COUNTY OF HARLAN; HARLAN COUNTY FISCAL COURT; DELZINNA BELCHER, HARLAN COUNTY JUDGE EXECUTIVE ; AND HOWARD HELTON, HARLAN COUNTY JAILER V. APPALACHIAN REGIONAL HEALTHCARE, INC .
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RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 26, 2002
TO BE PtAISHED
COUNTY OF HARLAN ;
HARLAN COUNTY FISCAL COURT;
DELZINNA BELCHER, HARLAN COUNTY JUDGE
EXECUTIVE ; AND HOWARD HELTON,
HARLAN COUNTY JAILER
V
APPELLANTS
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2000-CA-0468-MR
HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT NO . 98-CI-840
APPALACHIAN REGIONAL HEALTHCARE, INC .
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE WINTERSHEIMER
AFFIRMING
This appeal is from an opinion of the Court of Appeals reversing an order of the
circuit court which had denied a writ of mandamus sought by Appalachian Regional
Healthcare, Inc. against the Harlan County Jailer .
The principal issue presented is whether a writ of mandamus should be issued
requiring the jailer to take the necessary steps to ensure that an indigency
determination is made for inmates in his county who require medical attention.
The dispute arose between Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc. and the
Harlan County Jailer and county officials concerning medical services provided to
inmates in the custody of the jailer from 1995 until 1998 . Healthcare filed a complaint in
circuit court demanding judgment for medical services rendered to indigent inmates in
an amount exceeding $300,000 and sought a writ of mandamus to compel the jailer to
comply with duties it believed were imposed on the jailer by statute. The question of
monetary damages was settled, but the issue regarding the writ of mandamus, which
centered on who had to fill out the necessary paper work, was denied by the circuit
judge . The Court of Appeals reversed that decision and remanded the case to the
circuit judge to issue an appropriate writ. This Court accepted discretionary review.
Harlan County argues that the jailer is under no such statutory duty to determine
if an inmate is indigent for the purposes of KRS 441 .045 . It contends that a writ of
mandamus can only issue against a public official when that official has a
nondiscretionary duty to perform the activity being requested . Harlan County maintains
that KRS 441 .045 and KRS 31 .120 are clear and specific and must be strictly
interpreted according to the language of each statute . It also claims that the relief
granted by the Court of Appeals is not workable .
Healthcare responds that the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the
jailer had a statutory duty to take the necessary steps to seek an indigency
determination for inmates of the county needing medical attention . It argues that the
writ of mandamus is a proper remedy to require the jailer to perform such statutory
duties and that the jailer has a statutory duty to seek an indigency determination for
inmates who need medical service. Healthcare asserts that KRS 441 .045 should be
construed to require the jailer to take certain actions to determine or assist in the
determination of indigency .
The parties agree that the county bears responsibility for the cost of "necessary"
medical services for indigent prisoners pursuant to KRS 441 .045 .
Section 8(a) of the
statute begins with the following sentence: "The determination of whether a prisoner is
indigent shall be made pursuant to KRS 31 .120 ." Although Section (2) of KRS 31 .120
addresses a judicial resolution of indigency status based on an affidavit of indigency
"compiled by the pretrial release officer," the county reads the Court of Appeals' opinion
as improperly placing on county jailers a "supervisory role" over pretrial release officers
with regard to indigency determinations . The county also points to an apparent
contradiction in the language used by the Court of Appeals:
While we agree with the jailer that a writ of mandamus
should not be issued to compel him to complete the affidavit
of indigency forms, we believe that his position as custodian
of the prisoners requires him to take the necessary steps to
seek an indigency determination .
The Court of Appeals panel remanded the case to the circuit court for entry of a
writ of mandamus consistent with the opinion rendered .
I . Duties of Jailer/County
KRS 441 .045(3) places the burden for the cost of necessary medical care
rendered to indigent prisoners in the county jail on the shoulders of the county
government . KRS 441 .045(8)(a) provides that the determination of indigency shall be
made pursuant to KRS 31 .120, which defines a "needy" person for purposes of court
appointment of counsel . A person seeking needy status is to certify by an affidavit of
indigency the material factors relating to his inability to pay.
No difference is recognized between legal and medical needs by either statute .
KRS 441 .045(3) obliges the county to pay for necessary medical care for all indigent
prisoners regardless of whether they have certified such indigency by means of an
affidavit for purposes of obtaining court appointed counsel . KRS 441 .045(8)(a)
indicates that a prisoner shall not be considered indigent for the purposes of receiving
medical care if the prisoner has funds in an inmate account to cover all or a portion of
medical expenses, if there is a medical insurance policy to cover the expenses, or if
the prisoner has private resources to pay for the use of medical facilities .
It is clear that the intent of this statutory system is for the jailer to have some
role in seeking the determination of indigency for medical purposes . The jailer should
be in the best position to know whether an inmate has funds in the inmate account,
and as a custodian of the prisoner, should know whether the inmate has private
insurance or other resources with which to pay medical expenses. Of necessity, this
section supports the position that a jailer has a role in seeing that the necessary paper
work for a determination of indigency be made for an inmate who receives medical
care . We must agree with the Court of Appeals that the statute contemplates that the
jailer is responsible for the care and custody of the inmates and that it is a reasonable
contemplation of the system provided by the General Assembly that the jailer is
responsible for taking the necessary steps to seek a determination concerning
indigency for medical care purposes .
Naturally, the determination of such a status is left to the judicial system . The
presentation of the necessary paper work must be a combined effort by the jailer and
the pretrial release service. Thus, KRS 441 .045 must be construed so as to require
the jailer to take certain actions to determine or assist in the determination of
indigency . KRS 441 .045 principally concerns payment for the costs associated with
medical, dental and psychological care of inmates in the county jail .
It is legitimate to construe the statute so as to require the jailer to see that the
necessary steps to seek an indigency determination for medical treatment are taken so
that the requirements of the statute and the intent of the legislature will be fulfilled .
General principles of statutory construction hold that a court must not be guided
by a single sentence of a statute but must look to the provisions of the whole statute
and its object and policy. Democratic Party of Ky. v . Graham , Ky., 976 S.W.2d 423
(1998) . The power granted by a statute is not limited to that which is expressly
conferred but also includes that which is necessary to accomplish the things which are
expressly authorized . See Strong v. Chandler, Ky ., 70 S.W.3d 405 (2002) citing Long
v . Mayo , 271 Ky . 192, 111 S.W.2d 633 (1937) . In interpreting a statute, this Court
must be guided by the intent of the legislature in enacting the law. No single word or
sentence is determinative, but the statute as a whole must be considered . Strong ,
su ra ; see also Davis v . Commonwealth Life Insurance Co . , Ky., 284 S.W.2d 809
(1955) ; Graham, supra . In order to effectuate the legislative intent, words may be
supplied, omitted, substituted or modified . The purpose is to give effect to the intent of
the legislature . Neutzel v . Ryans , 184 Ky . 292, 211 S .W. 852 (1919) . KRS 446 .080
provides that all statutes shall be liberally construed to carry out the intent of the
legislature .
The administrative burden of the jailer comes from his custodial responsibilities
as stated in KRS 71 .020, 71 .030 and 71 .040. KRS 71 .040 requires humane treatment
of prisoners and as such necessarily includes the proper paper work or assistance
therewith . Not to require the jailer to cooperate with other officials in providing the
necessary services would produce an absurd result and frustrate the system
envisioned by the legislature . There is no question that the jailer can easily comply
with the duties required . The result envisioned by obedience to the statute is very
workable. Here, there is a legal duty and it must be fulfilled .
In Gordon v. Morrow , 186 Ky . 713, 218 S.W. 258 (1920), the court recognized
that although no express statutory authority authorized the state auditor to issue a
warrant in payment of a judgment or pay special counsel employed by the Governor,
the court indicated that it should hardly be a question that the state auditor would be
under such a duty . Gordon , supra, went on to say "the legislature in authorizing the
employment of special counsel also authorized such counsel to take such action as
might be necessary to recover the compensation to which they were entitled ." In
Trimble County Fiscal Court v. Trimble County Bd . of Health , Ky.App ., 587 S .W.2d 276
(1979), the County Board of Health brought an action against magistrates of the
Trimble County Fiscal Court seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the magistrates to
set a specific health tax rate . The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court which
granted the writ and judgment so as to direct the county clerk to prepare tax bills with
the levy. The Court of Appeals reasoned that requiring the clerk to prepare the bills
"merely recognizes that what has been ordered to be done will be done ."
Here, the county is statutorily required to pay for the necessary medical bills of
indigent inmates . Requiring the jailer to take the necessary steps to seek a
determination of indigency for inmates in his custody merely assures that what has
been ordered by the legislature will be done. When KRS 441 .045 is taken as a whole
and considered with the responsibility of the jailer for the inmate in his custody, it is
clear that the jailer has the duty to take the necessary steps to seek an indigency
determination . To do otherwise would produce an absurd result . Cf. Layne v .
Newberg , Ky., 841 S .W.2d 181 (1992) .
As a custodian for the inmates, the jailer has the duty to insure that the intended
result of the statute is achieved . To hold otherwise would frustrate the intent of the
legislature . We find the reliance by Harlan County on Newberg , supra , to be
misplaced . We are not convinced by the citations to authority in Hatchett v . City of
Glasgow , Ky., 340 S .W.2d 248 (1960) or Commonwealth v . Allen , Ky., 980 S .W .2d
278 (1998),
The common sense and reasonable interpretation of KRS 441 .045(8), is that
the reference to KRS 31 .120 was intended for the purpose of incorporating the
financial provisions for determining indigency into the mandate of KRS 441 .045(8) .
The legislature did not find it necessary to set forth another procedure for separately
determining indigency . At is clear that whatever paper work the judicial system may
require to establish indigency must be processed by the jailer. The jailer can request
the pretrial officer to compile the necessary affidavit and swear to it. These officers
must work together and already do so in many counties and in many other aspects
involving prisoners . It is of interest to note from the record that the Kentucky
Department of Corrections has supplied all county jailers with forms necessary for their
counties to be reimbursed under the state's catastrophic program .
The statutory system ordained by the legislature is clear . It contemplates the
appropriate payment to a healthcare provider when the jailer fulfills certain statutory
obligations . These responsibilities include arrangements with the sheriff for the
transportation of the inmate to the healthcare facility and assistance to the inmate in
obtaining indigent status so that the final medical expense can be paid by the county
as necessary. The payment of medical bills for indigents is not limited to those
inmates who receive public defender assistance in the legal aspects of their
involvement in the judicial and penal system . Folks v. Barren County , 313 Ky. 515,
232 S.W.2d 1010 (1950), states that mere imperfections in a statute may be cured by
judicial construction . Clarification may be had by considering the character and nature
of the statute and the purpose to be accomplished . Deficiencies may be supplied by
inference or implication from the act as a whole. Folks , supra . Folks asserted that
"where the end is expressly given, the means necessary to the effectuation of that end
are given by implication ."
Here, the end is that the county must pay for necessary medical expenses for
indigent inmates and the means necessary to produce this end is that the jailer who
has custody of the inmate, must take the necessary steps to assist in making sure that
required paper work to establish indigency is complete.
II . Writ of Mandamus Remedy
In some ways it may seem harsh that a writ of mandamus is necessary to
require a jailer to perform statutory duties . However, the function of a writ of
mandamus is to compel an official to perform duties of that official where an element of
discretion does not occur . It does not usurp legislative powers or invade the functions
of an independent branch of government . Kavanaugh v . Chandler , 255 Ky. 182, 72
S .W.2d 1003 (1934) . As noted in Kavanaugh , supra , "it is familiar law that courts may
mandatorily require a public officer to perform his duty ." For other examples of this
general principle, reference is made to 52 Am . Jur. 2d Mandamus ยงยง 49 to 54 (2000) .
Without exception, the judicial opinions and other legal writings which treat
mandamus observe that it is an extraordinary remedy which compels the performance
of a ministerial act or mandatory duty where there is a clear legal right or no adequate
remedy at law. Specific cases are driven by the application of these legal principles to
the particular facts and naturally, the results vary . We recognize that mandamus
should be cautiously employed . It is not a common means of redress and is certainly
not a substitute for appeal . It is different from prohibition although it shares some
common elements . The term "mandamus" comes from the Latin and means "we
command ." Mandamus is a legal remedy but its issuance is largely controlled by
equitable principles with consideration given to rights of the public and of third persons .
See Keane v . St. Francis Hospital , 522 N .W.2d 517 (Wis .Ct .App . 1994) .
Mandamus compels the performance of ministerial acts or duties only . An act is
ministerial when the law clearly spells out the duty to be performed by the official with
sufficient certainty that nothing is left to the exercise of discretion . In some respects
public officials must interpret the statutes imposing duties on them to form a judgment
from the language of the statute as to what responsibilities are imposed . Such an
intellectual activity does not make the duty of the officer anything other than a
ministerial one . Accordingly, if the statute directs the officer to perform a particular act
which does not involve discretion, the officer is required to do so and the act remains
ministerial despite any doubt by the official .
Here, the only logical inferences make it sufficiently clear as to the responsibility
of the jailer and nothing is left to the exercise of discretion . Thus, mandamus will lie
where a statute imposes on a public officer a specific duty which he fails or refuses to
perform because of an erroneous conclusion by him as to his responsibilities . The
failure or refusal to perform a particular responsibility need not be expressed but may
be implied when an officer fails to act within a reasonable time so as to demonstrate
an intention not to perform the duties .
It is our hope and expectation that all government officials will cooperate with
the purpose of harmonizing their individual responsibilities with each other so as to
produce an efficient government for the public in general . It should be understood that
it is not the intention of this Court to require the jailer to physically fill out the affidavit of
indigency, but only to assist the inmate in seeking indigency status and with completing
the paper work necessary by the judicial system and the statutes to establish
indigency . Certainly, there is no supervisory authority by the jailer over the pretrial
release officer. Such is not necessary because each officer has individual
responsibilities that if discharged properly are congruent. In completing these
responsibilities, the jailers, who may not be notaries, should arrange for the
appropriate notary to be present for the execution of the affidavit.
We affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals which held that the county jailer
has a statutory duty to take the necessary steps to seek an indigency determination for
inmates in his county needing medical attention . A writ of mandamus is the proper
remedy to require the performance of the statutory duties in question .
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is affirmed . This case is remanded to the
Harlan Circuit Court for the entry of a writ of mandamus consistent with this opinion .
Lambert, C.J ., Keller and Stumbo, JJ ., concur . Graves, J . dissents by separate
opinion and is joined by Cooper and Johnstone, JJ.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS:
Jaron Paul Blandford
Brent L . Caldwell
McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland, PLLC
163 W. Short Street, Suite 300
Lexington, KY 40507-1361
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Charles D. Cole
David T. Enlow
Tracy S . Enlow
Enlow, Wright & Enlow, PLLC
1850 Lexington Financial Center
250 West Main Street
Lexington, KY 40507
RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 26, 2002
TO BE PUBLISHED
2001-SC-0423-DG
COUNTY OF HARLAN ;
HARLAN COUNTY FISCAL COURT;
DELZINNA BELCHER, HARLAND COUNTY JUDGE
EXECUTIVE; AND HOWARD HELTON,
HARLAN COUNTY JAILER
V.
APPELLANTS
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2000-CA-0468-MR
HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT NO . 98-CI-840
APPALACHIAN REGIONAL HEALTHCARE, INC .
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE GRAVES
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion on several grounds. First. I
do not believe the Harlan County Jailer was under any statutory obligation to seek
indigency determinations for inmates needing medical care . Second, the remedy
sought does not redress the alleged harm, and other statutory safeguards obviate the
need for a writ of mandamus in this case . Finally, the remedy granted by the majority is
vague and unworkable . As such, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals .
A.
As the majority points out, this case turns on the issue of duty . Specifically, the
pivotal issue concerns whether the Harlan County Jailer was under statutory obligation
to take necessary steps to seek a determination of indigency status for each inmate in
need of medical care . This Court, and other courts, have held repeatedly that a writ of
mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is to be employed cautiously . Allied
Chemical Corp . v. Daiflon_, Inc . , 449 U.S . 33, 101 S . Ct. 188, 66 L .Ed .2d 193 (1980) ;
Humco v. Noble, Ky ., 31 S .W.3d 916, 920 (2000). Furthermore, mandamus has been
held to issue only where an official refused or neglected to perform a clear statutory
duty . Humana of Kentucky Inc . v . NKC Hospitals, Inc. , Ky., 751 S.W.2d 369, 374
(1988) (noting that mandamus will lie where a breach of duty is clear beyond dispute) ;
Stratford v . Crossman , Ky. App., 655 S.W.2d 500, 503 (1983) (providing that
mandamus will issue only where the duty of the defendant is clear) .
The General Assembly has clearly enunciated whom it intends to prepare the
paperwork for determinations of inmate indigency, and the jailer is not included therein .
It may well be, as the majority explains, that the jailer is in the best position to ascertain
information about inmates' economic situations . The legislature bases its decisions on
experience, empirical data, and the will of the people, and this Court is not in a position
to second guess the legislators . Likewise, we are not free to insert words into statutes
simply because we believe they should be there . Commonwealth v. Allen , Ky., 980
S .W.2d 278, 280 (1998) ("a court may not interpret a statute at variance with its stated
language") ; Hatchett v . City of Glasgow, Ky ., 340 S.W.2d 248 (1960) ("where a statute
on its face is intelligible, the courts are not at liberty to supply words or insert something
or make additions . . . .") .
In issuing writs of mandamus, we compel officials to act in accordance with the
duties clearly imposed on them by law . In the present case, the law clearly requires
that a determination be made regarding the indigency of inmates needing medical care .
It does not, however, impose on the jailer the duty of carrying out that task . The
majority holds that statutes must be interpreted in such a way that gives effect to the
legislative intent, and cites several cases to the end . See Strong v . Chandler, Ky., 70
S .W.3d 405 (2002) ; Neutzal v . Ryans; 184 Ky. 292, 211 S .W . 852 (1919). It is true at
times that ambiguity forces courts to focus on the purposes and circumstances behind
legislation . However, the statutes at issue are neither ambiguous nor inconsistent with
one another. As such, the plain text of the statutes should govern and this Court should
give effect to the ordinary meaning of the words therein . Layne v . Newberg, Ky., 841
S .W.2d 181, 183 (1992) .
Several statutes work synergistically to establish the procedure for determining
indigency of inmates needing medical care. KRS 441 .045, concerning inmate medical
treatment, reads, "The determination of whether a prisoner is indigent shall be made
pursuant to KRS 31 .120 ." KRS 31 .120(2), in turn, states, "[The person seeking indigent
status] shall certify by affidavit of indigency which shall be compiled by the pretrial
release officer. . . the material factors relating to his ability to pay in the form the Supreme
Court prescribes ." (Emphasis added) . KRS 431 .515(1) addresses pretrial release
investigation and services : "All trial courts in this Commonwealth having jurisdiction of
criminal causes shall provide such pretrial release investigation and services as
necessary to . . . assist in the earliest possible determination of whether a person is a
needy person under KRS Chapter 31 ." Subsection (2) of the same statute makes
mention of "the court's determination of whether a person is a needy person as
provided in KRS 31 .120 ." That the legislature enlisted the services of the trial court and
pretrial release officer, but opted not to mention the jailer, calls into question the
majority's interpretation of the statutes . A more realistic reading suggests that the trial
court and pretrial release officer are ultimately responsible for making indigency
determinations for inmates . Certainly, the jailer should cooperate with these
procedures, but no statute suggests that he is under any obligation to initiate and
ensure completion of such a determination .
The majority dictates that "mandamus will lie where a statute imposes on a
public officer a specific duty which he fails or refuses to perform because of an
erroneous conclusion by him as to his responsibilities ." While this rule is sound, it has
no application here . No statute imposes on the jailer a "specific duty" to take the
necessary steps to seek an indigency determination for inmates in his county needing
medical attention . As such, there can be no failure to perform said duty, either
intentional or as a result of an erroneous conclusion .
Although no breach has occurred, the majority seeks to create one, even in the
absence of supporting evidence . The majority states, "Not to require the jailer to
cooperate with other officials in providing the necessary services would produce an
absurd result and frustrate the system envisioned by the legislature ." However, there is
no indication that the jailer has been unwilling to cooperate with the pretrial release
officer, who is statutorily obligated to compile affidavits of indigency . To the contrary,
Healthcare itself admits that "it is not as if the Jailer and Pretrial Release Officer are
strangers . They work together in many aspects involving the inmates ." This being the
case, the absurdity lies in the supposition that the jailer has been an obstacle to
payment for medical services provided to indigent inmates . If the system envisioned by
the legislature has been frustrated by the omission of a statutory duty to be imposed on
the jailer, the legislature is empowered to revisit its statutes and create such a duty .
By issuing a writ of mandamus, which compels the fulfillment of a statutory duty,
this Court is creating a duty by supplementing the statute with words that are not there .
In so doing, the majority not only undertakes a legislative task, but also undermines the
well-established rule that mandamus should not issue if the duty sought to be
compelled is subject to the discretion of the officer. The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in Power v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 781, 786 (D.C. Cir. 2002),
recently stated, "Where an alleged duty is not . . . plainly prescribed, but depends on a
statute or statutes the construction or application of which is not free from doubt, it is
regarded as involving the character of judgment or discretion which cannot be
controlled by mandamus ." (quoting Wilbur v . United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U .S . 206,
218-219, 50 S .Ct. 320, 74 L .Ed . 809 (1929)) . I find such reasoning sound and
persuasive, as it forces courts to respect the difficulties and choices associated with
work of others, work with which courts may not be entirely familiar .
Here, both the statutory duty before issuance of the writ and the statutory duty
imposed by the writ are "not plainly described" or "free from doubt," and are therefore
discretionary . The majority would compel the jailer to take necessary steps to seek a
determination of indigency of inmates requiring medical care . Under this obligation, the
jailer must decide what steps are necessary, what constitutes seeking a determination,
and which inmates require medical care . Therefore, the majority has not only found a
violation of a statutory duty that did not exist, it also has fashioned a remedy in
mandamus very much subject to the jailer's discretion in carrying it out .
I cannot agree that the jailer was ever under a clear statutory duty to take steps
toward an indigency determination on behalf of inmates needing medical care . The
statutory provisions clearly assign that task to the court and pretrial release officer, and
the proposed writ of mandamus serves only to confuse the issue . Because a writ of
mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, it should not be employed by this Court to
impose a duty on the jailer that may or may not have been contemplated by the
legislature, and that clearly was not placed on the pages of Kentucky's statutes .
B.
Healthcare requests this writ of mandamus to eliminate future problems
regarding unpaid medical bills because in the past, the County has failed to file
affidavits of indigency for all of its indigent inmates . The result of this oversight has
been that, when billed for medical care of its indigent inmates, the County has refused
to issue payment, responding that it is only responsible for inmates with an affidavit of
indigency on file . In effect, Healthcare is asking this Court to impose extra duties on the
Harlan County Jailer to negate any possibility that the County might shirk its financial
responsibility . To that end, Healthcare contends that a writ of mandamus requiring the
jailer to complete or ensure the completion of an affidavit of indigency for each inmate
brought to the hospital for the purpose of receiving medical care is necessary .
The General Assembly has enacted a number of safeguards to ensure that
counties are able to pay the medical bills of their indigent inmates and recover medical
expenses from inmates who are treated but are not indigent. As previously noted, KRS
431 .515(1) requires the trial court to offer pretrial services to needy inmates . KRS
532 .354 (1) allows local governments to require a reasonable co-payment from
prisoners in advance of medical care, but adds that "no prisoner shall be denied
medical treatment by reason of indigency." The same section then places a financial
safety net for local governments, authorizing sentencing courts to order reimbursement,
minus any co-payment, from prisoners found able to pay for the medical services they
received while incarcerated . KRS 532 .352(1) makes it clear that any reimbursement
collected for services rendered, including medical, is to be credited to the local
government's sinking fund . Additionally, KRS 532 .358 provides for reimbursement from
prisoners upon completion of their sentences, to be paid "to the state or local
government ." This section further authorizes the sentencing court to use its contempt
sanctions to enforce any reimbursement orders.
Putting these rules into context, it becomes obvious that the County had, or
should have had, the means to pay for medical care for all of its inmates . Any debt
owed to Healthcare should have been paid by the local government, which presumably
had been amassing reimbursement dollars from able inmates in its sinking fund,
pursuant to KRS 532 .352(1) . If the funds were not available, it would have been
because either the number of indigent inmates treated surpassed the County's
expectations and budget, or the trial courts were failing to order reimbursement from
financially-able inmates. In either case, the solution rests with the local government .
Healthcare, the Court of Appeals, and the majority fail to realize that affidavits of
indigency would not have created more money for operation of the system . The only
consequence of having affidavits of indigency on file for all inmates who received
treatment from Healthcare would be a more efficient discovery period and a faster,
more responsive settlement . Having already settled, of course, Healthcare stands to
gain from this writ of mandamus only an assurance that it will be able to produce proof
in the future that it has treated patients for whom the County is financially responsible .
The writ does not require payment for such services, and, as such, does not redress the
harm allegedly done to Healthcare .
The problem in this case is ultimately one of organization and budgeting, not
jailer malfeasance, and does not warrant a writ of mandamus . The legislature has
provided a clear vehicle through which local governments can care for their inmates
while receiving compensation from those who can afford it. The Harlan County
government is responsible for fulfilling its financial obligations, and the County, not the
Supreme Court of Kentucky, must find a way to ensure that indigent inmates are cared
for and that doctors get paid for their services .
C.
Finally, the remedy presented by the writ is vague and unworkable . Both the
Court of Appeals in issuing the writ, and the majority of this Court in upholding said writ,
have simply clouded the explicit statutory requirements with vague semantic
alternatives . This Court would have the jailer take necessary steps to seek an
indigency determination for inmates requiring medical care, but fails to elaborate on
what it means to "take necessary steps" or "seek a determination ."
Furthermore, the practical effect of the rule is to require the jailer to obtain
indigency evaluations for each and every inmate upon arrival at the jail, not merely on
an as-needed basis . There are undoubtedly many inmates who require urgent medical
care at some point during their incarceration . In such a situation, the jailer would be
unable to inform the pretrial release officer and the trial court that an indigency
determination is needed, nor would there be time to complete an affidavit and have
such notarized . As those would seem to be the "necessary steps" of which the majority
speaks, and the jailer would be responsible for completion thereof, he would have to
choose between his "new" statutory duty to procure indigency status and his statutory
duty to treat inmates humanely by getting them to the hospital . See KRS 71 .040 . To
avoid such a conflict, the jailer would necessarily have to seek indigency determinations
for all inmates upon their arrival, no matter how short their stay or state of health . This
likely was not the legislature's intention . Had it been so, the legislature would have
avoided any mention of indigency determinations at the pretrial, sentencing, and
release proceedings .
The majority also relies upon the efficiency of having the jailer initiate indigency
proceedings as proof of legislative intent, since it is the jailer who has information about
the inmates' prison accounts and any private insurance or other resources for payment.
There is no doubt that the jailer is obligated to provide such information to those making
the determination . However, KRS 31 .120 requires consideration of more than simply
the ability to pay for medical care in certifying an affidavit of indigency . KRS 31 .120(2)
sets forth other factors as well, including income, property owned, outstanding
obligations, and the number and ages of dependants . As the jailer may or may not be
privy to such information, I cannot conclude that he is necessarily in the best position to
seek a determination of inmate indigency .
Furthermore, the majority claims to envision a world in which the jailer, the
pretrial release officer, and the trial court work together to make the system run
efficiently . Placing the jailer in a position in which he is responsible for the failure of
others to do their jobs will likely have the opposite effect . The majority has neglected to
consider the plight of the jailer when medical care is required but the "necessary steps"
yield no indigency determination due to the fault of another. Though the majority's
decision claims not to place the jailer in a supervisory position, practice will eventually
demonstrate the flaw in such reasoning . As the Court's decision here creates more
problems than it solves, the issuance of a writ of mandamus is all the more
inappropriate .
CONCLUSION
As the majority attempts to fit the square peg of mandamus into the round hole
of statutory interpretation, it encounters additional difficulties reconciling its proposed
requirements with other statutory provisions concerning indigency determinations .
Likewise, the majority has fashioned a remedy that introduces even more questions
about the duties of the jailer . I would avoid these problems altogether and conform my
decision to the well-established rules surrounding writs of mandamus, reserving such a
drastic remedy for a more pertinent situation . For these reasons, I would reverse the
Court of Appeals .
Cooper, and Johnstone, J .J ., join in this dissenting opinion .
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