WATKINS (LARRY E.) VS. THOMPSON (LADONNA), ET AL.
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RENDERED: JUNE 3, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-001882-MR
LARRY E. WATKINS-EL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 10-CI-00526
LADONNA THOMPSON;
STEVE HANEY; LT. WALLS;
CHRISTINA DAUGHERTY;
DAVID DYKES; AND DAWN
DECKARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON, KELLER AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Larry Watkins-El appeals pro se from the order by the
Franklin Circuit Court granting Appellees’1 motion to dismiss. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
At all times pertinent to this action, Watkins-El was incarcerated at
Northpoint Training Center (“Northpoint”). On August 21, 2009, an inmate riot
ensued at Northpoint. Following the riot, Watkins-El’s personal property was
seized by Appellees, employees of Northpoint. Watkins-El filed the underlying
action, alleging that the seizure of his personal property violated his constitutional
rights. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to CR2 12.02(f), in which they
asserted that Watkins-El failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The trial court granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss on the basis that their actions
were discretionary and they were entitled to qualified official immunity. This
appeal followed.
A trial court should not grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
“unless it appears the pleading party would not be entitled to relief under any set of
facts which could be proved in support of his claim.” James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d
875, 883 (Ky.App. 2002) (citation omitted). Since the trial court is not required to
make any factual findings in determining whether to grant or deny a motion to
dismiss, the determination is purely a matter of law. Id. at 884. An appellate court
reviews questions of law de novo. Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010)
(citation omitted).
1
LaDonna Thompson, Steve Haney, Christina Daugherty, David Dykes, and Dawn Deckard.
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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On appeal, Watkins-El argues the trial court erred by granting Appellees’
motion to dismiss his claim because he alleged facts supporting a claim that his
constitutional rights were violated. We disagree.
As the Kentucky Supreme Court explained in Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d
510 (Ky. 2001),
‘Official immunity’ is immunity from tort liability
afforded to public officers and employees for acts
performed in the exercise of their discretionary functions.
It rests not on the status or title of the officer or
employee, but on the function performed. Official
immunity can be absolute, as when an officer or
employee of the state is sued in his/her representative
capacity, in which event his/her actions are included
under the umbrella of sovereign immunity . . . .
Similarly, when an officer or employee of a
governmental agency is sued in his/her representative
capacity, the officer’s or employee’s actions are afforded
the same immunity, if any, to which the agency, itself,
would be entitled, . . . . But when sued in their individual
capacities, public officers and employees enjoy only
qualified official immunity, which affords protection
from damages liability for good faith judgment calls
made in a legally uncertain environment. Qualified
official immunity applies to the negligent performance by
a public officer or employee of (1) discretionary acts or
functions, i.e., those involving the exercise of discretion
and judgment, or personal deliberation, decision, and
judgment; (2) in good faith; and (3) within the scope of
the employee’s authority.
Id. at 521-22. (internal citations omitted).
The trial court dismissed Watkins-El’s claim based on the reasoning set
forth in Ashley v. U.S., 37 F.Supp.2d 1027 (W.D. Tenn. 1997). In Ashley, a
prisoner filed a pro se claim against the Bureau of Prisons seeking to recover
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damaged and missing personal property that was seized the day after an inmate riot
occurred at the prison. Id. at 1029. The trial court specifically held that the
internal security of a prison is left to the discretion of the prison administrators. Id.
at 1032 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 n. 14, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2400
n. 14, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981)). Further, the court noted that the minute-to-minute
decisions made during the chaotic circumstances of a riot are examples of activities
requiring the exercise of discretion so as to preserve the internal order and
discipline within a prison. Ashley, 37 F.Supp.2d at 1032 (citation omitted). The
trial court granted the United States’ motion to dismiss on the basis that the prison
employees’ actions in regards to inmates’ personal property in response to a riot
situation were discretionary functions afforded immunity. Id.
In the instant case, the conduct of the Appelles that Watkins-El alleges
violated his rights was undoubtedly in response to the inmate riot at Northpoint.
Similar to the facts in Ashley, Watkins-El’s personal property was seized less than
a day after the inmate riot began. We find the analysis in Ashley to be a proper
application of the discretionary function requirement so to extend qualified official
immunity to Appellees in this instance. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by
granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss.
The order of the Franklin Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Larry E. Watkins, Pro se
West Liberty, Kentucky
Wesley W. Duke
Justice & Public Safety Cabinet
Frankfort, Kentucky
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