CITIZENS FOR ALTERNATIVE WATER SOLUTIONS VS. KENTUCKY PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION , ET AL.
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RENDERED: AUGUST 19, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-001597-MR
CITIZENS FOR ALTERNATIVE
WATER SOLUTIONS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-01055
KENTUCKY PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION; KENTUCKY
AMERICAN WATER COMPANY;
LOUISVILLE WATER COMPANY;
ATTORNEY GENERAL JACK
CONWAY; LEXINGTON-FAYETTE
URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT;
KENTUCKY INDUSTRIAL
UTILITY CUSTOMERS, INC.,;
BLUEGRASS WATER SUPPLY
COMMISSION; AND THE
KENTUCKY RIVER AUTHORITY
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
APPELLEES
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; CAPERTON AND CLAYTON, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE: Citizens for Alternative Water Solutions (CAWS)
brings this appeal from a July 26, 2010, Opinion and Order of the Franklin Circuit
Court affirming a final order of the Kentucky Public Service Commission
(Commission) granting a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity
(certificate of necessity) to Kentucky American Water Company (KAWC) for
construction of a water treatment facility in Owen County. We affirm.
The facts of this case are intricate; we will, however, endeavor to
present a succinct recitation of only the material facts necessary to resolution of
this appeal. KAWC is a water utility company that serves the Kentucky counties
of Bourbon, Clark, Fayette, Gallatin, Grant, Harrison, Jessamine, Owen, Scott and
Woodford. Due to projected increases in future water demand and KAWC’s
inability to meet such increased demand projections, KAWC applied for a
certificate of necessity with the Commission. Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
278.020(1). It sought the certificate of necessity in order to construct in Owen
County a new water treatment plant adjacent to Pool 3 of the Kentucky River,
along with associated facilities1 and a 30.59-mile water transmission line from the
plant to its distribution system in Fayette County. CAWS intervened in the
proceedings, as did Louisville Water Company, Attorney General Jack Conway,
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, Kentucky Industrial Utility
Customers, Inc., Bluegrass Water Supply Commission and Kentucky River
1
It appears the “associated facilities” included a raw water intake and raw water pumping
station.
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Authority. KRS 278.020(8). Relevant herein, CAWS claimed that KAWC was
not entitled to the certificate of necessity and advanced a myriad of arguments in
support thereof.
After an extensive evidentiary hearing, the Commission rendered a
detailed ninety-one page order granting KAWC’s certificate of necessity to
construct the water treatment plant, associated facilities, and pipeline. Being
dissatisfied with the Commission’s decision, CAWS sought review of the
Commission’s order with the Franklin Circuit Court. KRS 278.410(1). In another
detailed order, the circuit court affirmed the Commission’s order granting the
certificate of necessity. Our review follows. KRS 278.450.
Because this is a review of a public service commission’s order, the
judiciary is limited to determining whether the Commission’s decision is
unreasonable or unlawful. KRS 278.410(1). A decision is considered “unlawful”
if it violates a statute or constitutional provision and is “unreasonable” if
reasonable minds could not differ upon the evidence. Public Serv. Comm’n v.
Jackson County Rural Elec. Co-op, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 764 (Ky. App. 2000); Boone
County Water and Sewer Dist. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 949 S.W.2d 588 (Ky.
1997). The Commission serves as fact-finder and possesses sole discretion to
judge the credibility of evidence. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Ky. Power Co.,
605 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. App. 1980).
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Per KRS 278.020(1), any person or corporation providing a utility
service2 to the public shall initially obtain a certificate of necessity from the
Commission before commencing construction upon “any plant, equipment,
property or facility.” To be entitled to such a certificate of necessity, the applicant
must demonstrate a need for the proposed facility and the absence of wasteful
duplication. Ky. Utilities Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 252 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. 1952).
A “need” may be demonstrated by “showing of a substantial inadequacy of
existing service” and “wasteful duplication” may be demonstrated by showing “an
excess of capacity over need,” “excessive investment in relation to productivity,”
or “unnecessary multiplicity of physical properties.” Ky. Utilities Co., 252
S.W.2d at 890.
CAWS contends that the Commission improperly granted KAWC a
certificate of necessity to construct the water treatment plant, associated facilities,
and pipeline. In support thereof, CAWS raised a plethora of allegations of error:
I.
KAWC failed to demonstrate the need for the new
water treatment plant and associated transmission
facilities.
A. The Commission acted unreasonably and
unlawfully in failing to resolve the significant
discrepancy between KAWC’s projected water
demand and KAWC’s historic usage trends.
B. The Commission erred in issuing a CPCN
[Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity] authorizing construction of facilities
2
Under KRS 278.010(3)(d), a utility service includes the pumping or distributing of water to the
public for compensation.
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intended to meet unreasonable customer
demand during the drought of record.
C. The Commission acted unreasonably in issuing
the CPCN without first requiring
implementation of demand management
measures and leak detection.
D. The Pool 3 project would constitutes [sic] a
wasteful duplication of facilities since the
applicant failed to evaluate reasonable supply
alternatives exist that in combination could
address KAWC’s supply and treatment needs.
II.
The Commission erred in approving the KAWC
proposal over other alternatives on the basis of the
status of the proposed project implementation.
III.
The Commission erred in concluding that the
KAWC project is consistent with regional planning
goals.
IV.
The Commission erred in relying on the Kentucky
River as a water source as a basis for approving the
KAWC project.
CAWS Brief at iii-v. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we agree with the circuit
court and are unable to find any merit in the above allegations of error.
To begin, KAWC is legally mandated to supply water in sufficient amounts
to satisfy the “total reasonable requirements of its customers under maximum
consumption.” 807 Kentucky Administrative Regulations (KAR) 5:066 Section
(10)(4)(2011); see also KRS 278.010(14). To meet this mandate in light of the
projected increase in future water demand of KAWC’s customers, the Commission
found that the new treatment facility at Pool 3 located on the Kentucky River was
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needed and would not result in a wasteful duplication of facilities.3 See Ky.
Utilities Co., 252 S.W.2d 885; Ky. Utilities v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 390 S.W.2d
158 (Ky. 1965). A review of the record reveals that the evidence before the
Commission was conflicting. However, we are unable to conclude that the
Commission’s decision was either unreasonable as to the evidence or unlawful as
violative of statute or constitutional provision. And, all of CAWS allegations of
error were painstakingly addressed by the circuit court in its well-reasoned and
well-written opinion. As we could add little to the circuit court’s resolution of
CAWS allegations of error, we adopt same herein:
The plaintiff, CAWS, argues that the PSC
[Kentucky Public Service Commission] Order should be
reversed as unlawful and unreasonable for several
reasons. CAWS argues that the PSC erred in issuing the
CPCN [Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity] to KAWC because KAWC failed to
adequately demonstrate the need for the new treatment
plant and associated transmission main. Specifically,
CAWS urges that the "need" requirement was not met
because the need for additional water supply and water
treatment capacity was overestimated and KAWC
focused exclusively on one supply-side option rather
than evaluating a range of options that could satisfy the
reasonable needs of KAWC customers at a lower cost.
In terms of the reasonableness of the projections of
future water demand, CAWS asserts that this was
overstated and that the PSC acted unreasonably and
unlawfully in failing to resolve discrepancies between
the projected water demand figures that KAWC utilized
and the historic water usage trends used by Dr. Martin
Solomon who testified on behalf of CAWS before the
PSC. The Attorney General points out that the PSC's
3
Specifically, the Kentucky Public Service Commission found that Kentucky American Water
Company lacked sufficient capacity and supply “to meet reasonable maximum projected
customer demands under normal conditions or in a drought of record.”
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acceptance of KAWC's projections and its decision to
accord little weight to the testimony of Dr. Solomon is
entirely within the province of the agency and that indeed
Dr. Solomon's testimony supports the view that KAWC's
projections fall within a range of reasonableness.
KAWC argues that there is abundant evidence in the
record to support the PSC's conclusion that the "need"
factor is met here. The PSC asserts that it was
reasonable and within its authority to afford little weight to
the demand projections put forth by KAWC and that the
PSC, as fact[-]finder, had the sole discretion to determine
the credibility of witnesses and pass on the weight of the
evidence.
CAWS further asserts that the PSC acted
unlawfully and unreasonably by failing to ensure that
the KAWC proposal would not result in excess
capacity and wasteful duplication by failing to
incorporate substantial conservation measures in planning
for the drought of record and thus utilizing unreasonable
demand projections. CAWS asserts that KAWC need not
plan for unreasonable demand even during a drought of
record and that no real restrictions were proposed
related to conservation during such a drought other than
restrictions on outdoor water use. KAWC responds that
the PSC was correct in its determination that the
facilities are reasonable under existing and
foreseeable circumstances and that independent
consultants concluded that this solution ensures
adequate supply and is the least cost alternative.
The Attorney General points out that moderate
restrictions during a severe drought were incorporated
into the KAWC projections and that the issue of the
appropriate level of restrictions for planning is a policy
decision for the PSC to make rather than the courts.
The PSC asserts that substantial evidence indeed
supports its finding that KAWC's existing water supply
and treatment facilities are inadequate, particularly in a
drought of record scenario. It points to KAWC witness
Linda Bridwell who testified that KAWC's projections
incorporated conservation efforts and moderate
restrictions during a severe drought.
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CAWS also argues that it was unreasonable for
the PSC to approve a new 20 MGD treatment plant
without first requiring assessment and implementation
of all reasonable and cost-effective demand
management measures and a more aggressive program
of leak detection. Essentially, CAWS urges that "normal
improvements in the ordinary course of business" could
be used to address the projected treated water deficit in
lieu of the construction of a new plant. The PSC
counters that implementation of demand management
and leak detection measures would not sufficiently
eliminate the supply deficits or the need for new facilities
because KAWC customers could still face shortages if a
severe drought were to occur. In its Order, the PSC
noted that a witness who testified for the Attorney
General, Scott Rubin, indicated that demand management
measures could not eliminate KAWC's supply deficit,
particularly under drought conditions. The Attorney
General similarly points out that a substantial
inadequacy of existing service was demonstrated to the
PSC and that the measures that CAWS refers to would
not eliminate the need for a water supply project and
additional treatment. (Citation omitted.)
CAWS asserts that the KAWC project would
constitute a wasteful duplication of facilities because
there are reasonable, lower cost alternatives that were not
adequately evaluated. Specifically, CAWS argues that the
pipeline proposal put forth by the LWC [Louisville Water
Company] is superior to the KAWC project, as it would
only require water customers to pay for incremental
increases in water use and would provide another source
of supply from the Ohio River. CAWS also asserts
that there was no meaningful exploration of the
feasibility of purchasing treated water from Versailles
nor of the impact of the installation of crest gates on
Dam 9 of the Kentucky River.
The PSC rejected these arguments, and the
administrative record supports a finding that the
alternatives were adequately studied. The PSC made
findings that none of the options advanced by CAWS
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would resolve either the maximum daily demand
deficit or the drought demand deficit. The Attorney
General similarly points to the administrative record
demonstrating that KAWC was reasonably diligent in
considering alternatives. With respect to the installation
of crest gates on Dam 9, one of the witnesses for CAWS
testified that it was unknown whether the KRA
[Kentucky River Authority] would install a crest gate by
2018. The Attorney General also points to the previous
PSC case No. 93-434 where the PSC determined that a
crest gate on Dam 9 would be insufficient and this finding
was not contested by the KRA. Thus, KAWC cannot be
faulted for failing to explore this option.
With regard to the LWC proposal, the Attorney
General persuasively argues that ample consideration
was given by the PSC to this option. The PSC found
that the cost of the LWC proposal and the cost of the
KAWC proposal were roughly the same, and this finding
is supported by evidence in the administrative record.
Therefore, the Court cannot substitute its judgment for
that of the PSC. The PSC had to endorse either the
KAWC option (which was fully developed and ready to
be implemented) or the LWC option (that was still in the
developmental stage and subject to many uncertain
contingencies). With regard to the Versailles option, the
record shows that the PSC rightfully concluded that this
is not a viable solution due to drought restrictions in the
Versailles water withdrawal permit, thus indicating that
the quantity of water that might be available from
Versailles is likely very limited.
CAWS further asserts that the PSC erred in
choosing the KAWC proposal over the LWC proposal
based on using a flow rate for the KAWC project that
was not supported in the record, leading the net present
value of the KAWC proposal to be much higher than that
of the LWC project. Specifically, CAWS argues it was
inappropriate for the PSC to assume a flow rate of 10
MGD in calculating the flow rate for the Pool 3 project
in the face of evidence that the minimum anticipated
flow rate would only be 6 MGD. The PSC's Order
dedicated 28 pages to the performance of an
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independent net present value ("NPV") analysis, which
indicated that the cost of the KAWC project was only
slightly higher than the LWC proposal. While analysis
of the cost of the Pool 3 project was based on actual
available construction bids, that of the LWC project
was based primarily on assumptions which the Order
pointed out were conservative in nature. The Attorney
General noted that the PSC found it necessary to use a
flow rate of 10 MGD in analyzing the NPV of the
LWC proposal and thus it was reasonable for the PSC
to compare NPV's for the two projects using the same
flow rate. The Attorney General's brief also points out
that use of the 10 MGD flow rate for the KAWC
proposal actually worked in favor of the LWC, because
it increased the net present value of the KAWC
proposal, thus any error alleged by CAWS did not result
in any prejudice. In addition, KAWC emphasizes the
fact that the KAWC proposal was premised on the fact
that the facilities would be needed not only for normal
conditions but also in a drought of record situation,
thus requiring KAWC to ensure that it can purchase
half of the amount of water capacity that the facilities
have (thus, the 10 MGD figure). (Citation omitted.)
CAWS argues that the PSC unlawfully and
unreasonably accorded controlling weight to the KAWC
proposal as opposed to other alternatives based on
KAWC having already taken actions to advance and
implement their plan. To bolster this assertion, CAWS
relies on the PSC conclusion that KAWC's proposed
facilities "represent a cost-effective approach to
resolving Kentucky-American's supply deficit that
can be immediately implemented with few regulatory
or financial risks." CAWS also characterizes the PSC
Order as having credited the actions that KAWC had
taken toward implementing its proposal as reasons for
approving that alternative and points to the PSC's
comments with regard to the LWC proposal being "a
concept that requires considerable work and is rife with
uncertainty and risk." The PSC responds that its Order
does not specifically accord any weight to the KAWC
project based on its level of development and that to
prevent prejudice, conservative assumptions were used
-10-
in assessing the LWC proposal that would mitigate the
financial impact from the later operational date as
compared with that of KAWC. The PSC recognizes that
it conducted an assessment of the relative financial and
regulatory risks associated with the two proposals and
asserts that this is neither unfair nor unreasonable, as
the agency is not required to provide the exact same
level of review and preparation for all proposed
alternatives. The Attorney General points to the PSC's
Order of June 5, 2008[,] denying CAWS' petition for
rehearing, where the PSC made a specific finding that
the LWC alternative was given a fair, comprehensive
evaluation. (Citations omitted.)
CAWS also asserts that the PSC failed to
adequately consider landowner opposition to
construction of the KAWC transmission line over
private lands. It finds error in the fact that the PSC
Order concluded that the KAWC proposal had fewer
financial and regulatory risks despite the fact that
many of the private easements necessary for
completion of the project had not been granted and it
may have been doubtful that KAWC could condemn
any of the private land. Essentially, CAWS argues that
it was inappropriate and unlawful for the PSC to accord
any weight to the fact that KAWC had already acquired
needed permits and easements. The PSC concedes that
in its Order, it found that the KAWC proposal was
subject to less financial and regulatory risk than that of
the LWC because of the advanced developmental stage
of KAWC's plans (specifically, the KAWC transmission
main had been designed and most of the necessary
regulatory approvals had been obtained). However, the
PSC argues that it did not consider or give any weight to
potential easement acquisition problems for either the
KAWC or the LWC project, and that any mention of
easement issues was merely to illustrate the differences
in the relative stages of development of the proposals.
The PSC also cites the Franklin Circuit Court decision in
Kentucky-American Water Co. v. Felgendreher, 08-CI2058, (July 29, 2009) for the proposition that KAWC
indeed has the authority to condemn land for the purpose
of supplying water. It is essentially undisputed that PSC
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lacks jurisdiction to determine the applicability of
Kentucky statutes to KAWC's efforts to condemn
private lands. (Citation omitted.)
CAWS also finds error with the PSC conclusion
that the KAWC project is consistent with regional
planning goals, asserting that the administrative record
does not support this finding. KAWC asserts that its
proposal included an option for BWSC [Bluegrass
Water Supply Consortium] to purchase 20% of the
facilities, and while this option was not exercised, the
facilities were designed to allow for additional capacity
in case the BWSC wants to partner with KAWC in the
future. KAWC submits that the PSC's lengthy
discussion in its Order of the historical background of
the efforts made by KAWC and the BWSC to work
together toward a regional water supply solution
provides evidence in the administrative record that the
KAWC proposal was consistent with regional planning
goals. The PSC similarly emphasizes its lengthy
discussion of the historical background to KAWC's
current efforts and specifically the fact that KAWC only
took a lead role in developing a solution to the water
supply problems when the BWSC was unable to secure
necessary funding for construction of a water treatment
plant. The Attorney General notes that it was entirely
appropriate for the PSC to make the qualitative
conclusion that the KAWC proposal represents a
significant effort to address the region's water supply
problems and there was no error in the PSC's mere
discussion of the cooperative efforts that were made
prior to the ultimate decision by KAWC to propose the
Pool 3 project.
Finally, CAWS asserts that the PSC, in granting
the CPCN, unlawfully relied on the misplaced
assumption that the LWC proposal would adversely
affect the revenue stream of the KRA because it would
use the Ohio River as a supplemental source of supply.
CAWS feels that this reliance is evident in the PSC's
conclusion that the KAWC facilities are consistent with
"use of the Kentucky River" and that the PSC went
beyond its statutory authority by instead citing
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"broader policy support for authorizing construction
of the [KAWC] facilities." The PSC points to the
language of its Order and the express statement that the
potential loss of revenue to the KRA that could result
from the LWC project played no role in the PSC's
ultimate conclusions pursuant to its statutory mandate
to determine need and the absence of wasteful
duplication in issuing a CPCN. Rather, the PSC's
comments regarding KRA revenues were simply part of
its concluding remarks and were not part of its analysis of
the KAWC proposal. The Court cannot find any basis
for reversal of the decision in the PSC's passing
reference to the KRA in this regard. (Citation omitted.)
In sum, we hold that the Commission’s granting of the certificate of
necessity was neither unreasonable as to the evidence nor unlawful as violating any
statute or constitutional provision. Rather, we agree with the circuit court that
more than ample evidence supported the Commission’s decision and that the
Commission committed no error of law in granting KAWC the certificate of
necessity.
For the foregoing reasons, the Opinion and Order of the Franklin Circuit
Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL
ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE KENTUCKY
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION:
Thomas J. FitzGerald
Frankfort, Kentucky
Helen C. Helton
Gerald E. Wuetcher
M. Todd Osterloh
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE
KENTUCKY PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION:
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Gerald E. Wuetcher
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE KENTUCKY-AMERICAN
WATER COMPANY:
Lindsay W. Ingram III
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
ATTORNEY GENERAL JACK
CONWAY:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
David Edward Spenard
Dennis G. Howard, II
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE
ATTORNEY GENERAL JACK
CONWAY:
David Edward Spenard
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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