,
the body appeared to have been in a struggle. King replied, "No," and
8
Appellant objected, claiming the question called for speculation. Though
the trial court overruled Appellant's subsequent motion to strike King's
response, his objection was sustained insomuch as the opinion lacked a
:proper foundation. The Commonwealth subsequently asked King the
basis of his opinion, with King replying that he first observed the body at
the scene with intact clothing, being free of rips, tears, or dirt. King
concluded that he saw no evidence consistent with a struggle .
Appellant also argues that the trial court erroneously admitted the
opinions of Detective Cohen . At trial, Cohen explained that he
investigated the scene and that part of his routine crime investigation
included visually inspecting a body for wounds, paying close attention to
detail and any relevant evidence. Cohen stated that he found small
drops of blood on Washington's shirt, that his sweatshirt was slightly
soiled, that his jacket was still on his shoulders, and that his hat was
still on his head.
When the Commonwealth began to lay a foundation as to Cohen's
experience, Appellant objected and asked the court to prohibit Cohen
from expressing an opinion as to whether there was a struggle prior to
Washington's death. Though the court believed that Cohen could not
properly state such a conclusion, it ruled that he could conclude whether
he believed the scene was consistent with a struggle, provided the
Commonwealth established the necessary foundation . In addition, and
over Appellant's objection, the trial court concluded that Cohen's
extensive experience in similar investigations qualified him as an expert
9
in his field. Cohen's testimony proceeded, wherein he explained that he
had seen the aftermath of approximately one hundred fights during his
ten years' experience as a police officer. He concluded that the
positioning of Washington's body was inconsistent with'. - fight or
struggle based upon the hat being close to his head, his clothing being
intact, and a bag of chips and drink in his possession.3
Pursuant to KRE 701, a witness may testify "in the form of an
opinion or inference" if. 1) it is "[r]ationally based on the perception of
the witness;" 2) "[hlelpful to a clear understanding of the witness'
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue;" and, 3) it is "[n]ot
based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge."4
Testimony offered under KRE 701 is constrained by KRE 602, which
"further refines the scope of permissible lay opinion testimony, limiting it
to matters of which the witness has personal knowledge ." Cuzick v .
Commonwealth , 276 S .W.3d 260, 265 (Ky. 2009) ; see also Mills v.
Commonwealth , 996 S.W.2d 473, 488 (Ky. 1999) ("KRE 701 must be
read in conjunction with KRE 602, which limits a lay witness's testimony
3 Appellant now asserts that testimony at trial suggested that the scene may
have been tampered with in this respect, thus undercutting the reliability of the
officers' opinions . This argument, however, does not appear to have been raised
below and thus we do not consider it here. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Pace, 82
S.W.3d 894, 895 (Ky. 2002) ("The general rule is that a party must make a
proper objection to the trial court and request a ruling on that objection, or the
issue is waived .") .
4 In Hampton v. Commonwealth , we explained that Kentucky's adoption of
KRE 701 "signaled this Court's intention to follow the modern trend clearly
favoring the admission of such lay opinion evidence," which "reflects the
philosophy of this Court, and most courts in this country, to view KRE 701 as
more enclusionary than exclusionary." 133 S.W.3d 438, 440-41 (Ky. 2004)
(quoting Clifford v . Commonwealth , 7 S .W.3d 371, 377 (Ky. 1999)) .
10
to matters to which he has personal knowledge.") . A trial court's
admission of lay opinion testimony is a decision committed to its sound
discretion and is thus reviewed for an abuse of discretion . See_ e.g.
United States v. Pierce , 136 F.3d .770, 773 (1=1 th Cir .'1998) ; see also
Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 6 .05[6], p.
416 (4th ed. 2003) ("Judgments that have to be made in using KRE 701
are difficult (especially the helpfulness decision) and more susceptible to
sound decisions at trial than on appeal .") .
Here, we conclude that both witnesses' opinions were clearly
admissible as lay opinion and thus find no abuse of discretion in this
regard. In forming their opinions that Washington's body did not reflect
that he had been in a struggle, the witnesses rationally drew an inference
from their first-hand perceptions at the scene . Though, as Appellant
contends, it is true that the jury had photographs of the scene, King and
Cohen, as eyewitnesses to their subject matter, could, nevertheless, help
the jury in their interpretation, all going toward determining a fact in
issue - namely, Appellant's claim of self-defense .
C. Inadmissible Reference to Possession of Handgun
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing Amber
Baker to testify that she had seen Appellant in possession of a small,
"silver" handgun three to four days before the night of the shooting when
the statements of Ditto and Scott indicated that a different, "black"
handgun was actually used in causing Washington's death. Because of
this discrepancy and because a handgun was never recovered, Appellant
11
argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that Baker's statement
was relevant and that its probative value substantially outweighed its
prejudicial effect. We agree that the trial court abused its discretion in
this regard, but believe that its effect was, ultimately; harmless .
That all evidence must be relevant in order to be admissible is
perhaps the most fundamental rule of evidence . See KRE 402 ; see also
Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, at § 2 .00, p . 27 ("The
first critical determination to be made concerning the admissibility of any
item of evidence is its relevance ; no other principle or concept is of any
significance in the absence of a positive determination on this issue.") .
KRE 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence ." Relevant evidence may, nevertheless, be
inadmissible where "its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of undue prejudice." KRE 403 . In both respects, we review a
trial court's determination for an abuse of discretion . See Love v.
Commonwealth , 55 S.W.3d 816, 822 (Ky. 2001) (citin Commonwealth v.
English, 993 S .W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) ; Barnett v. Commonwealth , 979
S.W.2d 98 (Ky. 1998)) .
Because the probativeness of Baker's statement - in the context of
the evidence - was so minimal via KRE 403, we conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion in admitting it. The Commonwealth makes
no attempt to justify its admission, other than to claim (without reference
12
to any authority) that it properly established Appellant's state of mind .
We cannot agree . In stating that Appellant carried a gun on his person a
few days prior to the shooting, Baker described a handgun that differed
markedly in its characteristics than the handgun- described by
eyewitnesses to the shooting. Indeed, by Appellant's own testimony, the
handgun that killed Washington was not his, but Washington's . In light
of the fact that a handgun was never recovered, Baker's statement
tended only to show Appellant's general propensity to carry a handgun a use prohibited by KRE 404(b) .
Nevertheless, in context, the error was harmless because we
believe that it did not have "substantial influence" upon Appellant's trial
such that it "substantially swayed" his conviction. Winstead , 283 S .W.3d
at 688-89 . Independent evidence strongly suggested Appellant's guilt.
While in custody prior to trial, Appellant telephoned Baker and a
recording of that call was played for the jury. Therein, Appellant warned
Baker not to tell investigators that he was known for having a gun and
told her to claim that she was forced or threatened to testify if she could
not ignore the subpoena . This evidence taken with the fact that neither
Appellant nor Washington had defensive wounds, that Appellant fled the
scene of the crime, that no murder weapon was recovered, that Appellant
attempted to dispose of the clothes he was wearing, and that Ditto saw
Appellant threaten and intentionally strike an unarmed Washington with
a loaded handgun all demonstrates that Baker's reference had little effect
on Appellant's conviction .
13
D. Inadmissible Evidence in Jury Deliberations
Appellant's next claim of error is unpreserved . Prior to trial,
Appellant moved that the audio from a crime scene DVD be excluded
from play at trial. The Cdizimonwealth agreed and the trial c6izrt
sustained the motion . At trial, the Commonwealth played the muted
DVD for the jury without objection . The Commonwealth then moved to
admit the DVD into evidence and Appellant did not object. Though
Appellant now argues that the jury was able to make use of inadmissible
evidence during its deliberations, he made no attempt to raise the issue
at trial. See Pace, 82 S .W.3d at 895 ; Brown v. Commonwealth , 890
S.W.2d 286, 290 (Ky. 1994) . Appellant does not request palpable error
review and we do not address it further.
E. Limited Impeachment of Prosecution Witness
Appellant also argues that the trial court erroneously limited his
ability to impeach Baker with a prior inconsistent statement. We agree,
but hold the error to be harmless .
At trial, Baker testified that ten to fifteen minutes after hearing
gunshots and sirens, Appellant came to her apartment for approximately
ten to twenty minutes acting scared and looking out her screen door .
Baker stated that the time was between 11 :30 pm and 1 :30 am, as that
was the time when a popular television program aired that she
remembered viewing that night. During Appellant's cross-examination of
Baker, defense counsel established that Baker had given a similar
statement to police . Defense counsel then proceeded to ask Baker
14
whether she recalled giving a prior statement to investigator Joyce
Aldrich, to which Baker stated that she did not. Defense counsel
informed Baker as to the date and time of that interview, but she still
claimed having no memory of way statement to Aldrich.
At the request of the Commonwealth, a bench conference ensued
in which defense counsel explained that she was attempting to impeach
Baker with a prior inconsistent statement - namely, that Baker had
allegedly stated in her interview with Aldrich that Appellant arrived at
her apartment at 11 :00 pm and omitted whether she heard gunshots or
observed Appellant acting scared. The trial court noted that the prior
statement had been incorporated into a written synopsis by Aldrich and
that defense counsel simply could not read the writing aloud to Baker to
accomplish impeachment. Rather, the trial court concluded that Aldrich
would have to testify as to its contents, to which defense counsel agreed.
Defense counsel resumed her cross-examination of Baker and
began asking whether she recalled giving certain statements to Aldrich
and, apparently, began reading from Aldrich's summary to identify
Baker's exact statement. As soon as it became clear that defense
counsel was about to do so, the Commonwealth objected on hearsay
grounds . The trial court agreed with the Commonwealth, stating that
because Baker could not recall the statement, defense counsel could not
ask her about it .
The next day, Aldrich testified and confirmed that she had spoken
with Baker on the date and time previously indicated during Baker's
15
cross-examination. Perhaps anticipating an objection from the
Commonwealth, defense counsel then approached the bench and argued
that Baker's previous denial and inability to recall speaking with Aldrich
- :lowed'her impeachment with the prior inconsistent statement. In
response, the Commonwealth argued that defense counsel could not
pursue impeachment where the denial was not evasive but simply an
inability to recall . The trial court agreed and ruled that Aldrich could not
read Baker's statement aloud in order to impeach her. The trial court
concluded that defense counsel could only ask Aldrich whether she had
spoken to Baker.
Impeachment by prior inconsistent statement is a common
technique used in discrediting witness credibility. In order to introduce a
prior inconsistent statement, a proper foundation must first be
established, whereby the witness is "inquired of concerning it, with the
circumstances of time, place, and persons present, as correctly as the
examining party can present them." KRE 613 ; see also Noel v.
Commonwealth , 76 S.W .3d 923, 929-931 (Ky. 2002) (noting strict
compliance with the foundation requirements) . Where a proper
foundation is laid, in Kentucky, the prior inconsistent statement
represents a hearsay exception and may also be received as substantive
evidence . KRE 801A(a)(1) ; Jett v. Commonwealth , 436 S .W.2d 788 (Ky.
1969) .
Though, generally, a trial court "has a broad discretion in deciding
whether or not to permit the introduction of such contradictory
16
evidence," Wise v. Commonwealth, 600 S .W. 2d 470, 472 (Ky. App. 1978),
here we must conclude that the court clearly erred in prohibiting Baker's
impeachment because her inability to recall speaking with Aldrich
constiL.uted inconsistency for purposes of the rule .' - In Brock v.
Commonwealth , this Court held that "[a] statement is inconsistent . . .
whether the witness presently contradicts or denies the prior statement,
or whether he claims to be unable to remember it." 947 S .W.2d 24, 2728 (Ky. 1994) (citin Wise, 600 S .W .2d at 472) . Indeed, as Wise
observed, "No person should have the power to obstruct the truth'-finding
process of a trial and defeat a prosecution by saying, `I don't remember.'
600 S .W .2d at 472 .
In any event, the error was harmless . Notably, the substantive
value of Baker's prior statement was quite low. If taken as true, it only
briefly placed Appellant in her home some two hours before Washington's
death - a fact of little relevance to Appellant's claim of self-defense . As to
its impeachment value, Baker's testimony was, nevertheless, later called
into question: the defense later recalled Detective Cohen to testify to
prior statements that Baker had made that were substantially similar to
those Appellant sought to introduce through the testimony of Aldrich.
Taken with the other evidence against Appellant, we cannot say that
Baker's limited impeachment in this respect "substantially swayed"
Appellant's conviction. Winstead, 283 S .W.3d at 688-89 .
F. Exclusion of Photographic Evidence
Appellant argues that the trial court erroneously excluded certain
photographic evidence which would have corroborated his defense . We
find no error .
1
- - -
During the testimony of Officer Woolen, Appellant sought to
introduce into evidence his "mug shot," taken just after his arrest for the
crimes. When the Commonwealth questioned its relevance, Appellant
argued that the picture showed redness along his wrists and thus
supported his claim that Washington held him by his wrists as the two
struggled over the handgun . The Commonwealth objected and
contended that the photo was of a low quality, as it was generated from a
non-photographic printer. The trial court reviewed the print-out and
noted that the printer production rendered Appellant's skin tone very
yellow in appearance . Though the Commonwealth suggested that
Appellant introduce from discovery a similar police photograph
documenting Appellant's wrists just after his arrest at the scene (and
prior to the prolonged wearing of handcuffs), he would not stipulate to
their admission. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that the print-out
was inadmissible due to its poor quality and Officer Woolen later testified
by avowal as to the authenticity of the mug shot.
Having reviewed the photograph, we hold that the trial court's
exclusion of the evidence was not "arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principals ." English, 993 S.W.2d at 945 ; see
also Love , 55 S.W.3d at 822 . It appears that the print-out did, indeed,
18
produce a yellowing-effect, giving greater contrast to areas of darker
pigmentation or low light. Thus, even if we assumed that the evidence
were relevant in spite of these inaccuracies, see KRE 401, we believe
that; pursuant W
w;KRE 403, the print-out left the evidence so inaccurate
that its probative value was "substantially outweighed by the danger of . .
. misleading the jury ."
G. Jury Instructions
Appellant challenges several aspects of his jury instructions,
arguing that such errors generally denied him a fair trial and his right to
due process . We address each contention, but find no cause for reversal .
1. Failure to Instruct on Self-Protection
Appellant first argues that the trial court erroneously denied his
request for a self-protection instruction as to the lesser offenses of
second-degree manslaughter and reckless homicide . Though we agree
that such an omission was an abuse of discretion, see Ratliff v.
Commonwealth , 194 S.W . 3d 258, 274 (Ky. 2006) (abuse of discretion
standard of review) (citin Johnson v. Commonwealth, 134 S .W.3d 563,
569-70 (Ky. 2004)), we believe that the error was harmless in this
instance .
At the conclusion of trial, the court instructed the jury on the
offenses of murder, second-degree manslaughter, and reckless homicide .
Though the murder instruction included an additional element that
required the Commonwealth to prove that Appellant did not act in selfprotection, both the second-degree manslaughter and reckless homicide
19
instructions lacked that additional element. Appellant tendered
instructions that included the self-protection instruction as to, all three
offenses and argued that it was legally required . The trial court
disagreed and concluded that self-protection was not an available
defense to the "non-intentional" offenses of second-degree manslaughter
and reckless homicide .
Generally speaking, "[onnce evidence is introduced which justifies
an instruction on self-protection or any other justification defined in KRS
chapter 503, the Commonwealth has the burden to disprove it beyond a
reasonable doubt, and its absence becomes an element of the offense ."
Commonwealth v . Hager, 41 S .W.3d 828,833 n .l (Ky. 2001) (citin KRS
500 .070(1), (3), and 1974 Commentary thereto; Brown v.
Commonwealth , 555 S .W .2d 252, 257 (Ky. 1977)) . In practice, "[t]he
burden of proof is assigned by including as an element of the instruction
on the offense `that he was not privileged to act in self-protection."' Id .
In Elliott v. Commonwealth, 976 S.W.2d 416, 422 (Ky. 1998), this Court,
in a thorough analysis, departed from a line of authority that had once
precluded the assertion of a self-protection defense to the charges of
wanton murder, second-degree manslaughter, and reckless homicide
(among other unintentional offenses) . Since Elliott, this Court has found
error where a trial court, nevertheless, denies an otherwise warranted
self-protection instruction within a homicide instruction requiring a
mens rea short of intent or specific intent. See Halter, 41 S .W.3d at 83738 (instruction given with respect to murder and first-degree
20
manslaughter but not given with respect to second-degree manslaughter
and reckless homicide) . Here, too, we think it quite clear that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying Appellant's requested selfprotection instruction within -the instructed offenses-of second-degree
manslaughter and reckless homicide .
Yet, we believe that this error was harmless, as we cannot say that
"`the error itself had substantial influence' upon Appellant's trial.
Winstead , 283 S .W .3d at 688-89 (Ky. 2009) . Indeed, we believe it quite
insignificant . Though it is generally true an erroneous instruction is
presumed prejudicial, see Harp v. Commonwealth , 266 S .W .3d 813, 818
(Ky. 2008) and that "an erroneous instruction on a lesser included
offense can be grounds for reversal even if the defendant was convicted of
the higher offense," Love, 55 S .W.3d at 826 n.3, the practical effect here
was to lessen the Commonwealth's burden with respect to the seconddegree manslaughter and reckless homicide instructions. In spite of that
error, the jury, nevertheless, chose to convict Appellant under the
correctly phrased instruction of murder, one which properly incorporated
the Commonwealth's additional burden to disprove Appellant's selfprotections claim beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, the jury
concluded, that Appellant was not entitled to the self-protection defense
at all . While Appellant argues that we should still find reversible error
here, he identifies no authority requiring such a result. The fact remains
that Appellant was convicted under a correct instruction . If the jury had
convicted him of either second-degree manslaughter or reckless
21
homicide, we would not hesitate to reverse his conviction here . See e .g.
Elliott, 976 S.W.2d at 422 (reversal where defendant was convicted under
instruction lacking self-protection element) ; Mondie v. Commonwealth,
153 S.W.3d 203, 210 (Ky. 2, 005) (same) . That, however, is not-the ca§e .
2. Erroneous Initial Aggressor Instruction
Appellant next contends that the evidence did not support an
instruction setting forth the provocation exception to the defense of selfprotection, pursuant to KRS 503 .060(2), and thus the trial court abused
its discretion in accepting the instruction over Appellant's objection .
Having reviewed the record, we cannot agree .
It is well-established that "[a] trial court is required to instruct the
jury on every theory of the case that is reasonably deducible from the
evidence." Fredline v. Commonwealth, 241 S .W.3d 793, 797 (Ky. 2007)
(citing Manning v. Commonwealth , 23 S .W .3d 610, 614 (Ky. 2000)) ; see
also RCr 9 .54(l) . Indeed, "[i]n a criminal case, it is the duty of the court
to prepare and give instructions on the whole law. This general rule
requires instructions applicable to every state of case covered by the
indictment and deducible from or supported to any extent by the
testimony." Lee v. Commonwealth , 329 S .W.2d 57, 60 (Ky. 1959) . This
Court reviews "a trial court's rulings regarding instructions for an abuse
of discretion ." Ratliff, 194 S.W .3d at 274 .
KRS 503 .060(2), in pertinent part, provides that a defendant's
otherwise valid self-protection defense is "not justifiable when . . . [t]he
defendant, with the intention of causing death or serious physical injury
22
to the other person, provokes the use of physical force by such other
person ." In other words, "the privilege of self-defense is denied to an
individual who provokes another into an assault for the purpose of using
the.. assault as an excuse to kill or seriously injure that person :" KRS §
503 .050 Commentary (1974) . The exception "may apply to a defendant
who is a mental or physical aggressor." Leslie W. Abramson, 10
Kentucky Practice, Substantive Criminal Law, § 5 .24 (2009-2010) .
Because the testimony at trial indicated that Appellant may have
intentionally provoked Washington, we find no error in the trial court
instructing the jury to that effect. Notably, Ditto testified that she saw
Appellant first strike Washington with a handgun and heard him
threaten Washington that he "ought to kill him." Moreover, Appellant
admitted that the two engaged in an aggressive verbal exchange and
shoved one another just prior to Washington's death . Taken together, an
issue of fact was raised as to whether Appellant intentionally provoked
Washington to assault him and precipitate his murder .
3. Failure to Instruct on Voluntary Intoxication
Appellant argues that it was reversible error for the trial court to
deny his tendered voluntary intoxication instruction, as the evidence
demonstrated that his intoxication prevented him from forming the
requisite mental state for commission of the crimes. Again, we cannot
agree .
Just as "[a] trial court is required to instruct the jury on every
theory of the case that is reasonably deducible from the evidence,"
23
Fredline, 241 S.W.3d at 797, a criminal defendant has the right "to have
the jury instructed on the merits of any lawful defense which he or she
has," Grimes v. McAnulty, 957 S .W.2d 223, 226 (Ky. 1997) (chin
Sanbornv. Commonwealth, 754. S.W.2d 534, (Ky. 1988),- Curtis v.
Commonwealth , 169 Ky. 727, 184 S .W . 1105 (1916)) . It, too, though "is
dependant upon the introduction of some evidence justifying a
reasonable inference of the existence of a defense." Id . (citin Brown v.
Commonwealth , 555 S.W.2d 252, 257 (Ky. 1977) ; Jewell v .
Commonwealth , 549 S .W.2d 807, 812 (Ky. 1977)) .
Pursuant to KRS 501 .080(1), voluntary intoxication may be a
defense where it negates "the existence of an element of an offense" most often, the mens rea, but, even then, only that of specific intent. See
McGuire v. Commonwealth, 885 S .W.2d 931, 934 (Ky. 1994) ("Voluntary
intoxication does not negate culpability for a crime requiring a culpable
mental state of wantonness or recklessness, but it does negate specific
intent.") . This Court has held that a voluntary intoxication instruction is
warranted where, "from the evidence presented, a jury could reasonably
conclude that the defendant was so intoxicated that he could not have
formed the requisite mens rea for the offense." Fredline , 241 S .W.3d at
797 (citing Nichols v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W .3d 683, 689 (Ky. 2004)) .
Yet, "there must be evidence not only that the defendant was drunk, but
that [he] was so drunk that [he] did not know what [he] was doing."
Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W .2d 439, 451-52 (Ky . 1999) (citin
Stanford v . Commonwealth, 793 S .W.2d 112, 117-18 (Ky. 1990) ;
24
Meadows v. Commonwealth , 550 S .W .2d 511 (Ky. 1977) ; Jewell, 549
S .W.2d at 807) . Thus, it is often said that "mere drunkenness will not
raise the defense of intoxication ." Ropers v. Commonwealth , 86 S .W.3d
29, 44 (Ky. 2.0.04) (citing Jewell , 549 S.W. 2d-at 812) :
Though Appellant may have been under the influence of narcotics,
the trial court properly denied his requested voluntary intoxication
instruction because no evidence indicated that he was so impaired or
intoxicated at the time the offenses were committed such that he was
unable to form the requisite mens rea for murder (KRS 507 .040) or
tampering with physical evidence (KRS 524. 100) . Appellant orally
ingested approximately ten to fifteen Xanax pills prior to leaving for the
convenience store, but that fact alone was insignificant . While
Appellant's testimony, in conjunction with Ditto and Scott's, suggested
that Appellant was "high" when the offenses were committed, it does not
show that he was so impaired at the time of the altercation and
subsequent flight to Rudolph's home that he did not know what he was
doing - indeed, at trial, Appellant's defense rested upon his detailed
account of what exactly happened.
4. Failure to Instruct on No Duty to Retreat
As to the jury instructions, we believe that Appellant's final
contention is without merit. He argues that the trial court should have
instructed the jury that he had no duty to retreat and that such an
omission misled the jury in evaluating his claim of self-protection .
Though it is generally true that Appellant had no duty to retreat, see
25
Gibson v. Commonwealth, 237 Ky. 33, 34 S .W.2d 936 (1931) ("It is the
tradition that a Kentuckian never runs . He does not have to ."), he
concedes that we have addressed and rejected the very argument he now
makes in Hilbert v:- .,Commonwealth , 162 S.W.3d 921, 925-26 . (Ky. -2005) namely, that "[a]n instruction on retreat . . . was necessary to counter
the inference that Appellant was under a duty to avoid, if at all possible,
the altercation with the victims." In Hilbert, this Court "explained that
the Penal Code had incorporated prior Kentucky law concerning retreat
and under that law a specific retreat instruction was not required,"
Ropers v. Commonwealth , 285 S.W.3d 740, 756 (Ky. 2009) (reaffirming
Hilbert),5 as an adequate self-protection instruction makes unnecessary
a "no duty of retreat" instruction.6 See id. a t 926 (citing cases) ; see also
Bush v. Commonwealth, 335 S .W .2d 324, 326 (Ky. 1960) ("In fact, an
instruction which does set out particular facts has been condemned, and
it has been held that an instruction on self-defense should be in the
usual form, leaving the question to be determined by the jury in the light
5 We note that the conduct for which Appellant was prosecuted occurred
before July 12, 2006 - the effective date of Senate Bill 38 and the 2006 selfdefense amendments - and, as in Rogers , we see no need to address their effect,
if any, upon Hilbert at this time .
6 Though we have acknowledged here that the trial court erroneously
omitted a self-protection instruction as an element within the instructed
offenses of second-degree manslaughter and reckless homicide, we do not
believe this to be the type of "inadequacy" contemplated by Hilbert and its
progeny which could necessitate a separate retreat instruction. See e.g.
Crawford v. Commonwealth , 281 Ky'. 557, 136 S . W.2d 754, 758 (1940) ("The
instruction in the instant case did not require the defendants to retreat and
allowed them to defend themselves.") . That is to say, the murder instruction
under which Appellant was convicted incorporated a legally proper selfprotection instruction.
26
of all the facts and circumstances of the case, rather than in the light of
certain particular facts .") ; Rogers , 285 S.W .3d at 757 ("[R]etreat remains
a factor amidst the totality of circumstances the jury is authorized to
consider.") . - Accordingly,,the trial court did not err by. refusin ~Appellant's tendered instruction.
H. Cumulative Error
Finally, Appellant contends that even if we do not find any
individual issue sufficient to require reversal, as is -the case, we should
still reverse his convictions on the basis of the cumulative errors he has
identified . Our review of the entire case, however, persuades us that
Appellant received a fair trial and that the errors we have discussed were
not so cumulative in their effect as to, nevertheless, mandate reversal.
See Funk v. Commonwealth , 842 S .W.2d 476, 483 (Ky. 1992); B ry d v.
Commonwealth , 825 S.W .2d 272, 278 (Ky. 1992) (overruled on other
grounds by Shadowen v. Commonwealth , 82 S.W.3d 896 (Ky. 2002)) .
III. Conclusion
Therefore, for the above stated reasons, we hereby affirm
Appellant's convictions and sentence .
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Daniel T. Goyette
Louisville Metro Public Defender
Advocacy Plaza
717-719 West Jefferson St .
Louisville; KY 40202
~.
Cicely Jaracz Lambert
Assistant Appellate Defender
Office of the Louisville Metro Public Defender
717-719 West Jefferson St.
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Gregory C . Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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