DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS VS. FRIAR (MARCUS)
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 20, 2013; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
OPINION OF MARCH 9, 2012, WITHDRAWN
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002158-MR
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ELLIOT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA PHILLIPS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00109
MARCUS FRIAR
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, COMBS, AND NICKELL, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: The Department of Corrections appeals the determination of
the Elliot Circuit Court holding that Marcus Friar was exempt from being
classified as a violent offender. Upon review, we reverse and remand.
Marcus Friar was a juvenile offender when he was convicted in the
McCracken Circuit Court of first degree rape and resisting arrest. He was
sentenced to serve fifteen years, but because he was still a juvenile, was remanded
to the care and custody of the department of juvenile justice. After he turned
eighteen years of age, he appeared before the trial court on August 16, 2004 for resentencing as an adult pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 640.030.
Friar was given credit for 1,503 days served as a juvenile and the
remainder of his sentence was probated for a period of 4 years. On October 10,
2006, he returned to the trial court after testing positive on a drug test. He
admitted the use of illegal drugs and waived any hearing considering the
revocation of his probation.
Friar was then sentenced to serve the remainder of the original fifteen
year sentence. The department of corrections incarcerated him in an adult prison
and classified him as a violent offender pursuant to KRS 439.3401. That
classification requires service of 85 percent of any sentence before a prisoner may
be considered for parole instead of the less punitive 20 percent parole eligibility for
non-violent offenders. 501 Kentucky Administrative Regulation 1:030.
Friar then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order
prohibiting the department of corrections from classifying him as a violent
offender. The trial court granted that request and entered the order sought. The
department of corrections then filed this appeal.
We first examined the issue of how to classify a juvenile offender who
has reached adulthood. Mullins v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 222 (Ky.App.
1997). In that case we held that juvenile offenders who attained the age of
-2-
majority are not exempt from the provisions of the violent offender statute, KRS
439.3401. The Kentucky Supreme Court held in the case of Commonwealth v.
Merriman, 265 S.W.3d 196, 201 (Ky. 2008), that the “Violent Offender Statute
cannot be read to apply to youthful offenders.” However, in the most recent case
of Edwards v. Harrod, 391 S.W.3d 755 (Ky. 2013) the Supreme Court discussed
the difference between probation and parole further and distinguished Merriman.
The Court in Edwards stated,
[T]he power to grant parole is a purely executive function.
Kentucky Courts have . . . conceptualized ‘probation’ as the
suspension of the imposition of a sentence while, after
imposition, ‘parole’ suspends execution of a sentence[.] So,
it would be inappropriate to apply Merriman here by simply
equating parole with probation. It is entirely consistent for
the General Assembly to direct circuit courts to consider
probation for youthful offenders despite the Violent
Offender Statute and, at the same time, require the parole
board to apply the parole restrictions of the Violent
Offender Statute to youthful offenders.
Second . . . the youthful offender statutes do not require
the parole board to consider all youthful offenders for early
parole.
....
So application of the parole-eligibility restrictions of a
Violent Offender Statute does not conflict with or nullify
the youthful offender procedures. KRS 640.030(2)
indicates that youthful offenders may be paroled prior to
their 18-year-old hearing. But the parole board is not
required to consider granting parole to youthful offenders.
And, under our holding today, the parole board cannot grant
parole to youthful offenders who are ineligible under the
Violent Offender Statute.
-3-
For the forgoing reasons, the Merriman opinion is
limited to probation considerations.”
Id. at 761-62 (footnotes and citations omitted).
We therefore reverse the decision of the Elliot Circuit Court granting
the petition for a writ of mandamus prohibiting the department of corrections from
classifying Friar as a violent offender and remand this action to the Elliot Circuit
Court consistent with the holding of this opinion.
NICKELL, JUDGE, CONCURS.
COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Marcus Friar, pro se
Central City, Kentucky
Angela E. Cordery
Frankfort, Kentucky
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