GERALDINE CARROLL V. OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS CORP.; OWENS-ILLINOIS GLASS CO.; GARLOCK, INC.; FIBREBOARD CORP.; FOSTER WHEELER ENERGY CORP.; THE ANCHOR PACKING CO.
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MODIFIED: MARCH 22, 2001
MODIFIED: AUGUST 24, 2000
RENDERED: AUGUST 24,200O
TO BE PUBLISHED
99-SC-0740-CL
GERALDINE CARROLL
V.
APPELLANT
ON CERTIFICATION OF LAW FROM THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
CASE NO. 98-00-005680
OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS CORP.;
OWENS-ILLINOIS GLASS CO.;
GARLOCK, INC.; FIBREBOARD CORP.;
FOSTER WHEELER ENERGY CORP.;
THE ANCHOR PACKING CO.
APPELLEES
CERTIFICATION OF THE LAW BY JUSTICE GRAVES
Appellant, Geraldine Carroll, widow of James Carroll, brought this action for
personal injuries, wrongful death and loss of consortium. James Carroll spent thirty
years exposed to asbestos, much of which Appellees manufactured, while working as a
plumber/steamfitter. In December 1983, Carroll was diagnosed with a mild, nonprogressive form of asbestosis, a chronic lung inflammation caused by prolonged
inhalation of asbestos particles. Carroll’s condition was not disabling and he chose not
to sue at that time. Eight years later, however, Carroll was diagnosed with lung cancer
and filed suit against Appellees in United States District Court within five months of the
diagnosis. Because the lung cancer was a distinct and separate disease from the
asbestosis, Carroll argued his claim was filed within the one-year statute of limitations
for personal injury cases, as required by KRS 413.140(1)(a). Following Carroll’s death
from lung cancer in December 1991, Appellant added a wrongful death claim.
The United States District Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of
Appellees, holding that the statute of limitations for both diseases began at the time of
the 1983 asbestosis diagnosis, thus time-barring the personal injury and loss of
consortium claims. The court cited to the discovery rule set forth in Louisville Trust Co.
v. John-Manville Prods. Co., Ky., 580 S.W.2d 497, 500 (1979), which provides: “When
an injury does not manifest itself immediately, the cause of action should accrue not
when the injury was initially inflicted, but when the plaintiff knew or should have known
that he had been injured by the conduct of the tortfeasor.”
,The decedent in that case,
William Sampson, fell within the statute of limitations by the Court’s holding that it
began to run at the discovery of his mesothelioma, almost three years after his initial
exposure to asbestos. Concerning the extent of the injury, however, the Louisville Trust
Court held that “lack of knowledge of the extent of his injury does not toll a statute of
limitation to which the discovery rule is applied.” This rule also was applied in Caudill v.
Arnett, Ky., 481 S.W.2d 668 (1972), to bar a victim from suing for greater injury years
after a school bus accident, when he was on notice almost immediately that there was
at least minor injury caused by the same accident. Similarly, the United States District
Court in this case used the Caudill rule prohibiting splitting causes of action to hold that
in single-cause-of-action rule states, all causes of action, including future ones, arising
out of a single transaction must be brought in a single proceeding.
An appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals resulted in a request for
certification by this Court. After reviewing the record and hearing oral argument, we
conclude that while Kentucky has never been a “two disease” state (which would allow
for recovery following the discovery of each disease), because asbestosis and lung
cancer are separate and distinct diseases, both arising from asbestos exposure,
Kentucky’s one-year statute of limitations should not bar Appellant’s cancer claim
simply because Carroll did not pursue a potential claim for the fear or the enhanced risk
of developing cancer following an asbestosis diagnosis seven years earlier. Splitting
.causes of action inherently implies more than one action; nothing is split when only one
action is brought. While Carroll’s claim for asbestosis is time-barred, Appellant
concedes that such claim was waived, as was any claim for the increased risk or fear of
further asbestosis disease, as would otherwise be allowed by Davis v. Graviss, Ky., 672
S.W.2d 928 (1984). This case does not turn so much on the rule against splitting
causes of action, but more on pinpointing when a cause of action accrues in cases
involving multiple diseases brought on by the same toxic agent.
Since the discovery of its toxicity, asbestos has been found to be the cause of
several impairments, mostly respiratory. Some, such as pleural plaques and
thickening, are not debilitating. Others are potentially fatal, such as lung cancer and the
rarer mesothelioma. Asbestosis can cause impairment, or as is obvious from Carroll’s
failure to bring suit after diagnosis, it can be a milder disease. What is important to
note is that these diseases are not causes or prerequisites for each other. One does
not flow from the other. David E. Lilienfeld, “The Silence: The Asbestos Industry and
Early Occupational Cancer Research: A Case Study,” 81 Am. J. Pub. Health 791
(1991). When Carroll was diagnosed with asbestosis, he did not necessarily know, nor
should he have known that he would also eventually develop lung cancer. Only actual
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knowledge or knowledge of the probability of disease triggers the statute of limitations
under a Louisville Trust, supra, analysis.
Appellees urge the adoption of Farmer’s Bank and Trust Co. v. Rice, Ky., 674
S. W.2d 510 (1984), for the proposition that it is the discovery of the alleged wrongful act
(i.e., the exp osure to asbestos) and not its extent that determines the time of accrual.
In Farmer’s Bank, the plaintiff was misdiagnosed with mastitis and underwent surgery,
radiation and chemotherapy until tests indicated she was in remission. She thereafter
learned she had cancer of the brain and lungs, and filed suit almost two years after the
original misdiagnosis. The trial court rejected the plaintiffs argument that a
reappearance of cancer triggered a new statute of limitations, and rather held that the
discovery was not new and did not revive the cause of action.
Similarly, Appellees rely upon Capital Holding Corp. v. Bailey, Ky., 873 S.W.2d
187 (1994), to suggest that this area of the law is settled, and that Carroll was required
to have brought suit immediately following the discovery of asbestosis and include in
that suit any risk or fear of additional harm. In Capital Holdinq Corp., this Court
examined a Florida decision, Eaale-Picher Ind., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So.2d 517 (Fla. App.
1985), in which the plaintiff sued for asbestosis, fear of contracting cancer and the
enhanced risk of cancer. In allowing the “fear” claim, but disallowing a claim for
“enhanced risk,” the Florida court noted that the plaintiffs right to later sue for cancer
was reserved. Id. at 529.
In Capital Holdinq Corp., however, we pronounced the Florida rule “unwieldy and
unnecessary under Davis v. Graviss which permits the finder of fact to evaluate and
assess damages for the enhanced risk of contracting cancer. . .” Capital Holding
Corp., supra, at 195. Under Capital Holdinq Corp., suits for asbestos-related claims in
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Kentucky may be brought only once and may encompass all current or future damages,
because a claim made early can take into account damages which may occur in the
future. Id. at 195. However, the decision is silent about the procedure to be followed
when the plaintiff is not sufficiently impaired to warrant suing for the earlier illness.
Thus, despite Appellee’s contentions to the contrary, Capital Holding Corp. clearly
permits Appellant to bring a single cause of action at this point. Appellee’s counsel
argued for a two-disease rule, and for elimination of intermediate fear or enhanced-risk
.claims. Such a rule, however, would not only allow this Appellant’s suit to proceed, but
would have permitted it even had Carroll sued for asbestosis in 1983.
While Kentucky has a policy of requiring all causes of action to be settled at one
time, therefore encouraging recovery based on fear of further complications, this policy
is not particularly logical or feasible in toxic substance cases. particularly those
concerned with asbestos, which causes diseases with an extended latency period of as
much as forty years. W. Nicholson et al., “Occupational Exposure to Asbestos:
Population at Risk and Projected Mortality,” 1980-2030, 3 Amer. J. Indust. Med. 259
(1982). In forcing those afflicted with milder asbestos-related diseases. or those who
have merely been exposed to asbestosis. to sue within one year of their discoveries in
order to stay within of the statute of limitations, “tens of thousands of these tort claims
have been made successfully by individuals who are understandably worried about
their exposure to asbestos, but who are not now and never will be afflicted by disease.”
Edley. Christopher F., Jr. and Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion-Dollar Crisis 30
Harv. J. on Legis. 38 (1993).
Eleven years earlier, then-Circuit Court Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed
the same idea against splitting causes of action in cases where only one suit is filed in a
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I
’
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia case strikingly similar to this one, Wilson v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. 1982). In Wilson, the plaintiff was
diagnosed with asbestosis in 1973, but did not sue. In 1978, he was diagnosed with
mesothelioma and his widow filed suit within the three-year statute of limitations.
Justice Ginsburg said:
Rules of res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel
(issue preclusion) concern the preclusive effects of former
adjudication. Here there has been no former adjudication, no prior
action resulted in a judgment to be given effect in a subsequent
action. . . . This case requires us to focus, not on judgments or their
preclusive effects, but on statutes of limitation and the policies they
implicate in personal injury actions. . . . Upon diagnosis of an initial
illness, such as asbestosis, the injured party may not need or
desire judicial relief. . . . If no further disease ensues, the injured
party would have no cause to litigate. However, if such a person is
told that another, more serious disease may manifest itself later on,
and that a remedy in court will be barred unless an anticipatory
action is filed currently, there will be a powerful incentive to go to
court, for the consequence of a wait-and-see approach to the
commencement of litigation may be too severe a risk.
Id.at 118.
In his article, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic Substances
Litigation, 76 Calif. L.Rev. 965 (1988) Professor Michael D. Green discussed why
statutes of limitations in toxic substance cases serve neither of the traditional functions
of statutes of limitations --the preservation of evidence and peace of mind for potential
defendants.
Unlike traditional torts, those involving toxic substances include a cause of
injury that is difficult to trace, a period of exposure which is longer and more varied,
harms more susceptible to misdiagnosis, and a greater number of victims. While
sharing Ginsburg, Edley, and Weiler’s concerns that a plaintiff may feel compelled to
rush to litigation on a flimsy case, Green argued that because of the latency of the
diseases, statutes of limitations force plaintiffs to go to court before they have all the
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facts about their illness. Often the claimant must move forward before there has been
a definitive diagnosis of likely injury from the exposure to asbestos.
When James Carroll was diagnosed with asbestosis in 1983, he should not have
been obligated to predict cancer, nor should he be penalized for suing for the greater,
more provable damage. rather than taking up judicial resources attempting to prove the
ephemeral damages covered by “enhanced risk or fear of cancer.” Because of the
length of time between the diagnoses of these two diseases. it is possible that an
asbestosis suit could have been filed and adjudicated before he ever knew he had
cancer, leaving him no direct remedy for the more serious disease.
While purportedly relying on Louisville Trust, sunra, the district court in this case
ignored a crucial passage:
Our own review of foreign authorities convinces us that this statement in
Birnbaum’s article in Forum is correct: “The clear trend. in most
jurisdictions in cases dealing with drugs, chemicals and asbestos has
been to apply some variation of the discovery rule which is based in
equitable considerations. Courts have felt that the injured party should be
allowed to have his day in court when his injury was of an inherently
unknowable nature.”
Louisville Trust at 501 (footnote, internal citations omitted).
James Carroll knew he had asbestosis and he knew the extent of that disease.
This is not a case of medical malpractice, like Farmer’s Bank, supra. where the disease
remained the same. but its complete nature was misdiagnosed. Even though the
plaintiff in Farmer’s Bank was not diagnosed with the correct type of cancer, she still
received a cancer diagnosis and, furthermore, cancer is known to spread. Asbestosis
does not necessarily progress to lung cancer.
James Carroll’s knowledge of
asbestosis did not make his lung cancer anymore knowable or give him a reason to
expect it.
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Therefore. we hold that the action for cancer accrued on the date of the
diagnosis of the cancer, not the diagnosis of asbestosis, which is a separate and
distinct disease.
All concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS:
Kenneth L. Sales
Joseph D. Satterly
Kathleen M. Flynn
Segal, Sales, Stewart, Cutler & Tillman
2100 Waterfront Plaza
325 West Main Street
Louisville, KY 40202
Marc Weingarten
Greitzer & Locks
1500 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19102
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
Cathleen Charters Palmer
O’Bryan, Brown & Toner
Suite 1500 Starks Building
455 South Fourth Ave.
Louisville, KY 40202
John L. Dotson
310 Coralberry
Louisville, KY 40207
Karin S. Schwartz
Debevoise & Plimpton
875 Third Ave.
New York, NY 1002
John K. Gordinier
Pedley, Ross, Zielke, Gordinier & Porter
1150 Starks Building
Louisville, KY 40202
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99-SC-0740-CL
GERALDINE CARROLL
V.
APPELLANT
ON CERTIFICATION OF LAW FROM THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
CASE NO. 98-00-005680
OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS CORP.;
OWENS-ILLINOIS GLASS CO.;
GARLOCK, INC.; FIBREBOARD CORP.;
FOSTER WHEELER ENERGY CORP.;
THE ANCHOR PACKING CO.
APPELLEES
ORDER
On the Court’s own motion, the opinion of the Court rendered August
24, 2000, is modified by changes to pages 5, 6, and 7, hereto attached, in lieu of
pages 5, 6, and 7 of the opinion as originally rendered. Said modifications do not
affect the holding.
ENTERED: August a!/, 2000.
Chief Justice
hprcme (hut of Kmtutkg
99-SC-0740-CL
APPELLANT
GERALDINE CARROLL
V.
ON CERTIFICATION OF LAW FROM THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
CASE NO. 98-00-005680
OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS CORP.;
OWENS-ILLINOIS GLASS CO.;
GARLOCK, INC.; FIBREBOARD CORP.;
FOSTER WHEELER ENERGY CORP.;
THE ANCHOR PACKING CO.
APPELLEES
ORDER
The petition for rehearing filed by Appellant, Geraldine Carroll, is denied.
The Court , on its own motion, modifies the opinion rendered on August 24,200O to the
extent that page 6 has been replaced by a modified page, attached hereto , in order to reflect a
correction to the first full sentence on that page. Said modification does not affect the hoiding of
the opinion as originally rendered.
ENTERED: March 22,200l.
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