MCCREARY COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION V. STEPHANIE BEGLEY
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RENDERED : November
TO BE
2002-SC-0264-WC
MCCREARY COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
V.
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2001-CA-2372-WC
WORKERSCOMPENSATION BOARD NO. 97-68464
STEPHANIE BEGLEY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING
Reversing decisions by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Workers'
Compensation Board (Board), the Court of Appeals has determined that where a timely,
but defective, application is received by the Department of Workers' Claims (DWC), a
policy of substantial compliance must govern enforcement of the time for resubmitting
an amended claim. 803 KAR 25:010E, § 3(2) . We disagree .
The claimant was injured at work on September 10, 1997 . Her employer paid
temporary total disability (TTD) benefits until August 11, 1998, after which she returned
to work . Consistent with its obligation under KRS 342 .040(1), the DWC then notified
her that she had two years from the date that benefits were terminated in which to file a
claim . On August 11, 2000, her Form 101 application for benefits was received at the
DWC . Nonetheless, because the application was not typewritten, was incomplete in
several respects, and was neither signed, witnessed, nor notarized, the DWC returned
it to her on August 21, 2000, with a cover letter that listed each of the defects and
stated as follows :
THE ORIGINAL DATE RECEIVED WILL BE SHOWN AS DATE OF
FILING IF THE APPLICATION IS RESUBMITTED IN PROPER FORM
WITHIN 20 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS LETTER. IT IS
IMPERATIVE THAT THIS LETTER BE RETURNED WITH YOUR
APPLICATION TO INSURE PROPER FILING DATE.
Twenty days from August 21, 2000, was September 10, 2000, which was a Sunday.
Thus, by DWC policy, the period for compliance was extended to Monday, September
11, 2000, the next day that was not a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday.
The claimant's amended Form 101 indicates that she signed it on September 8,
2000, which was a Friday. An unsworn, unnotarized document, that was styled as an
"affidavit" and attached to the claimant's brief to the ALJ, indicates that her attorney's
secretary deposited it in regular U .S. Mail on September 11, 2000 . The DWC received
the corrected application on September 14, 2000, and stamped it as having been filed
on that date. On October 4, 2000, the Commissioner issued the Notice of Claim,
notifying the employer of the application and informing the parties that it had been
assigned to an ALJ . Furthermore, the document advised the employer that a Form 111
(Notice of Claim Denial or Acceptance) must be filed within 45 days .
Forty-five days after October 4, 2000, was November 18, 2000, which was a
Saturday . On Monday, November 20, 2000, the next day that was not a Saturday,
Sunday, or holiday, the employer timely filed its Form 111 and a Special Answer,
wherein it asserted a limitations defense . Its argument was that a corrected Form 101
must be received by the DWC in order to be "resubmitted" and in order for its filing date
to relate back to the original date received . Thus, it maintained that the claimant's
amended application was untimely because it was not received by the DWC until
September 14, 2000 .
The claimant pointed out that the regulation used the word "resubmitted" and
failed to define it, arguing that the purpose of the regulation was not to impose a strict
time requirement as with filing . Otherwise, the term "refiled" or "received" would have
been used . In view of the fact that September 10, 2000, was a Sunday, she maintained
that she had resubmitted the corrected application by mailing it on the 20th day, that
she had complied with the regulation under the mailbox rule, that she had done so
within a reasonable time, and that any delay was due to excusable neglect and the
ambiguous wording of the regulation . See Cabinet for Human Resources v. Riley, Ky.,
921 S .W.2d 616, 617 (1996) . She argued, therefore, that a policy of substantial
compliance should be applied . Finally, she maintained that the employer waived its
right to raise a limitations defense by failing to file its special answer until 47 days after
the date of the Commissioner's Notice of Claim .
Rejecting the claimant's argument concerning the applicability of the mailbox
rule, the AU determined that she had failed to comply with it. Finding no distinction
between the regulation's use of the terms "filing" and "resubmission," the AU pointed
out that the claimant was informed that resubmission must occur within 20 days in order
for the original filing date to apply. The AU concluded, therefore, that the claim was
not filed within the statutory period of limitations and must be dismissed .
Agreeing with the decision, the Board pointed out that the regulations have not
adopted the "mailbox rule" and that even the civil rules adopt it only in instances where
a document is deposited with a carrier that reflects the date upon which it receives the
document, an example being registered mail. See CR 76 .40(2) . Yet, here, the
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claimant offered only a purported affidavit that was neither sworn nor notarized. Noting
the need "to afford some reasonable degree of consistency in addressing filing
requirements," the Board concluded that depositing a document in a mailbox was
insufficient to comply with the regulation and that the claim was properly dismissed .
Reversing and remanding, the Court of Appeals noted that the initial filing tolled
the period of limitations, that compliance with the regulation was "something less than
jurisdictional," and that strict compliance was neither mandated nor justified by the
holding in Riley, supra . The Court determined, therefore, that it was an abuse of
discretion for the AU to fail to apply "the less draconian standard of substantial
compliance, which is the correct approach according to Riley." Concluding that a policy
of substantial compliance "comports more logically and more harmoniously with the
spirit of `beneficent purpose' underlying and animating the 'letter' of the rules and
regulations," the Court remanded the matter for a decision on the merits of the claim .
Thus, the employer appeals .
803 KAR 25 :010E, § 3 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(1) An application for resolution of claim and all other
pleadings shall be typewritten and submitted upon forms
prescribed by the commissioner .
(2) . . . Incomplete applications may be rejected and
returned to the applicant. If the application is resubmitted in
proper form within twenty (20) days of the date it was
returned, the filing shall relate back to the date the
application was first received by the commissioner.
Otherwise, the date of second receipt shall be the filing date .
In Riley, supra , the worker submitted a defective Form 101 on December 15,
1987, precisely two years after the final payment of TTD. At that time, the regulation
permitted a corrected Form 101 to be resubmitted within 10 days of the date that it was
returned . Thus, on December 20, 1989, the DWC returned the form to counsel with a
letter which indicated that if it was resubmitted within 10 days, the filing would relate
back to the date on which it was originally received but that, otherwise, the date of
second receipt would be the filing date. The 10-day period ended on December 30,
1989, which the 1989 calendar indicates was a Saturday . Ms. Riley's resubmitted
application was received on January 2, 1990, the next day that was not a Saturday,
Sunday, or holiday . Like the initial application, the resubmitted one was deficient .
Although the regulation did not expressly provide for multiple 10-day periods, the
application was again returned to counsel with a letter indicating that it must be
completed and resubmitted within 10 days . The application was received by the DWC
11 days thereafter, on January 19, 1990, and the DWC treated the date of receipt as
the filing date . Thus, an ALJ later dismissed the claim as being untimely .
Although the Board affirmed the dismissal, the Court of Appeals reversed on the
ground that the Board had abused its discretion in enforcing its regulation . Finding no
such abuse, we reversed the Court of Appeals, pointing out that although the regulation
provided for a 10-day period within which to correct a defective claim, Ms . Riley had
failed to do so for some 35 days . We noted that such a delay, by itself, was sufficiently
egregious to warrant dismissal . Turning to another argument, we agreed with the
Board's reasoning that timely receipt of the initial Form 101 tolled the period of
limitations so long as Ms . Riley complied with the requirements of the regulation within
"a reasonable time." Id at 617. Noting the Board's authority to implement regulations
.
in order to assure the efficient processing of claims, we determined that a failure to
comply with the regulations was a proper ground for dismissal . Workers' Compensation
Board v. Siler, Ky., 840 S .W.2d 812 (1992) ; Cornett v. Corbin Materials. Inc. , Ky., 807
S .W.2d 56 (1991) .
It is apparent that Ms. Riley was given two 10-day periods to resubmit a proper
application, that the first amended application was received within the applicable 10-day
period, but that the second amended application was not received until one day after
the applicable 10-day period had expired . The decision clearly implied, therefore, that
because the Board had the authority to implement regulations, it had the authority to
grant a second 10-day extension if a resubmitted but deficient Form 101 was received
within the applicable 10-day period . Although our use of the words "within a reasonable
time" might be confusing, the fact remains that we reinstated the Board's decision after
concluding that it was authorized to implement and enforce regulations . In other words,
we concluded that the Board was authorized to require that an amended Form 101
must be received within the 10-day period following its return to the worker or that the
latest date of receipt would control its filing . Nothing in Rile, supra, indicated that an
amended application was considered to be resubmitted on the day that it was mailed .
KRS 342 .185 .requires that a claim shall be made within two years after the date
of accident or the last voluntary payment of income benefits, whichever is later. It is
mandatory . As amended effective April 4, 1994, KRS 342.228 gives the Commissioner
of the DWC jurisdiction to administer Chapter 342, and KRS 342 .260 vests the
Commissioner, rather than the Board, with the authority to promulgate administrative
regulations for implementing Chapter 342 . The filing of a claim is the procedural device
for invoking the DWC's jurisdiction, and 803 KAR 25:010E, §§ 3, 5, and 6 set forth the
procedure for applying for the resolution of an injury or occupational disease claim
under Chapter 342 . 803 KAR 25 :010E, § 1(5) defines the "date of filing" as the date
upon which a pleading is received by the Commissioner at the DWC . Thus, the
regulations provide that in order for a worker to invoke the DWC's jurisdiction within the
period of limitations, the Commissioner must receive a proper application for resolution
of the claim within the period . Although the DWC has a policy of extending the date for
taking an action from a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday to the next day that is not a
Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, it has not chosen to adopt a "mail rule" such as that set
forth in CR 76.40(2) .
In order to prevent the dismissal of a claim because the application, though
timely received, was defective, 803 KAR 25 :010E, § 3(2) gives the worker a grace
period of 20 days within which to amend it.' By operation of the provision, a timely
received but defective application serves to toll the period of limitations for a period of
20 days. See, Rim, supra . Thus, the DWC interprets its regulation as requiring that
an amended application must be received within the 20-day period . Otherwise, it treats
the application as having been filed on the date that the amended application is
received . With regard to the claimant's assertion that the word "resubmitted" should be
construed as "mailed," we note that ordinarily an administrative body's construction of
its own regulation is controlling, particularly when that construction is longstanding and
consistent . See J.B . Blanton Co . v. Lowe, Ky., 415 S.W.2d 376, 378 (1967) .
Furthermore, long before the instant claim arose, Rile[ , supra , made it apparent that
the DWC and the Board construed "resubmitted" as meaning "received ."
Concluding that the DWC's implementation of 803 KAR 25:010E, § 3(2) is
contrary to the spirit of Chapter 342 and, therefore, inconsistent with KRS 342 .260(1),
'803 KAR 25:010E, § 27 provides a similar 20-day grace period if an outdated
application or form is submitted .
the Court of Appeals urges that the DWC be required to apply a "less draconian"
standard when enforcing the 20-day grace period . It is apparent, however, that
803 KAR 25:010E, § 3(2), itself, exemplifies a policy that is "less draconian" than strict
compliance with respect to the application requirements . It prevents the dismissal of a
meritorious but defective application that is received within the applicable period of
limitations by providing a 20-day grace period within which to resubmit an amended
application . Mindful of the Commissioner's authority under KRS 342.260(1), we
conclude that neither the regulation nor the manner in which the DWC enforces it is
unreasonable or contrary to Chapter 342 .
The claimant's amended application was due on Sunday, September 10, 2000;
therefore, Monday, September 11, 2000 was the next day that was not a Saturday,
Sunday, or holiday . Her application was not received at the DWC until September 14,
2000. Under those circumstances, the ALJ properly determined that the amended
application was resubmitted on September 14, 2000, which was outside the 20-day
grace period ; that the filing date for the claim was September 14, 2000; that the period
of limitations expired on September .11, 2000 ; and that the claim was not filed within the
applicable period of limitations. Thus the Board properly affirmed the decision .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the decisions of the Board
and the ALJ are hereby reinstated .
All concur .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Douglas W. Gott
1010 College Street
P .O. Box 738
Bowling Green, KY 42102
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Kenneth Sizemore
105 S. Broad Street
P .O . Box 1808
London, KY 40743-1808
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