VINEY (THOMAS M.) VS. VINEY (JENNIFER R.)
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RENDERED: AUGUST 26, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-001810-MR
THOMAS M. VINEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
FAMILY COURT, DIVISION II
HONORABLE TIMOTHY E. FEELEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-01162
JENNIFER R. VINEY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, COMBS, and THOMPSON, JUDGES.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Thomas M. Viney appeals from the Oldham Family
Court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of dissolution of marriage
entered July 22, 2010. After our review, we affirm.
Thomas and Jennifer R. Viney were married in October 2002. They
separated in November 2008. At the time of trial in February 2010, Thomas was
thirty-three years of age and Jennifer was thirty-seven. Thomas is employed as an
executive with ResCare, Inc., in Louisville. Prior to the birth of their first child in
August 2003, Jennifer had been employed by Lexmark International, Inc., in
Lexington. Jennifer began to suffer with severe postpartum depression and
anxiety, and she took a leave of absence from her position with Lexmark. She also
suffers from a disabling addiction to alcohol. At the time of trial, Jennifer was
unemployed and living in a residential group home in Lexington.
From May 2005 until December 2008, Jennifer was admitted to multiple
rehabilitation facilities aimed at treating her depression and alcohol addiction
within a thirty-day program setting. In December 2008, she was admitted to a
residential treatment facility (the Hope Center in Lexington) with a long-term
recovery program. In October 2009, she was admitted to Chrysalis House in
Lexington where she continued to reside at the time of trial.
Following the hearing, the family court awarded Thomas sole custody of the
parties’ minor child and ordered Jennifer to contribute to the child’s support. The
non-marital property was valued and assigned; the marital property was divided.
The family court ordered Thomas to pay maintenance to Jennifer, and a final
decree of dissolution of marriage was entered. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Thomas contends that the family court erred by awarding
maintenance to Jennifer because she failed to show that she required maintenance
to meet her reasonable needs and because Thomas demonstrated that it would be
impractical for him to pay such a sum in view of his earnings and expenses.
Thomas argues that the family court neglected to make specific findings of fact in
support of the maintenance award -- despite his express request for those findings.
Our review of the family court’s findings of fact “is governed by the rule
that such findings shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” Gosney v.
Glenn, 163 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Ky.App.2005). A factual finding is not clearly
erroneous if it is supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is
evidence that, when taken alone or in light of all the evidence, would be regarded
as adequate to support a particular conclusion. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336
(Ky.2003). However, a family court’s conclusions of law are subject to plenary
review. Gosney, supra.
Kentucky Revised Statute[s] (KRS) 403.200(1) provides that a court may
grant maintenance only where it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance has
shown that he:
(a) Lacks sufficient property, including marital property
apportioned to him, to provide for his reasonable needs;
and
(b) Is unable to support himself through appropriate
employment . . . .
The provisions of KRS 403.200(2) direct that where an award of maintenance is
deemed necessary, the “order shall be in such amounts and for such periods of time
as the court deems just,” having considered “all relevant factors,” including:
(a) The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance,
including marital property apportioned to him, and his ability to
meet his needs independently. . .;
(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or
training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find
appropriate employment;
(c) The standard of living established during the marriage;
(d) The duration of the marriage;
(e) The age, and the physical and emotional condition of the
spouse seeking maintenance; and
(f) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought
to meet his needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking
maintenance.
In this case, the family court made extensive findings with respect to the
parties’ employment history, income, and property. It ordered the marital
residence to be sold.1 From the proceeds, 67% was assigned to Jennifer as her
nonmarital property; the remaining 34% was divided between the parties. Because
Jennifer had been largely absent from the home and family, she was awarded only
9% of the accumulated marital equity in the home; Thomas was awarded the
remaining 25%. In addition, most of the modest amount of household goods and
furnishings were assigned to Jennifer as her nonmarital property. The value of a
2004 Toyota Tacoma truck ($7,762.00) was assigned to Jennifer as her nonmarital
property, and she was awarded a 2004 Toyota Sienna minivan, a portion of which
also constituted her non-marital property. Jennifer was awarded an IRA account
with a value of $15,448.00; one-half of Thomas’s account with Morgan Stanley
Smith Barney having a total value of $7,962.00; and one-half of Thomas’s Charles
1
In an order entered on January 20, 2011, the family court indicated that the asking price for the
marital home would be $306,000.00. The mortgage balance one year earlier was $225,000.00.
Schwab account having a total value of $17,337.00. Thomas’s retirement and
savings plan was equally divided pursuant to a Qualified Domestic Relations
Order. Finally, Thomas was ordered to contribute $4,000.00 toward Jennifer’s
attorney fees.
After having restored to Jennifer her nonmarital property and distributed to
her a portion of the couple’s marital property, the family court found that Jennifer
nevertheless lacked sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs and that
she was unable (at least in the short term) to support herself through employment.
The court considered the factors enumerated in KRS 403.200(2) pertaining to the
amount and duration of maintenance and referred specifically to Thomas’s ability
to meet his own needs while contributing to Jennifer’s. The court found that
Thomas’s annual salary is $105,000. While Jennifer testified that her anticipated
monthly expenses would exceed $4,700 after she completed her rehabilitation
program, the family court ordered Thomas to pay maintenance in the amount of
$2,250 per month for a period of two years. From this sum, Jennifer was ordered
to pay monthly child support in the amount of $215 and a portion of the child’s
extraordinary medical expenses.
Thomas contends that the family court erred “by completely failing to
document its findings” in support of its conclusion that Jennifer was entitled to a
maintenance award of $2,250 per month for a period of two years. He contends
that the evidence does not support that conclusion, in part, because he showed that
he cannot afford to pay a significant amount of maintenance to Jennifer each
month.
In support of his argument, Thomas explains that the full spectrum of
services provided by Chrysalis House initially includes housing (and eventually
housing assistance) when its clients transition to independent living. While she
was receiving in-patient substance and mental health treatment, Thomas argues
that Jennifer had no demonstrable expenses whatsoever; he also contends that if
and when she completes her substance abuse program, residing with family
members might well be desirable. Thomas asserts that the family court’s monthly
maintenance award was nothing more than a random figure lacking any basis so as
to comport with adequacy of findings.
On the contrary, the record clearly supports the family court’s finding that
Jennifer was unable to support herself (at least in the short term) by means of
appropriate employment. It is equally clear that Jennifer lacked sufficient property
to provide for her reasonable needs. Under the circumstances presented here,
Jennifer was not required to liquidate and consume her property, to rely on the
kindness of strangers, or to turn to her family for financial support in lieu of an
award of maintenance.
Moreover, there is nothing before us to suggest that the family court’s
maintenance order was anything but a fair compromise (both in terms of the
amount payable and in duration) properly considering: (1) Jennifer’s projected
needs based upon her emotional condition and the time necessary for her recovery,
(2) her ability to meet those needs independently, (3) the standard of living
established during the marriage, and (4) the ability of Thomas to contribute (in the
short term) to her support. Instead, the family court’s decision with respect to the
maintenance award appears to have fallen soundly within its broad discretion.
Nothing about the order suggests that the family court imposed an undue
burden upon Thomas, and the provisions of KRS 403.200 do not require the family
court to support its findings with mathematical precision. The family court did not
abuse its discretion by awarding maintenance in the amount and for the time period
contained in its order.
We affirm the judgment of the Oldham Family Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Louis P. Winner
Stacy Anne Hoehle
Louisville, Kentucky
James L. Theiss
LaGrange, Kentucky
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