AMANDA BAKER V. THERESA KAMMERER
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RENDERED : MARCH 23, 2006
TO BE PUBLISHED
2004-SC-000085-DG
APPELLANT
AMANDA BAKER
V.
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2002-CA-001352-M R
CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT NO. 01-CI-01034
APPELLEE,
THERESA KAMMERER
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE ROACH
REVERSING
I. INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal of a jury verdict in a personal injury action that was brought by
Appellant, Amanda Baker, against Appellee, Theresa Kammerer. At trial, Baker was
not permitted to cross-examine Hope Frost, an investigator employed by Kammerer's
insurance carrier, about possible bias stemming from her employment. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court . Because we hold that the trial court abused its
discretion in limiting the cross-examination of Frost, we hereby reverse .
I1. BACKGROUND
This case involves a personal injury claim arising from an accident in which
Baker, who was crossing the street on foot, was struck by an automobile driven by
Kammerer . Baker sought various damages, including medical expenses of over
$5,000 .00. At trial, the parties contested the circumstances of the accident, particularly
whether Baker was inside the designated crosswalk when she was hit and whether the
traffic signal favored Kammerer.
Prior to opening statements, Kammerer's counsel indicated to the trial court that
he had received supplemental discovery information shortly before trial suggesting that
Baker intended to call two eyewitnesses, Aleisha Sams and Leah Edmonds, to testify
on her behalf.
He stated, "One of those witnesses spoke to Hope Frost, who's in the
courtroom right now, and gave a statement . If she testifies inconsistently with that
statement, I might call Hope Frost." As noted above, Frost was an investigator
employed by Kammerer's insurance provider. Baker's attorney asserted that if Frost
testified he was "going to have to identify who Hope [Frost] is-she's the insurance
adjuster ." While counsel continued to discuss the point, the judge noted, "My
suggestion is, you don't have to identify [Frost], she's just a person the witness spoke
to."
Later in the trial, after both Sams and Edmonds had testified on behalf of Baker,
Kammerer asked to call Frost for the limited purpose of rebutting the testimony of the
two witnesses. According to Kammerer, both Sams and Edmonds had testified
inconsistently with statements they had previously made to Frost. Baker's counsel
objected on the grounds that Frost had not been listed as a witness in any of the pretrial
discovery materials submitted by Kammerer as required by CR 93.04. Kammerer's
counsel responded that he had not disclosed Frost as a potential witness because he
had not planned to call her until the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of Sams
and Edmonds surfaced at trial.
The trial court held a discussion in chambers to address the merits of Baker's
objection and to decide whether Frost would be allowed to testify . During that
discussion, Baker's counsel argued that Frost should not be allowed to testify because
she had not been identified by Kammerer prior to trial . Baker's counsel also argued that
if Frost was allowed to testify, he should be allowed to ask her questions about the
nature of her involvement in the case, specifically her employment by Kammerer's
insurer .
Kammerer's attorney countered that prior to hearing the testimony of Edmonds
and Sams, he had no reason to believe Frost's testimony would be necessary. He
further stated that inadequate discovery responses by opposing counsel had prevented
him from contacting and interviewing witnesses, making inconsistencies in their
testimony undiscoverable . Following this exchange, the trial court ruled that Frost
would be allowed to testify, stating, "I'll allow her to testify, I think that forms a sufficient
basis in the record ."
The judge went on to advise counsel for both sides that no mention was to be
made of Frost's employment by Kammerer's insurance company. Although Baker's
attorney had specifically raised this issue, arguing that Frost's cross-examination would
necessarily involve questions regarding her employment, Kammerer's attorney did not
even address this argument, concentrating instead on his primary request that Frost be
allowed to testify . Nevertheless, the judge stated unequivocally, "And contrary to what
counsel says, it will be a mistrial if you [disclose Frost's employer] . You just say, you
can state the term 'investigator,' that's all that needs to be said. You don't have to go
into anything else-investigator."
After this statement, Baker's attorney interrupted the judge in an attempt to
explain the discovery violation that had been alleged by opposing counsel. The judge
responded :
I'm telling you why I'm making the ruling that I am . Had you
spelled out in detail what they were going to say, I wouldn't
be ruling this way, believe me. If you had spelled out in your
exchange what they would have been saying--but because
you didn't and because of the fact that these aren't
anybody's witnesses as such, they don't belong to anybody.
So, based upon that fact, I think clearly counsel has the
opportunity , especially in light of the fact. . .of the
representation of inconsistent statements .
(Emphasis added .) Although his remarks are somewhat ambiguous, when considered
in context, the judge's explanation seems to be offered as a rationale for his primary
ruling that Frost would be allowed to testify. In particular, the trial court's statement,
highlighted above, that "clearly counsel has the opportunity' seems to refer specifically
to that aspect of the dispute . After this statement, the parties returned to the courtroom
and the trial resumed . Shortly thereafter, Frost testified regarding her previous
meetings with Edmonds and Sams. As directed by the judge, neither party made any
mention of Frost's employer, nor did they attempt to explain her role in the case. After
Frost's testimony the defense rested .
Shortly after the jury began deliberating, they submitted two questions to the trial
court . Those questions were "Who is Hope Frost?" and "What's her interest in this
case?" The trial court informed the jury that it could not answer either of the questions .
The jury continued its deliberations and ultimately returned a verdict for Kammerer.
Baker filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied.
Baker then appealed to the Court of Appeals and specifically objected to the
testimony of Hope Frost . Despite her claims of error, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the trial court, holding that it was not error to admit the testimony of Frost
and that it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse requests by Baker's attorneys to be
able to cross-examine Frost regarding potential bias stemming from her employment.
We subsequently granted Baker's motion for discretionary review.
III. ANALYSIS
In deciding Baker's direct appeal, the Court of Appeals addressed two alternate
claims of error: (1) that the testimony of Hope Frost should not have been admitted, and
(2) that Baker's attorney should have been permitted to cross-examine Frost regarding
her employment as a means of showing her alleged bias . On this appeal, Baker has
elected to pursue only the second claimed error.
At the outset we acknowledge the general rule that `[t]he presentation of
evidence as well as the scope and duration of cross-examination rests in the sound
discretion of the trial judge . This broad rule applies to both criminal and civil cases . . . ."'
Commonwealth v . Maddox , 955 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Ky. 1997) (quoting Moore v.
Commonwealth, 771 S .W .2d 34, 38 (Ky. 1988)) ; see also Ky. Dep't of Highways v.
Smith, 390 S.W.2d 194 (Ky. 1965) ("[T]he trial court is vested with a sound judicial
discretion as to the scope and duration of cross-examination. Were this not so, any trial
could be rendered a farce and mockery; witnesses could be insulted and threatened;
juries would become exhausted and exasperated ; justice could be frustrated and
thwarted .") . But we also note that:
Opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses is seen as
indispensable to the search for truth in litigation . . . . The
Evidence Rules say nothing about a "right" to crossexamination, perhaps because nothing needs to be said
about a practice so fundamental to the litigation process .
KRE 611(b) addresses the subject of "scope of crossexamination" but undoubtedly contemplates that litigants will
be given an opportunity to subject evidence to the cleansing
and clarifying process of cross examination .
Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 3 .20[3], at 239 (4th ed .
2003) [hereinafter Lawson, Kentucky Evidence .
Likewise, we have held that "[t]he credibility of a witness' relevant testimony is
always at issue and the trial court may not exclude evidence that impeaches credibility
even though such testimony would be inadmissible to prove a substantive issue in the
case ." Sanborn v. Commonwealth , 754 S .W .2d 534, 545 (Ky. 1988) . "A wide array of
evidence is admissible only because it renders testimonial credibility more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence ." Lawson, Kentucky Evidence §
5 .05[3], at 82 . This language illustrates one of the most crucial goals of crossexamination, namely, exposing the bias of an opposing witness. Ultimately, the law
favors admissibility of evidence of bias.
Though decided prior to our adoption of the rules of evidence, our predecessor
court traditionally allowed the introduction of insurance evidence to show the bias of a
witness. See, e .g ., Nunnellee v. Nunnellee, 415 S .W.2d 114,116 (Ky. 1967) ("We have
held that it is proper to show, as here, that a witness represents an insurance company
in order to disclose his possible bias ."). The admissibility of evidence of insurance
coverage would seem to have been complicated by the enactment of KRE 411, which
prohibits the admissibility of evidence of a defendant's liability insurance to prove
negligence or fault. However, the rule provides certain exceptions to this prohibition, in
essence, retaining those recognized at common law. The rule states :
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against
liability is not admissible upon the issue whether the person
acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully . This rule does not
require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against
liability when offered for another purpose , such as proof of
agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a
witness .
KRE 411 (emphasis added) .
While a decision as to the admissibility of such evidence still rests within the
discretion of the trial judge, that discretion is not limitless . The law favors the admission
of evidence that is relevant to a jury's determination of a witness's credibility. As with
most evidentiary decisions, the trial court's discretion in this area stems from its
gatekeeping function under KRE 403 . As noted by Professor Lawson, "protection
against excessive use of the 'other purposes' clause of Rule 411 is provided by Rule
403, which requires a balancing of probative value against undue prejudice ." Lawson,
Kentucky Evidence , § 2.60[3], at 210. This approach was specifically adopted in
Wallace v. Leedhanachoke , 949 S .W .2d 624 (Ky. App . 1997), where the Court of
Appeals held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in prohibiting the
introduction of KRE 411 "other purposes" evidence which alleged bias of an expert
witness due to the commonality of insurance carriers between a physician defendant
and the expert. In affirming the decision to exclude the evidence, the Court of Appeals
noted, "we adopt the balancing test [of KRE 403] to allow trial courts to exercise their
broad discretion on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 628 .
In this case, the identity of Hope Frost's employer went to the heart of her
potential bias and would likely have been crucial to the jury's assessment of her
credibility. It is clear from their questions to the judge that Frost's identity was
particularly important to the jurors who decided the case. Having been presented
evidence that the incident had been investigated by police, the jurors were forced to
consider Frost's testimony, without any explanation of her involvement in the case or
her role as an "investigator." And it is possible, perhaps even likely, that the trial court's
instruction to use the term "investigator" to describe Frost not only prevented the jury
from knowing the truth but may actually have misled it about Frost's interest in the case .
Given the fundamental importance of the ability to cross-examine as to bias and
the trial court's apparent failure to engage in any meaningful analysis under Rule 403
before prohibiting cross-examination as to Frost's employment, we conclude that the
trial court abused its discretion in this case . In reaching this conclusion, however, we
must also note that we are not mandating the disclosure of evidence relating to
insurance in every case like the one before us . To the contrary, our holding still
recognizes the trial court's inherent discretion over evidentiary questions such as this
one. Because a multitude of factors may be considered by a trial judge addressing
such an issue, judges are free to consider a spectrum of potential remedies. In an
appropriate case, a judge might reasonably conclude that insurance evidence should be
freely admitted . Another judge might choose a middle ground, allowing the identification
of a witness as an agent of the defendant, but refusing to allow the disclosure that a
defendant is insured . Likewise, applying the balancing test of KRE 403 might lead to
the conclusion that certain insurance evidence is inadmissible . See , e.g., Wallace, 949
S.W.2d at 628 .
That being said, it is hard to imagine any case involving circumstances similar to
these in which a trial court decision that completely shields the jury from evidence of
possible bias would not be an abuse of discretion . As noted above, dual concernsthe
general inclusionary thrust of the Rules of Evidence and the more particular preference
to allow evidence of bias-weigh heavily in favor of admissibility . Absent unusual
circumstances wherein the evidence would be either extremely prejudicial or minimally
probative, the principal question is the scope of the evidence of bias to be allowed . As
with the broader question of initial admissibility, the balancing test of KRE 403 provides
a useful tool for determining the scope of the evidence to be admitted . Therefore, on
retrial, the trial court shall be guided by KRE 403 to determine whether Frost shall be
identified as an agent of Defendant, an employee of the insurance carrier, or otherwise .
Kammerer argues that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in limiting
the scope of Frost's cross-examination, contending that the court's ruling operated as a
quasi-sanction for Baker's alleged discovery violation . Having reviewed the record,
however, it seems more likely that the trial court's reference to discovery deficiencies
was offered as justification for its ruling on the ultimate question of whether Frost would
be allowed to testify-not to the more limited question as to the scope of her crossexamination . Even if Kammerer is correct, however, such a violation is not a proper
basis for limiting the scope of cross-examination to exclude evidence of possible bias
because a discovery violation has little significance to the factors to be considered
under the KRE 403 balancing test.
A trial judge may always exclude evidence when its probative value is
substantially outweighed by its risk of undue prejudice . Normally, we would even
assume that admitted evidence has been subjected to this balancing test. However, the
record in this case suggests the trial court did not engage in the KRE 403 analysis .
When the possibility that Frost might be called as a witness was first raised, the judge
clearly signaled his intention to exclude any mention of Frost's role as an insurance
agent by stating, "you don't have to identify [Frost], she's just a person the witness
spoke to." Such a statement suggests the trial court employed a rigid, per se exclusion
of any evidence of insurance as opposed to the flexible, case-by-case approach
required by KRE 403 once one of the "other purposes" exceptions of KRE 411 is met.
IV. CONCLUSION
The trial court's refusal to allow Baker to cross-examine Frost as to her possible
bias was an abuse of discretion and is sufficient to warrant a new trial. Accordingly, the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the Campbell
Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion .
Lambert, C .J . ; Graves, and Johnstone, JJ., concur.
Cooper, J., dissents by separate opinion in which Scott and Wintersheimer, JJ.,
join.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Charles T. Lester, Jr.
PO Box 75069
Ft. Thomas, Kentucky 41075-0069
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Timothy Brien Schenkel
Freund, Freeze & Arnold
50 East Rivercenter Boulevard
Suite 408
Covington, Kentucky 41011-1660
Kelly A. Armstrong
Freund, Freeze & Arnold
50 East Rivercenter Boulevard
Suite 408
Covington, Kentucky 41011-1660
John J . Garvey, III
4th and Walnut Center
105 East Fourth Street
Suite 1400
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202-4011
RENDERED : MARCH 23, 2006
TO BE PUBLISHED
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2004-SC-0085-DG
AMANDA BAKER
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2002-CA-1352-MR
CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT NO. 01-CI-1034
THERESA KAMMERER
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE COOPER
There were five eyewitnesses to this pedestrian/automobile accident .
Plaintiff/Appellant, Amanda Baker, and three other teenage girls, Leah Edmonds,
Aleisha Sams, and Tamara Thibodeaux, were pedestrians intending to cross Carothers
Road at its intersection with Monmouth Street in the city of Newport.
Defendant/Appellee, Theresa Kammerer, was operating her vehicle from east to west
on Carothers Road. Baker stepped into the intersection and was struck by Kammerer's
vehicle . Kammerer testified that the traffic light was green for traffic on Carothers Road .
Baker, Edmonds, Sams, and Thibodeaux all testified that the traffic light was red for
traffic on Carothers Road. Sams testified that she saw Kammerer's vehicle approaching
and stretched out her arms to prevent Edmonds and Thibodeaux from stepping into the
intersection ; unfortunately, her reach did not extend to Baker. The jury obviously
believed Kammerer and disbelieved Baker, Edmonds, Sams, and Thibodeaux. The
majority of this Court now reverses this case for a new trial solely because the trial court
did not permit Baker's trial counsel to tell the jury that Hope Frost, an impeachment
witness for Kammerer, was an employee of Kammerer's liability insurer .
When Kammerer's trial counsel announced his intent to call Frost as a witness,
Baker's counsel asked for an in-chambers hearing, at which he objected on grounds
that Frost had not been listed as a witness on Kammerer's pre-trial "exchange of
information ." Counsel then stated that if Frost were permitted to testify, "that would
open the door to discussing where she works, who she works for, and I think that would
certainly not help their case because then the jury would know they were dealing with
an insurance company, in fairness to the defendant, and they have to explain somehow
where this lady comes from." At no time did counsel claim during either the bench
conference prior to opening statements or in the chambers conference on this issue that
his reason for wanting to identify Frost as an employee of Kammerer's insurer was to
show her bias as a witness. Kammerer's trial counsel then explained that Frost had not
been listed on the exchange of information because he had not expected Edmonds and
Sams to testify that the traffic light was red for traffic on Carothers Road . After hearing
these arguments, the trial court ruled that Kammerer could call Frost as a witness and
"contrary to what counsel says, it will be a mistrial if you do it [identify Frost as an
insurance representative] ; you can state that she's an investigator." Obviously, the trial
court's ruling was in response to counsel's argument that "they have to explain
somehow where this lady comes from," and not in response to an unspoken claim that
the evidence was admissible to show bias.'
' The trial court's subsequent explanation that he "would not be ruling this way" if Baker
had filed a more complete exchange of information obviously related to his decision to
-2-
On direct examination, Frost testified that she had separate telephone
conversations with Edmonds and Sams and that Sams told her that she was not in a
position to see the color of the traffic light. On cross-examination, Baker's attorney
asked Frost to produce her notes of her conversations with Edmonds and Sams and
told her to "give those to your attorney and let him look at them first," whereupon Frost
left the witness stand, retrieved her notes, and handed them to Kammerer's attorney
who, with the trial court's permission, tore off a portion of Frost's notes that reflected a
settlement offer - all in the presence of the jury. Thus, the jury learned that Kammerer's
attorney was also Frost's attorney and that their relationship was such that he could
destroy a portion of Frost's notes. Baker's counsel then elicited from Frost that her
notes did not reflect the statement allegedly made to her by Sams, and that they did
reflect that Edmonds told her that the light was red for traffic on Carothers Road. (!)
KRE 611 (b) permits the trial court, "[i]n the interests of justice," to limit crossexamination with respect to matters not testified to on direct examination . KRE 411
"does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance . . . when offered for another
purpose, such as proof of . . . bias or prejudice of a witness ." (Emphasis added.)
However, neither does it require the admission of such evidence - especially where, as
here, the trial court was never advised that it was being offered for that purpose . Even if
the trial court had been advised of the "other purpose" for introducing the evidence, the
trial court was required to weigh the probative value of the evidence against its
prejudicial effect. KRE 403 ; Wallace v. Leedhanachoke , 949 S.W .2d 624, 626-28 (Ky.
App . 1996). Here, Frost was not a substantive witness offering direct evidence relevant
to prove who was at fault . Compare Triplett v. Napier, 286 S .W .2d 87, 88-89 (Ky. 1956)
permit Frost to testify even though she had not been listed on Kammerer's exchange of
information .
(witness was engineer/architect retained by insurance company to testify to
measurements he made and to safety of allegedly defective stairway) ; Lexington Glass
Co. v. Zurich Gen . Accident & Liab . Ins . Co. , 271 S .W.2d 909, 911 (Ky. 1954) (witness
testified to measurements he made at the accident scene) . Frost was only an
impeachment witness - and her testimony only marginally impeached one of three
eyewitnesses who testified for the plaintiff. She did not testify that Sams told her the
light was green for traffic on Carothers Road (which would have tended to prove fault),
but only that Sams told her that she was not in a position to see the light (which tended
only to impeach Sams's credibility) . Under these circumstances, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in finding that the probative value of showing Frost's implied bias
was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect of interjecting evidence of liability
insurance into the case .
Although the majority opinion assumes that Baker's counsel had an unexpressed
"other purpose" of seeking to prove the nature of Frost's employment in order to show
bias, it declines to assume that the trial judge conducted the KRE 403 balancing test
because he did not expressly articulate such on the record when making his ruling . Of
course, that does not mean that he did not conduct the test sub silentio while listening to
the arguments of counsel . If we are going to reverse for a new trial every case in which
a trial judge either admits or excludes evidence without specifically stating on the record
that "the probative value of this evidence [is] [is not] substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect," then we are going to clog our trial dockets with unnecessary retrials
of cases that were fairly and properly tried in the first place. Until today, we have
assumed for purposes of review that trial courts do conduct the KRE 403 balancing test
and admit or exclude evidence on that basis, which we then review for abuse of
discretion . In more than nine years on this Court, I can recall reviewing only one trial
videotape in which the trial court specifically articulated the KRE 403 balancing test on
the record. (Furthermore, I do not recall in my almost eighteen years as a trial judge
ever personally articulating the KRE 403 balancing test on the record - or ever having a
case reversed because of my failure to do so.)
In addition to all of the above, Baker's attorney did, in fact, inform the jury that
Frost was biased in favor of the defense by referring to Kammerer's attorney as "your
[Frost's] attorney ." In that respect, the facts of this case are similar to those in Herbold
v. Ford Motor Co. , 310 Ky. 697, 221 S .W.2d 646 (1949), also a pedestrian/automobile
collision case . The plaintiff in Herbold was attempting to cross a six-lane boulevard at
an intersection governed by a traffic light . The light was red for traffic on the boulevard
when she began to cross but apparently turned green before she reached the other
side. She was struck by the defendant's pickup truck as she attempted to dodge traffic
in an effort to reach the sidewalk . A witness for the plaintiff testified that the defendant
had passed him at a high rate of speed just prior to the accident. An associate attorney
in defense counsel's law firm then impeached that testimony by producing a written
statement that he had obtained from the witness prior to trial in which the witness had
stated only that the plaintiff was struck while attempting to run across the highway in the
middle of the block. The attorney admitted that he was associated with the law firm
representing the defendant. The trial court overruled the plaintiff's motion to be allowed
to also show that the attorney's law firm was being paid by the defendant's liability
insurer . Id., 221 S .W.2d at 649. Our predecessor court held that since the witness had
already admitted his connection with the defendant, "the rejection of the proffered
evidence was not a prejudicial error." Id . At worst, I would reach the same conclusion
in this case, though I find no error at all .
Accordingly, I dissent and would affirm both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals.
Scott, and Wintersheimer, JJ., join this dissenting opinion .
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