MARY DIANE CLEMENTS V. JAN HARRIS, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THOMAS LEROY CLEMENTS
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APPELLANT
MARY DIANE CLEMENTS
V.
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
NO . 98-CA-001343
DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT NO . 96-CI-01177
JAN HARRIS, EXECUTRIX OF THE
ESTATE OF THOMAS LEROY CLEMENTS
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE STUMBO
AFFIRMING
The instant action concerns the validity of a decree of the Daviess Circuit Court,
which dissolved the marriage of Thomas Leroy Clements (Leroy) and the Appellant,
Mary Diane Clements (Mary) . Leroy has since passed away and the interests of his
estate are being represented by Jan Harris, the Executrix and Appellee herein . The
Court of Appeals below affirmed the dissolution decree, but reversed the circuit court's
decision concerning the property disposition . Mary now requests we reverse only that
part of the Court of Appeals' decision that upheld the dissolution decree . For the
reasons set forth in the remainder of this opinion, we affirm .
Mary and Leroy became acquainted at church functions in Owensboro . The two
became romantically involved and decided to move from Owensboro to Florida during
June of 1996. While in Florida, Mary and Leroy married on July 19, 1996 . Using
Leroy's pre-marital assets, the couple purchased residential property in Florida .
After only being wed for a few months, the couple's marital bliss dissolved .
Leroy allegedly committed acts of domestic violence against Mary and he was
subsequently arrested on October 2, 1996. Leroy posted bond, left Florida, returned to
Owensboro, and moved in with his daughter . Soon thereafter, on October 11, 1996,
Leroy filed a petition to dissolve the marriage .
On October 17, 1996, Mary was purportedly served a summons in Florida .
However, the process server did not leave the summons with Mary, but instead left it
with another individual at Mary's residence . Mary contends that this service of process
was ineffective . Less than a month later, on November 11, 1996, the circuit court
authorized the Master Commissioner, on Mary's behalf, to execute a deed to Leroy's
pre-marital residence in Owensboro. The proceeds from the sale were to be placed in
an escrow account . Then, on December 9, 1996, Mary filed a special appearance
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and the Master Commissioner entered a
pendente lite order awarding the proceeds from the sale of the Owensboro property to
Leroy .
On December 17, 1997, Mary was personally and effectively served a summons
in Florida . Mary objected and renewed her motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction . On
April 14, 1998, Leroy filed a motion for entry of decree in the Daviess Circuit Court, and
Mary once again objected and moved to dismiss . On May 12, 1998, the circuit court
entered a decree, which dissolved Leroy and Mary's marriage and allocated property .
Mary then appealed the circuit court's decision to the Court of Appeals . In a unanimous
opinion, the Court of Appeals panel reversed the circuit court's decision as to the
property disposition, but affirmed the entry of the dissolution of marriage decree . While
the Court of Appeals determined the circuit court lacked the proper jurisdiction due to
Leroy's failure to meet the 180-day next residency requirement, it held that under KRS
22A.020(3), the dissolution decree could not be disturbed and must be affirmed . Mary
then sought discretionary review from this Court . We granted review and now affirm .
The only issue before this Court is whether the decree which dissolved the
marriage of Mary and Leroy was valid . Generally, a decree of dissolution of marriage is
not subject to review before an appellate court of the Commonwealth . Section 115 of
the Kentucky Constitution provides that "the General Assembly may prescribe that
there shall be no appeal from that portion of a judgment dissolving a marriage ." In
1976, the General Assembly enacted KRS 22A.020(3), which provides that "there shall
be no review by appeal or by writ of certiorari from that portion of a final judgment, order
or decree of a Circuit Court dissolving a marriage ." In addition, for well over a century,
appellate courts of the Commonwealth have consistently held that a judgment granting
a dissolution of marriage is not appealable or subject to appellate jurisdiction . Whitney
v. Whitney , 70 Ky . (7 Bush) 520 (1870) ; Irwin v. Irwin , 105 Ky. 632, 49 S.W . 432 (1899) ;
DeSimone v. DeSimone , Ky., 388 S.W.2d 591 (1965); Drake v. Drake, Ky. App ., 809
S.W.2d 710 (1991) .
However, Mary contends that, under the circumstances of the instant matter,
appeal and reversal of the dissolution decree should be permitted despite the existence
of KRS 22A.020(3) . For instance, Mary argues that the Court of Appeals should have
reversed the dissolution decree because it determined that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction. Mary directs this Court to Self v. Self, 293 Ky . 255, 168 S .W.2d 743 (1943),
which held that a judgment granting a divorce may be appealed when that judgment is
void . However, it has also been held that even when jurisdictional matters are
concerned, a judgment granting a divorce will be upheld even if it is erroneous. Lewis
v . Lewis , 224 Ky. 18, 4 S .W.2d 1106 (1928) ; Weintraub v. Murphy, Ky., 240 S .W .2d
594 (1951) . Here, the Court of Appeals below held that the circuit court should have
found that Leroy was not a resident of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. However, the
Court of Appeals held that it could not review the dissolution decree. The Court of
Appeals referenced Elswick v. Elswick , Ky., 322 S.W.2d 129 (1959), wherein it states:
Where the question of jurisdiction in a divorce action has been raised in
the lower court, and there is any evidence to show the jurisdictional
residence of the parties, the lower court's judgment granting a divorce
based upon a determination that it has jurisdiction is not void and cannot
be questioned on appeal regardless of the fact that the determination may
be against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and be clearly
erroneous.
Id. at 131 .
Thus, though the trial court acted erroneously in finding Leroy to be a resident of
Kentucky, the decree of dissolution is not void . Elswick , supra . Mary has failed to
present any contrary decisions or argument to persuade this Court to declare invalid the
decree dissolving her marriage with Leroy . Accordingly, we find no error in the Court of
Appeals' decision to uphold the divorce judgment.
We have reviewed the other issues raised and find them to be without merit.
Therefore, we need not address them .
The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Daviess Circuit Court's decree
of dissolution of marriage is affirmed .
Lambert, C .J . ; Cooper, Graves, and Wintersheimer, JJ ., concur. Keller, J .,
dissents by separate opinion, with Johnstone, J ., joining that dissent.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Michael T. Connelly
Connelly, Kaercher & Stamper
1610 Kentucky Home Life Building
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
John W. Stevenson
613 Frederica Street
Owensboro, KY 42301
RENDERED : NOVEMBER 21, 2002
TO BE PUBLISHED
,*uyrrmr Courf of '~trnfurhV
2000-SC-0304-DG
MARY DIANE CLEMENTS
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
NO . 98-CA-001343
DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT NO. 96-CI-01177
JAN HARRIS, EXECUTRIX OF THE
ESTATE OF THOMAS LEROY CLEMENTS
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE KELLER
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because the record in this case
permits only two possible conclusions : (1) there is absolutely no evidence showing that
Thomas Leroy Clements actually resided in Kentucky for the 180 days next preceding
his filing of this divorce petition, in which case an appellate court may vacate the
divorce decree even under the holding of Elswick v. Elswick ,' or (2) Thomas Leroy
Clements testified untruthfully as to his Kentucky residency, in which case appellate
review is proper because the decree of dissolution in this case was void as fraudulently
obtained . Accordingly, I would reverse the Court of Appeals and vacate the Daviess
'Ky., 322 S .W.2d 129, 131 (1959) ("Where the question of jurisdiction in a
divorce action has been raised in the lower court, and there is ,any evidence to show the
jurisdictional residence of the parties, the lower court's judgment granting a divorce
based upon a determination that it has jurisdiction is not void and cannot be questioned
on appeal . . . . " (emphasis added)) .
Circuit Court decree dissolving the marriage between Appellant and Thomas Leroy
Clements.
As "[t]he word `jurisdiction' is more easily used than understood," 2 I wish to begin
with some operational definitions . In simple terms, jurisdiction is "[a] court's power to
decide a case or issue a decree,"' but a court's jurisdiction has three separate
elements: "(1) jurisdiction over the person, (2) jurisdiction over the subject matter, and
(3) jurisdiction to render the particular judgment sought, or as is sometimes said,
jurisdiction of the particular case."'
"Personal jurisdiction" is "[a] court's power to bring a person into its adjudicative
process ; jurisdiction over a defendant's personal rights, rather than merely over
property interests . ,5 "Subject-matter jurisdiction" is "[j]urisdiction over the nature of the
case and the type of relief sought; the extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of
persons or the status of things ."' It "refers to a court's authority to determine `this kind
of case' as opposed to `this case."'' Particular-case jurisdiction, although related to
subject-matter jurisdiction, "means the right, authority, and power to hear and determine
a specific case within that class of cases over which a court has subject matter
2Commonwealth . Department of Highways v. Berryman, Ky., 363 S .W .2d 525,
526 (1962).
3 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 857 (7 th ed . 1999) .
420 AM . JUR . 2D Courts § 54 (1995).
5 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 857 (7th ed . 1999) .
6Id.
7Privett v . Clendenin , Ky., 52 S.W.3d 530, 532 (2001).
jurisdiction ."' In other words, particular-case jurisdiction refers to a court's authority to
determine "this case" as opposed to "this kind of case." And, although a court that
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over an action will also always lack particular-case
jurisdiction, a court can have proper subject-matter jurisdiction over an action, but
nonetheless lack particular-case jurisdiction -- e .g., when a particular jurisdictional fact9
is not present.
While circuit courts have general subject-matter jurisdiction over dissolution of
marriage actions,' ° a circuit court's jurisdiction to hear a particular dissolution of
marriage action -- i .e., its particular-case jurisdiction -- is dependent upon the court
finding a jurisdictional fact: "that one (1) of the parties, at the time the action was
commenced, resided in this state . . . and that the residence . . . has been maintained
for 180 next preceding the filing of the petition[ .J"" In the present case, as the record
conclusively demonstrates, and as the Court of Appeals correctly determined, the trial
8 20 AM. JUR . 2D Courts § 55 (1995) (emphasis added).
9A "jurisdictional fact" is "[a] fact that must exist for a court to properly exercise its
jurisdiction over a case, party, or thing ." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 611 (7tn ed . 1999) ;
Collins v. Duff, Ky., 283 S.W.2d 179, 182 (1955) ("[W]here the jurisdiction of the court
depends upon a fact which the court is required to ascertain, the court has jurisdiction
to determine that jurisdictional fact, and its judgment determining that fact is conclusive
on the question of jurisdiction until set aside or reversed by direct proceedings, and
cannot be attacked collaterally .") ; Duncan v. O'Nan , Ky., 451 S .W .2d 626, 631 (1970)
("A jurisdictional element of this particular case was a judgment complying with formal
requisites properly entered in the county court.") .
109 ("The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in
. . . a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the Circuit Court . . . . "); KY. CONST . §
112(5) ("The Circuit Court shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes not
vested in some other court."); KRS 24A.010(1) ("The Circuit Court is a court of general
jurisdiction ; it has original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes not exclusively vested in
some other court .") ; KRS 403.010 ("[C]ourts having general jurisdiction may grant a
divorce -for the cause set out in this chapter.").
"KY . CONST. §
"KRS 403 .140( 1)(a ).
court lacked particular-case jurisdiction because Thomas Leroy Clements had not been
an actual resident of Kentucky for the required 180 days ."
The majority concludes that it cannot set aside the decree of dissolution because
KRS 22A .020(3) insulates such decrees from appellate review even when the trial
court's finding of jurisdiction is erroneous . However, in this case, while the trial court's
residency finding was erroneous, it was more than that -- it was either wholly
unsupported by the record or based upon fraudulent testimony . The majority opinion's
recitation of the factual background to this appeal demonstrates the complete lack of
support for the trial court's finding. Simply stated, the undisputed fact that Thomas
Leroy Clements "decided to move from Owensboro to Florida during June of 1996 . . . .
[and] purchased residential property in Florida 03 is mutually exclusive with the trial
court's conclusion that Thomas Leroy Clements actually resided in Kentucky between
early-to-mid-April, 1996 and October 11, 1996 (when the petition for dissolution was
filed) .
In fact, the Petition for Dissolution itself explicitly states that "[b]oth parties lived
in the state of Florida since approximately July 19, 1996, and established residency in
that state ."
"While Kentucky adopted verbatim many provisions of the 1970 Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act, Kentucky made substantial changes to the provisions
relating to particular-case jurisdiction . The Act proposed a finding by the court that "one
of the parties, at the time the action was commenced, was domiciled in this State . . .
and that the domicil . . . has been maintained for 90 days next preceding the making of
the findings ." UNIF . MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 302(x)(1) (amended 1973), 9A U .L.A.
200 (1998) (emphasis added) . Kentucky departed from this provision of the Act in two
significant ways. First, in accordance with pre-existing Kentucky law, see Lanham v.
Lanham, 300 Ky. 237, 188 S .W .2d 439 (1945), Kentucky opted for a residency
requirement instead of a domicile requirement . KRS 403.140(1)(x). Second, the
General Assembly decided that residency must be maintained "for 180 days [not 90
days] next preceding the filing of the petition [not the making of findings.]" Id .
13
Majority Opinion at
S .W .3d
,
(200_) (Slip Op . at 1-2) .
The trial court's Decree of Dissolution of Marriage states that its finding that
Thomas Leroy Clements satisfied Kentucky's 180-day residency requirement was
premised upon : (1) an affidavit filed by a friend of the Petitioner that provided absolutely
no support for the trial court's jurisdictional finding ;" and (2) Thomas Leroy Clements's
testimony before the Domestic Relations Commissioner :
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Now, have you been a resident at least 180 days, a
resident of Kentucky at least 180 days prior to the
filing of this petition? In other words -Yes, sir.
Okay. You were still a resident of the State of
Kentucky when this petition was filed, is that right,
even though you had lived in Florida for a few
months?
Yes, that's right.
Okay, have you ever established a residence?
Well, we never established a residence as far as
driver's license or anything you know like cars.
Voter registration?
No, sir.
You had bought a house?
Bought the house, paid for it .
In my opinion, none of Thomas Leroy Clements's answers to the questions posed to
him constituted "any evidence to show" that he actually resided in Kentucky for the
requisite period . In fact, his answers show exactly the opposite -- i .e ., that he "bought a
house" and "lived in Florida for a few months" during the preceding six months. The
first two questions established only that he had been a resident for at least 180 days
"prior to the filing of this petition" -- not necessarily the 180 days "next preceding" that
filing -- and that he was a resident of Kentucky "when the petition was filed."
"The affiant expressed her opinion that Thomas Leroy Clements had not
changed his legal residency to Florida, but admits that he "lived in Florida until the latter
part of September, 1996, approximately 60 to 75 days" and did not reestablish actual
residency in Kentucky until late September of 1996 .
Alternatively, the argument could be made that Thomas Leroy Clements's
testimony constituted evidence that he had actually resided in Kentucky for the statutory
time period . If that is the case, then, given not only the other evidence, but also the
procedural posture of this case, I believe it is an inescapable conclusion that such
testimony was untruthful and that any judgment entered on the basis of such testimony
was void as fraudulently obtained . The Court of Appeals held that "the trial court did not
have jurisdiction as [Thomas Leroy Clements] did not meet the 180-day next residency
requirement," and, as Appellee did not file a cross-motion for discretionary review" from
the opinion below, this holding is unchallenged and undisputed ." While, generally
speaking, testimony can either be true or false, this testimony -- to the extent that it
directly addresses the jurisdictional question or created an inference relevant to the
jurisdictional question -- cannot have been truthful because the Court of Appeals has
finally determined that Thomas Leroy Clements was, in fact, residing outside of
Kentucky during a portion of the 180 days immediately preceding the filing of the
petition. And, if the testimony cannot have been truthful, there is only one alternative
remaining -- it was false . As such, even if we stretch the testimony to make it germane
to the specific-case jurisdiction inquiry, I do not see how we can avoid concluding that
the decree of dissolution was obtained by fraud and is therefore void ." Because KRS
'5CR 76 .21 .
"See Green River Health Department v. Wigai_inton , Ky., 764 S .W .2d 475, 479
(1989), overruled on other rounds by Withers v. University of Kentucky, Ky., 939
S .W .2d 340 (1997).
"See McDaniel v. McDaniel, Ky., 383 S .W .2d 244, 245 (1964) ("the rule is that a
divorce judgment procured through fraud and perjury as to residence may by direct
attack be set aside as void even though the party obtaining the divorce has remarried
and innocent parties may be affected ."); Kirk v. Kirk, 240 S.W.2d 598, 599 (1951)
("'[W]henever judgment is the result of a fraud perpetrated upon the court by a false
22A .020(3) does not preclude the appeal of a void judgment' $ -- for the principal reason
that "if there is no remedy by which judgments so procured . . . can be impeached and
annulled,
courts of justice may be made instruments by which the grossest frauds may
be successfully accomplished, to the great wrong and injury of innocent persons"" -- I
would reverse the Court of Appeals and vacate that part of the decree dissolving the
marriage .
Johnstone, J., joins this dissent.
representation of jurisdictional facts, the court rendering it may set it aside in a proper
proceeding instituted for that purpose. For example, if a judgment is obtained upon
constructive service by the plaintiff's false allegations that he resided in the court where
the action was brought and that the defendant was a nonresident of the state, the
judgment may be set aside on the ground that it was procured by fraud."' (citing 31 Ann .
JUR . Judgments § 738)) ; Logsdon v. Logsdon , 204 Ky. 104, 263 S .W. 728 (1924) .
Self v. Self, 293 Ky. 255, 168 S .W .2d 743, 744 (1943) ("It is only where a
divorce judgment is void that an appeal may be prosecuted in this court . . . . If the fraud
has been practiced to obtain apparent jurisdiction, the judgment can be set aside . . . ; if
the fraud related only to the testimony to obtain the divorce, the judgment cannot be so
set aside.").
18
"Logsdon v. Lo_ sc~ don , supra note 17 at 732, citing Edson v. Edson, 108 Mass .
590(1867) .
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