R. (J.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MARCH 18, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-001622-ME
J.R.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ELISE GIVHAN SPAINHOUR, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-J-00475
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND NICKELL, JUDGES; ISAAC,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: J.R. appeals from an order of the Bullitt Family Court
entered on July 28, 2010, which held her in contempt for failure to attend summer
school. The court ordered her to serve thirty (30) days in the county jail, which
was conditionally discharged if J.R. immediately began education classes to obtain
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Senior Judge Sheila R. Isaac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
her General Equivalency Diploma (hereinafter “G.E.D”). After a careful review,
we vacate the court’s order and remand with instructions for the court to dismiss
the action from its docket.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 17, 2009, a juvenile complaint was filed against J.R.
alleging that she was an habitual truant. The complaint alleged that, as of
December 1, 2009, J.R. had amassed thirty (30) unexcused absences and eleven
(11) unexcused tardies. Further, the complaint stated that phone calls, letters, and a
visit to the home had all been made without the truancy being corrected.
Thereafter on February 24, 2010, J.R. and her father appeared in
Bullitt County Court where a public advocate was appointed for J.R. At this time,
the family court advised J.R. that, without correcting the truancy, the worst case
scenario would be removal from her father’s home and placement where she would
have no option but to attend school. The family court entered two orders – a
standard school attendance order (SSAO) and a parental responsibility order.
A hearing was held on March 24, 2010. At the hearing, based on an
agreement with the county attorney, J.R. admitted to the habitual truancy allegation
and waived a separate disposition hearing. Prior to the hearing, J.R. had been
suspended from school and stipulated to contempt. Specifically, J.R. agreed to
attend school, write a 250-word essay, perform twenty (20) hours of community
service, and remain on the SSAO. After holding a colloquy with J.R. to determine
that the plea was knowingly and intelligently made, the family court accepted the
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plea and ordered her to attend school, do community service, and write an essay.
During the February and March court appearances, the family court judge did not
inform J.R. that a violation of the SSAO could result in juvenile detention or time
in the adult county jail.
Next, at the review hearing held on April 21, 2010, J.R. provided the
court with her essay, and another review hearing was set for June 2, 2010. Yet, on
June 2, 2010, neither J.R. nor her parents were in court. Since J.R. and her father
failed to appear on that date, the family court entered show cause orders for both of
them. The show cause order indicated that a contempt hearing would be held on
July 7, 2010. Notwithstanding that J.R. was not in court, the family court judge
also signed a docket sheet order, on that day, which required J.R. to attend summer
school. Nothing on the docket sheet indicates that provisions were made for J.R.’s
parents or J.R. to receive official notice about this order.
On July 7, 2010, J.R. and her parents were again not present in family
court. Subsequently, the family court issued a bench warrant for J.R.’s parents and
a pick-up order for J.R. On July 22, 2010, however, both orders were rescinded.
The next pertinent date is July 28, 2010, when J.R., with her advocate, and father,
appeared in court. Because J.R.’s birth date was July 15, 1992, she was now
eighteen (18). Regarding the missed court dates, J.R.’s father explained that J.R.
and he had come to court on June 1, 2010, rather than June 2, 2010, because he
misunderstood the paperwork regarding the hearing date. Furthermore, J.R. stated
that she and her mother returned to court on June 2, 2010, but that the case was
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never called. After waiting two hours that day, J.R. went to the clerk’s office
where she was given the paperwork for her community service and told to go
home. Regarding the missed court appearance on July 7, 2010, J.R. told the family
court that she was sick on that day. The Commonwealth acknowledged that it had
seen a doctor’s note attesting to J.R.’s illness on that date although the note was not
in the file. The family court accepted the reasons for J.R.’s absence on the
aforementioned court dates.
The only remaining issue for the family court was J.R.’s failure to
attend summer school. According to J.R., she was never told that she must attend
summer school. Contrary to her assertion, Mark Hardin, a school official, stated
that she had been given two summer school applications, plus Hardin also sent an
email to J.R.’s public advocate regarding the summer school requirement. J.R.’s
advocate did not contradict Hardin. At this point, the judge made the following
comments:
What I’ve got, my perception of what I’ve got here is that
I’ve got somebody that thinks she has been able to play
the system, which is really a source of irritation to me. A
whole lot of irritation. Now if you think that just because
you’ve turned eighteen that I’ve lost jurisdiction over you
and that you are free to go – wrong analysis. I have a
clear court order in the file prior to the time you turned
eighteen dealing with your education and I maintain the
authority to enforce my orders up until you shuffle off
this mortal coil or I shuffle off this mortal coil. Now I’m
done with the excuses and I’m ready to go on and deal
with a contempt hearing for your failure to go to summer
school.
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The family court then held the contempt hearing wherein testimony was provided
by Hardin. J.R., as previously noted, maintained that she did not know that she
was supposed to attend summer school. Hardin stated that he told J.R. about
summer school when he left four messages for her, spoke to her neighbors,
attached a message on the door of her house and notified her advocate. At the
conclusion of the testimony, the family court judge ordered:
Ok, I’m going to find that J[R.] is in contempt of court
. . . . And I’m going to sentence you to thirty days in the
County Jail. I’m going to conditionally discharge that on
the basis that you will immediately get started on the
G.E.D and I’m going to be doing monthly reviews every
single month until you get your G.E.D and the first time
there is a bobble you’re going to the County Jail.
J.R. now appeals from this order.
J.R. maintains that the finding of contempt and the thirty (30) day
sentence must be set aside because the June 2, 2010 order, was not a valid court
order, and further, that the family court order finding J.R. in contempt and ordering
her to obtain her G.E.D must be vacated because the court’s jurisdiction over status
offender in the Unified Juvenile Code expires at age eighteen (18). Conversely,
the Commonwealth claims that J.R. waived any issue regarding the validity of the
court order or otherwise invited error. Further, the Commonwealth argues that the
trial court did not err in exercising its inherent powers.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
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J.R. raises issues of law; therefore, our review is de novo. Western
Kentucky Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet, 80 S.W.3d 787 (Ky.
App. 2001).
ANALYSIS
We begin our analysis by observing that status offenses, such as
habitual truancy, “are neither criminal nor delinquent.” Com. v. B.J., 241 S.W.3d
324, 327 (Ky. 2007). But, notwithstanding this factor, these cases are concerned
with significant social and personal rights. The Court, in B.J. emphasized the
importance of these proceedings by stating:
“A proceeding against a child for the status offense of
habitual truancy under Chapter 630 . . . can result in
severe consequences to that child.” T.D. v.
Commonwealth, 165 S.W.3d 480, 483 (Ky. App. 2005).
In light of these potentially severe consequences to
the child, due process must be afforded, despite the noncriminal nature of juvenile proceedings. “[W]here the
fault of the child is at issue and penalties, including loss
of liberty, may attach, criminal protections provided by
the constitution apply.
Id. Such is the case here.
Specifically, we are dealing with the status offense of truancy. A
juvenile who has been a habitual truant from school is considered a status offender
under Chapter 630. And such behavior shall not be considered criminal or
delinquent pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 600.020(59)(a). “Status
offense action” is any action brought in the interest of a child who is accused of
committing acts, which if committed by an adult, would not be a crime. KRS
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600.020(59)(a). So, here we are dealing with an act, which if committed by
someone over eighteen (18) years of age would not be any type of offense,
criminal or civil. But, as noted by the Kentucky Supreme Court above, since the
adjudication of such offenses affects the rights of individuals, in this case, children,
due process concerns are significant.
It is helpful at this juncture to review the intent of KRS Chapters 600
to 645, which are titled the Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code. The following
legislative purposes are encompassed in the Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code.
These purposes, found in KRS 600.010(2), include, among others, the protection of
children, strengthening of family life, the use of less restrictive alternatives so that
children are not removed from families except when absolutely necessary, and the
right to treatment to improve the child’s condition. Further, KRS 600.010(2)(g)
provides procedural guidelines that affirm:
It shall further be the policy of this Commonwealth to
provide judicial procedures in which rights and interests
of all parties, including the parents and victims, are
recognized and all parties are assured prompt and fair
hearings. Unless otherwise provided, such protections
belong to the child individually and may not be waived
by any other party.
In relation to status offenses, the Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code
explicates an even more distinct rationale, which is in addition to the purposes
highlighted in KRS 600.010, also allows:
(1) The Commonwealth’s courts shall utilize a separate
and distinct set of guidelines for status offenders which
reflect their individual needs;
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(2) It shall be declared to be the policy of this
Commonwealth that all its efforts and resources be
directed at involving the child and the family in
remedying the problem for which they have been
referred;
(3) Status offenders shall not be detained in secure
juvenile detention facilities or juvenile holding facilities
after the initial detention hearing unless the child is
accused of, or has an adjudication that the child has
violated a valid court order, in which case the child may
be securely detained for up to forty-eight (48) hours,
exclusive of weekends and holidays, pending receipt of
the written report required under KRS 630.080(4). Any
period of secure detention prior to the detention hearing
shall not exceed twenty-four (24) hours, exclusive of
weekends and holidays;
(4) Status offenders accused of violating a valid court
order shall not be securely detained in intermittent
holding facilities; and
(5) Status offenders accused of or found guilty of
violating a valid court order shall not be converted into
public offenders by virtue of this conduct.
KRS 630.010.
To summarize, the reason for separate treatment of children is based
on both their vulnerability and their rehabilitative potential. Because courts have
been given significant power over children, however, the legislature placed
paramount importance in the statutes on the recognition of children’s rights plus
their need for special treatment. Finally, the Unified Juvenile Code outlines major
differences in the guidelines for children involved with the court for non-criminal
or status offenses rather than public offenses. Keeping this in mind, we now turn
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J.R.’s “disposition,” at eighteen (18), to thirty (30) days in the county jail for
failure to attend summer school.
The first error alleged by J.R. is that the June 2, 2010, court order was
not a valid court order. The Commonwealth counters that this issue was not
preserved, and therefore, is not subject to review by an appellate court. But J.R.
maintains that the issue of whether a court order is valid is a matter of subject
matter jurisdiction, and thus, may be raised by the parties or the court at any time.
Basically, “courts have recognize three separate categories of
‘jurisdiction’: (1) personal jurisdiction involving authority over specific persons;
(2) subject matter jurisdiction involving authority over the nature of a case and the
general type of controversy; and (3) jurisdiction over a particular case involving
authority to decide a specific case.” Hisle v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Government, 258 S.W.3d 422, 429 (Ky. App. 2008). Thus, subject-matter
jurisdiction refers to a court’s authority to determine “this kind of case” as opposed
to “this case.” Duncan v. O’Nan, 451 S.W.2d 626, 631 (Ky. 1970).
To recap, a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction when it attempts to
decide a type of controversy over which it has no authority over the nature of the
case or the statutory prerequisites of the case. In Kentucky, the family court has
been specifically granted jurisdiction over status offenses. KRS 23A.100(2)(d);
Kentucky Constitution § 112. In particular, once a complaint of habitual truancy is
properly before the family court, subject to compliance with KRS 159.140 and
630.060, the family court has subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover,
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notwithstanding exceptions, which are inapplicable here, the statutory grant of
authority provides the juvenile courts with exclusive jurisdiction over individuals
under the chronological age of eighteen (18) years who have allegedly committed
status or public offenses. Pursuant to the Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code, in KRS
600.020(8), which provides statutory definitions for KRS Chapters 600 - 645, a
child is defined as “any person who has not reached his eighteenth birthday[.]” At
the June 2, 2010 hearing, J.R. was still seventeen (17), so that the family court had
both subject matter jurisdiction and the authority to hear the case. Hence, J.R. is
challenging the procedural validity of a court order, which she acknowledges was
not preserved.
Granted that the family court had subject matter jurisdiction, an issue,
even if unpreserved, is subject to the palpable error rule. Kentucky Rules of
Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26 provides as follows: “A palpable error which
affects the substantial rights of a party may be considered . . . by an appellate court
on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and
appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has
resulted from the error.”
Consequently, RCr 10.26 permits review of an unpreserved error if
the error affects the substantial rights of an appellant. An error affects the
substantial rights of an appellant if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings. Com. v. Rodefer, 189 S.W.3d 550, 553
(Ky. 2006). Sentencing an eighteen (18) year old person to thirty (30) days in jail
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for failure to attend summer school when neither she nor her parents were given
official notice of an order, is palpable error. It seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, and reputation of juvenile family court proceedings. In essence, we are
persuaded that the court order emanating from the June 2, 2010 hearing, was
invalid and because it was invalid, no contempt hearing could result from the
order.
Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code provides that courts may only hold
children in contempt of court to enforce a valid court order.
(11) Nothing in this chapter shall prevent the court from
holding a child in contempt of court to enforce valid
court orders previously issued by the court, subject to the
requirements contained in KRS 610.265 and 630.080.
KRS 610.010(11). Prior to holding a contempt hearing, which may result in a
child being securely detained, the court must do the following:
(3)(d) Prior to ordering a status offender or alleged status
offender who is subject to a valid court order securely
detained because the child violated the valid court order,
the court shall:
1. Affirm that the requirements for a valid court order
were met at the time the original order was issued;
2. Make a determination during the adjudicatory
hearing that the child violated the valid court order;
and
3. Within forty-eight (48) hours after the adjudicatory
hearing on the violation of a valid court order by the
child, exclusive of weekends and holidays, receive
and review a written report prepared by an
appropriate public agency that reviews the behavior
of the child and the circumstances under which the
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child was brought before the court, determines the
reasons for the child's behavior, and determines
whether all dispositions other than secure detention
have been exhausted or are inappropriate.
KRS 610.265(3)(d). The language found in KRS 630.080(4)(a) is identical to the
portion of KRS 610.265 cited above. The plain meaning of this language mandates
that for a court to exercise its contempt power in juvenile court it must strictly
comply with the requirements for a valid court order. To be a valid court order, an
order must meet the statutory requisites found in KRS 600.020:
(61) “Valid court order” means a court order issued by a
judge to a child alleged or found to be a status offender:
(a) Who was brought before the court and made
subject to the order;
(b) Whose future conduct was regulated by the order;
(c) Who was given written and verbal warning of the
consequences of the violation of the order at the time
the order was issued and whose attorney or parent or
legal guardian was also provided with a written
notice of the consequences of violation of the order,
which notification is reflected in the record of the
court proceedings; and
(d) Who received, before the issuance of the order,
the full due process rights guaranteed by the
Constitution of the United States.
Examining the four requirements for a valid court order, it is obvious
that the order for J.R. to attend summer school was not valid. First, J.R. was not
before the court. In fact, at the July 28, 2010 hearing, the family court judge
readily accepted that J.R. and her mother had waited in a crowded anteroom and
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did not hear the case called. Second, J.R. did not receive written or verbal warning
concerning the consequences of the violation of the order when the order was
issued. Next, neither her attorney nor her parents were present at the hearing.
Lastly, nothing is reflected on the court docket to show the order was officially
conveyed to J.R. and her parents.
Most significant, however, is the review of the circumstances
surrounding the issuance of the order. It demonstrates a violation of J.R.’s due
process rights. Initially, on the court docket, it is indicated that an oral motion for
contempt was made. But J.R., her parents, and her attorney were not present.
Therefore, no one responded to the motion or defended J.R. Additionally, J.R. was
ordered to summer school without discussion about its cost, time, or
reasonableness. Notwithstanding these factors, no discussion was held concerning
J.R.’s impending eighteenth birthday, which would have removed the court’s
jurisdiction over her.
Lastly, the issue of notice to J.R.’s parents regarding the summer
school order is very troubling. The school official’s testimony, both sworn and
unsworn, indicates many messages were left, but he never directly stated that
anyone including himself spoke directly to J.R. or her parents about summer
school. Second, the docket sheet on which the order to summer school was written
does not show any official service upon J.R. or her parents. It is impossible to
discern from the record whether J.R. or her parents were ever officially provided
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notice about the summer school order. Due process mandates that one be given
adequate notice.
Because we have determined that no valid court order was issued and
that this factor is palpable error, it is not necessary for us to address the
jurisdictional issue regarding the court’s authority to order J.R. to thirty (30) days
in the county jail if she did not begin the process of obtaining her G.E.D.
Having reviewed this matter, we hold that, as a matter of law, the
notice about the order that was given to J.R. and her father at the June 2, 2010
hearing, was not sufficient and a violation of her due process rights. Because the
notice to attend summer school is inadequate, all that transpired at the July 28,
2010 contempt hearing, is tainted by the deficient notice and unenforceable.
Accordingly, we vacate and remand with directions that the family court set aside
the challenged order.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Rebecca Hobbs
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Ken W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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