COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. BRANDY SUE STEPHENS
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2006-SC-000305-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NUMBER 2005-CA-001638
FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT NO . 05-CR-00440
V.
BRANDY SUE STEPHENS
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
On February 1, 2005, Darin Larrabee, a Lexington police officer, was monitoring
two breezeways of a building in the Coolavin Park area of Lexington known for drug
trafficking . After observing Brandy Stephens leave the second breezeway of this
building, Larrabee approached Stephens and asked if he could speak with her.
Eventually, after Larrabee had asked her several questions and had run two record
checks using the computer in his squad car, Stephens consented to a pat-down search
of her person . The search revealed a crack pipe located in Stephens's inner coat
pocket. Larrabee arrested Stephens and, after she was taken to jail, a subsequent strip
search of her person uncovered rocks of cocaine . Stephens was indicted for firstdegree possession of a controlled substance, giving an officer a false name, and other
drug-related charges .
Prior to trial, Stephens moved to suppress the crack pipe and the rocks of
cocaine on the ground that the investigatory stop was improper . The Fayette Circuit
Court, however, denied Stephens's suppression motion, concluding that Officer
Larrabee possessed the required reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the stop .
Stephens then entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to a total of one and
one-half years imprisonment, which was probated for three years . On appeal, the Court
of Appeals reversed, finding that at the time Officer Larrabee approached Stephens, he
lacked an articulable, reasonable suspicion that she was engaging in criminal activity
and thus, his stop was improper. On discretionary review to this Court, the
Commonwealth argues first that the Court of Appeals erred with respect to when
Stephens was actually stopped, and second, that he possessed the requisite
reasonable suspicion when he detained Stephens. Although we agree with the
Commonwealth that the stop did not occur upon Officer Larrabee's initial approach of
Stephens, we nonetheless conclude that Stephens was subjected to an investigatory
stop, which was not justified by an articulable, reasonable suspicion . We therefore
affirm the Court of Appeals on different grounds .
RELEVANT FACTS
During the early evening of February 1, 2005, Officer Darin Larrabee of the
Lexington Police was in his squad car patrolling the Coolavin Park area of Lexington,
Kentucky. In particular, Larrabee was monitoring two breezeways of the first building in
this area, where people commonly gathered to buy and sell drugs . At one point,
Larrabee observed Brandy Stephens walk into the second breezeway and stay there for
approximately three minutes . While Stephens was in the breezeway, a woman and her
daughter pulled up next to Officer Larrabee in their vehicle and asked him for directions .
Larrabee was still talking with this woman when Stephens emerged from the
breezeway . Larrabee testified that Stephens glanced at him while she was walking and
appeared to be "real nervous." Stephens then walked up to the woman's car, which
was still parked alongside Officer Larrabee, and spoke with the woman's daughter, who
was in the passenger seat . After speaking briefly with the daughter, Stephens began
walking away. Larrabee asked the woman in the car what Stephens had said, and the
woman stated that Stephens was looking for her sister and had inquired if they had
seen her. The woman and her daughter then drove away.
Officer Larrabee then parked his squad car, exited the vehicle, and began
approaching Stephens . Larrabee called out to Stephens, who was approximately thirty
yards away from him at the time, and asked if he could talk with her for a second.
Stephens stopped, turned around, and began approaching the officer. Larrabee asked
Stephens what she was doing, and she responded that she was looking for her sister.
Larrabee requested identification from Stephens, but she stated that she did not have
any. When Larrabee pulled out his notebook and asked Stephens for her name, social
security number, and date of birth, Stephens told the officer that her name was Sheena
Tolsca . She also stated her age and date of birth, however, Officer Larrabee pointed
out that the age she had given was three years off from the birth date . Stephens then
corrected her age to match her birth date . Officer Larrabee went to his squad car to run
a records check using the information Stephens had given, and the search uncovered
no criminal record. Larrabee returned to Stephens and informed her that it was a crime
to give a false name to a police officer. Again, Stephens stated that she was Sheena
Tolsca and provided the officer with the same information . Next, Larrabee asked
Stephens if she had a driver's license, to which she responded that she had a Florida
driver's license . Larrabee went back to his car to run a second check using Florida's
database, but he found no record of Sheena Tolsca having a driver's license in Florida .
After completing this second record check, Larrabee returned to Stephens and
asked her if she had any drugs or paraphernalia. Stephens stated that she did not.
Larrabee then asked Stephens if he could do a pat-down search of her, and she
responded, "okay." During the search, Officer Larrabee found a crack pipe in
Stephens's inner coat pocket. Larrabee then arrested Stephens for possession of drug
paraphernalia. Upon arriving at the jail, a further strip search of Stephens revealed that
she was carrying rocks of crack cocaine .
On April 5, 2005, Stephens was indicted for possession of a controlled
substance, promoting contraband, possession of drug paraphernalia, and giving an
officer a false name . Prior to trial, Stephens moved to suppress the crack pipe and
cocaine, arguing that her initial stop was not justified. The trial court held a suppression
hearing on May 10, 2005, during which the defendant, in her testimony, finally admitted
that her real name was Brandy Sue Stephens and that Sheena Tolsca was the name of
one of her sisters. Stephens stated that she had given a false name to the officer
because she thought she had an outstanding warrant in Scott County. After hearing
testimony from Stephens and Officer Larrabee, the trial court concluded that Officer
Larrabee had reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct the investigative stop of
Stephens . Stephens then entered a conditional guilty plea to both possession of a
controlled substance and giving an officer a false name ; the Commonwealth dismissed
the charge of promoting contraband as a condition of Stephens's guilty plea .
On July 1, 2005, Stephens was sentenced to a total of one and one-half years in
prison, which was probated for three years. Stephens appealed her conviction, and on
March 24, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its opinion reversing the trial court's
suppression ruling. The Court of Appeals held that the investigatory stop of Stephens
occurred when Officer Larrabee initially asked to speak with her; that Larrabee did not
possess reasonable suspicion that Stephens was engaging in criminal activity prior to
this initial encounter, and thus, the stop was improper. On the Commonwealth's motion,
this Court granted discretionary review. After reviewing the applicable law, we conclude
that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the stop occurred when Officer Larrabee
initially approached Stephens. That permissible initial encounter, however, was
elevated to an investigatory stop when, after Larrabee found no criminal record of
Stephens on file, and after Stephens maintained that the information she had given him
was accurate, Larrabee continued to question her. We conclude that at this point of
detention, Officer Larrabee did not have an articulable reasonable suspicion that
Stephens was engaged in criminal activity and therefore, the stop was unlawful .
Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals' holding that the evidence seized pursuant
to Stephens's illegal stop should have been suppressed .
ANALYSIS
An appellate court reviews a trial court's suppression ruling using two different
standards: the factual findings of the trial court are reviewed pursuant to the "clearly
erroneous" standard, while the trial court's application of the law to the facts is subject to
a de novo review. Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S . 690, 691, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1659,
134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996); Adcock v. Commonwealth , 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998). The
material facts of Officer Larrabee's interaction with Stephens as set forth during the trial
court's suppression hearing are not in dispute . However, there are two legal issues
which this Court must resolve : at what point did the stop occur and did reasonable
suspicion exist to support that stop. These legal questions will be reviewed de novo.
1. Officer Larrabee's Initial Approach of Stephens Did Not Constitute An
Investigatory Stop Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment .
The United States Supreme Court has held that a seizure or an investigatory
stop does not occur unless "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident,
a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." U .S . v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L. Ed . 2d 497 (1980); Baker
v. Commonwealth , 5 S.W.3d 142, 145 (Ky. 1999) . During its suppression hearing, the
trial court never specified at what point Officer Larrabee conducted an investigatory stop
of Stephens . The Court of Appeals, however, found that "the initial investigative stop
occurred when the officer called to Stephens and asked what she was doing ." In
addition to the factual circumstances surrounding that initial encounter, the Court of
Appeals based its finding on Officer Larrabee's testimony that if Stephens had refused
to stop or answer his question he would have detained her, and on Stephens's
testimony that she did not feel free to leave when the officer initially asked to speak with
her. Although the Court of Appeals found that this testimony supported its conclusion
that a reasonable person in this circumstance would not have felt free to leave, in
actuality, neither the subjective belief of the suspect nor the subjective intent of the
investigating officer is determinative in this analysis .
In Mendenhall , the United States Supreme Court held that a stop occurs, thus
triggering the Fourth Amendment protections, not when the suspect subjectively thinks
he is unable to leave, but rather, when "a reasonable person would have believed that
he was not free to leave." Id. Therefore, Stephens's subjective belief regarding her
freedom of movement is not dispositive of the issue of when the stop actually occurred .
6
Similarly, the Supreme Court also stated in Mendenhall that "the subjective intention of
the DEA agent . . . to detain the respondent, had she attempted to leave, is irrelevant
except insofar as that may have been conveyed to the respondent ." Mendenhall , 446
U .S . at 555 n. 6, 100 S. Ct. at 1877 n. 6 . In Stephens's case, there was no testimony
presented during the suppression hearing that Officer Larrabee's initial request to speak
with Stephens conveyed an intent to detain . Larrabee did not order Stephens to stop or
demand that she talk with him; rather, both Stephens and Larrabee testified that he
simply asked if he could speak with her for a second . Thus, Larrabee's subjective intent
to detain Stephens should not have been a determining factor in deciding when the
initial stop occurred .'
Having concluded that these subjective components are not determinative, this
Court agrees with the Commonwealth that based on the facts and circumstances
surrounding Stephens's interaction with Officer Larrabee, Stephens was not subject to
an investigatory stop within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when Officer
Larrabee initially asked to speak with her. It is well-established that police officers are
free to approach citizens on the street without the encounter constituting a "seizure" or
violating the Fourth Amendment. Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S .1, 19 n . 16, 88 S. Ct. 1868,
1879 n. 16, 20 L . Ed. 2d 889 (1968) (stating that "not all personal intercourse between
policemen and citizens involves `seizures' of persons"); Florida v. Roger, 460 U .S . 491,
497, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L . Ed. 2d 229 (1983) (holding that officers "do not violate
the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street . . .);
To clarify that an officer's subjective intent is never determinative, we note that
if the reverse had happened in this case-if Officer Larrabee had testified that Stephens
was actually free to leave during their initial encounter-this Court would not then be
required to find that no stop occurred .
Commonwealth v. Banks, 68 S .W.3d 347, 350 (noting that "[p]olice officers are free to
approach anyone in public areas for any reason") .
In Stephens's case, Larrabee simply walked up to Stephens and asked to speak
with her for a moment . Although Stephens suggests in her brief that being approached
by the police at nighttime in a high crime area would cause a reasonable person to feel
as if they were not free to leave, this Court has recognized previously that nighttime
encounters in high crime areas do not necessarily constitute stops or seizures . In
Commonwealth v. Baker, supra, an officer approached two individuals late at night in an
area known for drugs and prostitution . Baker, 5 S.W.3d at 144. As a safety precaution,
the officer asked one of the individuals to remove his hands from his pockets . Id .
Although the officer ultimately ordered the individual to remove his hands, which we
found did trigger the Fourth Amendment protections ; this Court held that the officer's
initial request did not amount to a seizure . Id . at 145. Other than emphasizing that she
encountered the "uniformed and apparently armed" officer at approximately 6:30 p.m . in
a high crime area and that she reasonably believed she was not free to leave, Stephens
points to nothing about her initial interaction with Officer Larrabee that would lead this
Court to conclude she was stopped within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, Officer Larrabee's initial approach of Stephens did not rise to the level of an
investigatory stop, but rather, constituted an encounter.
11. The Investigatory Stop of Stephens Occurred When Officer Larrabee
Continued to Detain Stephens After No Criminal Record Was Found on File and
She Maintained that Her Information Was Accurate.
After Officer Larrabee approached Stephens and inquired as to what she was
doing, he asked her if she had any identification, which she did not. Next, Larrabee
pulled out his notebook and requested that Stephens give him her name, social security
number, and date of birth . Stephens stated her age and date of birth, but then
corrected her age after Larrabee noted that it did not match her date of birth . At this
point, Larrabee walked to his squad car in order to check Stephens's information in his
computer database .
After approaching a citizen, an officer may ask questions or request identification,
and as long as the officer does not restrain the liberty of the person or indicate that
compliance with his request is mandatory, the interaction does not amount to an
investigatory stop . See I .N.S . v. Delgado , 466 U .S . 210, 216, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1762, 80
L. Ed . 2d 247 (1984) (stating that an "interrogation relating to one's identity or a request
for identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment
seizure"). Circumstances that may indicate when an encounter has evolved into a stop
or seizure include
the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an
officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of
language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's
request might be compelled. In the absence of some such evidence,
otherwise inoffensive contact between a member of the public and the
police cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that person.
Mendenhall , 446 U .S . at 554-555, 100 S . Ct. at 1877 .
Although Officer Larrabee asked Stephens for information relating to her identity,
there are no facts in the record to indicate that this request amounted to a seizure.
Larrabee did not demand the information from Stephens or suggest that her compliance
was mandatory. No evidence was presented during the suppression hearing that
Officer Larrabee touched Stephens, used an intimidating tone of voice, or told her that
she was not free to leave . Thus, Larrabee's encounter with Stephens was still
consensual when he asked for information relevant to her identity and checked her
information through his computer .2 If Officer Larrabee had ceased questioning
Stephens after discovering that the information she provided produced no criminal
record, then his interaction with her would have remained a consensual encounter.
However, such was not the case. After the check revealed no record on file, Officer
Larrabee informed Stephens that it was a crime to give an officer a false name and
asked for her information again . Stephens maintained her position regarding her
personal identification and repeated the same name, age, and date of birth . If at this
point, Officer Larrabee had ended his inquiry with Stephens, perhaps it would not have
risen to the level of an investigatory stop . But once Larrabee continued questioning
Stephens regarding her identity even after she repeated for a second time the same
information, a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave . At that point, Officer
Larrabee clearly subjected Stephens to an investigatory stop .
lll. Based on the Totality of the Circumstances, Officer Larrabee Did Not Have
Reasonable Suspicion to Detain Stephens .
When Officer Larrabee decided to detain Stephens even after a negative record
check and her insistence that her information was accurate, he needed a reasonable
suspicion, based on objective and articulable facts, that Stephens was engaged in
criminal activity in order to justify that stop. See Brown v. Texas , 443 U.S . 47, 51, 99 S .
2 Several jurisdictions hold that retaining a pedestrian's driver's license or
identification card in order to perform a records check constitutes a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Daniel , 12 S.W.3d 420, 427 (Tenn . 2000)
(holding that "a seizure . . . occurred when Officer Wright retained Daniel's identification
to run a computer warrants check"); United States v. Lambert , 46 F .3d 1064, 1068 (10th
Cir. 1995); State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 844-845,103 P.3d 454 (2004) ; People v.
Rockey , 322 III . App. 3d 832, 838, 752 N. E.2d 576 (2001); Richmond v.
Commonwealth , 22 Va . App. 257, 261, 468 S .E .2d 708 (1996); Salt Lake City v. Ray,
998 P.2d 274 (Utah App. 2000). The facts in this case are distinguishable, however,
because Officer Larrabee did not retain Stephens's license or ID card ; rather, he simply
wrote her information onto his notebook in order to perform the check.
10
Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L. Ed . 2d 357 (1979); U .S . v. Cortez, 449 U.S . 411, 417, 101 S. Ct.
690, 695, 66 L. Ed . 2d 621 (1981); Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S . at 30-31, 88 S. Ct . at 1885 .
To determine whether Officer Larrabee had such reasonable suspicion, this Court must
look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding Stephens's detention . U .S . v.
Cortez, 449 U .S . at 417, 101 S . Ct. at 695. At the time of Stephens's stop, the objective
facts upon which Officer Larrabee could base his reasonable suspicion were that
Stephens had spent approximately three minutes in an area known to be high in drug
trafficking, she appeared nervous, and she initially gave an age that did not match her
date of birth. While perhaps a close call, we must conclude that these circumstances
alone failed to supply Officer Larrabee with the requisite reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity to stop Stephens .
Although a suspect's presence in a high crime area alone is not sufficient to
justify a stop, it can certainly be a factor adding to an officer's reasonable suspicion .
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U .S . 119, 124, 120 S . Ct. 673,676 (2000). In Baker v.
Commonwealth , supra, this Court confirmed the relevance of this factor when we found
that the investigating officer had a particular, reasonable suspicion to stop Baker who
was in a high crime area, standing next a known prostitute. Baker was wearing clothes
that could possibly conceal a weapon, and he initially refused the officer's request to
remove his hands from his pockets. Baker, 5 S .W.3d at 146. Similarly, in
Commonwealth v. Banks, supra, this Court held that due to Banks's presence at an
apartment complex with a "No Trespassing" sign in a high crime area, his attempt to
3 Officer Larrabee testified at the suppression hearing that Stephens also
aroused suspicion because instead of asking him, a police officer, about the
whereabouts of her sister, she asked the woman's daughter in the car. Larrabee stated
that he thought this behavior was odd because most people would speak with a police
officer if they were looking for someone. The trial court made no finding on this issue
and, in any event, it is not indicative of criminal activity .
11
evade the police by turning around and walking in the opposite direction after seeing
them, and an officer's knowledge that Banks was not a resident of the apartment
complex, the officers were justified in believing that Banks may have been engaged in
criminal activity. Banks , 68 S .W.3d at 350. Furthermore, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals upheld the investigatory stop in Simpson v. Commonwealth , 834 S.W.2d 686,
687-688 (Ky. App . 1992), noting that Simpson's presence on a corner known for drug
activity and his meandering back and forth for over fifteen minutes in a "no trespassing"
area provided the investigating officers with reasonable suspicion that criminal activity
was afoot .
In Stephens's case, although she was present in a high crime area, the other
facts Officer Larrabee relied on to justify his stop are not necessarily indicative of
criminal activity in the same manner as the additional facts from Baker, supra , Banks,
supra, and Simpson . supra . Officer Larrabee stated that as Stephens walked out of the
second breezeway, she glanced at his car and looked nervous. However, upon seeing
the officer, Stephens made no evasive movements, did not change her direction, and
did not attempt to avoid him; as a matter of fact, she walked right up to the car sitting
alongside his squad car. Although the United States Supreme Court recognized in
Wardlow , 528 U.S . at 124, 120 S . Ct. at 676, that "nervous, evasive behavior is a
pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion," the cases cited for that
proposition clearly focused on the evasive nature of a suspect's behavior and not just
their nervous demeanor. See U .S. v. Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U.S . 873, 885, 95 S. Ct .
2574, 2582, 45 L. Ed . 2d 607 (1975) (stating that "obvious attempts to evade officers
can support a reasonable suspicion") ; Florida v. Rodriguez , 469 U.S. 1, 6, 105 S . Ct.
308, 311, 83 L. Ed. 2d 165 (1984) (noting that the suspect's "strange movements in his
12
attempt to evade the officers aroused further justifiable suspicion") ; U.S . v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S . Ct. 1581, 1586, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989) (stating that "taking an
evasive path through an airport" may be "highly probative" of criminal activity). Thus, in
the case at hand, Stephens's nervous glance, absent some actual evasive behavior, is'
not an objective fact indicating that she was engaged in any criminal activity.
Lastly, the Commonwealth notes that Stephens's inconsistent answer regarding
her age and date of birth added to Officer Larrabee's reasonable suspicion . After
Officer Larrabee pointed out the three year discrepancy in her given age and birth date,
Stephens immediately corrected it. Although Stephens's inconsistent response may
have justified Larrabee's decision to extend his encounter and make the initial record
check, when combined only with the additional fact that Stephens was in a high crime
area, this did not constitute an articulable reasonable suspicion to justify conducting a
full-fledged investigatory stop . Stephens's age discrepancy was not so egregious to
indicate she was giving an officer a false name or to justify her detention, particularly
after she maintained that she was providing accurate information . Furthermore, the
result of the record check did not add anything to Larrabee's suspicion because it
revealed that the suspect did not have a criminal record . Since the only other objective
fact on which Larrabee could rely was Stephens's mere presence in a high crime area
(allegedly to locate her sister), the additional fact of her inconsistent response is not
substantial enough to create an articulable, reasonable suspicion that she was
engaging in criminal activity. Therefore, Larrabee's investigatory stop of Stephens
violated the Fourth Amendment .
Because Officer Larrabee's stop of Stephens was not supported by a particular,
reasonable suspicion, the seizure of the crack pipe was improper and the evidence
13
should have been suppressed under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine . Wong Sun
v. United States , 371 U .S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963). Even though
Stephens consented to the pat down search by Officer Larrabee, a suspect's consent to
being searched can be "tainted" by an illegal stop or detention . Florida v. Rover, 460
U.S . at 507-08, 103 S . Ct. at 1329 . Since Stephens's consent flowed directly from her
unlawful stop, it cannot constitute a valid basis for admitting the evidence seized. See
Parks v. Commonwealth , 192 S .W.3d 318, 330 (Ky. 2006). Furthermore, since
Stephens's arrest flowed directly from the illegal seizure of evidence, and since there
were no intervening circumstances to dissipate the taint caused by the unlawful stop,
the rocks of cocaine found during her search incident to arrest should also be
suppressed . See Wong Sun , 371 U.S. at 484-485, 83 S. Ct. at 416; See also Baltimore
v . Commonwealth , 119 S.W.3d 532, 541 n . 37 (Ky. App. 2003) (noting that "a valid
arrest may constitute an intervening event that cures the taint of an illegal detention")
(emphasis added).
CONCLUSION
Officer Larrabee's initial approach of Stephens, which included asking her
questions about her identification and performing a brief records check, amounted to a
consensual police encounter. However, once Officer Larrabee continued questioning
her after discovering that her information produced no criminal record and after
Stephens maintained that her information was accurate, his encounter evolved into an
investigatory stop . The objective facts upon which Officer Larrabee could rely to justify
his stop-that Stephens was in a high crime area and that she gave an inconsistent
response to questions regarding her age and date of birth-did not support an
articulable, reasonable suspicion that Stephens was engaged in criminal activity.
14
Because Officer Larrabee's stop of Stephens was unlawful, all evidence flowing from
the stop should have been suppressed . The trial court erred in denying her suppression
motion . Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals decision on other grounds and
remand this case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion .
Lambert, C.J ., Abramson, Cunningham, and Noble, J .J., concur . Scott, J .,
dissents by separate opinion in which Minton, J., joins. Schroder, J., not sitting.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney J . Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Herbert T. West
111 Church Street
Lexington, KY 40507
RENDERED : MAY 22, 2008
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
6$UyrrMr (~Vurf of
irufurhv
2006-SC-000305-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V.
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NUMBER 2005-CA-001638
FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT NO. 05-CR-000440
BRANDY SUE STEPHENS
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE SCOTT
I respectfully dissent on the issue of whether Brandy Sue Stephens was
subjected to a lawful investigatory stop . In my opinion, there was reasonable
suspicion to continue questioning Stephens, given that she was loitering in a high
crime area, appeared nervous upon seeing a police car nearby, did not have
identification, and gave false information to the arresting officer. Thus, the trial
court properly denied Stephens's motion to suppress the crack pipe and crack
cocaine rocks. I would, therefore, reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the
conviction and sentence .
The stop occurred at Coolavin Park, Lexington, a high crime area known
for drug trafficking. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S . 119; 124, 120 S .Ct. 673,
676, 145 L .Ed .2d 570 (2000) (a suspect's presence in a high crime area is a
relevant factor in determining reasonable suspicion). Officer Larrabee was
conducting surveillance and monitoring for drug trafficking activity when he
observed Stephens loitering for several minutes .
When Stephens saw Officer Larrabee, she became nervous. See id.
("nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable
suspicion") . Instead of asking Officer Larrabee for help, Stephens approached a
car parked alongside his squad car, asked the passenger about the whereabouts
of her sister, and then began to walk away.
His suspicions aroused, Officer Larrabee approached Stephens and
began questioning her. When Officer Larrabee asked for identification, Stephens
stated she did not have any. See, e.g. , United States v. Hawthorne , 982 F.2d
1186, 1190 n .4 (8th Cir. 1992) (lack of identification is a factor to be considered
for determining reasonable suspicion) . When Officer Larrabee asked her name,
age, and date of birth, she gave the wrong age, indicating an age that was three
years off from the date of birth given .
Finding no record of the name she gave, Officer Larrabee informed
Stephens that it was a crime to give a false name to a police officer . KRS
523.110 . Officer Larrabee again asked her name and she gave the same name .
At this point, there was reasonable suspicion that Stephens had given
a false
name, a Class B misdemeanor. See Wardlow, 528 U .S. at 123, 120 S.Ct. at 675
(reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and
requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence).
Therefore, the subsequent searches which uncovered the crack pipe and
crack cocaine rocks were valid . For these reasons, I must dissent .
Minton, J., joins this dissent .
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