OWENS (MICHELE) VS. ANDREW CLOONEY; COMPLETE LEGAL, LTD.; AND COMPLETE LEGAL SUPPORT, INC.
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RENDERED: AUGUST 26, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-002067-MR
MICHELE OWENS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE A.C. MCKAY CHAUVIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 10-CI-003201
ANDREW CLOONEY;
COMPLETE LEGAL, LTD.;
AND COMPLETE LEGAL
SUPPORT, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Michele Owens appeals from the Jefferson Circuit Court
order dismissing her claims against Complete Legal for lack of personal
jurisdiction. For the following reasons, we affirm.
This action stems from Complete Legal’s subpoenaing and its
procurement of Owens’ confidential academic records from the Court Reporting
Institute (“CRI”) in Dallas, Texas. At the time, Owens was involved in a civil
action against her former employer, Kentuckiana Reporters, in Jefferson Circuit
Court (No. 07-CI-8322). During the damages phase of that suit, counsel for
Kentuckiana, Andrew Clooney, hired Complete Legal to obtain Owens’ CRI
records in connection with that lawsuit. The records were ultimately deemed
inadmissible by the trial court.
Owens then brought the underlying suit against Clooney and
Complete Legal alleging invasion of privacy, forgery, fraud, unauthorized practice
of law and negligence based on the manner in which her records were obtained in
Texas. Specifically, Owens alleges that Complete Legal forged fraudulent
documents that purported to be a subpoena issued by court order to obtain her
records from CRI. The trial court dismissed her claims against Complete Legal for
lack of personal jurisdiction. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Owens argues that (1) Kentucky has specific personal
jurisdiction over Complete Legal and (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
Complete Legal in Kentucky would not offend Complete Legal’s federal due
process rights.1 We disagree.
1
Owens only argues the existence of “specific” personal jurisdiction over Complete Legal for
claims arising out of or relating to Complete Legal’s contacts with Kentucky, not the existence of
“general” personal jurisdiction, which requires a showing that Complete Legal has continuous
and systematic contacts with Kentucky so as to justify Kentucky’s exercise of judicial power
with regard to any and all claims Owens may have against Complete Legal. See Crouch v.
Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 682 F.Supp.2d 788, 792 (W.D.Ky. 2010) (differentiating between
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The question of whether a trial court properly declined to exercise
personal jurisdiction is an issue of law and our review, therefore, is de novo.
Appalachian Reg’l Healthcare, Inc. v. Coleman, 239 S.W.3d 49, 53-54 (Ky. 2007)
(citations omitted).
First, Owens argues that Kentucky has specific personal jurisdiction
over Complete Legal pursuant to Kentucky’s long-arm statute, KRS2 454.210,
which provides, in relevant part:
(2)(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim
arising from the person’s:
1. Transacting any business in this
Commonwealth;
2. Contracting to supply services or goods in this
Commonwealth;
3. Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in
this Commonwealth[.]
Recently, the Kentucky Supreme Court in Caesars Riverboat Casino,
LLC v. Beach, 336 S.W.3d 51 (Ky. 2011), clarified that a two-step process should
be used to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists, specifically overruling
precedent that had collapsed this two-step process into a single inquiry of whether
due process permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The Court explained,
[T]he proper analysis of long-arm jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant consists of a two-step process.
“specific” and “general” personal jurisdiction).
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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First, review must proceed under KRS 454.210 to
determine if the cause of action arises from conduct or
activity of the defendant that fits into one of the statute’s
enumerated categories. If not, then in personam
jurisdiction may not be exercised. When that initial step
results in a determination that the statute is applicable, a
second step of analysis must be taken to determine if
exercising personal jurisdiction over the non-resident
defendant offends his federal due process rights. To the
extent Wilson [v. Case, 85 S.W.3d 589 (Ky. 2002)],
Cummings [v. Pitman, 239 S.W.3d 77 (Ky. 2007)], and
like cases hold otherwise, they are overruled.
Id. at 57.
Thus, we first proceed under KRS 454.210(2)(a) to determine whether
Owens’ cause of action arises from conduct or activity on the part of Complete
Legal that fits into one of the statute’s enumerated categories. Owens maintains
that jurisdiction is proper under Subsections (1), (2), and (3) because the
contractual agreement between Clooney and Complete Legal constitutes a business
transaction and/or a contract to supply services in Kentucky which caused her
tortious injury in Kentucky. Owens emphasizes that Complete Legal was aware
that her records would be used in a pending civil proceeding in Kentucky.
However, controlling law is clear that these contacts are insufficient to
invoke personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in Kentucky. In Tube
Turns Div. of Chemetron Corp. v. Patterson Co., 562 S.W.2d 99 (Ky.App. 1978), a
Kentucky corporation sued a Colorado corporation to recover the balance due on a
contract for payment of goods. The court noted the following details regarding the
nonresident defendant’s contacts with Kentucky:
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Patterson is a Colorado corporation. The initial contact
with Patterson was made in Colorado by Tube Turns’s
Colorado representative. Subsequent negotiations were
conducted by mail and telephone between Patterson in
Colorado and Tube Turns’s Louisville office. Patterson’s
order was accepted by Tube Turns in Louisville.
Patterson has no certificate of authority to transact
business in Kentucky. It has never maintained an office,
a post office box, or telephone directory listing for the
purpose of transacting business in Kentucky. Patterson
has no employees or agents in Kentucky, and it owns no
property in Kentucky. Its employees and agents never
physically entered Kentucky for the purpose of
negotiating contracts or soliciting any business.
Id. at 99-100. The court ultimately concluded that “it would be unreasonable for
Kentucky to exercise jurisdiction over Patterson solely on the basis of negotiations
by telephone and mail which culminated in the acceptance of a single order in
Louisville.” Id. at 100.
Additionally, a Kentucky federal court reached the same conclusion
when it determined that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant in Papa John’s Int’l, Inc. v. Entertainment Marketing &
Communications Int’l, Ltd., 381 F.Supp.2d 638 (W.D.Ky. 2005). In Papa John’s,
a dispute arose over marketing services that were being provided to Papa John’s by
a New York corporation with its principal place of business in Connecticut. Id. at
640. The court noted that neither defendant conducted regular business in
Kentucky or owned any property in Kentucky. Id. The court further noted that at
no time during the business relationship did the defendants physically enter
Kentucky; instead, “Papa John’s employees in Kentucky communicated via
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telephone, mail and email with Defendants in New York and Connecticut on the
development of the marketing campaign.” Id. In declining to exercise personal
jurisdiction, the court held:
There was virtually no evidence that Defendants solicited
business in Kentucky or that they actually performed
work in Kentucky. Plaintiffs produced no evidence that
Defendants derived substantial revenues from business in
Kentucky. Whatever agreement was reached, was not
reached in Kentucky. . . . The facts here do not present
the case of a corporation reaching out to create an ongoing series of relationships with a Kentucky customer
involving numerous billings, shipment of product to or
from the state and substantial sums of money.
Id. at 643-44 (internal citations omitted).
The circumstances of the case at bar are similar to those in Tube Turns
and Papa John’s. Clooney retained Complete Legal to perform services in Texas.
Complete Legal is organized and incorporated in Texas and is not and never has
been organized, incorporated, or licensed to conduct business in Kentucky. No
representative of Complete Legal ever visited Kentucky to negotiate or complete
this transaction and Complete Legal never subpoenaed documents in Kentucky.
Further, all of the negotiations in this business relationship occurred via telephone
or mail. Complete Legal has no offices in Kentucky, does not own property in
Kentucky, does not have any employees located in Kentucky, has no equipment in
Kentucky and has no post office or other mailing address in Kentucky. Moreover,
Owens’ allegations that Complete Legal engaged in fraud and forgery involve
activities that occurred in Texas.
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With respect to Owens’ argument that the court should exercise
personal jurisdiction because Complete Legal was aware of the fact that the
services it performed in Texas would impact a lawsuit pending in Kentucky, we
note that in Kennedy v. Ziesmann, 526 F.Supp. 1328 (E.D.Ky. 1981), the court
refused to extend personal jurisdiction to a doctor who treated a Kentucky resident
on the mere allegation that his work would have some effect in Kentucky. In
Kennedy, the physician resided and practiced in Ohio, and his private medical
practice was incorporated in Ohio. He was not on staff at any Kentucky hospitals,
did not own property in Kentucky, and did not have a bank account in Kentucky.
Id. at 1329. He did, however, list his practice in directories that circulated in
Kentucky and admitted to having operated on a few other Kentucky patients during
the last five years. Id. Similar to Owens, the plaintiff in Kennedy urged the court
to extend personal jurisdiction to the defendant because he “‘purposely’ caused a
‘consequence’ in Kentucky, since he knew plaintiff would return there bearing any
ill effects his treatment may have caused her.” Id. at 1330-31. In rejecting the
plaintiff’s theory, the court concluded that “[a]lthough [the defendant] might have
foreseen that his treatment of plaintiff might have some indirect effects in
Kentucky, more than that is required” for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant. Id. at 1332. Here, unlike the physician in Kennedy,
Complete Legal is not listed in any directories in Kentucky and does not otherwise
solicit business here. The mere fact that Complete Legal may have known that its
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actions in Texas might have an effect in Kentucky is alone insufficient to exercise
personal jurisdiction.
Finally, Owens’ claim that she should not have to travel to Texas to
litigate her claims against Complete Legal is unpersuasive. Owens has chosen to
assert claims against a Texas corporation that is only licensed to do business in
Texas, whose office and employees are located in Texas, for actions it performed
in Texas. The fact that it may be inconvenient for Owens to file suit in Texas is
not dispositive of the personal jurisdiction issue before us. See Tube Turns, 562
S.W.2d at 100 (holding that the convenience of location is not enough to satisfy
due process).
Since we hold that personal jurisdiction cannot be exercised under
KRS 454.210(2)(a)(1), (2), or (3), we need not proceed to an analysis of whether
the exercise of personal jurisdiction in these circumstances violates Complete
Legal’s federal due process rights. Caesar’s, 336 S.W.3d at 57. Thus, the trial
court did not err by dismissing Owens’ claims against Complete Legal.3
The order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ACREE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE, DISSENTS.
3
Though the trial court’s decision to dismiss Owens’ claims against Complete Legal was based
on different reasoning (the exercise of personal jurisdiction violates Complete Legal’s federal
due process rights), the rule is well-settled that an appellate court may affirm a lower court for
any reason supported by the record. McCloud v. Commonwealth, 286 S.W.3d 780, 786 n19 (Ky.
2009).
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kirk Hoskins
Louisville, Kentucky
Edward T. Depp
Lynsie T. Gaddis
Louisville, Kentucky
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