T.A., A JUVENILE V. JOAN BYER, JUDGE, JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MARCH 23,200O
TO BE PUBLISHED
T.A., A JUVENILE
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
99-CA-2392-OA
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 1999 FYI718
V.
JOAN BYER, JUDGE,
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
APPELLEE
AND
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE JOHNSTONE
AFFIRMING
T.A., a juvenile, appeals from an order of the Court of Appeals which dismissed
her case for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.
On September 14, 1999, T.A. appeared before Appellee, Judge Joan Byer, who
was sitting in Division One (1) of Jefferson County Family Court. Over T.A.‘s objection,
the trial judge entered an order requiring T.A. to cooperate in counseling, undergo a
drug and alcohol screening, and to schedule a gynecological examination before the
next hearing date.
T.A. filed an original action in the Court of Appeals to prohibit Judge Byer from
enforcing her order. Additionally, she filed a motion for intermediate relief seeking a
one-judge order staying the proceedings in the family court. Judge William L. Knopf
conducted a one-judge hearing on October 11, 1999, and he entered an order the next
day dismissing the case on grounds that the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction
to consider the motion for intermediate relief. Specifically, Judge Knopf stated:
The district court has exclusive jurisdiction over
juvenile matters. KRS 610.01 O(1). In matters involving
juvenile status offenses, the family court judge is exercising
the jurisdiction of the district court. JFRP’ 109(A) provides
that in any family court matters “over which the District Court
would otherwise have jurisdiction, any appeal shall proceed
by the Rules of Civil Procedure . . . to Circuit Court.”
On October 22, 1999, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals granted
T.A.‘s petition to advance. However, in the same order, the panel denied T.A. relief
reasoning that, “Petitioner should first seek relief in the circuit court.” While not
expressly stating so, the panel apparently adopted Judge Knopfs reasoning.
In Elery v. Martin, Ky. App., 4 S.W.3d 550 (1999) the Kentucky Court of Appeals
decided a jurisdictional issue very similar to the issue in the case at bar. The Elery
court held that the question of appellate jurisdiction turned on the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the underlying case. Id. at 552. The Elery court then “identified the family
matters on appeal and determined that all of the matters would otherwise be within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the district court” and, accordingly, held that the jurisdiction for
the appeal lay in circuit court pursuant to JFRP 109. Id. at 553. We agree with the
reasoning expressed in Elery which, standing alone, would require that we affirm the
‘Jefferson Family Court Rule of Practice
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Court of Appeals’ order dismissing. However, T.A. raises an issue not addressed in
Elery which requires further discussion on our part.
On appeal, T.A. cites us to SCR 1.030(3),
which provides in pertinent part,
“Proceedings in the nature of mandamus or prohibition against a circuit judge shall
originate in the Court of Appeals.” Because Judge Byer is an elected circuit court
judge, T.A. argues that the Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction over her petition
for a writ of prohibition. However, T.A. ignores the fact that, pursuant to the Family
Court project and Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution, Judge Byer also has
been assigned by the Chief Justice to serve as a special district judge. See Kuprion v.
Fitzaerald, Ky., 888 S.W.2d 679, 682 (1994).
The action at question in this case concerns the offense of being a habitual
runaway which is a status offense pursuant to KRS 630.020(l). As such, the action
falls exclusively in the jurisdiction of district court. KRS 610.010(1). Judge Byer was
acting in her capacity as a special district judge when T.A. appeared before her in the
matter in question. SCR 1.040(6)
provides in pertinent part, “Proceedings for relief in
the nature of mandamus or prohibition against a district judge shall originate in the
circuit court.” Thus, under the facts of this case, Elery, supra, and the applicable
Supreme Court Rules are not in conflict.
For the reasons set forth above, the order dismissing by the Court of Appeals is
hereby affirmed.
All concur.
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.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Daniel T. Goyette
Jefferson District Public Defender
J. David Niehaus
Deputy Appellate Defender
Office of the Jefferson District Public Defender
200 Civic Plaza
719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Judge Joan Byer
Jefferson Family Court
700 W. Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST:
Steven J. Kriegshaber
Jefferson Assistant County Attorney
531 Court Place
Louisville, KY 40202
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Capitol Building
Frankfort, KY 40601
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