M. (F. T.) VS. M. (G. S.), ET AL.
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RENDERED: AUGUST 12, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-001850-ME
F.T.M.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODERICK MESSER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 10-AD-00004
G.S.M. AND T.L.M., A CHILD
AND
APPELLEES
NO. 2010-CA-001851-ME
F.T.M.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODERICK MESSER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 10-AD-00005
G.S.M. AND S.E.M., A CHILD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: NICKELL AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; ISAAC,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: F.T.M. (father) appeals two judgments terminating his
parental rights to his two children and granting the adoption petitions filed by the
children’s stepfather, G.S.M. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Father and W.K.M. (mother) were married in 1995. In 1997, their
first child was born and the second was born in 2000. Sometime in 1998, father
began having a substance abuse addiction and, before father and mother finally
separated in March 2004, had two separate emergency protective orders issued
against him for violent acts committed in the children’s presence.
In June 2004, the marriage between father and mother was dissolved
and father was ordered to pay $331 per month in child support and to pay certain
marital debts, including payments on a truck he was awarded. Mother was
awarded custody of the children. Father was not awarded visitation with children
but was required to petition the court for visitation. However, father did not file a
motion to have contact with the children until May 14, 2010, after the petitions for
adoption were filed.
Despite the absence of a visitation order, mother permitted some
contact with the children and father after the decree through November 2004, when
father moved to Michigan. Father admits that between 2004 and 2007, he suffered
a drug addiction and during that time was periodically incarcerated. In 2005, he
served a nine-month sentence and upon release, violated his parole and was
1
Senior Judge Sheila R. Isaac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
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sentenced to an additional six months’ home incarceration. During that time, he
did not comply with his obligations under the decree to pay his share of the marital
debts and child support.
In 2007, father contacted an attorney to establish child support and
visitation. However, an agreement was not reached before father’s arrest for
driving under the influence. His probation was revoked and he was sentenced to
two years’ imprisonment. During his incarceration, father occasionally telephoned
his children and received periodic letters and cards for holidays such as Christmas
and Father’s Day, the last being a letter received in September 2009 from his oldest
child. Although he alleges that he sent money through his sister, he had no proof
of his payments and admitted it was not sufficient to meet his child support
obligation.
When released in 2010, father called his oldest child to wish her
Happy Easter and reestablish communication. Mother reported father to his parole
officer but was informed that there was no order prohibiting contact with the
children. After G.S.M. filed the petitions for termination and adoptions in April
2010, father filed a motion to establish phone visitation with the children.
A hearing was held at which the parents, the paternal grandmother,
paternal aunts and stepfather testified. Additionally, the guardian ad litem’s report
was introduced.
Mother testified that father did not pay child support or the debts as
ordered in the decree. The only money she received was from father’s sister in the
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first few months following the divorce and, pursuant to the decree, father owed her
approximately $54,000. Although father knew her address and she did not prevent
him from seeing the children, he had not exercised any parenting time with the
children since November 2004. She testified that she married stepfather in
September 2005, and the couple has one child. Stepfather has provided support for
the children and they refer to him as “Dad.” Father’s family, including his mother,
sister, and brother have had contact with the children once a year and sent
Christmas and birthday gifts. She testified that adoption of the children by
stepfather is in the children’s best interests.
Father testified that prior to his drug addiction, he had a loving
relationship with his children. However, since the divorce until the date of the
hearing, he had seen his children only four or five times, which he stated was the
result of his addiction and incarceration. He alleged that he stopped using drugs
prior to the revocation of his probation in April 2008, but admitted that his
probation was revoked because of a DUI charge in October 2007. While in prison,
father participated in drug treatment programs which were completed and he took
parenting courses. Additionally, he worked and obtained his GED. As a result of
his performance on the GED, he received college scholarships and, at the time of
the hearing, had completed a college course. He attributed his failure to provide
support for his children as required by the decree to his drug addiction. However,
since his release from prison in March 2010, father has been employed earning $15
per hour but had not paid child support.
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Father’s mother and sisters testified that they continue to have a
loving relationship with the children. They see the children approximately once
per year, maintain telephone contact, and send holiday gifts. All testified that prior
to his drug addiction, father was a loving parent.
Stepfather testified that he loves the children and is fully aware of his
financial responsibilities to the children. Since late 2004, he has provided the
children with food, clothing, and a home. He testified that he was not aware of any
support received from father.
The guardian ad litem’s report stated that he interviewed the parents,
the stepfather, and the children. He observed that the children appeared wellnourished, well-groomed, active and content. The children reported that they
understood the adoption process and believed adoption by their stepfather was in
their best interest. Their only contact with father in the past five years was through
cards and letters. The guardian ad litem concluded that termination of father’s
rights and adoptions by stepfather were in the children’s best interests.
Following the close of the evidence, the circuit court judge orally
stated his findings and conclusions. Specifically, the court found that father had
failed to provide support or be involved with the children for more than seventy
months, well in excess of the ninety days required by statute. Additionally, the
circuit court found that father failed to or was incapable of providing paternal care
and support for a period of more than six months and that there was no reasonable
expectation of improvement in parental care and protection, considering the age of
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the children. After orally stating his decision, the judge instructed stepfather’s
counsel to prepare the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgments and to
forward them to father’s counsel. Subsequently, the judgments prepared by
stepfather’s counsel were entered.
Father’s initial contention is that the circuit court erred when it
delegated the duty of drafting findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgments to
opposing counsel. We are not persuaded that the circuit court erred.
In Bingham v. Bingham, 628 S.W.2d 628, 629-630 (Ky. 1982), the
Court was confronted with a similar argument and concluded:
There has been no showing that the decision-making
process was not under the control of the trial judge, nor
that these findings and conclusions were not the product
of the deliberations of the trial judge's mind. The
evidence adduced at trial clearly supports the findings of
fact and conclusions of law announced by the court and
in the absence of a showing that the trial judge clearly
abused his discretion and delegated his decision-making
responsibility under CR 52.01, they are not to be easily
rejected.
We set forth the entirety of the circuit court’s oral findings of fact and
conclusions of law stated after the hearing to emphasize that the circuit court
explicitly stated its findings and conclusions. There was no objection to the
tendered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgments; thus, the parties and
the court accepted the tendered findings, conclusions, and judgments as an accurate
reflection of the circuit court’s oral findings and conclusions. Therefore, we
cannot say that the circuit court’s use of stepfather’s proposed written findings of
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fact, conclusions of law, and judgments was erroneous. M.E.C. v. Com., Cabinet
for Health and Family Services, 254 S.W.3d 846, 851 (Ky.App. 2008).
We next address the circuit court’s conclusion that the adoptions
should be granted.
This case was initiated as an adoption proceeding. Nevertheless, “an
adoption without consent of the biological parents is, by its nature, a proceeding
seeking the termination of parental rights.” C.M.C. v. A.L.W., 180 S.W.3d 485,
489 (Ky.App. 2005). Thus, the statute governing adoption, KRS 199.502, requires
the same conditions set forth in KRS 625.090(2), which require clear and
convincing evidence to prove whether one of the conditions therein supports the
termination of parental rights.
As applicable to the present case, KRS 199.502 provides:
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 199.500(1), an
adoption may be granted without the consent of the
biological living parents of a child if it is pleaded and
proved as part of the adoption proceeding that any of the
following conditions exist with respect to the child:
(a) That the parent has abandoned the child for a period of
not less than ninety (90) days;
...
(e) That the parent, for a period of not less than six (6)
months, has continuously or repeatedly failed or refused
to provide or has been substantially incapable of
providing essential parental care and protection for the
child, and that there is no reasonable expectation of
improvement in parental care and protection, considering
the age of the child;
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...
(g) That the parent, for reasons other than poverty alone,
has continuously or repeatedly failed to provide or is
incapable of providing essential food, clothing, shelter,
medical care, or education reasonably necessary and
available for the child's wellbeing and that there is no
reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the
parent's conduct in the immediately foreseeable future,
considering the age of the child;
(2) Upon the conclusion of proof and argument of
counsel, the Circuit Court shall enter findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and a decision either:
(a) Granting the adoption without the biological parent's
consent; or
(b) Dismissing the adoption petition, and stating whether
the child shall be returned to the biological parent or the
child's custody granted to the state, another agency, or
the petitioner.
Because adoption is a statutory right, severing permanently the parental
relationship, Kentucky courts require strict compliance with the procedures to
protect the rights of the natural parents. Day v. Day, 937 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Ky.
1997). “Nothing can be assumed, presumed, or inferred and what is not found in
the statute is a matter for the legislature to supply and not the courts.” Id. (citing
Coonradt v. Sailors, 186 Tenn. 294, 209 S.W.2d 859 (1948)). A trial court must
find that termination of parental rights is supported by clear and convincing
evidence. V.S. v. Com., Cabinet for Human Resources, 706 S.W.2d 420, 424
(Ky.App. 1986). The findings of the trial court will not be disturbed unless there is
no substantial evidence in the record to support its findings. Id.
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The focus of the circuit court was on the father’s failure to exercise
visitation with the children, his past drug addiction, his periodic incarceration, and
his failure to provide any meaningful support to the children for a period exceeding
five years. Thus, we examine whether there was substantial clear and convincing
evidence to support termination of father’s parental rights pursuant to KRS
199.502(1)(a) or (1)(e).
We emphasize that no single factor can serve as the basis for
termination of parental rights and incarceration alone cannot be the basis for
finding that a parent has abandoned a child. J.H. v. Cabinet for Human Resources,
704 S.W.2d 661 (Ky.App. 1985). “Generally, abandonment is demonstrated by
facts or circumstances that evince a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims to the child.” O.S. v. C.F., 655 S.W.2d 32, 34
(Ky.App. 1983). Thus, we first examine the entirety of the circumstances to
determine whether there was substantial clear and convincing evidence that father
had abandoned his children for a period of more than ninety days. KRS
199.502(1)(a).
The evidence is undisputed that even prior to his incarceration in
2008, father had little contact with his children and offered minimal support. He
had not visited with his children since November 2005 and had not sought a
visitation order as directed by the decree. Prior to his incarceration in 2008, father
was employed full-time earning $18 per hour but he nevertheless failed to provide
support for his children. Moreover, following his release from prison in March
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2010 and until the date of the hearing, he had not attempted to support the children.
He admits that his lack of contact with the children was attributable to his drug
addiction and that mother’s unwillingness to allow him to visit the children while
plagued by his drug addiction was reasonable.
Father argues that the letters and cards sent by his children to him
while he was incarcerated and his most recent attempt to have telephone contact
are sufficient to demonstrate his desire to rekindle his relationship with his
children. Father’s attempts to reestablish a relationship appears to be a reaction to
the pending adoption petition and does not negate his failure to assume his parental
duties for the preceding five years. Regardless of his current motives, it remains
that father has had no contact with these children, has provided little financial
support, and has been voluntarily absent for more than five years of his children’s
lives. Under the circumstances, the trial court’s finding that father had abandoned
his children for a period in excess of ninety days was not clearly erroneous.
Father contends that the evidence does not support a finding that
there was no reasonable expectation of improvement in parental care and
protection. He points to his recent employment, attempts to enroll in college, and
his drug rehabilitation.
We point out that KRS 199.502(1)(a) does not require that the court
find that there is no reasonable expectation of parental improvement and reiterate
that there was substantial clear and convincing evidence to support the circuit
court’s finding that the children had been abandoned. However, although not
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required, the circuit court also premised its conclusion that father’s rights be
terminated based on subsection (e) and found that there is no reasonable
expectation of parental improvement. Thus, we discuss the evidence to support
the circuit court’s finding.
Father’s self-described history demonstrates that although he has
periods when he is free from the use of illegal drugs and alcohol, he has
repeatedly returned to drug and alcohol abuse resulting in his repeated
incarcerations and inability to care for and support his children. Father’s
recidivist behavior convinced the circuit court and convinces this Court that the
prospect for his continued freedom from addiction is uncertain. It is this Court’s
hope that father will continue to be drug-free and a productive citizen. However,
it remains that he abandoned his children to live a drug-addicted and criminal
lifestyle. The circuit court did not clearly err when it granted the adoptions by
the stepfather who, for six years, had assumed the role of father and provided the
children with a loving and nurturing home.
For the reasons stated, the judgments of the Bell Circuit Court are
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Martha Farmer Copeland
Corbin, Kentucky
Gerald L. Greene
Pineville, Kentucky
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