KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION V. DAVID R. REEVES
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TO BE PUBLISHED
KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION
V.
IN SUPREME COURT
DAVID R. REEVES
RESPONDENT
OPINION AND ORDER
Respondent, David R. Reeves, whose address is Grayson, Kentucky, and who is
admitted to practice law in this Commonwealth, was issued a three-count charge by the
Kentucky Bar Association (KBA) alleging violations of SCR 3.130-I .3, SCR 3.130-I .4
and SCR 3.130-l .16(d) based on his representation of AESOP Financial Corporation,
(AESOP). An evidentiary hearing was held before a trial commissioner. Neither party
filed a notice of appeal pursuant to SCR 3.360(4). Therefore, pursuant to SCR
3.370( lo), this Court adopts the recommendation of the trial commissioner and
Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a period of sixty (60) days.
In December 1997, Respondent agreed to assume representation of AESOP
against St. Claire Medical Center (St. Claire), in a collection case after he was
contacted by Michael Levy, counsel for AESOP in Virginia. Respondent agreed to
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handle the matter on a contingency fee basis and requested court costs and a retainer
fee from AESOP totaling $256.00. Levy forwarded that sum to Respondent in
March 1998. Respondent did not file suit until October 8, 1998.
In April 1998, Levy wrote Respondent inquiring as to the status of the litigation.
Levy testified before the trial commissioner that he also attempted to phone
Respondent in April and again in August 1998. Levy testified that on neither occasion
was he able to speak with Respondent, nor did Respondent return his calls. On
October 27, 1998, Levy wrote Respondent and demanded that Respondent return the
AESOP file and the $256.00 fee. In response, Respondent forwarded Levy the
Complaint (filed on October 8, 1998), the Answer and the $150.00 retainer. At this
time, Respondent failed to notify Levy that an economic litigation project (ELP) order
had been entered on October 27, 1998. Furthermore, Respondent failed to advise
Levy that a status conference had been scheduled for December 18, 1998 and that the
Rowan Circuit Court had ordered each party to file an ELP status report before that
conference.
On December 4, 1998, St. Claire filed its ELP status report with the circuit court.
Respondent mailed a copy of the ELP status report to Levy on December 16, 1998, two
days prior to the court-ordered status conference. Levy testified that he received the
report on December 18, 1998, the day the conference was held; and that, as of that
time, he still had not been informed that a status conference was to take place on that
day. The order from the Rowan Circuit Court reflects that no attorney appeared on
behalf of AESOP.
At the status conference, the court ordered that dispositive motions be filed
within thirty (30) days, after which each party would have twenty (20) days in which to
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respond. Respondent failed to provide Levy with a copy of the status conference order.
Pursuant to the order, St. Claire moved for summary judgment. While St. Claire’s
motion indicates that it was mailed to Respondent on January 18, 1999, Levy did not
receive it until February 3, 1999. Levy testified that he attempted but was unable to
obtain substitute counsel to handle the motion. As a result, the Rowan Circuit Court
granted St. Claire’s motion for summary judgment on March 2, 1999.
As a result of his inaction in this matter, the KBA issued a three-count charge
against Respondent. Count 1 alleged a violation of SCR 3.130-I .3, which states that,
“[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”
The trial commissioner found Respondent guilty of violating SCR 3.130-l .3 by failing to
timely file the civil suit on behalf of AESOP after receiving the filing fee and other
requirements in March 1998.
Count 2 of the charge alleged that Respondent violated SCR 3.130-l .4 which
states:
(a)
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A lawyer should keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
A lawyer should explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
Respondent was found guilty of violating SCR 3.130-l .4 by failing to return
Levy’s phone calls and letters regarding the status of the litigation. Respondent also
failed to inform Levy of the ELP order and status conference scheduled for
December 18, 1998 and of the motion schedule ordered by the court, ordering each
side to submit dispositive motions and responses if necessary. Finally, Respondent
failed to promptly supply Levy with a copy of St. Claire’s motion for summary judgment,
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which precluded Levy from being able to arrange for substitute counsel to respond to
the motion.
Count 3 of the charge alleged that Respondent violated SCR 3.130-I .16(d) by
failing to notify opposing counsel and the Rowan Circuit Court of the termination of his
representation of AESOP. Respondent also failed to promptly inform AESOP of
pending hearings and deadlines in the matter and failed to provide Levy with a copy of
the dispositive motion filed by St. Claire, which, if timely provided, would have given
AESOP time to retain substitute counsel to file a response or request additional time in
which to do so. SCR 3.130-l .16(d) states:
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable
notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering
papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance
payment of fee that has not been earned.
As with regard to counts 1 and 2 of the charge, the trial commissioner found by a
preponderance of the evidence that Respondent had violated SCR 3.130-I. 16(d).
The trial commissioner also found that even though Levy was a licensed attorney
in Virginia, that fact did not relieve Respondent of his duty to protect AESOP’s interests.
While Respondent’s failure to timely file suit on behalf of AESOP did not cause
substantial harm to the client, his failure to protect AESOP’s interests after his
termination did substantially impact AESOP’s position in the case. Because of this
failure, the trial commissioner found Respondent guilty of all three counts of the charge
and recommended that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law in this
Commonwealth for a period of sixty (60) days.
Upon the foregoing facts and charges, the trial commissioner’s findings and
recommendation are hereby adopted. It is further ordered that:
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1. Respondent, David R. Reeves, is suspended from the practice of law in this
Commonwealth for a period of sixty (60) days. The period of suspension shall
commence on the date of entry of this Opinion and Order.
2. In accordance with SCR 3.450, Respondent is directed to pay all costs
associated with these disciplinary proceedings against him, said sum being $596.74,
and for which execution may issue from this Court upon finality of this Opinion
Order.
All concur.
Entered: April 20, 2000.
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and
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