GREG HADDOCK V. HOPKINSVILLE COATING CORPORATION; THOMAS LEWIS, ARBITRATOR; THOMAS A. NANNEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: DECEMBER 20,200l
TO BE PU ISHED
74
2001
-SC-0367-WC
GREG HADDOCK
V.
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2000-CA-0417-WC & 2000-CA-0461-WC
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD NO. 98-01705
HOPKINSVILLE COATING CORPORATION;
THOMAS LEWIS, ARBITRATOR; THOMAS A. NANNEY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
The claimant periodically developed sores and blisters on his hands and, for a
while, developed a rash over much of his body. Medical evidence established that he
suffered from contact dermatitis from exposure to various chemicals in the workplace
but that the condition warranted an AMA impairment only at times when it was
symptomatic. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the claimant suffered
from an occupational disease and was entitled to medical benefits but concluded,
nonetheless. that he was not entitled to income benefits because he had missed no
work due to his condition and had neither a permanent impairment nor disability.
Noting that the claimant retained the ability to perform all of his past work activities so
long as he avoided contact with offending chemicals, the ALJ also denied his request
for rehabilitation benefits.
Except for remanding the claim to the ALJ to reconsider the claimant’s request
for rehabilitation benefits under the decision in Wilson v. SKW Alloys. Inc., Ky.App., 893
S.W.2d 800 (1995) the Board affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed to that extent,
relying upon REO Mechanical v. Barnes, Ky.App., 691 S.W.2d 224 (1985), for the
principle that a finding of permanent disability is prerequisite to an award of
rehabilitation benefits. This effectively reinstated the ALJ’s decision. Although we have
determined that a finding of permanent partial or permanent total disability is not
prerequisite to an award of rehabilitation benefits in a post-December 12, 1996, claim,
we have also concluded that none of the disputed findings of fact or conclusions of law
was erroneous as a matter of law and, therefore, we affirm.
The claimant was born in 1956 and gave a work history that included work as a
truck driver while in the military and work as a maintenance man, a general laborer, and
a welder before becoming employed by the defendant-employer in 1995. The company
paints automobile parts, and the claimant worked on the production line and in
maintenance. In July or August of 1995, he first developed blisters and sores on his
hands after working for several hours with chemicals while cleaning paint from
machinery. Dr. Spencer diagnosed a contact dermatitis which he treated with various
steroid medications. After subsequent bouts of such symptoms and additional steroid
therapy, he referred the claimant to Dr. Kurita, a dermatologist.
In August, 1996, the claimant complained to Dr. Kurita of a rash over his entire
body that had waxed and waned for approximately six months, and he gave a history of
sensitivity to isocyanate products while working for a previous employer. Patch testing
was performed by Dr. Zanolli, revealing an allergic reaction to thimerosol (merthiolate)
and to epoxy resins, chemicals that are commonly found in glue, plastic, and paint. He
-2-
reported that epoxy resins are present in numerous industrial environments and that
even a slight exposure is sufficient to cause an allergic reaction in a sensitive individual.
Both Drs. Zanolli and Kurita recommended that the claimant avoid exposure to the
offending chemicals. The claimant testified, however, the substances were present in
vapor form and were unavoidable; therefore, because he continued to work, he
continued to experience periodic flare-ups of symptoms until he was terminated by the
employer in October, 1998.
In a report dated December 31, 1998, Dr. Kurita noted that he had reviewed the
claimant’s medical record and also noted that in November, 1998, the claimant stated
that his condition had reoccurred while he was off work but exposed to gasoline and
petroleum products while working on motor vehicles.
Dr. Kurita assigned a 15% AMA
impairment. When deposed, he explained that once an individual is allergic to a
substance, the sensitivity is permanent, and he will experience symptoms whenever he
is exposed to the substance. The symptoms will subside when the exposure ceases
and will flare up again upon re-exposure. He testified that epoxy resins were present in
the claimant’s workplace but were also present in the everyday environment. When
questioned about the manner in which he had assigned an AMA impairment and
confronted with an example from the AMA’s Guidelines, he testified that the skin
condition was rated when it was in its symptomatic state and conceded that no
impairment rating was warranted when it was asymptomatic. When he last saw the
claimant in January, 1999, the condition was not active.
At the July, 1999, hearing, the claimant testified that his attempts to find other
employment had been unsuccessful and that he was presently enrolled in a vocational
program, taking courses in electricity. He testified that he tried to avoid any exposure to
-3-
epoxy resins and that it was difficult to use his hands due to the swelling, pain, itching,
and open sores that such exposure produced. He indicated that the blisters that were
presently on his hands were worse than they had been a month earlier but that his
hands were much better than they had been while he was working.
After reviewing the lay and medical evidence, the ALJ determined that the
claimant had sustained a contact dermatitis and that the condition was at least partially
related to his exposure to chemicals at work. Rejecting the employer’s argument that
the claimant’s problems were entirely due to an incident in which he was exposed to
chemicals while cleaning paint from some machinery, the ALJ determined that the
dermatitis was an occupational disease that resulted from his exposure over time and
that the claim was timely filed. Nonetheless, relying upon Dr. Kurita’s deposition
testimony and the example from the AMA Guidelines, the ALJ determined that the
condition caused no AMA impairment and, therefore, that the claimant was not entitled
to income benefits for permanent disability. Likewise, noting that the condition had
never prevented the claimant from working, the ALJ determined that benefits for
temporary total disability were inappropriate. Noting that the claimant retained the
physical capacity to perform all of his past work if he were not exposed to the offending
chemicals, the ALJ also determined that he was not entitled to rehabilitation benefits.
Appealing the Court of Appeals’ reinstatement of the decision, the claimant
asserts that he is permanently sensitized to epoxy resin, that he continues to suffer
from chronic dermatitis, that he has a 15% impairment, and that he is entitled to both
rehabilitation and temporary and permanent income benefits. In contrast, the employer
maintains that the evidence of permanent impairment and of temporary total or
permanent partial disability was not so overwhelming as to compel a finding in the
-4-
claimant’s favor. It also maintains that because the claimant did not sustain a
permanent impairment, the ALJ and the Court of Appeals correctly determined that he
is not entitled to an award of rehabilitation benefits.
Since December 12, 1996, KRS 342.001 l(11) has required evidence of an AMA
impairment to support a finding of permanent, partial disability. Refusing to accept the
finding that he has no AMA impairment, the claimant continues to assert that his
impairment is 15% and that he is entitled to income benefits for partial disability. The
fact remains, however, that although Dr. Kurita assigned a 15% impairment at a time
when the claimant’s dermatitis remained active, he later testified that when he saw the
claimant in January, 1998, approximately three months after the employment had
ended, the condition was no longer active and did not warrant an AMA impairment.
The claimant received no additional work-related exposure to epoxy resins thereafter,
and there was no medical evidence that the work-related injury would result in a
spontaneous flare-up of symptoms. Under those circumstances, we are not persuaded
that a finding of an AMA impairment or of a permanent partial disability was compelled
as a matter of law. Likewise, in view of the fact that the claimant continued to work
when he was symptomatic, we are not persuaded that a finding of temporary, total
disability was compelled as a matter of law.
KRS 342.710(l) makes it clear that one of the primary purposes of Chapter 342
is the physical and vocational rehabilitation of injured workers so that they can return to
gainful employment. To that end, KRS 342.710(3)
provides in pertinent part, as
follows:
When as a result of an injury [a worker] is unable to perform work for
which he has previous training or experience, he shall be entitled to such
vocational rehabilitation services, including retraining and job placement,
-5
as may be reasonably necessary to restore him to suitable employment.
Restoring a worker to “suitable employment” means attempting to achieve a reasonable
relationship between the worker’s pre- and post-injury earning capacity. Wilson v. SKW
Alloys. Inc., supra.
Rehabilitation benefits may be awarded to partially as well as to totally disabled
workers. Furthermore, a factual finding concerning whether a worker is unable to
perform work for which he has previous training or experience is mandatory whenever a
worker seeks to obtain rehabilitation benefits. Edwards v. Bluearass Containers
Division of Dura Containers Inc., Ky.App., 594 S.W.2d 900, 902 (1980). In REO
Mechanical v. Barnes, supra, the court upheld a finding that a worker who sustained a
period of temporary total disability but did not retain any permanent disability was not
entitled to an award of rehabilitation benefits. At that time, the term “disability” referred
to occupational disability as determined under the standard that was set forth in
Osborne v. Johnson, Ky., 432 S.W.2d 800 (1968) and did not require evidence of an
AMA impairment. Under that standard, a worker who sustained a work-related allergic
reaction and sought to prove a resulting occupational disability was required to
demonstrate an impairment of his capacity to perform work that did not involve an
injurious exposure. Princess Manufacturina Co. v. Jarrell, Ky., 465 S.W.2d 45, 49
(1971).
Effective December 12, 1996, the legislature changed the standard for a finding
of permanent disability to require evidence of an AMA impairment; however, it did not
change the standard for awarding rehabilitation benefits. Thus, we are not persuaded
that KRS 342.710(3) requires a finding of permanent disability as a prerequisite to a
post-December 12, 1996, award of rehabilitation benefits. It requires only a finding that
-6-
the affected worker “is unable to perform work for which he has previous training or
experience.”
In the instant case, the ALJ determined that the claimant was physically capable
of performing the same types of work that he could perform before being exposed to
epoxy resins so long as he avoided exposure to them, noting that the claimant “readily
admitted” as much. It was that finding, not the lack of a finding of disability under the
1996 standard, that formed the basis of the ALJ’s decision to deny rehabilitation
benefits. Although the claimant testified that he was unable to find other employment,
there was no evidence that his inability to do so was attributable to his work-related
injury. Thus, although retraining would be expected to enhance his occupational
opportunities, we are not persuaded that the evidence compelled a finding that he
required additional training in order to obtain employment that bore a reasonable
relationship to his pre-injury employment. Under those circumstances, we are not
persuaded that an award of rehabilitation benefits was compelled as a matter of law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
HOPKINSVILLE COATING:
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Dick Adams
Adams Law Firm
28 Court Street
Madisonville, KY 42431
Robert A. Winter, Jr.
David M. Andrew
Hemmer, Spoor, Pangburn,
DeFrank & Kasson, PLLC
250 Grandview Drive, Suite 200
Ft. Mitchell, KY 41017
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.