DESHAWN MOFFETT V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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6
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2008-SC-000216-MR
OVERSON JACKSON
V.
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE F. KENNETH CONLIFFE, JUDGE
NO. 05-CR-002608
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
AND
2008-SC-000264-MR
DESHAWN MOFFETT
V.
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE F. KENNETH CONLIFFE, JUDGE
NOS . 05-CR-002022-004 AND 07-CR-003657
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING IN PART AND VACATING IN PART
In the early part of 2005, in Jefferson County, Appellants, Overson
Jackson and Deshawn Moffett, were members of a group known as the "Click
Tight" gang or the "Stick Em Up" kids. Jackson suggested that the group begin
robbing people to get money. These robberies eventually escalated into a series
of burglaries . During one of these burglaries, a Hispanic female known as E .D.
was raped and sodomized.
Jackson and Moffett were tried as codefendants in a joint trial. Other
members of the group accepted plea bargains and testified against both
individuals. Prior to the commencement of trial, Jackson and Moffett each filed
motions for a separate trial on the basis that the Commonwealth would
introduce statements of codefendants in violation of Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004) . Moffett also moved to separately try the multiple counts
included in the indictment . The Commonwealth contended that Crawford
would allow the introduction of statements by codefendants, provided that
those statements were sufficiently redacted in accord with Richardson v.
Marsh, 481 U.S . 200 (1987) . The trial court denied both of these motions .
A jury trial was conducted from November 15 through December 10,
2007 . Jackson was tried for 134 offenses and was found guilty of one count of
complicity to rape, one count of complicity to sodomy, two counts of complicity
to kidnapping, four counts of complicity to burglary in the first degree, sixtyfour counts of complicity to robbery in the first degree, one count of complicity
to unlawful imprisonment, and one count of possession of a handgun by a
minor.' The jury recommended a sentence of 369 years, and the trial court
reduced the recommendation, pursuant to KRS 532 .110(1) (c), to 70 years.
1 At final sentencing on February 6, 2008, the possession of a handgun by a minor charge
was dismissed by the trial court upon motion of Jackson.
Moffett was tried for 72 offenses and was found guilty of one count of
complicity to rape, one count of complicity to sodomy, two counts of complicity
to kidnapping, four counts of complicity to burglary in the first degree, thirtythree counts of complicity to robbery in the first degree, and one count of being
a persistent felony offender in the second degree. The jury recommended a
sentence of 321 years, and the trial court reduced the recommendation,
pursuant to KRS 532 .110(1) (c), to 70 years. The trial court also assessed court
costs of $125.00 and a fine of $10,000.00 as to each Appellant.
Both Jackson and Moffett appeal their respective judgments as a matter
of right, Ky . Const. § 110(2)(b) . Their appeals have been consolidated for our
review, and each appeal raises a number of errors which we will address .
Redacted statements and testimony from codefendant witnesses
Jackson contends that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right
under the United States Constitution and Section 11 of the Kentucky
Constitution when it allowed the introduction of redacted statements made
during a police interrogation by codefendant Moffett. Additionally, Jackson
contends that his confrontation rights were again violated when other
codefendants were permitted to testify about statements Moffett made to them.
To support his argument, Jackson argues that Crawford v . Washington, id.
implicitly overrules Richardson v. Marsh, id. According to Jackson, redacting
the testimony of a non-testifying codefendant is not a valid substitute for
confrontation and cross-examination .
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant's right to cross-examine
witnesses. Bruton v . United States, 391 U .S . 123, 126 (1968) . Bruton held
that, in a joint trial, the confession of one codefendant, which implicates both
defendants, may not be introduced despite the court's limiting instruction that
the confession be considered only against the confessing defendant. Id. at 128 .
The Bruton rule was subsequently modified in Richardson , 481 U .S. 200. In
that case, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment is not violated
where the non-testifying codefendant's confession is admitted with a limiting
instruction, provided that the confession is redacted to eliminate both the
defendant's name and any reference to his or her existence . Id. at 211 .
However, in Crawford , the Supreme Court held that "the admission of
testimonial statements against an accused without an opportunity to crossexamine the declarant is alone sufficient to establish a violation of the Sixth
Amendment." Heard v. Commonwealth, 217 S .W.3d 240, 243 (Ky. 2007) . We
are then left with the issue of whether Crawford forbids the introduction of a
redacted statement in compliance with the Richardson guidelines.
Multiple federal courts confronted with this same issue have made it
clear that the U . S . Supreme Court's interpretation of the scope of the
Confrontation Clause in Crawford does not change the analysis for the
admission of codefendant statements. The 5th Circuit, for example, held that:
"[W]hile Crawford certainly prohibits the introduction
of a codefendant's out-of-court testimonial statement
against the other defendants in a multiple-defendant
trial, it does not signal a departure from the rules
governing the admittance of such a statement against
the speaker-defendan t himself, which continue to be
provided by Bruton, Richardson, and Gray."
United States v . Ramos-Cardenas, 524 F.3d 600, 609-10 (5th Cir. 2008) . See
also United States v . Williams, 429 F.3d 767,773 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005) ("We note
that Crawford did not overrule Bruton and its progeny.") ; United States v. Lung
Fong Chen, 393 F.3d 139, 150 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[W]e see no indication that
Crawford overrules Richardson or expands the holding of Bruton.") ; United
States v. Vasilakos, 508 F.3d 401, 407-08 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying Bruton and
finding no violation of the Confrontation Clause in the reading of a
codefendant's redacted statement) ; United States v. Rodriguez-Durdn, 507 F.3d
749, 768-70 (1st Cir . 2007) (separately analyzing admission of an out-of-court
statement for Bruton error and Crawford error) .
We unanimously adopted this reasoning in Rodgers v. Commonwealth ,
285 S.W.3d 740 (Ky. 2009) . In Rodgers , this Court held that the introduction,
in a joint trial, of a declarant-codefendant's self-incriminating, extra-judicial
statement where the defendant's name is redacted and a neutral term is
substituted, avoids any Sixth Amendment or Bruton violation. Id. at 746 . In
this case, before introducing any of Moffett's statements to the police at trial,
the Commonwealth redacted each reference to Jackson. Though the transcript
used by the Commonwealth still at times utilized masculine pronouns such as
"he" or "they," those instances cited by Jackson could just have easily
referenced any of the other testifying accomplices in this matter. The
statements became incriminating "only when linked with evidence introduced
later at trial ." Richardson , 481 U.S. at 208 .
There is a crucial difference between the statement at issue in Crawford
and the redacted statements by Moffett that Jackson challenges here . The
Crawford statement was both facially incriminating and introduced against the
defendant challenging the statement. The redactions here either eliminated the
existence of Jackson entirely or utilized neutral pronouns . The statements do
not facially incriminate anyone except Moffett himself. Nor, and most
importantly for confrontation purposes, were any of the statements introduced
as evidence against Jackson, who did not make them . We find no error.
Jackson also contends that the testimony of the codefendant witnesses
concerning statements made to them by Moffett, which he concedes were nontestimonial in nature,. implicated his right of confrontation . Jackson points to
the following testimony: Dante Felton testified, "They took the little chick to
the back room, they raped her." ; Donnie Nelson testified, "He said that, after,
uh, Overson Jackson proceeded to do . . ." ; Thomas Williams testified, "They
went and robbed somebody, uh, cause they was supposed to sell him some
weed but he ended up coming short with the money so they ended up robbing
him." Jackson argues that these statements, in addition to implicating his
confrontation rights, were hearsay and not subject to any exception .
The admissibility of non-testimonial statements is dependent on whether
or not the statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, or there is
some showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness . See United
States v. Franklin, 415 F.3d 537, 546 (6th Cir. 2005), citin United States v.
Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir . 2004) ; United States v. Gibson, 409 F.3d
325, 338 (6th Cir. 2005) . We therefore review the trial court's determination of
admissibility under an abuse of discretion standard . Commonwealth v.
English, 993 S .W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) .
Dante Felton testified about a statement Moffett made to him concerning
a robbery near the University of Louisville . This statement did not implicate
Jackson nor was it offered against him. Therefore, Jackson's confrontation
rights were not violated . Additionally, Felton recalled a conversation with
Jackson concerning a robbery in which people were thrown on the ground and
their money taken, and who were then forced to crawl under nearby vehicles .
This testimony was based upon a statement made to Felton by Jackson and,
therefore, was clearly admissible under KRE 801A(b)(1) . Finally, Felton
testified about a robbery which led to the rape of a woman named E .D. The
testimony concerning Moffett's own involvement in the attack, and the use of
the masculine pronoun "they" was not a clear reference to Jackson . It could
just have easily referenced any of the other testifying accomplices . Moreover,
this statement was made by Moffett and introduced only against Moffett. As
such, the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Felton to testify about
these statements .
Donnie Nelson testified about statements made by Moffett after the rape
of E.D. During his testimony, however, he used Jackson's name . The
Commonwealth interrupted Nelson and rephrased the question so that
Nelson's testimony would be limited to what Moffett said about Moffett's own
involvement. Jackson did ,riot object and no testimony was given concerning
Moffett's statements about Jackson's involvement. The mere mention of
Jackson's name by Nelson was harmless in this instance, especially when
considered in light of the wealth of evidence of Jackson's complicity or active
involvement in the rape of E .D.
Finally, Thomas Williams' testimony concerned Moffett's and Jackson's
own statements regarding their respective involvement in multiple burglaries .
As such, each was admissible under KRE 801A(b)(1) . The use of the pronoun
"they" in the statement referenced by Jackson was harmless, as testimony had
been given by a female victim that several men were involved in the home
invasion. In fact, the victim identified Jackson as one of the men of the home
because his face was left uncovered . Because of this testimony identifying
Jackson, there was no error warranting reversal .
In light of the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing the introduction of Moffett's redacted statements or the
testimony from the codefendant witnesses.
Police testimony establishing victim identities where victims did not
testify
4f the seventy-four counts of which Jackson was convicted, thirty-one
were presented without victim testimony. Additionally, sixteen victims had
their identities established solely through the testimony of police officers . Over
defense counsel's objections, the trial court allowed the police officers to testify
as to the identity of the victim and the crime he or she reported. According to
Jackson, the testimony of the "name-reader" witnesses constituted
inadmissible hearsay and were testimonial in nature, in violation of his
confrontation rights . Thus, he contends that the guilty verdicts cannot stand
for these offenses . Jackson specifically points to five separate occasions where
the identities of the following victims were established solely through police
officer testimony: Jennie Frias; Laura Frias; Angel Lopez; Carlos Rico; Jessica
Weinstein; Brenda Ramirez; Francisco Ramirez, Sr. ; Francisco Ramirez, Jr . ;
Jose Ramero-Ramos ; Duran Victor Gonzalez ; Francisco Hernandez Mendoza;
Angel Mendoza; Jose C . Ramirez; Juan Jose Ramirez; Joseph Martin RamirezMendoza; and E .D . In addition, although another witness identified Jonathan
Nunn as being present at a certain location, Officer Riggs was the only witness,
according to Jackson, to provide evidence that Jonathan Nunn had reported
being robbed . At the conclusion of the evidence, Jackson moved for a directed
verdict on those counts . The trial court denied his motion .
We disagree with Jackson that the officers' testimony should be barred
on either confrontation or hearsay grounds . The Supreme Court has made
clear that the Confrontation Clause does not bar the use of testimonial
statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter
asserted. Tennessee v. Street, 471 U .S. 409, 414 (1985) . Evidence as to
names is commonly regarded as not being hearsay, either because it is not
introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, or it is so imbued with
reliability because of the name's common usage as to make any objection
frivolous. See United States v. Patrick, 959 F .2d 991, 999-1000 (D .C .Cir.
1992) ; Wigmore on Evidence § 667a, at 928 (Chadbourn rev. 1979) ; United
States v . May, 622 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[A] name, however
learned, is not really testimonial . Rather, it is a bit of circumstantial
evidence .") . Even assuming that the testimony was hearsay, its admission
would clearly be harmless . The identity of the victim is not, although almost
always given, absolutely necessary to establish that an offense occurred. See
Decker v. Commonwealth , 303 Ky. 511, 513, 198 S .W .2d 212, 214 (1946)
(holding that whether stolen property was owned by "the Church of England,
the King of Siam or John Doe made no material difference") ; Kirk v.
Commonwealth ; 192 Ky. 460, 233 S .W. 1060 (1921) (holding that indictment
charging defendant with murder in the death of a homeless man whose identify
was not known and who was identified in the indictment as "John Doe"
conformed to requirements of Criminal Code) . In each instance where the
victim's identity was established solely through police testimony, the
Commonwealth introduced ample evidence to support each count. On every
occasion cited by Jackson, the Commonwealth offered testimony from someone
with first-hand knowledge of the event who described a scene involving
multiple victims. The fact that these witnesses may not have known the names
of all of the other victims at the scene does not nullify their testimony.
Kim Graham's testimony concerned a robbery that involved her and eight
or nine other Hispanic individuals . She testified with first-hand knowledge of
the incident, and the identities of the other victims were established through
officer testimony. Thomas Williams testified that he saw Jackson rob and
punch an intoxicated female on March 18, 2005 . The victim's identity was
then supplied by Officer Barbara Bailey. Carlos Halcomb testified that he
witnessed Jackson pull a gun on a man coming out of an apartment and
subsequently force his way inside the home. The home was occupied by a
woman and child . The identities of the three victims were established by
Detective Dwayne Colebank, who responded to a call from the family after the
robbery took place. Multiple victims testified concerning a burglary that led to
the rape of a Hispanic woman identified as E .D. Other victims were in the
residence at the time of the events, and their identities were established
through the testimony of Detective Clark. Finally, Tony Crain witnessed
Jonathan Nunn lying naked on the ground after he had been robbed . Crain
approached Nunn and was eventually robbed himself and his dog shot with a
gun. This testimony is consistent with that of Lewis Clark, who testified about
an incident where Jackson and another individual robbed two people, stole a
van, and shot a dog.
The standard for appellate review of a denial of a motion for a directed
verdict, based on insufficient evidence, is if under the evidence as a whole it
would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find the defendant guilty.
Commonwealth v . Sawhill, 660 S.W .2d 3, 4-5 (Ky . 1983) . Considering the
evidence offered by the Commonwealth in this case, the trial court did not err
in denying Jackson's motion for a directed verdict.
Admissibility of Derrick Hudd leston's handwritten statement
Jackson argues that the trial court erred when it deemed Derrick
Huddleston's handwritten statement inadmissible . Huddleston testified that
he and his girlfriend, Donetta Cornwell, made a list of items taken from them
the night they were robbed at gunpoint . On cross-examination, Jackson
attempted to introduce a handwritten notation on Cornwell's list, purportedly
made by Huddleston, which included the phrase, "Donnie Nelson robbed me
and my girlfriend ." Huddleston testified that the statement concerning Nelson
appeared to be in his own handwriting, but he could not recall identifying
anyone as the person that had robbed him and had stolen his car. He further
testified that he did not know why he would have written that on Cornwell's
list. The trial court then ruled that the document was inadmissible because it
had not been properly authenticated.
The decision to admit or exclude evidence is within the sound discretion
of the trial court, and its determination will not be overturned on appeal absent
a showing of abuse of that discretion . Mullins v . Commonwealth, 956 S .W.2d
210 ) 213 (Ky. 1997) . The test for an abuse of discretion is whether the trial
judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound
legal principles . Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S .W.3d 313, 320 (Ky. 2006) .
KRE 901 (a) states that "[t]he requirement of authentication or
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims ." The burden on the proponent of authentication is slight; only a prima
facie showing of authenticity is required. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 134
S .W.3d 563, 566 (Ky. 2004) . "This rule `treats preliminary questions of
authentication and identification as matters of conditional relevance according
to the standards of [FRE] 104(b) ."' Id . , uotin United States v . Reilly, 33 F.3d
1396, 1404 (3rd Cir. 1994) .
Here, evidence concerning the circumstances surrounding the writing
was sufficient to cross the threshold requirements of admissibility. The
statement was written on a document prepared after the robbery occurred .
Huddleston testified that it appeared to be in his own handwriting.
Additionally, he indicated that his telephone number and mailing address were
written in his handwriting directly below the statement. The testimony
indicating Huddleston's confusion as to why his handwriting was on Cornwell's
list of stolen items, or that he did not recall identifying anyone and "[didn't]
even know who Donnie Nelson [was]," affected its weight, not its admissibility.
There was sufficient evidence before the trial judge to support a finding that the
statement was what defense counsel purported it to be . See Turner v.
Commonwealth , 914 S.W .2d 343, 346 (Ky. 1996) ("An item of evidence . . . need
not prove conclusively the proposition for which it is offered . . . . It is enough
if the item could reasonably show that a fact is slightly more probable than it
would appear without that evidence.") . We therefore find that,-"the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to admit Huddleston's handwritten statement.
However, we believe that the trial court's error was harmless in nature.
"The question here is not whether the jury reached the right result regardless
of the error, but whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error might
have affected the jury's decision ." Crane v. Commonwealth, 726 S .W.2d 302,
307 (Ky . 1987) . After reviewing the record before us, we cannot say that there
is a likely possibility that the result of the trial would have been different had
Huddleston's handwritten statement been introduced into evidence. On at
least three separate occasions during the brief cross-examination, Huddleston
was directly asked about the content of the statement. During each instance,
defense counsel virtually read the statement verbatim. Defense counsel asked,
"Did you ever identify somebody as having robbed you as Donnie Nelson? And
it says that Donnie Nelson robbed me and my girlfriend . It appears to be your
handwriting. And it indicates that Donnie Nelson robbed me and my
girlfriend ." Though the document itself was ruled inadmissible, the jury had
already heard its substance. See Fields v. Commonwealth , 274 S .W .3d 375,
401 (Ky. 2008) . As such, there is little possibility that the jury was prejudiced
by the trial court's evidentiary ruling. Therefore, reversal in this instance is not
required .
Burglary instructions
Jackson contends that the trial court violated his constitutional right to
a unanimous verdict in the complicity to first-degree burglary instructions
given to the jury. Jackson takes issue with the language in Section D:
"That when in effecting entry or while in the building
or immediate flight therefrom, he, or a complicitor, was
armed with a deadly weapon or used or threatened the
use of a dangerous instrument against [names of
victims] or caused physical injury to [names of victims]
who were not participants in the crime ."
Specifically, Jackson objects to the language regarding "use of a
dangerous instrument" and "cans[ing] physical injury" because, according to
Jackson, no evidence was introduced to support a conviction under either
theory.
It has long been clear that in this state a defendant cannot be convicted
of a criminal offense except by a unanimous verdict. Ky. Const. § 7 ; Cannon v.
Commonwealth , 291 Ky. 50, 163 S.W .2d 15 (1942) ; RCr 9 .82(1) . In the past,
this Court has stated that a "combination" instruction permitting a conviction
of the same offense under either of multiple alternative theories does not
deprive a defendant of his right to a unanimous verdict, so long as there is
evidence to support a conviction under either theory . Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 12 S .W.3d 258, 265-66 (Ky. 1999); Miller v. Commonwealth ,
77 S .W.3d 566, 574 (Ky. 2002) .
Any "impairment of physical condition," as used in KRS 500 .080(13),
simply means any "injury ." Commonwealth v. Potts, 884 S.W .2d 654, 656 (Ky.
1994) . See also Covington v. Commonwealth , 849 S .W.2d 560, 564 (Ky.App .
1992) (holding facial bruise and scratch below the eye to be physical injuries) ;
Meredith v . Commonwealth, 628 S .W.2d 887, 888 (Ky.App . 1982) (holding
superficial knife wound to be a physical injury); Key v. Commonwealth , 840
S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky.App. 1992) (holding sore ribs and having one's breath
knocked out to be physical injuries) . Considering the facts of this case, we
have no difficulty in holding that the evidence was sufficient to prove the
physical injury requirement necessary to convict Jackson of burglary in the
first degree . The Commonwealth offered testimony from victims who were
restrained in such a manner as to cause cuts and bruises on their wrists and
legs . These were clearly physical injuries, and the jury could reasonably
believe that they resulted from Jackson tying the victims' wrists and legs
together.
Additionally, we do not agree with Jackson that a gun cannot be both a
"deadly weapon" under KRS 500.080(4) and a "dangerous instrument" under
KRS 500 .080(3) . The two are not mutually exclusive . See Commonwealth v.
McCombs , No . 2007-SC-000127-DG, 2009 WL 735794, at *5 (Ky. Mar. 19,
2009) (stating reasonable jurors could determine a crowbar to be either a
"deadly weapon" or a "dangerous instrument") ; Heard v. Commonwealth, 217
S .W.3d 240, 245 (Ky. 2007) (finding defendant guilt of second-degree assault
despite fact that no evidence of gun or other dangerous instrument
persuasively linked to the assault) . Subsection (3) of KRS 500 .080 defines
dangerous instrument as "any instrument . . . which, under the circumstances
in which it is used, attempted . to be used, or- threatened to be used, is readily,
w
capable of causing death or serious physical injury." (Emphasis added .) In
this case, there was substantial evidence that guns were used in the burglaries
by either Jackson or a complicitor. A reasonable juror could no doubt
conclude that a gun is readily capable of causing serious physical injury, and
even death, and would thus constitute a dangerous instrument . As such, we
find no error.
Failure to give cautionary instruction on accomplice testimony
Jackson's next assignment of error is that the trial court erred in failing
to give an instruction to the jury regarding the "reliability of accomplice
testimony." Jackson submitted to the trial court instructions modeled after
pattern instructions for the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit. Jackson urges this Court to require an instruction on accomplice
testimony, especially in cases where it constitutes the only evidence with
respect to some of the offenses. We have previously addressed this issue and
find Jackson's argument to be without merit .
Kentucky follows the "bare bones" principle with respect to jury
instructions . Peak v . Commonwealth , 197 S.W .3d 536, 545 (Ky. 2006) .
Instructions, such as those offered by Jackson, tend to overemphasize
particular aspects of the evidence. Hodge v. Commonwealth , 17 S.W .3d 824,
850 (Ky. 2000) . "Generally, evidentiary matters should be omitted from the
instructions and left to the lawyers to flesh out during closing arguments ."
Baze v. Commonwealth , 965 S .W.2d 817, 823 (Ky. 1997) . See also McGuire v.
Commonwealth , 885 S.W.2d 931, 936 (Ky. 1994) . As such, the trial court
committed no error in failing to give the proposed jury instructions.
RCr 6.24 violates Section 7 of the Kentucky Constitution
Moffett contends that Section 7 of the Kentucky Constitution mandates a
separate trial for every defendant. Section 7 of the Kentucky Constitution
provides that "[t]he ancient mode of trial by jury shall be held sacred, and the
right thereof remain inviolate, subject to such modifications as may be
authorized by this Constitution ." According to Moffett, Section 7 "prohibits
legislative or judicial tinkering" with "the mode of trial at the time the language
was adopted." Moffett cites the precursor to RCr 6 .20, Criminal Code Section
237, which provided that "[i]f two or more defendants be jointly indicted for a
felony any defendant is entitled to a separate trial." This, Moffett contends,
shows that, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the defendant had
an absolute right to demand a separate trial . Because RCr 6.20 is permissive
instead of mandatory, Moffett claims it runs afoul of Section 7 of the Kentucky
Constitution .
The constitutional questions raised here were not presented to the trial
court for its consideration . Because Moffett failed to assert this matter before
the trial court, we hold that this was not properly presented for or our review.
Harrison v . Commonwealth, 858 S .W.2d 172, 177 (Ky. 1993) ("A new theory of
error cannot be presented on appeal.") . Thus, the issue is unpreserved, and we
decline to address it in this case .
Failure to instruct the Jury on KRS 532.110
Jackson and Moffett next argue that the trial court erred in failing to
instruct the jury on the 70-year sentencing cap of KRS 532 .110 . Prior to the
sentencing phase of the trial, Jackson's counsel requested that the jury
instructions include a reference to the 70-year sentencing cap. Moffett's
counsel objected on the basis that there was some disagreement concerning
whether the cap would apply to someone who committed the offenses while on
probation, and that such an instruction would create prejudice by encouraging
the jury to assign a longer sentence to Moffett than it assigned to Jackson. The
trial court ruled that neither party was to instruct the jury as to the sentencing
cap because the language of the statute required the trial court to apply it as a
matter of law. The trial court then stated that the statute would be applied to
each codefendant by the court at sentencing.
Neither Jackson nor Moffett has shown any prejudice in this case that is
based upon anything more than speculation . While this Court has held that
the jury should be instructed on the sentencing cap of KRS 532 . 110, the trial
court's failure to so instruct in this case is harmless . See Allen v.
Commonwealth , 276 S .W.3d 768, 774 (Ky. 2008) . The sentence imposed by
the jury is a recommendation and it is the trial judge who sets the final
sentence . Commonwealth v. Johnson, 910 S .W .2d 229, 230 (Ky. 1995) . By the
plain terms of the statute, Jackson and Moffett were subject to a maximum 70year sentence, far below the 369 years and 321 years, respectively,
recommended by the jury. This Court previously addressed the issue of the
proper procedure for when "the jury's sentencing recommendation [falls]
outside the required statutory range ." Neace v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d
319, 322 (Ky. 1998) . We held that "the trial court can correct [the] sentence at
any time" to ensure that it correctly conforms to the law. Id. Accordingly, the
trial court acted correctly by reducing Moffett's and Jackson's sentences to the
70-year maximum mandated by KRS 532 .110 .
Trial court's assessment offine and court costs
In Jackson's final assignment of error, he alleges the trial court
improperly assessed a fine and court costs against him, despite the fact that
the trial court had already recognized his indigent status pursuant to KRS
Chapter 31 . Jackson concedes that this alleged error is not preserved for
appellate review, but nonetheless requests the Court to review the issue
pursuant to the palpable error standard of RCr 10.26.
On November 22, 2005, Jackson's private counsel withdrew from the
case and the Jefferson Circuit Court appointed the Office of the Louisville
Metro Public Defender to represent Jackson in this matter. After the
imposition of a 369-year sentence, the trial court assessed a $10,000 fine and
$125 in court costs against Jackson . The trial court explained Jackson's
appellate rights, including his right to have a public defender represent him on
appeal if he was unable to afford private counsel. The trial court then signed
an order allowing Jackson toy proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, and the
Office of the Louisville Metro Public Defender was appointed to represent him.
KRS 534 .030(1) authorizes the imposition of fines for those defendants
convicted of a felony. Subsection (4) of KRS 534 .030, however, provides that
"[finnes required by this section shall not be imposed upon any person
determined by the court to be indigent pursuant to KRS Chapter 31 ." As this
Court said in Simpson v. Commonwealth , 889 S.W.2d 781 (Ky. 1994) :
"Pursuant to [KRS 534.030], the judge must
independently determine the appropriateness of any
fine, and if so, the appropriate amount and method of
payment thereof. In so doing, the judge must also
consider whether the appellant is indigent . In this
connection, we observe that at sentencing in this case,
the appellant was represented by an assistant public
advocate. Thus, we may assume that the trial judge
had already determined that the appellant was
indigent."
Id . at 784 .
Nor may court costs be levied upon defendants found to be indigent.
KRS 23A.205(2) . As noted above, at the time of his trial and sentencing,
Jackson was receiving the services of a public defender and he was granted the
right to appeal in fonna pauperis. Thus, the trial court clearly erred in
imposing a fine and court costs upon Jackson . We find that the trial court's
failure to recognize Jackson's indigent status resulted in manifest injustice .
But for the court's error, the result would have been different.
At final sentencing, the trial court also assessed Moffett the same fine
and court costs as Jackson. Like Jackson, Moffett was also indigent and
represented by a public defender . Also like Jackson, Moffett did not raise an
objection to the imposition of the fine and court costs at sentencing. Unlike
Jackson, however, Moffett does not raise this issue on appeal. Nonetheless, we
find that, under RCr 10 .26, it would be manifest injustice not to afford Moffett
the same relief as we do Jackson .
Therefore, for the reasons set out above, the respective judgments and
sentences of the Jefferson Circuit Court are hereby affirmed, except for those
portions thereof imposing fines and court costs, which are hereby vacated .
Minton, C .J . ; Abramson, Cunningham, Scott and Venters, JJ., concur.
Schroder, J ., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion in which
Noble, J ., joins .
SCHRODER, JUSTICE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART: Of the seventy-four counts for which Appellant was convicted, I would
affirm fifty-eight. I have a problem with sixteen of the thirty-one convictions
where the victims were not present to testify. I can accept a conviction where
the sole evidence is the testimony of another that witnessed a robbery, even if
the witness does not know the victim's name . However, where the officer that
prepared the offense report is permitted to read the victim's name and the
crime that he or she reported, I see a problem . The non-testifying victims'
statements to the police reporting the crime are testimonial statements being
admitted into evidence for the truth of the matter asserted (that they were
robbed, etc .) . The admission of these statements against the accused without
an opportunity to cross-examine violates the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause . See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U .S. 36 (2004) . Even in the cases
where the officer's testimony may not have been necessary to obtain these
convictions, it is not possible to say that the error was harmless .
Noble, J ., joins.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT,
OVERSON JACKSON:
Bruce P. Hackett
Deputy Appellate Defender
Office of the Louisville Metro Public Defender
Advocacy Plaza
717-719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
Elizabeth B. McMahon
Assistant Public Defender
Office of the Jefferson District Public Defender
200 Advocacy Plaza
717-719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT,
DESHAWN MOFFETT:
James David Niehaus
Deputy Appellate Defender
Office of the Louisville Metro Public Defender
200 Advocacy Plaza
719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Heather Michelle Fryman
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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