MICHELLE NAPIER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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67supremr ttvurt vi
N2006-SC-000745-MR
MICHELLE NAPIER
ON APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RON JOHNSON, SPECIAL JUDGE
NO. 02-CR-000035
V
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Michelle Napier, appeals her September 1, 2006, Judgment
and Sentence in the Whitley Circuit Court, as a matter of right pursuant to Ky.
Const. ยง 110(2)(b), of the charge of complicity to commit the murder of Roger
Arthur "Cotton" Adams on October 7, 1984, wherein she was sentenced to a term
of twenty years . She now asserts that the Whitley Circuit Court erred by (1)
overruling her motion for a directed verdict, and (2) in not allowing, or taking
appropriate corrective measures regarding two comments by one of the
Commonwealth's witnesses, while on cross-examination, that the witness had
taken a lie detector (polygraph) test. For the reasons set out herein, we affirm
the conviction.
I . Facts
On March 11, 2002, the Whitley County Grand Jury issued an indictment
charging James Wesley Napier (Napier) with murder and Appellant, Michelle
Napier, with Complicity to Commit Murder, for the October 7, 1984, shooting
death of Roger "Cotton" Adams (Adams). At the time of the shooting, Appellant
was dating Napier. They were married approximately six months later. At
Appellant's request, she and Napier were tried separately, with Appellant having
been tried first .
Appellant was twenty-three (23) in October of 1984 . Her sister, Sherri
Long (Sherri), was nineteen (19). At the time, Sherri was dating Adams and
living in a motel room with Adams, Martin Monholland (Monholland),' and Marvin
Luttrell (Luttrell) .
According to Monholland, on October 4, 1984, he and Adams were just
outside the open door to the motel room working on a car when they heard a
gunshot from the motel room. Monholland immediately ran inside and found
Sherri, who he believed, had shot herself in the right temple. Luttrell was in the
bathroom. Monholland then called the police . Marilyn, Sherri and Appellant's
mother, later testified, however, that Sherri was left handed. However, no
charges were filed in Sherri's death as it was treated as a suicide .
Shortly after Sherri's funeral, Adams disappeared. His body was found
several weeks later by a fisherman in Cabin Creek. He had been shot once in
the forehead and his body was wrapped in chains . Years later, on February 19,
2002, Appellant was interviewed by Joie Peters of the Kentucky State Police .
The tape of that interview was played in full for the jury during the trial.
In the interview, Appellant acknowledged that she believed someone
murdered Sherri, noting that Sherri was left-handed, yet she was shot in the right
1 Appellees' brief refers to Monholland as "Arthur Nicholas Monholland,"
while Appellant refers to him as "Martin Monholland ."
2
temple, with no powder burns on her hands and no fingerprints on the gun . She
thought that one of the three persons present had killed her. She noted that
Adams did not come to the funeral, but admitted that after she and Napier left the
cemetery following Sherri's burial, they saw Adams, stopped and asked him if he
wanted to see Sherri's grave, which he did, so they drove him back to the
cemetery.
When they got to the cemetery, she walked to Sherri's grave . Adams,
however, did not follow her. Then, as she knelt by the grave, she heard a "pop,"
looked back and saw Napier standing by his white Lincoln Town car with the door
open . He told her to "come on." When she got to the car, Napier said to her,
"are you okay with it?" She looked in the back seat and saw Adams dead . She
thought Napier had a .38 caliber pistol.
When the officer asked her again what Napier had said, she repeated that
he had asked her if she was "okay with it" because "if you're not, I'll have to do
you too ." She indicated that she said, "[she] was okay with it, because [she] was
afraid ." According to her statement, Napier then dropped her off at a woman's
house, whose name she could not recall, and she ultimately ended up at her
mother's house. She also stated that Napier later got Ed Sizemore (Sizemore) to
clean the car up. Sizemore testified at trial as to his attempts to clean the car
and the assistance he gave Napier in disposing of Adams' body.
Appellant noted that she was not married to Napier at the time, of the
alleged murder, but married him later when she was pregnant and he was in jail.
She said they were still married, but she wanted a divorce, so she could have a
real marriage, but acknowledged she would then have to testify against him .
She also stated that a few months before the interview, Napier had come
to see her and took her to Williamsburg to his sister's house, where his sister
tried to get her to say that she had committed the murder, reasoning that since
Napier had money, he could take care of her daughter (who was living with him)
better than she could ; however she refused . She also reiterated that she was
afraid of Napier and that when he found out that she had given a statement,
"[she] would be dead, or her mother would be, or somebody ." Napier did not
testify at Appellant's trial.
Officer Powers testified that Appellant did appear to be afraid of Napier
during the interview. He also testified that Napier drove up during the interview,
but fled before he could arrest him. He was arrested later in 2005, approximately
a, year before the trial, in August 2006.
Sizemore testified that he drove a truck for Napier and, at various times,
had been related to him through several marriages. He testified that in October
1984, Napier brought his white Lincoln Town car to him and asked him if he
would clean it up and he agreed . He believed it was late at night. At the time, he
noticed that Napier had what appeared to be spots of blood on his pants, which
Napier said was rust.
Although he at first testified that "Marilyn" (Appellant and Sherri's mother)
was with Napier that night and that it was his "understanding that she had
dropped him off, then came back later and picked him up," the Commonwealth
pointed out "Marilyn" was Appellant's mother, then reiterated the question, asking
if Appellant was with Napier that night when he came to see him . Sizemore then
answered, "yes ."
Sizemore testified that he left town for a little while, but when he got
around to cleaning the car a couple of days later, it was in Napier's mother's
driveway . There was a mess in the floor and under the mat. When asked what it
looked like, he testified "flesh" and added, "[w]hat was left of a man's head, I
guess." He testified he tried to clean it up, but could never get rid of the foul
smell and worked on it for two days, but never opened the trunk .
At one point, he overheard Appellant state to Napier's sister, Carol, that
there was a body in the trunk, that it was Adams' body and that she had killed
him. According to Sizemore, she said she had reached across the back seat and
shot him. Napier, however, told Sizemore that he had killed Adams and put him
in the trunk.
Sizemore said that Napier later suggested that they get rid of the body and
Sizemore suggested the place to dispose of it. He then described how he and
Napier had gotten rid of the body, wrapping it with a logging chain and dumping it
in the water at a fishing hole in Cabin Creek, where he used to fish.
Monholland, who testified about Sherri's death, also testified that he went
to the funeral home the night before her funeral and while there, Napier wanted
him to go outside and talk, but he did not go. He became concerned and had his
sister bring the car around and they left. He also noted that when he entered the
funeral home, he heard Appellant screaming . He assumed it was because he
was there . While there, Appellant, however, did not approach him, only Napier.
Monholland did testify, however, that Napier and Appellant followed him
and his sister in the white Lincoln Town car when they left. After a while,
however, he pulled his car over onto the shoulder and got out holding his gun.
Napier drove on by . He acknowledged that he did not attend the funeral for
Sherri, since he "knew not to."
The last time he saw Adams was the night before they were supposed to
go to court on a public intoxication (PI) charge, which apparently was the Monday
following Sherri's Sunday funeral . He went to Adams' motel that morning to get
him to go to court, but no one answered the door. Once he got the motel
operator to let him in, he looked in the room. Adams was not there and his bed
had not been slept in.
Larry Adams, Adams' brother, testified that he also visited the funeral
home before Sherri's funeral . When he was leaving, headed for his car, he
overheard Appellant tell Napieq "[that's] not [Adams] that's his brother ." To him,
it was an eerie experience as they were "staring holes through him ."
The next day Larry received a phone call from Appellant and Sherri's
mother. About halfway through the conversation, based upon what she said, he
immediately felt Adams was dead. Larry then tried to locate his brother and the
next day called the police. He testified later on rebuttal, that Marilyn, in this
tearful telephone conversation had told him "I'm so sorry they have hurt your
brother . . . [he] didn't deserve that."
The Commonwealth also called Dr. George Nicholls, a forensic
pathologist, who had performed the autopsy on Adams. Dr . Nicholls testified that
Adams was killed by a .38 caliber bullet which struck him in the head. He found
an additional bullet in Adams' diaphragm, but noted that it had been from a
previous shooting, possibly a long time prior to the date of his death . He did not
find any corresponding gunpowder residue around the bullet wound to the head,
nor was there any suet present around the skin. Therefore, he believed the
muzzle to target distance of the gunshot exceeded the length necessary to
produce gunpowder residue and suet. He did not state his belief as to the actual
distance .
Several other witnesses testified for the Commonwealth to other aspects
of the case. However, their testimony is not relevant to the errors alleged herein .
Both sides stipulated that the cemetery where the shooting allegedly occurred
was in Whitley County.
II. Analysis
A. The trial court was correct in overruling Appellant's Motion for
a Directed Verdict
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in overruling her motion
for a directed verdict on the charge of complicity to commit murder. However, on
a motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth, Commonwealth v.
Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991), and if the evidence is sufficient to
induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given . Id. Manifestly, "[i]f the
totality of the evidence is such that the judge can conclude that reasonable minds
might fairly find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, then the evidence is sufficient,
albeit circumstantial ." Hodges v. Commonwealth , 473 S .W.2d 811, 81314 (Ky.1971) .
Under KRS 503.020(1), a person is guilty of an offense committed by
another person when, `with the intention of promoting or facilitating the
commission of the offense, he [or she] : . . . [a]ids, counsels, or attempts to aid
such person in planning or committing the offense . . . ." Pursuant thereto, the
jury was instructed that it could find Appellant guilty of complicity to commit
murder, if it believed beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following:
A. That in this county, on or about the 7t" day of October, 1984 .
. . she aided and assisted James Wesley Napier in shooting
Roger Arthur Cotton Adams with a gun ;
B . That in so doing she intended to cause the death of Roger
Arthur Cotton Adams;
C. That under the circumstances as she believed them to be,
the defendant's actions constituted a substantial step in a
course of conduct planned to result in the death of Roger Arthur
Cotton Adams . . . .
Admittedly, one's mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to
prove one's guilt. See Moore v. Commonwealth , 282 S .W .2d 613, 615 (Ky.
1955). However, the evidence here established much more than a presence.
Appellant's own statement established that she thought one of the three
men present in the motel room had killed her sister. Adams was her sister's
boyfriend and one of the three. When one of the three, Monholland, attempted to
go to the funeral home the night before the actual funeral, he was approached by
Napier who wanted to talk with him. Fearing that Napier was going to harm him,
he asked his sister to get the car and they left, yet were followed from the funeral
home by Napier and Appellant in Napier's white Lincoln Town car. When
Monholland stopped the car and got out with his gun, Napier and Appellant drove
on by.
Larry Adams, the deceased's brother, gave similar testimony to the effect
that when he went to the funeral home he saw Napier and Appellant and testified
to hearing Appellant say to Napier when he was leaving "that's not [Adams],
that's his brother." Even so, Appellant and Napier followed him to his car, staring
"holes through him ." To him, it was an eerie experience .
Appellant testified that although Adams did not show up at the funeral, she
and Napier saw him as they left the cemetery, stopped and asked him if he
wanted to see Sherri's grave . They then drove Adams back to the cemetery
where, according to the Appellant, Napier shot him in the car while she was at
Sherri's grave . Napier then told her to "come on" (back to the car) and then
asked her "are you okay with it?" According to Appellant, she said she was, but
only because she was afraid Napier would kill her too.
Appellant then testified that Napier dropped her off at "some woman's
house," whose name she could not recall, and that she later ended up back at
her mother's . Sizemore, however, testified that Napier came to his house to ask
him if he would clean up Napier's white Lincoln Town car for him, which he later
testified he did and Appellant was with him. He also testified that he overheard
Appellant telling Napier's sister, Carol, that there was a body in the trunk of the
car, that it was Adams' body and that she had killed him - specifically, that she
had reached across the back seat and shot him. Sizemore later assisted Napier
in disposing of the body in Cabin Creek.
Several months after Adams' death, Appellant married Napier.
Admittedly, she told Officer Powers that she was afraid of Napier, that she
wanted a divorce so she could have a real marriage, but notably, these
statements were made almost eighteen years after Adams' death.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we find no error in
the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on this
evidence. In her brief, Appellant challenges the credibility of the prosecution's
witnesses, arguing, for example, that she was only a passenger in Napier's car.
However, her argument as to how she believes the jury ought to have viewed the
evidence does not change
its
totality . That evidence, when viewed in a light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, supports a finding that Appellant and
Napier took the victim to the location where he was killed, that Appellant and
Napier removed the victim's body from the scene of the crime and Appellant
herself - who was known to carry a gun, even claimed responsibility for the
victim's death, albeit Napier did too.
"[I]ntent may be inferred from the actions of a defendant or from the
circumstances surrounding those actions ." Marshall v. Commonwealth 60
S .W.3d 513, 518 (Ky . 2001). Moreover, a complicity conviction can be based
exclusively upon circumstantial evidence. Stone v. Commonwealth, 677 S .W .2d
894, 896 (Ky. App. 1984). In this instance, under the evidence as a whole, it was
not clearly unreasonable for a jury to find Appellant guilty of the charged
complicity offense . See Benham, 816 &Wd at 187. Thus, we find no error.
B . Appellant's Due Process rights were not violated in this instance by a
witness' comments during cross-examination by Appellant's counsel, that
he "took a lie detector (polygraph) test"
Appellant asserts that the comments by Monholland, while under crossexamination by Appellant's counsel, that he had taken a lie detector (polygraph)
10
test violated Appellant's due process rights . On two separate occasions,
Monholland voluntarily offered that he had taken a lie detector (polygraph) test.
In the first instance, the colloquy occurred as follows :
Defense Counsel: Do you remember talking to Colan
Harrell about this case in October of 1987?
Monholland : That might have been when I took a lie
detector, I don't know
Defense Counsel :
Judge:
May we approach Your Honor?
You may.
During the bench conference, Appellant's counsel suggested to the court
that Monholland had, in fact, not passed the test, or at least had never completed
it, and requested permission to cross-examine him on this point. The court,
observing the testimony to be "troublesome ground," denied the request stating
"we're not getting into the results of the lie detector test." After further discussion,
the court stated that it did not want either side to mention it.
When cross-examination resumed, however, the reference occurred
again, as follows:
Defense Counsel : So you [have] been interviewed by
Colan Harrell, do you recall, more than once, is that fair to
say?
Monholland : Yes, I [have] been interviewed several times . I
even took a lie detector test over there.
Judge:
Alright.
Defense Counsel:
We heard you the first time .
Judge :
Let's, I don't want anyone to use the word lie
detector test again . Do not refer to it.
Monholland : Polygraph?
Judge:
Polygraphs are not admissible in court. So
that, that's the end of it. If there's further admonitions
requested I'll give them . Any further admonitions requested?
Prosecutor:
Your Honor, I think you made it real clear.
Defense Counsel :
Judge:
I think you did, Judge.
Alright .
Other than the comments by Appellant's two counsel at the bench
conference to the effect that Monholland had in fact failed the lie detector test, or
in the alternative, had failed to complete it, no avowal was requested or made as
to what V testimony would have been in regards to passing, failing, or failing to
compete, the lie detector test. Nor were any further admonitions requested of the
court, even though the court indicated it would give further admonitions if
requested. Neither was a mistrial requested.
Appellant asserts her "due process" arguments were "partially preserved
for review," by the requested bench conference following the first reference by
Monholland . Appellee disagrees.
a.
The trial court did not err in denying Appellant the right to crossexamine Monholland on his comment about his lie detector test
Appellant's request at the bench conference to be allowed to cross
examine Monholland in regards to his comment about his lie detector test and
the court's subsequent denial thereof would, under normal circumstances, be
sufficient to preserve this issue in regards to the court's denial . However, under
the rules of evidence applicable at the time, where the ruling was one excluding
evidence, the requesting party had to make an offer of proof by avowal. KRE
103(a)(2) (1996). "Counsel's version of the evidence [was] not enough . A
12
reviewing court must have the words of the witness." Noel v. Commonwealth, 76
S.W.3d 923, 931 (Ky. 2002) (citing Partin v.,Commonwealth,, 918 E&Qd 219,
223 (Ky. 1996) (overruled on other grounds b Chestnut v. Commonwealth, 250
S.W.3d 288 (Ky. 2008)).). In this instance, Appellant's counsel disagreed
between themselves as to what they believed Monholland's answers would have
been ; with one believing he had failed the test and the other indicating he just did
not complete it.
We note, however, that effective May 1, 2007, this court amended KRE
103(a)(2) to allow preservation, if "the substance of the evidence was made
known to the court by offer" from counsel . Yet, in this instance, were we to apply
the rule as amended, with Appellant's counsel disagreeing among themselves as
to what the evidence would be, we still could not say that a valid "offer of proof'
was made .
The question of preservation aside, however, this court long ago held that
evidence of he detectors, or polygraph examinations, are inadmissible in
Kentucky. Conley v . Commonwealth, 382 S .W.2d 865, 867 (Ky. 1964). "This
court has held repeatedly and consistently that it does not . . . consider such
evidence scientific or reliable ." Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W-2d 671, 675 (Ky.
1984). "We have not only excluded the evidence of polygraph examiners, but
excluded mention of the taking of a polygraph, the purpose of which is to bolster
the
claim of credibility or lack of credibility of a particular witness or defendant."
Id . (citing Perry v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 655 (Ky. 1983)) (emphasis
added) .
In Conley , we reversed when evidence of the lie detector (polygraph)
results were introduced pursuant to the defendant's written consent . In Ice, we
reversed when evidence was introduced as to the lie detector results of
witnesses against the defendant specifically bolstering their testimony given at
the trial. In Perry , we admonished the trial court, on retrial, not to permit a party
in a paternity action to testify he "took a polygraph test," as, "[i]n reply to his own
counsel's question [he] said that there was no doubt in his mind that he was the
father of the child because' . . . I even went on my own and took a lie detector
test."' Perry, 656, S .W.2d at 661-62 .
In Morgan v. Commonwealth, 809 S .W .2d 704 (Ky. 1991), a polygraph
examiner described the room in which Appellant had given an incriminating
statement, noting a desk, two chairs, a two-way mirror and a polygraph
instrument. We held that the reference to the polygraph was intentional and
created a clear inference that Appellant had taken and failed a polygraph
examination . Id . at 706. (emphasis added). Add in McQueen v.
Commonwealth , 669 S .W.2d 519, 523 (Ky. 1984), we explained that "[t]he mere
mention of the words 'polygraph' or `polygraph examiner' is not fatal, per se.
There must arise a clear inference that there was a result and that the result was
favorable, or some other manner in which the inference could be deemed
prejudicial." Id . (emphasis added).
The colloquy in McQueen was:
[Q] At that time you were in fact waiting to interrogate the Defendant
Burnell and then decided not to; isn't that true?
A At what point, sir?
[Q] At the time that you interrogated Miss Rose14
A In Frankfort?
[Q] Yes, sir.
A No, sir, that was not my decision up there . The polygraph examiner
said he could notTHE COURT :
Mr. Estes, just confine it to yes or no .
A No, sir.
In Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S .W .2d 13, 33 (Ky. 1998), the witness
uttered "this for a polygraph[?]" intending to indicate that the interview did not
occur at the place referenced in the question, but at the state police polygraph
laboratory. Relying upon McQueen, and the belief that the utterance within the
context within which it occurred, could not be deemed prejudicial, we again noted
"[t]he mere inadvertent utterance of the word `polygraph' is not grounds for
reversal ." Id . It must be deemed "prejudicial ." Id.
Again, in Garla nd v. Commonwealth, 127 S.W.3d 529, 545 (Ky. 2003)
(reversed on other grounds by Lanham v. Commonwealth , 171 S .W.3d 14 (Ky.
2005)), we held that the mention of the fact that the Appellant had taken a
polygraph test was not grounds for reversal, stating :
This information was revealed during the testimony of defense
witness Starling Douglas, Appellant's brother-in-law, who stated
that Appellant had come to visit him three or four days after the
murders "right after he had come from London from having
polygraph tests done ." Ms. Isgrigg, Appellant's ex-wife, also
testified that Appellant came to her sister's house on the Monday
after the murders "[w]hen he had to go for a polygraph test."
Although polygraph evidence is inadmissible, in this case the
inadvertent references came from defense witnesses upon
examination by defense counsel . After the second mention of
15
"polygraph," the Commonwealth objected, and the trial court
admonished the witness not to say "polygraph." As the mere
utterance of the word without a prejudicial inference as to the result
is not grounds for reversal, Appellant's claim must fail.
(Internal citations omitted) (emphasis added) . Thus, we clearly require that the
reference must, within the context given, be prejudicial .
In this instance, the comments were made by the witness during crossexamination by Appellant's counsel ; they were references to the fact that the
witness had taken a lie detector (polygraph) test in 1987, yet no mention was
made of the result.
Importantly, the context created by the questions asked and evidence
introduced in this case, indicate that the lie detector (polygraph) test was taken of
the witness in regards to events surrounding the death of Appellant's sister,
Sherri, rather than the death of Adams, for which Appellant was on trial. This
conclusion is compelled (even if erroneous) by the fact that the evidence in this
case limited the people involved in the murder of Monholland's friend, Adams to
two people, i .e ., the Appellant by her own admission and the evidence of others,
as to Napier, who Appellant fingered as the actual shooter. This analysis is
further buttressed by evidence establishing that Monholland was one of only
three persons present with Sherri at the motel when she died . The jury, of
course, was aware of this through the taped statement of Appellant that she
believed that one of them killed Sherri, as well as the fact that Sherri died as a
result of a gun shot wound to the right temple, though she was left-handed .
Moreover, the jury was aware that her death was ultimately treated as a suicide.
2 Admittedly, we have not been provided with a transcript or the tape of
this polygraph interview, yet it is the context and meaning to the jury which must
be measured for prejudice .
16
Thus, were we to consider the issue preserved as to the court's denial of
cross-examination as to these statements, notwithstanding the absence of an
avowal, we would still not be disposed to find error, as any further "mudding of
the waters" regarding his having taken a lie detector (polygraph) test in 1987,
would only confuse and exacerbate immaterial issues . KRE 403 .
In any event, we find no "manifest injustice," on these facts, and thus no
"palpable error."
b.
There was no palpable error in the trial court not granting a
mistrial or giving further admonitions sua sponte
As these issues were not raised before the trial court, RCr 9.22, they may
only be reviewed under the "palpable error' rule, RCr 10.26. "Under RCr 10.26,
`an error is reversible only if a manifest injustice has resulted from the error."'
Yell v. Commonwealth , 242 S.W.3d 331, 340 (Ky. 2007) (citations omitted) . "'To
discover manifest injustice, a reviewing court must plumb the depths of the
proceeding . . . to determine whether the defect in the proceeding was shocking
or jurisprudentially intolerable ."' Id . (citations omitted) . "For an error to be
palpable, it must be `easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily noticeable .' A
palpable error `must involve prejudice more egregious than that occurring in
reversible error[.]"' Brewer v . Commonwealth , 206 S .W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006)
(citations omitted) . Thus, the alleged error must be "so improper, prejudicial, and
egregious as to have undermined the overall fairness of the proceedings." Id.
(citing Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S .W.3d 827, 873 (Ky. 2004).).
Appellant simply asserts here, that absent her right to cross-examine the
witness as to the statements, the court should have sua sponte declared a
17
mistrial and/or given additional admonitions . In fact, the court after the second
occurrence, admonished the witness, as well as counsel . "Let's, I don't want
anyone to use the word lie detector test again. Do not refer to it." Thereafter, the
court admonished the jury, "[p]olygraphs are not admissible in court. So that,
that's the end of it. If there's further admonitions requested I'll give them . Any
further admonitions requested?" No such request was made by counsel, nor was
a mistrial requested . Moreover, nothing contained in RCr 10.26 precludes the
wavier of "palpable error' or the waiver of a constitutional right. West v.
Commonwealth , 780 S .W.2d 600, 602 (Ky. 1989).
Here, it is fair to conclude that the court even went so far as to prod
Appellant as to what further admonitions she would desire . Thus, the fact that
Appellant's counsel did not request any further admonitions, and did not request
a mistrial, strongly suggests that counsel "believed the admonitions were
sufficient, or despite the improper [comment], desired to have the jury as
impaneled render a verdict in [her] case." Id . at 603 . Thus, it "strongly suggests
that defense counsel's failure to move for a mistrial was a tactical decision ." Id .
Thus, under the standards set out above, we are unable to conclude that the
court's conduct under these circumstances is anywhere near the level required
for "our intervention pursuant to RCr 10.26 ." Id.
III .
Conclusion
For the reasons aforesaid, Appellant's conviction is affirmed .
Minton, C.J ., Abramson, Cunningham, Noble, Schroder and Scott, JJ.,
concur . Venters, J ., not sitting .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
V. Gene Lewter
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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